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This overview of the book serves as an introduction and also 
as a compact explanation of the design and intended function 
of the new institution it prescribes as a remedy for democratic 
dysfunction. That explanation should help those who want to 
understand this design without reading the whole book, as well 
as those who do read it but then find they need a summary to 
help them judge the potential of this prescription.
To begin then, we might observe that it has long been rec-
ognized by academics and others, including many experienced 
politicians, that democracies tend to be seriously dysfunctional. 
For half a century, ‘public choice’ economists have theorized that 
the structure of liberal democracies makes their governments 
underprovide public goods. By ‘public goods’ these scholars ba-
sically mean goods and services that are available to any citizen 
to use or to benefit from, for free or without direct, individu-
al purchases. Public goods may be concrete things like public 
roads and also more or less abstract things like the security of 
a nation from attack, or social capital such as a general atmos-
phere of trust between citizens. ‘Public goods’ contrast with ‘pri-
vate goods’ largely by the latter being ‘excludable’, that is, owned 
by individuals or private entities like corporations — having 
been obtained by these owners by direct purchase, or by receiv-
ing them as gifts, or by making these goods for themselves. 
Public choice scholars theorize that the purpose of gov-
ernments — and the only justification for having them — is to 
provide important public goods that would not be provided or 
protected if there were no government to do it. They therefore 
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regard underprovisions of public goods as ‘government failure’. 
In addition to the observations and ideas of these economists, 
over the last three decades political scientists have implied that 
government failure is a serious problem with their focus on the-
ory and experiment in ‘deliberative democracy’. The main idea 
here is that the performance of democratic governments would 
be improved if citizens could be induced to deliberate public is-
sues more effectively. In these and other ways, social science has 
been giving us, for some time now, observations of symptoms 
of democratic illness and diagnoses of it. Political scientists and 
others have proposed many prescriptions to cure this, but all of 
these are ineffectual because they are either far too small in scale 
to affect the quality of government, or if they are big enough 
they are virtually impossible to implement as they require dys-
functional governments to do this. To try to overcome these 
problems, this book sketches a systemic diagnosis of govern-
ment failure and then uses it to devise a prescription with the 
following crucial characteristics: (1) by diagnosing systemic fail-
ure it tackles the problem of scale to address government failure 
at state, national and even higher levels; and (2) it is capable of 
being implemented in the real world of democratic politics. 
The diagnosis is dubbed ‘triple dysfunction theory’ because 
it postulates that three causes of government failure are pro-
duced by the fundamental structure of modern democracies. 
That structure is the selection of political representatives by 
means of elections. The three causes of failure are named am-
biguous delegation, excessive competition and excessive compro-
mise. Ambiguous delegation is an inherent uncertainty in the 
electoral transfer to representatives, of the democratic authority 
and responsibility of citizens to govern themselves. The result 
is basically that no-one is in charge. Some of the responsibil-
ity for making optimal provisions of public goods is therefore 
neglected. Elections produce this irresponsibility because their 
frequency and the usual eligibility of incumbents for re-election 
mean that when citizens vote, they do not fully transfer their 
democratic authority to govern. They largely retain it to exer-
cise at the next election. However, it is very well known in po-
21
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litical science (as elaborated at the end of this synopsis) that an 
overwhelming majority — something like 80% — of citizens are 
deeply ignorant of public affairs and policy. In view of this, it 
is imperative for good government that candidates and repre-
sentatives make themselves well informed. But if they do and 
then act accordingly, most voters are likely to misunderstand 
them and (exercising citizens’ authority to govern) refuse to 
elect and re-elect them. So candidates and representatives focus 
on understanding the wishes of their constituents rather than 
on understanding society’s needs for public goods. To an im-
portant degree, then, nobody governs: citizens delegate the job 
to politicians who cannot fully do it, as they want to get elected 
and re-elected. The delegation fails to some extent, and govern-
ment with it. 
This government failure (failure to carefully choose public 
goods) is anticipated to occur mainly in government’s choice of 
strategic policy. That is because politicians’ concerns for their 
constituents’ desires tend to constrain them to produce policy 
and legislation that addresses the short-term and personal is-
sues that are of most interest to most citizens. Strategic prob-
lems are therefore neglected. One example of this neglect is that 
24 years after global warming was internationally recognized as 
an existential threat by the establishment of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, little has been done to limit 
global greenhouse gas emissions — and their rate continues to 
increase. A related but more general consequence of failure in 
strategic policy is explored below in Chapter 5. This is that de-
mocracies are incorrigibly addicted to economic growth, despite 
the fact that infinite growth on a finite planet (and also within 
finite national territories) is obviously impossible and must do 
incalculable damage before that damage halts the growth. Of 
course some of this damage is starting to be produced by global 
warming. At its root, addiction to growth is a short-term focus 
by voters on the personal benefits of more jobs, more income 
and their freedom to reproduce. This myopia ignores the long-
er-term costs of providing those benefits, which are that natural 
22
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capital is made progressively scarcer by consuming it and also 
by increasing the number of people trying to use what’s left. 
The second element of ‘triple dysfunction’, excessive compe-
tition, takes place between politicians. It is intense, pervasive 
and incessant because of the frequency of elections, the eligibil-
ity of incumbents for re-election and the political lethality of 
failure, in which politicians are ejected from politics (at least 
temporarily) if they fail to get enough votes. This competition is 
excessive because it makes politicians fight each other to attract 
votes instead of learning about public goods and carefully delib-
erating amongst themselves to choose those they will provide 
or protect. The third element of triple dysfunction, excessive 
compromise, is the compromising of the political influence of 
the views of relatively well-informed citizens with the political 
influence of those who are badly informed. It arises largely from 
universal franchise and equality of the vote. This compromise is 
excessive because, as noted above, the overwhelming majority 
of citizens are badly informed. Long ago in ancient Greece, Plato 
recognized this as a crippling problem for democracy.
A popular conception of why democratic governments fail 
to perform well is that it is due to manipulation by wealthy pri-
vate interests. Although this effect is alarmingly strong and well 
documented (e.g. Gilens 2012, Ash 2015) it is not a cause of gov-
ernment failure, but a result. When government fails to function 
because its structure is incompetent, powerful private interests 
are able to take advantage of its attention deficit disorder (in 
respect of public goods) to make it serve their purposes instead. 
As triple dysfunction theory analyses inadequacy in our current 
electoral systems of democratic government, it does not look 
for inadequacy in anything external to those systems. These ex-
ternal things, such as people and corporations trying to acquire 
private goods, are parts of the environment within which gov-
ernment must produce and maintain important public goods. 
To do this it must have a structure that enables it to do so in that 
environment.
As the triple dysfunction diagnosis blames electoral systems 
for government failure, it suggests that one way of fixing this 
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might be to replace elections with some other type of represen-
tation, such as sortition, the selection of representatives by lot 
from all those citizens who are eligible to vote (in other words, 
sampling by random selection) (e.g. Burnheim 1985 and 2016). 
If those representatives could be prevented from being bribed 
by powerful private interests, then some variant of sortition may 
indeed minimize triple dysfunction. However, all forms of this 
process have a fatal problem: they need existing governments 
to get them running and then to step aside and let them take 
over. But it is hardly conceivable that politicians who are suc-
cessful in an electoral system will see any need to replace that 
system, including themselves. Reforms such as sortition that 
require strong government support for their implementation 
are therefore virtually impossible to implement. We need some 
other prescription, one that not only addresses the diagnosis but 
can be implemented in the face of government inertia, indiffer-
ence or even hostility. 
If a prescription is to be feasible to implement, it seems it 
must be one in which the people have a strong stake, for then 
they might force their representatives to establish it, or — if 
the prescription is such that this is possible — they might do it 
themselves. One way of giving citizens such a stake is to give 
them more power over policy. This would also address triple 
dysfunction, as it would minimize the ambiguity in delegation 
by reducing the area of governing that is attempted to be del-
egated from citizens to their representatives, which would leave 
the people more clearly in charge (and the system more directly 
democratic). This might be achieved with a new institution that 
allocated them an especially powerful area of public policy. 
Strategic policy meets this criterion, because as well as cover-
ing the establishment of long-term goals for the development 
of the nation, it also determines the range of options for future 
medium-term and short-term policies. Moreover, as indicated 
above, attending to strategic policy would tackle the major area 




An institution that might give citizens this responsibility and 
authority and also be feasible to implement is a new type of poll 
or referendum, if it were designed to (1) be possible for citizens 
or NGOs to establish and run; (2) address strategic issues; and 
(3) develop strong political influence. The first of these objec-
tives would be met by having its voting voluntary, as citizens 
and NGOs can establish and run polls but not compel people to 
vote. As will be seen later, the type of voluntary voting required 
is not only that citizens could choose whether they voted in this 
poll but also that they could restrict their vote to any questions 
they cared to choose from all those on the ballot paper. The sec-
ond objective would be met by confining the poll’s questions to 
strategic issues and, as we will see, a potential to meet the third 
would be created by making the vote repetitive. Because care-
fully chosen, crucial questions on strategic issues may remain 
highly relevant for years, such a poll might be repeated without 
changing its questions for a decade or more. A cycle of annual 
repetition should allow public debate on those questions to pro-
duce some learning by citizens between polls and consequent 
changes in their results, so that after a few years trends would 
emerge in these, as voters learnt from each other and developed 
their views. As the general public would gain some awareness 
that the voters in this poll were becoming wiser on its questions, 
the public status of its voting trends should rise and that should 
start to produce some political influence for them.
If the vote was not only voluntary but entirely self-selective, 
the poll would develop a public visibility that should strengthen 
its political influence. ‘Self-selective’ means that the poll relies 
on the initiative of each citizen to decide to vote and also to 
choose which questions they vote on. The public visibility that 
self-selection should generate would make this design very dif-
ferent from conventional random sample opinion polling as the 
latter does not make the general public aware of its operation 
before and as it takes place. The only citizens that random sam-
pling notifies are those in the minuscule section of the popula-
tion that is selected to be the sample — and they get no prior 
notice. The bulk of the population only learns about conven-
25
synopsis
tional random sample polling after the results are published, 
which is too late to excite public argument to try to influence 
that outcome. In contrast, voluntary, self-selective voting would 
raise the public profile of the poll before the vote is held and 
especially as the time for this drew near, because this type of 
voting must be advertised to attract voters — at least until it be-
comes well-established in citizens’ minds as an annual public 
event. In addition, the self-selective poll website would have its 
ballot paper on permanent public display, so that citizens could 
debate its questions at any time and well before they voted. This 
should result in citizens learning from each other and search-
ing for more information on those specific questions. In addi-
tion, if they could choose any time within, say, a week in which 
to lodge (and revise) their ballot paper, additional publicity for 
the event would be generated by media reports of the progress 
of the voting on each day of that week. As this occurred, citi-
zens — perhaps especially those whose concerns are faring bad-
ly in the daily results — would use the time remaining before the 
poll closed to make sure they voted and to urge potential allies 
to vote as well. 
Similar interaction and learning would occur year-round, 
between polls, as repetitive self-selective voting gives citizens an 
incentive to engage in continuing public discourses on the ballot 
questions. Their motivation would be to try to build voter sup-
port for their views before the next poll. This incentive should 
be significant because the self-selective nature of the poll means 
that such public conversation and argument does not have to 
influence the views of the whole population, as it must if it is 
to affect the results of a conventional, random sample opinion 
poll. It only has to affect the views — and the desire to vote — of 
the small, relatively politically engaged proportion of the popu-
lation that might vote in a self-selective poll. Moreover, public 
argument would be helped to develop the views of voters — and 
to some extent, of onlookers — by the ballot paper tightly focus-
ing on fundamental questions and by those questions generally 
remaining unchanged for many years. Voters — and also non-
voting citizens who merely observe the process — would thus 
26
rescuing democracy
be stimulated to inform themselves and develop their views on 
these crucial questions. After a few years of polling this should 
start to produce trends in the way the voters in this system were 
developing or maintaining their views on each question. At the 
same time, as relatively disengaged citizens observe the process, 
they should increasingly accord those voting trends that were 
publicised, some public status and thus political influence. Citi-
zens in general would be learning that voluntary, self-selective 
voting produces relatively informed and deliberated results and 
that it does so in two ways: first, it reflects only the views of 
citizens who are interested in the issues (they are the ones who 
are concerned enough to vote) and second, many of these voters 
are becoming better informed and wiser as they engage with the 
public debates about the ballot paper’s questions. Such increas-
ing sophistication and growing political influence of the vote 
would create a potential for it to ameliorate the third element of 
triple dysfunction, excessive compromise.
Where the trends of this new poll’s voting consistently run 
against existing policies or laws, and especially where they show 
such demands for new policies or laws to be getting stronger, 
then many people (whether they vote in this system or not) are 
likely to start calling for the government to make those changes. 
They will argue that not only do these trends show the views of 
those citizens who are interested in these issues, but that their 
views are comparatively well-considered. This political influ-
ence will be strengthened before elections by the poll’s managers 
publishing ‘report cards’ that compare their polling trends with 
the policies of parties and individual candidates. Another pos-
sible heuristic from this new poll that might generate political 
influence is that its voting trends may influence the responses 
of some citizens when they are sampled at random by conven-
tional opinion polls.
In this environment, the government is likely to declare that 
unless the poll’s next ballot reverses trends that have, for some 
years, persistently demanded changes in policy or law, then it 
will make those changes. It will do this rather than act without 
prior notice, so that it avoids getting ahead of mass opinion to 
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the extent that it becomes vulnerable to electoral backlash. Such 
challenges to citizens from their representatives should increase 
participation in this poll because those who become worried 
by the prospect of a change to law or policy will start to argue 
in public against it and begin to vote in the poll. Others who 
previously voted for or against that change — together with citi-
zens who are now starting to agree with them — may intensify 
their participation in the ballot and in the public debates about 
its questions to try to accomplish or prevent the change. This 
should further strengthen the poll’s public profile, its public sta-
tus, its political influence and the wisdom of its trends.
If voluntary, self-selective voting is to attract a healthy turn-
out, it must be made as easy as possible for voters. It will there-
fore be done by phone and internet, for which it seems that ad-
equate security and privacy would be feasible. These modes of 
voting will also facilitate electronic tabulation and analysis. As 
noted above, citizens will have a week in which to lodge and re-
vise their vote and the resultant media coverage during this pe-
riod will remind them to act. The ballot paper will be available 
free of cost, both in hardcopy and on the poll website; each of 
its questions will have the widest possible menu of answers for 
voters to choose from; it will give a brief, balanced description 
of each strategic issue it addresses; and there will be no limit to 
the number of these on the ballot paper, so that as many citizens 
as possible will find something of interest in it and also so that 
its treatment of strategic policy is comprehensive, allowing it to 
draw the attention of voters (in its descriptions of issues) to im-
portant relationships between issues. 
In its first year or two of operation this new poll is unlikely 
to produce strikingly wiser results than those of random sample 
opinion polls, despite the fact that self-selective voting excludes 
the ignorance of those with little interest in (and knowledge of) 
the issues it addresses. This is expected because those who are 
interested enough to vote will be a mixed bunch, ranging from 
thoughtful, informed types to those who are prejudiced, dog-
matic and fanatical. However, there are three ways in which the 
poll design should overcome that problem. The first is that ir-
28
rescuing democracy
rational poll results will enrage many rational citizens who have 
hitherto neglected to vote, provoking them to try to swing the 
results in wiser directions by making sure they and their allies 
vote in future polls. These relative newcomers to the process will 
also tend to ramp up their engagement with the public discourse 
on the ballot questions, to try to expose what they see as ill-in-
formed thinking and deluded dogma. The second way in which 
domination of the poll by irrational types might founder is that 
on some questions they may comprise different factions with 
conflicting views that tend to cancel each other in the voting 
results. This may leave rational voters with a stronger voice in 
those results. The third way by which dogma should fail to pre-
vail is that, as discussed above, the pertinence and persistence 
of the questions through successive annual polls should assist 
those who engage in the public discourses on these (whether 
or not they actually vote in the polls) to develop more knowl-
edge and wisdom on those specific questions. Such growing so-
phistication should increasingly marginalize those who persist 
with irrational dogma, in both the poll’s results and in the broad 
realm of mass public opinion. Dogmatists will be less and less 
likely to dominate the poll results, and even where they manage 
to do so, those results will be less and less likely to be accept-
able to the general public and to their political representatives 
as guides to new public policy and legislation.
In addition to these three ways by which this poll should en-
courage deliberation, it has another feature that should assist. 
This is that, where it can be done with a menu of answers, the 
ballot paper would ask for the motivations behind the voters’ 
selections of answers to a previous question on an issue. There 
may be two types of these motivational questions: ‘mechan-
ics questions’, which ask voters to explain how their preferred 
policy would work; and ‘justification questions’, which inquire 
into the voter’s reasons for their preference. Responses to these 
questions would be statistically analysed and published to stim-
ulate public argument and deliberation on their wisdom and 
morality. For example, it may be found that particular views on 
issues were rarely accompanied by responses to motivational 
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questions, whereas voters with other views on those issues often 
gave answers on their motivation. In addition, the types of mo-
tivation that are declared will arouse public debate over their ap-
propriateness and the rationality of the views they motivate. Of 
course, although this poll may arouse more argument than care-
ful deliberation, the argument will provide much of the energy 
that is needed to drive deliberation and engagement in the poll.
This self-selective serial poll thus has three major functions 
that may ameliorate two parts of triple dysfunction: (1) register-
ing only the opinions of those citizens who are interested in the 
issues it treats (potentially reducing excessive compromise); (2) 
creating political influence for those opinions (reducing ambi-
guity in delegation by reducing the area of responsibility that is 
attempted to be delegated from citizens by elections), and (3) 
facilitating the development of both these opinions and the 
opinions of many citizens who do not bother to vote (reducing 
excessive compromise). As the function of this design is distin-
guished from that of conventional polls and referendums by its 
registration of relatively developed public opinion (1 above) and 
the further development of both this opinion and mass opinion 
(3 above), it is called an ‘opinion development poll’. The organi-
sation that would establish and manage it is dubbed the ‘People’s 
Forum’ and it would conduct the poll in ways that encourage 
citizens at large to recognize it as: (1) impartial, (2) asking inci-
sive questions that are fundamental to society’s future, (3) assist-
ing citizens to exchange pivotal points of view and to learn from 
each other, (4) showing how the opinions of its voters are chang-
ing over successive polls, (5) developing choices for collective 
action, and (6) pressuring government to execute those choices.
As the People’s Forum would position citizens who choose to 
vote in it as those who develop strategic public policy, it would 
give them the potential to be the ‘directors’ of government. If 
this potential was realised by the Forum becoming politically 
influential, politicians would be relegated to the role of execu-
tives — those who implement the strategic policy of directors. 
In that role politicians would choose appropriate tactical policy 
(which is of medium range in terms of time, geographical reach 
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and impacts on other issues) and also devise operational policy 
that helps to execute tactical policy (operational policy being 
of the shortest range in time and space and of minimal impact 
on other issues). This clarification of the roles of citizens and 
their representatives would reduce the damage to governance 
that is inflicted by excessive competition between politicians, as 
it would have citizens doing some of the policy work that these 
agents neglect as they fight with each other. This effect should 
be powerful as that policy work — the development of strategic 
policy — would arguably be the most important in government. 
Thus, if the Forum worked it would ameliorate all three parts of 
triple dysfunction.
As we have noted, this design can work only if it attracts 
strong public esteem, not only from those citizens who vote in 
it, but also from most of those who don’t. This latter effect is 
plausible, as political scientists observe that most citizens are 
quite happy to let others ponder public policy and vote, as long 
as they know they can step in and contribute whenever they 
want to (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 239). This design in-
vites them to do that, with its self-selective voting and accessi-
ble, repetitive ballot. If a strong public status did develop for the 
Forum as it operated, it would then realize its potential to make 
citizens the directors of government and politicians their execu-
tives. If that happened we might then learn to stop calling our 
political agents our ‘leaders’. Although democracies have a vague 
division of labour that is arguably already along these lines (of 
voters as ‘principals’ or leaders and politicians as their ‘agents’ or 
executives), it is confused by the electoral process (as argued at 
beginning of this synopsis) and further obscured by Homo sa-
piens’ social or tribal nature, which makes citizens instinctively 
regard presidents, prime ministers and other politicians as their 
‘leaders’. Citizens therefore do not even try to perform their 
democratic role of leadership and the ‘strategic’ policies they 
impose on politicians (by electoral rewards and punishments) 
lack thought, being merely the wider implications of the short 
term, local and narrowly focused policies they usually demand.
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We thus appear to have an institutional design that could not 
only curb triple dysfunction but be implemented in the face of 
it. We now give some thought to whether the Forum’s managers 
would actually prosecute its mission and also to how this new 
institution could be introduced into politics and government.
The voluntary, self-selective voting of the Forum provides 
citizens with a power of boycott that would make it highly vul-
nerable to public criticism. Adverse comments by journalists, 
academics, NGOs, think-tanks and citizens in general could eas-
ily discredit it unless quickly countered by strong arguments 
from credible sources. With little or no real evidence, public 
criticism might be able to portray the Forum as a biased tool of 
self-interested manipulators who are trying to corrupt govern-
ment even further, for their own ends. The result could quickly 
be that its polls become objects of public ridicule and virtually 
nobody votes in them. This power of boycott should ensure that 
the managers of the Forum keep their ballot paper relevant, 
incisive and impartial. It will encourage them to post a stand-
ing notice at the head of this paper, inviting citizens to suggest 
alterations to it such as corrections of issue descriptions, new 
issues, new questions and new menus of answers. One obvious 
requirement, if the Forum is to develop a high public regard, 
is that it must attract a ‘respectable’ number of voters, which 
might be most of those in the polity who could be expected to 
have interests in the issues on the ballot. This proportion is not 
likely to be anywhere near a majority of citizens who vote in the 
Forum and it would be a much smaller proportion that votes on 
any particular question.
Another requirement for the Forum to work is that it must 
present incentives for its managers to restrict it to strategic is-
sues. It would do this in two ways. First, the repetitive func-
tion of opinion development polling means that it can only pose 
questions that will be relevant for many years — and these tend 
to be those that address strategic issues. Second, if the Forum, 
is to have political influence it must have a high public status 
and that will depend largely on citizens seeing that it seriously 
focuses on very important policy and also on policy that is cur-
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rently neglected by democratic governments. On both counts, 
this is strategic policy.
As the success of the People’s Forum depends on its strategic 
focus, it can only work in a polity whose citizens consider has 
some prospect of implementing such policy. Small scale trials, 
perhaps at the level of local government, are therefore likely to 
give misleading results. Trials of the Forum must be carried out 
at the scale for which it is designed, that of large jurisdictions 
capable of applying (or influencing) strategic policy. These are 
national, multinational and global systems of governance. By 
the same principle, the Forum could also be viable in states and 
provinces within federations, as they should have considerable 
influence on national strategic policy and law. One strategic is-
sue that guarantees such influence is that of secession, which 
separatist citizens may see as a precondition to solving other 
strategic issues.
To introduce the Forum into a polity it is not essential to 
have widespread popular appreciation of its potential, nor that 
government takes the initiative. If enough philanthropists or 
other citizens are sufficiently intrigued by this design to raise 
perhaps $10–20 million to establish and run it for a few years, 
then that public exposure might make it widely considered to 
be an essential part of government. Such an achievement in one 
democratic state or country could set a precedent that sees Peo-
ple’s Forums established as a formal part of many governments 
around the world. In addition to the executive, legislative, ju-
dicial and administrative branches of democratic government, 
this new institution would constitute a totally new branch, one 
that is dedicated to helping public opinion to develop. Arguably, 
the current lack of such branches in all democratic governments 
is a crippling gap in their structures. As those governments run 
on public opinion (e.g. Druckman and Jacobs 2015, 30), it is ab-
solutely crucial that this opinion be well informed and well de-
liberated. The fact that it isn’t is recognized by political scientists 
as one of the firmest findings in all of the social sciences (e.g. 
Bennett 2006). Over the last half century, surveys have repeat-
edly shown that large majorities of citizens in democracies are 
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very badly informed on politics and public policy. The editor of 
Critical Review has observed: ‘The chief prescriptive implication 
is, I believe, that the will of the people is so woefully uninformed 
that one might wonder about the propriety of enacting that will 
into law’ (Friedman 2006, iv, v).
As the People’s Forum would address long-running issues it 
might determine not only strategic policies and legislation, but 
also reform and innovation in political constitutions, conven-
tions and institutions. One of these innovations would of course 
be the Forum itself, as the new branch of government recom-
mended above. Others might be: as indicated above, a new con-
vention that the choice of secession is a right for separatists to 
exercise (subject to safeguards for minorities in separatist re-
gions); the establishment (where needed, such as in the USA) of 
nonelected electoral commissions for redrawing the boundaries 
of electoral districts without partisan gerrymandering; the in-
stallation of multimember electoral districts instead of single-
member ones, in order to have minority views proportionally 
represented in the legislature; to support this effect by introduc-
ing preferential voting for representatives; to have the upper 
house (such as the Senate or the House of Lords) abolished, if its 
function is deemed superseded by the People’s Forum; and even, 
perhaps, to replace electoral representation with some form of 
sortition, especially if this is assessed as either compatible with 





On Friday 10 February 2012, a panel of scientists met in London 
to prepare a statement for the Rio+20 Earth Summit that was 
scheduled for June, 20 years after the original Earth Summit. 
All of the panellists were winners of the prestigious Blue Planet 
prize, often seen as the Nobel Prize for environmental science. 
They concluded that we can forget about fixing the planet’s eco-
systems and climate until we have fixed government systems. 
The chair of the meeting, the UK government’s chief environ-
mental science advisor Bob Watson (cited in Pearce 2012a), 
declared: ‘We are disillusioned. The current political system is 
broken … Essentially nothing has changed in 20 years. We are 
not remotely on a course to be sustainable’. He identified the 
top environmental priorities as ending the fossil-fuel era to curb 
climate change and investing in limiting population by mak-
ing contraception available to everyone. But neither is likely to 
happen because, as climate modeller Syukuro Manabe (Pearce 
2012a) of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration observed, ‘the political system is not motivated to worry 
about the future’.
Four months later in June at Rio+20, AFP (2012) reported that
veteran observers who watched the 10–day event drag to a close yes-
terday shook their heads in dismay.
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To them, it was a fresh failure by the United Nations system, 
after the near-disastrous 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, to re-
spond to eco-perils that are now approaching at express speed.
‘It’s a demonstration of political impotence, of system paralysis, 
and it makes me feel pessimistic about the system’s ability to deliver,’ 
said Laurence Tubiana, director of the French think-tank, the Insti-
tute for Sustainable Development and International Relations.
These negative assessments of the performance of governments 
around the world include democracies as being dangerously 
incompetent. Three years later, the 2015 Paris climate summit 
gave little reason to change this view. Although this Confer-
ence of the Parties expressed a desire to limit global warming 
to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels (rather than the riskier target 
of 2°C), it was noted by Michael Grubb of University College 
London (cited in Le Page 2015) that: ‘All the evidence from the 
past 15 years leads me to conclude that actually delivering 1.5°C 
is simply incompatible with democracy.’ The abandonment at 
Paris of legally binding national targets for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in favour of voluntary targets (Intended Nation-
ally Determined Contributions or INDCs) might be taken as 
confirming Grubb’s assessment — that governments have given 
up on effectively addressing the problem. The INDCs pledged at 
Paris are expected to lead to warming of around 3°C, but this is 
hoped to be avoided by a ‘ratchet mechanism’ in which INDCs 
may be voluntarily increased at five-year intervals. Although a 
high and rapidly rising price on carbon is needed to deter fos-
sil fuel use and drive emission reductions, the Paris agreement 
does not require any nation to implement this measure (Le Page 
2015). The reaction of climate scientist James Hansen (cited by 
Le Page 2015) to the Paris agreement was: ‘It’s just worthless 
words. There is no action, just promises. As long as fossil fuels 
appear to be the cheapest fuels out there, they will be continued 
to be burned.’ 
A forecast of such government failure might have been seen 
more than a decade before in an observation by Eran Vigoda 
(2002, 530), political scientist at the University of Haifa:
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Constitutions, legislatures, federal and local structures, as well as 
electoral institutions are in slow but significant decline in many 
Western societies. They suffer from increasing alienation, distrust, 
and cynicism among citizens; they encourage passivism and raise 
barriers before original individual involvement in state affairs.
Many other scholars have expressed similar views on demo-
cratic government. Political scientists April Carter and Geoffrey 
Stokes (2002, 2) have stated that despite ‘general agreement on 
the political benefits of liberal democracy, there is a widespread 
sense that its present institutions are not operating satisfacto-
rily’. Nine years later, political sociologist Claus Offe (2011, 447) 
wrote: ‘Democracies, and by far not just the new ones among 
them, are not functioning well.’ Before any of those observers, 
sociologist Anthony Giddens (2000, 90) had described the 
problem in these terms:
Democracy is spreading around the world … yet in the mature de-
mocracies, which the rest of the world is supposed to be copying, 
there is widespread disillusionment with democratic processes. In 
most Western countries, levels of trust in politicians have dropped 
over the past years. Fewer people turn out to vote than used to, par-
ticularly in the US. More and more people say they are uninterested 
in parliamentary politics, especially among the younger generation.
In Australia, political scientists Janette Hartz-Karp and Lyn 
Carson (2009, 10) have noted that
the recent Democratic Audit of Australia and other studies tell a 
story of falling confidence in our political system. Symptoms in-
clude low levels of citizen engagement, apathy, and cynicism toward 
politics, declining membership in and public support for political 
parties, and growing numbers of young Australians seeking to avoid 
mandatory voter registration. (Australia makes voting compulsory 
at all levels of government.) Some observers trace the malaise to a 
‘democratic deficit’ — institutional arrangements and conduct that 
appear at odds with the normative ideals of democracy, including 
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factionalism within parties, the intentional polarization of issues 
by political partisans, the over-simplification of issues in the news 
media, and the short time horizon of the policy-making process.
President Emeritus of Harvard, Derek Bok (2001), has written 
a detailed analysis of why the federal government of the United 
States has fallen into disrepute and offers many approaches to 
reform. However his proposals are piecemeal and he doubts 
their potential to fully address the problem. Public policy 
scholar at Yale, Peter Schuck (2014), has written a comprehen-
sive analysis of the failure of US federal governments to imple-
ment existing domestic programs, but does not address failure 
to produce adequate law, policy and programs. According to 
the Quality of Government Institute at Sweden’s University of 
Gothenburg, dysfunction at this deeper level can be minimized 
only by installing institutions that are impartial and competent 
(Rothstein 2011). One precondition for competence is that the 
whole system of institutions is simple, so that the voting public 
can easily see who is responsible for existing policies and laws 
and respond accordingly at the next election. As discussed later, 
this precondition is not well provided by the US system.
Concerns about democratic government are expressed not 
only by social scientists, but also by some politicians in liberal 
democracies. Former Vice President of the US, Al Gore (2007) 
has declared that democracy is broken and needs fixing. In a 
farewell speech to Congress, Senator Bill Bradley (cited in Dal-
ton 2004, 2) gave an alarming assessment of American democ-
racy.
Democracy is paralyzed not just because politicians are needlessly 
partisan, although we are. The process is broken at a deeper level, 
and it won’t be fixed by replacing one set of elected officials with 
another … Citizens believe that politicians are controlled: by spe-
cial interests who give them money, by parties which crush their 
independence, by ambition for higher office that makes them hedge 
their position rather than call it like they really see it, and by poll-
sters who convince them that only focus-group phrases can guar-
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antee them victory … Voters distrust government so deeply and so 
consistently that they are not willing to accept the results of virtually 
any decision made by this political process.
Ex-leader of the Australian Labor Party, Mark Latham (Barns 
2007) has urged young people not to become politicians. The 
finance minister in the Australian Rudd and Gillard govern-
ments, Lindsay Tanner, abandoned politics in the lead up to the 
2010 Federal election and subsequently complained that it was 
a deceptive ‘sideshow’:
The creation of appearances is now far more important for lead-
ing politicians than the generation of outcomes. This produces a 
good deal of deception, and … a collective mentality of cynicism 
and manipulation. Policy initiatives are measured by their media 
impact, not by their effect … I am very pessimistic about the future 
of Australian politics, as the sideshow syndrome seeps ever more 
insidiously into every tiny corner of government … (Tanner 2011).
Barry Cohen (2008, 3), Federal Minister for the Environment 
from 1983 to 1987 in the Australian Hawke government, has la-
mented that ‘governments never connect the dots between in-
creasing population numbers and the ‘crises’ that daily beset our 
citizens’. In looking at the 2006 UN forecast of a world popula-
tion of 9.2 billion by 2050, Boris Johnson (2008), who was elect-
ed as the Conservative Party’s candidate for Mayor of London in 
2008 and 2012, expostulated: 
How the hell can we witter on about tackling global warming, and 
reducing consumption, when we are continuing to add so relent-
lessly to the number of consumers? The answer is politics, and po-
litical cowardice … It is time we had a grown-up discussion about 
the optimum quantity of human beings in this country and on this 
planet.
Many scientists recognize that problems are neglected or made 
worse by liberal democratic governments. For example, social 
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epidemiologists Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009, 4, 
5) express concern at their neglect of inequality:
Mainstream politics no longer taps into these issues [of unsatisfied 
social needs] and has abandoned the attempt to provide a shared 
vision capable of inspiring us to create a better society. As voters, we 
have lost sight of any collective belief that society could be differ-
ent. Instead of a better society, the only thing that almost everyone 
strives for is to better their own position — as individuals — within 
the existing society.
Economics Commissioner on the UK Sustainable Development 
Commission, Tim Jackson (2009, 167–8), describes liberal de-
mocracies as ‘deeply conflicted’ with ‘institutional schizophre-
nia’ that compels them to promote economic growth while they 
struggle to protect public goods from that growth. He declares 
that a ‘new vision of governance … is critical.’ Eminent Aus-
tralian economist Ross Garnaut (cited in Spratt 2011, 30) has 
called his country’s political response to global warming ‘The 
great Australian complacency’. Kevin Anderson, director of the 
UK Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, and his colleague Alice 
Bows (cited in Spratt 2011, 29) have expressed alarm at political 
incompetence: ‘Put bluntly, while the rhetoric of policy is to re-
duce emissions in line with avoiding dangerous climate change, 
most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely 
dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and im-
mediate reductions.’
Early this century in the United Kingdom, persistently poor 
voter turnouts at elections prompted the Joseph Rowntree 
Trusts to conduct an inquiry. This reported that membership of 
the three main parties in the UK in 2001 was less than 25 per cent 
of its 1964 level (POWERInquiry 2006, 46) and that ‘two separate 
studies found significant aggregate falls in party membership 
across thirteen and sixteen established democracies respective-
ly since the 1950s’ (POWERInquiry 2006, 51). Similarly, Danish 
political scientists Jorgen Goul Andersen and Jens Hoff (2001) 
found that in the Scandinavian democracies, participation has 
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declined in conventional forms of politics, such as turnout at 
elections and membership of parties. However, they also found 
that, in an informal sense, interest in politics is not diminish-
ing because Scandinavians are turning to single issue forms of 
participation and ‘small democracy’ in the workplace. This turn 
from party politics to issue politics is noted by Sian Kevill (cited 
in Smith 2005, 96), one of the directors of the BBC iCan website 
that facilitates citizen involvement on public issue campaigns in 
the UK. ‘People don’t approach politics through party allegiances 
any more … they approach it through an issue, and this site [BBC 
iCan] makes it easier for people to connect into politics through 
an issue.’ Kevill’s view is supported by Australian political scien-
tist Judith Brett (2007, 12):
Party identification was once the strongest predictor of how a per-
son would vote, for the great majority of the electorate … Parti-
sanship was habitual and it simplified the political world … party 
rhetoric at election time reminded people of their traditional alle-
giances, activating the existing party loyalty that would deliver the 
vote. The electorate still contains such people, but their numbers are 
declining. Across the western world, partisanship is on the wane 
and electorates are becoming more volatile. People change their 
vote between elections, between state and federal, between lower 
and upper houses. People identify with a party but vote for another 
as a protest. Or people identify not much with any party but make 
up their minds once the campaign is underway, based on issues and 
their judgements of the leaders.
In surveying democratic politics in Australia, environmental 
scientist David Yencken and legal scholar Nicola Henry (2008, 
17) have assessed that 
Australians are generally satisfied and proud of their democracy, 
but … There is widespread evidence of voter cynicism about politics 
and politicians in Australia and elsewhere. Opinion poll after opin-
ion poll has shown low confidence in the standing of politicians and 
in the confidence of Australians in political institutions … [research 
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shows] a one-third decline of belief in the moral standards of mem-
bers of parliament over the preceding two decades.
Yencken and Henry offer several possible causes of this lack of 
confidence: a blurring of differences between the major par-
ties as each seeks to cater to the mainstream majority of voters; 
the rarity of bipartisan concern for the country, as each party 
declares the others incompetent; apathy and retreat by citizens 
worn out and wearied by a myriad of issues; and disenchantment 
with governments that are neither transparent nor accountable 
and that do not facilitate meaningful public participation.
Robert Reich, who was US Secretary of Labor in the Clin-
ton Administration, notes the growth of a similar cynicism and 
sense of powerlessness in his country. In 1964, 36 per cent of 
Americans felt ‘public officials don’t care much what people like 
me think’ (Reich 2007, 5). By 2000 that sentiment was shared by 
more than 60 per cent. In 1964, almost two-thirds of Americans 
believed government was run for the benefit of all and only 29 
per cent said it was ‘run by a few big interests looking out only 
for themselves’ (Reich 2007, 5). But by 2000, the ratio was al-
most reversed: only 35 per cent believed government was run 
for the benefit of all, while more than 60 per cent thought it was 
run by a few big interests.
In surveying the fortunes of democracy around the world 
over the previous four decades, the founding coeditor of The 
Journal of Democracy, Larry Diamond (2009, 20), noted that a 
‘wave of liberation began in 1974 in Portugal’. At that time barely 
a quarter of the world’s states were democratic in the minimal 
sense of choosing their politicians by regular, free and fair elec-
tions based on universal suffrage. Over the next twenty years, 
dictatorships were replaced by freely elected governments in 
southern Europe, then in Latin America, followed by East Asia.
Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early ’90s … spread democ-
racy from Moscow to Pretoria … In recent years, however, this 
mighty tide has receded … [starting] in 1999, with the military coup 
in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public weary of endemic 
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corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and political 
violence … Many emerging democracies were experiencing similar 
crises … . Thanks to bad governance and popular disaffection, de-
mocracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 
states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these rever-
sals have occurred in the past nine years — and included some big 
and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Thai-
land … Nigeria and the Philippines. (Diamond 2009, 20–21)
Diamond also noted that democratic government was fac-
ing difficulties in Bolivia, Ecuador, Turkey, South Africa and 
Ukraine. Although observing some successes such as Indonesia, 
Brazil, Ghana and, very tentatively, Pakistan, he concluded that 
around 60 democracies were insecure, that many could fail and 
‘need deep reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions 
and improve governance’ (Diamond 2009, 22).
Several organisations provide comparative rankings of the 
democratic qualities of national governments. One of the most 
respected is that of The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy 
Index (EIUDI), and it supports Diamond’s claims by indicating 
that although almost half of the world’s 165 independent states 
and two territories (excluding 27 micro-states) can currently be 
considered democracies, only 26 of these are rated as ‘full de-
mocracies’, while 53 are ‘flawed democracies’. Of the remaining 
countries, 33 are assessed as ‘hybrid regimes’ (authoritarian but 
with some democratic features) and 55 as ‘authoritarian regimes’ 
(Economist 2010, 1). Comparing this assessment with its previ-
ous survey of 2008, The Economist (2010, 1) observed: ‘Now de-
mocracy is in retreat. The dominant pattern in all regions over 
the past two years has been backsliding on previously attained 
progress in democratisation.’ The US-based non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) Freedom House also finds a serious reversal 
in the recent fortunes of liberal democracy, with 2007 being the 
second year in succession in which ‘freedom retreated’ (Econo-
mist 2008b, 12). A large part of this has been the rapid reversal of 
democratic reforms made in the aftermath of the breakup of the 
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Soviet Union. However, this experience in Eastern Europe and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States is not unique.
Major reversals have taken place before — a democratisation wave 
after the second world war ended with more than 20 countries sub-
sequently sliding back to authoritarianism. That sort of rollback is 
not currently evident, but the threat of backsliding now greatly out-
weighs the possibility of further gains … But trends such as globali-
sation, increasing education and expanding middle classes would 
have tended to favour the organic development of democracy. These 
underlying forces, even if developing at a slower pace than in the 
recent past, suggest that the retreat from democracy will not be per-
manent. (Economist 2010, 21).
Only a few months after this assessment, its optimistic side ap-
peared to be finding justification as authoritarian regimes in Tu-
nisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and other middle east 
and north African countries were shaken or toppled by popular 
resistance. However, as the revolutionaries tried to install and 
maintain democracy, they apparently found that the necessary 
dialogue, compromise and inclusiveness was incompatible with 
their revolutionary and religious sentiments. A few years later, 
as this is written, only Tunisia has made a successful transition.
Evidence that many established democracies are in trouble is 
accompanied by theoretical predictions of democratic failure, at 
least in terms of competence if not of viability. Scholars work-
ing in the research program of ‘public choice’ (which uses the 
‘rational choice’ method) are prominent in having ‘elaborated a 
long list of arguments for why democracy fails to deliver ‘good’ 
policy’ (Leeson 2006, 357). One of the founders of public choice, 
James Buchanan (2003, 8), observed that, in ‘a very real sense, 
public choice became a set of theories of governmental failures.’ 
Public choice economist Bryan Caplan outlines one of these 
theories:
In economic jargon, democracy has a built-in externality. An ir-
rational voter does not hurt only himself. He also hurts everyone 
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who is, as a result of his irrationality, more likely to live under mis-
guided policies. Since most of the cost of voter irrationality is ex-
ternal — paid for by other people, why not indulge? If enough voters 
think this way, socially injurious policies win by popular demand. 
(2008, 3, Caplan’s emphasis)
Economists Charles Blankart and Gerrit Koester (2006) have 
suggested that government failure is predicted, identified and 
explained much more in public choice than in mainstream po-
litical science because the scholars in each area ask different 
questions. International relations theorist Hans J. Morgenthau 
(cited in Blankart and Koester 2006, 189) has observed that po-
litical science ‘deals with the nature, the accumulation, the dis-
tribution, the exercise, and the control of power on all levels of 
social interaction, with special emphasis upon the power of the 
state’. Blankart and Koester (2006, 190) therefore note that
political scientists ask: What are the institutions and constraints 
that allow the accumulation, distribution, exercise, and control of 
power here and now — and not under some alternative, not yet 
existing framework? And they focus on the coercive power of the 
state … [But for public choice scholars] the relevant question in 
constitutional analysis is not limited to what effects existing institu-
tions have … public choice focuses on suggestions for institutional 
improvements based on constitutional analysis.
In addition to the work of public choice theorists, that of com-
parative political scientists implies that many democratic gov-
ernments fail in some ways, for a major purpose of their com-
parisons is to assess which forms of democracy function best 
(e.g Lijphart 2012; Rothstein 2011). Further recognition by po-
litical science of this failure is the development over the last 
thirty years of the theory that democratic government would be 
improved by more public participation, provided that it is delib-
erative. Political scientist Graham Smith (2001, 72) has observed 
that ‘deliberative democracy is fast establishing itself as a new 
orthodoxy within contemporary democratic theory’, and the 
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motivation for this appears to have been expressed by political 
philosopher Iris Marion Young (2000, 132): ‘All existing repre-
sentative democracies could be improved by additional proce-
dures and fora through which citizens discuss with one another 
and with representatives their evaluation of policies representa-
tives have supported.’ So the deliberative orthodoxy in political 
science not only views democracies as being dysfunctional to 
some extent, but identifies a deficit of competent input by citi-
zens as a major cause.
This ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory has been preced-
ed and accompanied by a host of practical attempts by both con-
cerned citizens and political scientists to facilitate constructive 
political participation by the public, many of which are listed in 
Participedia (www.participedia.net). Some of these attempts are 
simply to increase participation and others include, or focus on, 
the facilitation of public deliberation. The latter effort has been 
mainly to develop and implement forums that conduct facili-
tated deliberation of a specific issue for a limited time. A very 
large forum of this type is that of AmericaSpeaks, which has run 
one in which five thousand citizens took part. Other delibera-
tive designs, such as consensus conferences, citizen juries, citi-
zens’ assemblies and deliberative opinion polls, convene smaller 
groups so that it is easier for their participants to hear, question 
and consider the views of the other members of the group. In 
the US, the National Issues Forums run by the Kettering Foun-
dation invite citizens to gather in groups up to the size of a town 
hall meeting, in which they discuss issues framed by carefully 
written booklets.
To encourage participation rather than deliberation, on-line 
polling is employed by NGOs such as MoveOn in the US, Get-
up! in Australia and Avaaz and Change.org internationally. A 
more hands-on form of participation is participatory budget-
ing (PB), which was initiated by the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil. 
This enables citizens to decide how their public funds are to be 
spent, and it is now used in about 180 Brazilian municipalities, 
one Brazilian state and a number of other cities across Latin 
America. As the PB system delegates executive power to citizens 
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rather than legislative power, it tends to be participatory rather 
than comprehensively deliberative. The German ‘delegative’ ex-
periment of Liquid Democracy tries to facilitate participation 
by enabling citizens to delegate their vote to other voters. In 
Tasmania, Australia, a community consultation process based 
on Oregon Shines, called TasmaniaTogether, monitors develop-
ment goals for the period 2000–2020 that it devised for the state 
at the outset of that period. Although TasmaniaTogether was in-
tended to engage citizens, it has virtually no deliberative capac-
ity (Crowley 2009), and after a few years was quietly sidelined 
by the government that introduced it. 
In all liberal democracies, the rather passive public participa-
tion produced by public opinion polls is accorded high political 
status by both the public and politicians. Many business asso-
ciations and other special interest groups (including NGOs such 
as Greenpeace, The Wilderness Society and Amnesty Interna-
tional) provide indirect participation with lobbying services for 
their members and sympathizers. In Washington the number 
of lobbyists has grown enormously since 1970, so that by 1999 
there were more than 60,000, spending almost US$2 billion a 
year, while a ‘similar tide of corporate lobbying has engulfed 
other global capitals in recent years’ (Reich 2007, 136). The 
amount spent on lobbying the American federal government in 
2009 has been estimated to have been US$3.5 billion (Economist 
2011a). By 2012 all government lobbying in the US was thought 
to employ around 100,000 lobbyists spending US$6–8 billion 
per year (Loomis 2013).
Most of these activities, whether deliberative or participa-
tory or both, are attempts to provoke responses from demo-
cratic governments on issues concerning public goods. As po-
litical scientist Francis Fukuyama (2014, 482–4) notes, some of 
these attempts are intended to promote what their organisers 
and lobbyists consider is in the public interest, and others are 
aimed at obtaining private goods for special interests at the cost 
of public goods (see §2.1 below for definitions of those types of 
goods). These activities can all be considered to make democ-
racy more participatory, shifting it a little from representative 
48
rescuing democracy
towards direct democracy. An obvious problem with moving in 
this direction is to make sure that the opportunity to influence 
government is distributed equally to all citizens, so that each 
has the same democratic ability to say which public goods are 
to be provided and to what degree their private goods are to be 
surrendered to make this possible. Another problem is to make 
sure that this democratic voice is informed by public delibera-
tion about the benefits and costs of specific public goods.
Many scholars focus on erosion of political support as a ma-
jor problem for democracy. Political scientist Russell Dalton 
(2004, 199–200) has described this as a ‘pattern of ‘dissatisfied 
democrats’ or ‘critical citizens’ who want to improve the demo-
cratic process, rather than one of anti-system critics of democ-
racy.’ Instead of starting with an analysis of the causes of such 
dissatisfaction, this book begins by investigating liberal dem-
ocratic governments’ failures to provide public goods. If this 
reveals such failure and why it occurs, it should indicate how 
it might be prevented. Any success with such measures might 
then help to restore political support, but the primary aim here 
is to achieve better government rather than less critical citizens.
Reich has given a view of democratic failure that contrasts 
with the view taken in this book. His interpretation of the grow-
ing sense of political powerlessness in American citizens is not 
so much that this is a sign that democracy is failing, but that 
capitalism has become extremely good at what it does, so that it 
has now become ‘supercapitalism’ and is therefore increasingly 
able to assert itself over government. He states that the ‘triumph 
of supercapitalism has led, indirectly and unwittingly, to the 
decline of democracy’ (Reich 2007, 224). However, it is argued 
here in Chapter 2 that it is more useful to view the causality as 
reversed — to view this decline as a failure of democratic gov-
ernment to provide public goods, which as pointed out in §2.1, 
includes intangible things such as cooperation and prudent re-
straint of self-interest. In order to produce public goods, govern-
ment (as also discussed in §2.1) must compete for the necessary 
resources with those who would use them to produce private 
goods. These resources include many public goods, so govern-
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ment must compete against capitalism to prevent it converting 
them into private goods. So this ‘decline’ should be seen as fail-
ure by democratic government, which allows capitalism to win 
the competition and grow into ‘supercapitalism’. This increased 
capacity of capitalism focuses the people’s interests more firmly 
onto private goods, so public goods are further neglected and 
government failure consolidates.
Several decades ago, economist Fred Hirsch (1977, 18) sur-
veyed the interaction of the market and politics, noting that
the market provides a full range of choice between alternative piece-
meal, discrete, marginal adjustments, but no facility for selection 
between alternative states … By contrast, the political mechanism, 
through which preference between alternative states could in prin-
ciple be posed, has not yet developed a satisfactory system for such 
decision  [making]… [Hence] both the market and the political sys-
tem … cannot deliver on what the public takes to be their promise. 
So Hirsch blamed the political system for making decisions that 
limited the welfare that could be gained from public and private 
goods. Economists Luis Carvalho and Joao Rodrigues (2006, 
344) observe that the ‘contradictions touched upon by Hirsch 30 
years ago have not yet been surpassed. On the contrary they are 
probably operative in a new phase of capitalism … which took 
root in the 80s and consolidated in the 90s.’
There are, therefore, signs from many sources that liberal de-
mocracy malfunctions to a serious degree. Perhaps the spectacle 
of these difficulties encourages authoritarian behaviour such as 
the democratic backsliding of Russia under Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev, the continuation of repressive control by the 
Chinese Communist Party and the restrictiveness of govern-
ment in Singapore, which fails to rate as even a flawed democ-
racy, being classed as a hybrid regime by the EIUDI (Economist 
2010, 5). Consistent with that rating, Kishore Mahbubani (2008, 
18, 21), Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, has 
given qualified support to authoritarian government for socie-
ties in difficult circumstances, by emphasizing that social order 
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contributes more to the freedom of citizens than their freedom 
to express themselves politically. Perhaps the challenge for lib-
eral democracy is to restructure itself so that it provides free-
dom of political expression in a way that enhances, rather than 
threatens, social order. Political journalist and author Fareed 
Zakaria (2003, 255–6) has called for this type of reform:
The greatest danger of unfettered and dysfunctional democracy is 
that it will discredit democracy itself, casting all popular govern-
ance into a shadowy light. This would not be unprecedented. Every 
wave of democracy has been followed by setbacks in which the sys-
tem is seen as inadequate and new alternatives have been proposed 
by ambitious leaders and welcomed by frustrated people … It is 
worth remembering that the embrace of communism and fascism 
in the 1930s did not seem as crazy at the time as it does now … As 
we enter the twenty-first century, our task is to make democracy 
safe for the world.
Zakaria’s call has been virtually ignored, with one consequence 
arguably being the global financial crisis of 2007–08. This dem-
onstrated fundamental weaknesses in democratic systems, for 
they had steadily accumulated dangerous levels of debt by de-
regulating banking and expanding entitlements. Disillusion-
ment with democratic governments then increased as they 
‘bailed out bankers with taxpayers’ money and then stood by 
impotently as financiers continued to pay themselves huge bo-
nuses’ (Economist 2014a, 48). In contrast to this frustration, the
Chinese elite argue that their model — tight control by the Com-
munist Party, coupled with a relentless effort to recruit talented 
people into its upper ranks — is more efficient than democracy and 
less susceptible to gridlock. The political leadership changes every 
decade or so, and there is a constant supply of fresh talent as party 
cadres are promoted based on their ability to hit targets … 
Many Chinese are prepared to put up with their system if it 
delivers growth. The 2013 Pew Survey of Global Attitudes showed 
that 85% of Chinese were ‘very satisfied’ with their country’s direc-
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tion, compared with 31% of Americans. Some Chinese intellectuals 
have become positively boastful. Zhang Weiwei of Fudan Univer-
sity argues that democracy is destroying the West, and particularly 
America, because it institutionalises gridlock, trivialises decision-
making and throws up second-rate presidents like George Bush 
junior … Wang Jisi … of Beijing University, has observed that ‘many 
developing countries that have introduced Western values and po-
litical systems are experiencing disorder and chaos’ and that China 
offers an alternative model. Countries from Africa (Rwanda) to the 
Middle East (Dubai) to South East Asia (Vietnam) are taking this 
advice seriously. (Economist 2014a, 48–49)
Former Science Counsellor at the US embassy in Beijing, Debo-
rah Seligsohn (2015, 43), adds weight to these assessments of 
the competitiveness of the Chinese system with her observation 
that the ‘Chinese government is good at collecting taxes, and 
does not have to deal with the same political opposition to taxa-
tion as the US and Europe.’
As the examples given in this chapter indicate, our focus is 
on democratic governance at large scales, such as national and 
global, rather than local. Part 1 now follows, looking for features 
common to all democracies that seem likely to cause govern-
ment failure. If we can identify such features, we then have a 
diagnosis that might indicate a general prescription for improv-
ing democratic performance. As we shall see, that diagnosis em-







DemoCratiC DySfunCtion from 
funDamental StruCture
This chapter offers the hypothesis that liberal democracies must 
fail to some degree because their basic institutions tend to gen-
erate dysfunction in three specific ways. The most significant of 
these ways is conjectured to be that ‘government by the people’ 
is neglected, indeed avoided, by the people. Although institu-
tions play a crucial role in this, human nature also provides a 
strong drive. As deeply social animals, people have a biological 
urge to look for leaders. As they do this they tend to abdicate 
their democratic role of governing by expecting their leaders to 
do it for them. In the process, citizens look for charisma instead 
of thinking carefully about public policy. As Hitler and many 
other leaders have demonstrated, this can produce bad policy, 
and in difficult times it can destroy democracy, replacing it with 
repressive regimes.
This threefold prediction of dysfunction diagnoses the dem-
ocratic failure sketched in Chapter 1. As it is deduced from the 
fundamental structure of democratic governments, it describes 
failure that causes more failure at higher (consequential) lev-
els of government structure. This method of investigation may 
therefore discover sites for remedies of dysfunction that are sys-
temic because corrections made at basic levels should permeate 
up causal chains through the whole system. If remedies are not 
feasible to implement at fundamental causal levels, consequen-
tial parts of the causal chain may be inspected for sites that are 
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more amenable to correction. If such interventions also seem 
impossible or too difficult, then any remedies must be direct al-
leviations of symptoms. The findings of this ‘forward mapping’ 
procedure (Head and Alford 2008) are compared later in this 
chapter with the findings of two backward mappings that start 
from symptoms of government failure and follow their appar-
ent origins back through causal chains to try to find a feasible 
site for correction. Those backward mappings investigate the 
neglect of long-term issues in Australia and repetitive misman-
agement of biodiversity conservation in the USA. In a backward 
mapping, the first causes that are identified are the least likely to 
be fundamental, so their correction is unlikely to produce sys-
temic solutions. However, if backward mapping is pursued far 
enough, it may provide a check on whether the forward map-
ping of dysfunction is accurate and significant.
2.1 The function of democratic government
A search for dysfunction in the governments of liberal democra-
cies must start with a clear idea of what the function of this type 
of government is. Primarily, it is to govern a state, the meaning 
of which is explored in the next paragraph. Further, as a govern-
ment that is democratic, then by definition it has the people do-
ing the governing. As a liberal democratic government, it must 
satisfy criteria such as the five specified by political scientist 
David Beetham (1992, 41–2). These are that it provides: (1) free-
doms, such as those of expression, movement and association; 
(2) separation of powers between the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary; (3) representative assembly (‘the most effec-
tive device for reconciling the requirements of popular control 
and political equality with the exigencies of time and the con-
ditions of the modern territorial state’); (4) ‘limited’ function, 
in that the state does not restrict private goods unless this is 
necessary to provide for the public good; and (5) ‘that the only 
criterion for the public good is what the people, freely organ-
ized, will choose’. Beetham’s definition of liberal democracy in-
corporates his notion that democracy has two basic ingredients, 
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popular control and political equality of citizens as they exert 
this control (see also Saward 1998, 9). As discussed later in §6.2, 
political scientist Robert Dahl has interpreted political equality 
as equality of the opportunity for control rather than as equality 
of exercised control. I follow Dahl (see Saward 1998, 17) in con-
sidering that equality of opportunity for control is required by 
justice, not because it is assumed that most citizens will wisely 
exert that control.
It was stated above that the primary function of a liberal dem-
ocratic government is to ‘govern a state’. To clarify the meaning 
of ‘govern a state’ I use Mancur Olson’s (1965, 15) public choice 
view that the ‘fundamental function’ of a state is to provide pub-
lic goods. Political theorist Michael Taylor (1987, 1) concurs with 
this, observing that the ‘most persuasive justification of the state 
is founded on the argument that, without it, people would not 
successfully cooperate in realizing their common interests and 
in particular would not provide themselves with certain public 
goods.’ This is not to suggest that states provide only public or 
collective goods. They often provide individual (private) goods 
like electric power, for example by selling such goods on the 
market as private firms do. However, if it is necessary for a state 
(i.e. a government) to do this it is because by doing so it is also 
providing a public good, such as preventing a market failure like 
monopoly exploitation, or alleviating an inability to raise the 
capital to develop a commercially viable production of a private 
good that would be useful to many citizens. It is therefore as-
sumed that to ‘govern a state’ means to provide public goods 
and that this is the only reason why citizens need governments, 
which is consistent with Beetham’s (1992) fourth criterion of the 
‘limited’ state. This view of government allows us to be specific 
about the objective of our inquiry. As implied at the beginning 
of this chapter, that objective is: To analyse failure in democratic 
government and then use that diagnosis to design a remedy for 
the failure. This can now be restated as: To analyse why liberal 
democratic governments underprovide public goods and then 
use that diagnosis to indicate what might be done to improve 
this provision. The judgement of whether a provision of pub-
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lic goods is an ‘underprovision’ is to be made by the people, as 
specified by Beetham’s fifth criterion for a liberal democratic 
government, which is ‘that the only criterion for the public good 
is what the people, freely organized, will choose’. ‘Freely organ-
ised’ will be taken here to include the time, the facilities and the 
information that the people need if they are to make competent 
choices of public goods.
This outcome-based assessment of government failure or 
success requires the meaning of ‘the public good’ and ‘public 
goods’ to be clear. The defining characteristic of public goods 
is that they are freely available to all members of a ‘public’. The 
economist’s term for this is that they are goods or services that 
are ‘non-excludable’ in their consumption or use by the mem-
bers of a public. Two examples of publics might be the citizens 
of a nation, and all of humanity. Public goods may or may not be 
‘divisible’ (often termed ‘rival’), which is the property that their 
use by some diminishes the quantity available for use by others. 
If they are indivisible they are referred to as pure public goods. 
Public goods may be material things such as roads, street signs, 
lighthouses, bridges and clean air; and they may also be more 
or less intangible things such as national security, domestic se-
curity (including law enforcement and the system of property 
rights), the general level of trust between citizens, and opportu-
nities for citizens such as those to earn income and to use public 
schools and national parks. A wide provision of the public good 
of opportunity is essential if a democracy is to be considered 
liberal, for this produces freedom and equality for its citizens. 
In contrast to public goods, private goods are excludable, which 
means their availability to all may be controlled by an individual 
or an entity, that is, the owner of the private good.
Some scholars doubt that the sole function of government 
is to provide public goods and therefore doubt that its effec-
tiveness must be assessed by how well it does this. For exam-
ple, political scientists John Gerring and Strom Thacker (2008, 
168–170) are sceptical because (a) it seems difficult to determine 
which public goods are worth providing (and also in what quan-
tity and quality); and (b) few public goods are enjoyed equally 
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by all members of a polity. Their first observation does not mean 
that democratic government must not be evaluated in terms of 
its provision of public goods, just that this is difficult to do. In 
a democracy it is citizens who must make that evaluation, and 
this poses problems of collective choice and action. Gerring 
and Thacker’s second problem does not appear relevant. Pub-
lic goods are non-excludable, so their provision presents the 
opportunity for all to use them. If the people decide that such 
an opportunity is a public good that they want, then they must 
provide or maintain the public goods whose existence produces 
that opportunity.
Another approach to judging whether government fails or 
succeeds is taken by the Quality of Government Institute at the 
University of Gothenburg, which was established in 2004 by po-
litical scientists Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein (2012). After 
considering several criteria for defining quality of government 
they selected the impartiality of their institutions. However, this 
is only one aspect of the adequacy of governmental procedures 
and may not be enough to ensure the optimal provision of pub-
lic goods. Other aspects such as public access to adequate infor-
mation and effective, politically influential public deliberation 
are also essential for government performance in democracies, 
so the criterion of good outcomes (i.e. the optimal provision 
of public goods) is used here, rather than good process. Refer-
ring to optimal provision of public goods is direct and although 
it may be difficult (perhaps impossible) to measure, it can be 
applied in the diagnosis of dysfunction that follows, as may be 
seen in its summary in §2.5. The focus on outcomes also invites 
case studies of outcome failures as is done later in Chapters 3, 
4 and 5, and these provide examples of the significance, inter-
relatedness, complexity and persistence of such failure. Details 
of this type help to identify the type of remedy that is required.
A crucial feature of issues about the provision, protection or 
elimination of public goods is that these issues usually involve 
private goods as well. For example, the provision of a national 
defence force, which is a pure public good, requires the taxing 
of each citizen, which is a reduction of their disposable income, 
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a private good. Another example is the river damming proposal 
discussed in Chapter 5 under the heading of ‘The scarcity multi-
plier’, where the protection of the public goods of beautiful scen-
ery, a population of rare native animals and opportunities for 
river-based recreation compete with the provision of the private 
goods of water rights, hydro-electricity and the employment and 
income that these create. The fact that ‘one man’s right to private 
property in the antebellum South was another man’s slavery’ 
(McGann 2006, 105) is another example of this competition, in 
this case between slaves as private goods and the public good 
of freedom for all. This compound nature of most public goods 
issues means that a government making a choice on these issues 
is likely to be choosing between private and public goods. The 
production or protection of one type of good generally restricts 
the production or protection of the other. In this competition 
for existence, private goods usually have the advantage because 
demands for these are facilitated by the market, by self-interest 
and by the speed and decisiveness with which an individual or 
an entity can choose them. The challenge for democracies is to 
make their collective choices equally easy, quick and decisive, 
otherwise crucial public goods will be foregone for the produc-
tion of private goods.
The competition between private and public goods has fun-
damental implications for democratic government. As the qual-
ity of this government depends on the quality of public opinion 
(not just as a theoretical ideal, but also, as we shall see later in this 
chapter, as an empirical finding) then it is absolutely crucial that 
public opinion develops without distortion by those who are far 
more interested in private goods than public ones. Accordingly, 
for good democratic government to be possible, it appears nec-
essary to make it illegal for people or bodies with financial in-
terests in a public issue to publicly comment on that issue — and 
also illegal for them to pay others to make such comments. Fail-
ure to pass such legislation has produced severe underprovision 
of public goods in such areas as damage to health from sales of 
tobacco and committed future damage to the climate and to at 
least a metre rise in sea level, due to past (and continuing) sales 
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of fossil fuel. The enactment of such law appears too difficult 
for current democracies and it may therefore become an urgent 
task for the new institution that is proposed here later, in Part 2. 
For a democracy, the choice of public goods is a collective 
or social choice, a choice made by the members of the group. 
Social choice may be direct, via some form of aggregation of the 
choices of all eligible citizens, or indirect, through choices made 
by their representatives. To assess the adequacy of direct or in-
direct social choice by liberal democratic governments we must 
investigate primarily whether these governments are likely to 
(a) recognize those issues where there is a need for social choic-
es to be made and (b) make good choices on these issues. To 
perform in these respects government must be able to make its 
social choices for its group prevail over any individual choices 
within the group for private goods that conflict with these social 
choices. From the perspective of a democratic group, individual 
choices within that group are those of individuals, or of entities 
such as corporations, or of other sub-groups within the group. It 
may be helpful to note here that ‘government’ does not include 
the market economy, as this system is not concerned with mak-
ing social choices of public goods for a whole society. The mar-
ket economy uses institutions that facilitate individual choice 
of private goods. On the other hand, government is the appa-
ratus that makes and implements choices of public goods for 
the members of the group it governs. A corporation is an entity 
that is a group comprising employees, shareholders, managers 
and directors so it needs its own government (a board of direc-
tors and CEO) to make choices of ‘public goods’ for that group. 
Although these are choices of public goods for those within that 
group (the corporation), the same choices are choices of private 
goods for that group as far as the greater group (such as the state 
or nation) is concerned. Part of the social choice task of demo-
cratic national government is to decide whether to regulate the 
activities of entities within the nation such as individual citi-
zens and corporations so that their individual choices of private 
goods contribute to, or do not unduly interfere with, the public 
goods that the government considers necessary for the nation. If 
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national governments have difficulty in doing this, then to that 
extent they are dysfunctional.
From this it may be seen that a term such as ‘capitalist de-
mocracy’ refers to two different systems with different purposes. 
The first is the market economy, a system for facilitating individ-
ual choice of private goods; and the second is government, a sys-
tem for making social choices of public goods for a group such 
as a nation. Hybrid terms such as ‘capitalist democracy’ may 
therefore encourage different institutions and their functions 
to be confused with each other. The widespread occurrence of 
such confusion and the importance of minimizing it have been 
noted by Reich (2007, 224–25). As he concluded an argument 
that democratic government has been overwhelmed by capital-
ism he declared that for clarity of thought ‘the two spheres must 
be kept distinct.’ Democratic government must be clearly un-
derstood to be an organization run by the members of a group 
to provide public goods for those members. One very important 
public good for a nation is its market economy. This is ‘public’ 
because it is available for any citizen of that nation to use: It is a 
non-excludable good. Part of the job of democratic government 
is to make sure — if citizens want a market economy — that it 
exists and operates effectively.
The quite different functions of government and market 
mean that a failure to prevent public goods being excessively 
damaged by pursuits of private goods is a failure of government 
to control these pursuits: it is not a failure of the market. As 
eminent economists Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus 
have observed: ‘Before we race off to our federal, state or local 
legislature, we should pause to recognize that there are govern-
ment failures as well as market failures’ (cited in Shaw 2002, 6–7, 
their emphasis). An example of conflating these types of failure 
is the statement by economist Sir Nicholas Stern (2007, viii) that 
anthropogenic global warming is ‘the greatest market failure the 
world has ever seen.’ In saying this, Stern was using the conven-
tional terminology of economics (e.g. Stiglitz 2012, 34), but it is 
suggested that as markets are neither structured nor intended to 
choose public goods, they should not be regarded as failing in 
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that case. Instead, it is government that must be regarded here 
as failing, as it is not protecting the climate (a public good) from 
the market’s pursuit of private goods. In this case, government 
fails primarily because there is no global government that might 
provide the global public good of a stable climate by control-
ling the global market that has a major role in the production 
of greenhouse gases. Perhaps this tendency to blame markets 
for deficiencies in public goods arises because it seems easier 
to correct markets than governments. This is especially the case 
for a global public good, as there is no global government to be 
corrected — and establishing one seems impossible. But viewing 
global warming as a market failure may be a crucial misdiagno-
sis, for it may divert us from focusing on two essential objec-
tives: reforming national governments and creating a competent 
global one.
The different functions of market economies and govern-
ments may be further clarified by defining ‘economics’. The emi-
nent economist Lionel Robbins (1935, 16, 24) defined economics 
as ‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.’ 
This definition is still widely accepted and might be abbreviated 
to ‘economics is the study of choice’. As Robbins’ version covers 
ends and means that may be private or public goods, it views 
economics as encompassing both market economics and the 
part of political science that studies the effectiveness of govern-
ment in choosing public goods. Much of that part of political 
science is undertaken by the research program known as ‘public 
choice’. Following Robbins, then, the political side of economics 
may be described as the part of political science that studies hu-
man behaviour in institutions (governments) that facilitate the 
choice of public goods as ends, where those goods must be pro-
duced from scarce means that may be private or public goods 
and which have alternative uses. Market economics differs from 
the political side of economics by studying human behaviour 
in institutions (markets) that facilitate the choice of private 
goods as ends, where those goods must be produced from scarce 
means that may be private or public goods and which have al-
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ternative uses. This division of functions between governments 
and markets gives governments the responsibility of choosing 
whether public goods are eliminated, either by allowing them 
to be destroyed or by converting them into private goods by al-
locating private rights for their use. As economics is the study of 
choice it does not cover the part of political science that is con-
cerned with power, which tends to be the focus of mainstream 
political science, as discussed in Chapter 1. The study of choice 
is very closely related to ethics, so it is not surprising that the 
father of modern economics, Adam Smith, was a professor of 
moral philosophy. We now look more closely at the function of 
democratic government, by inspecting its procedures for social 
choice.
2.1.1 Social choice by democratic government
Until the latter part of the 20th century most political scientists 
and economists considered that the quality of democratic gov-
ernment depended on its ability to combine the preference or-
derings of the members of the governed group in a way that was 
fair to all members. The preference ordering of a member is the 
order of her choices among available public goods: a first prefer-
ence for one public good, a second preference for another and 
so on. A procedure for combining the individual choice order-
ings of all members to produce a social ordering for their group 
is called a social welfare function. In 1951, Kenneth Arrow, who 
was subsequently awarded a Nobel Prize in economics, pro-
duced his famous (or for some, notorious) logical proof that no 
single social welfare function can perform this translation in a 
way that satisfied four rather mild and apparently indisputable 
democratic requirements. This theorem caused many scholars 
to conclude ‘that democracy is meaningless or that it can only be 
defended in the most minimalist terms, in that it merely ensures 
that governments can sometimes be removed (as argued most 
notably in Riker 1982)’ (McGann 2006, 9). There have been 
many subsequent attempts to investigate Arrow’s gloomy con-
clusion, and these resulted in similar ‘impossibility theorems’. 
Then Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen (1999) demon-
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strated that Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ is of limited signifi-
cance because social welfare functions oversimplify democratic 
social choice by ignoring interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
If the various strengths of each individual’s wants for different 
goods can be accounted for in the aggregation of individual 
wants into wants for the whole society, then Arrow’s and other 
similar results are avoided.
More recently, political scientist Anthony McGann (2006, 9) 
has produced another argument that social welfare functions 
oversimplify social choice. He points out that these functions, 
by definition, must produce transitive results, which means that 
Arrow, in requiring that a social welfare function makes a so-
cial choice, had stipulated five rather than four conditions for 
this procedure. Transitivity is the property that if an individual 
prefers (or is indifferent to) A over B, and also prefers (or is in-
different to) B over C, then she must prefer (or be indifferent 
to) A over C. Intransitivity means that ‘cycling’ of preferences 
occurs, such as that A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, C 
is preferred to A and there is no single choice. McGann argues 
that the requirement of transitivity for social choice by Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem is an unrealistic, indeed an undemocratic 
requirement. While cycling may be nonsensical for an indi-
vidual, it is quite rational for a society: ‘social reason is inher-
ently different from individual rationality. A socially reasonable 
outcome is one that balances a plurality of different claims, not 
one that maximizes a single criterion’ (McGann 2006, 122). The 
social need to balance a plurality of claims may be pursued by 
citizens forming many different coalitions, each working for one 
claim or a parcel of these. In this situation a group that gathers 
around a coalition of groups to win on one issue may later be 
defeated by a new coalition forming around another issue. This 
means that a minority group may not always be beaten, for it 
may be able to construct a majority coalition to win on some of 
its concerns. This will tend to preserve democracy, for minori-
ties will be motivated to persist with this form of government by 
seeking new coalitions instead of trying to overthrow democ-
racy by taking up arms. In addition, majorities will consider the 
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needs of minorities, for part of the majority coalition may need 
their cooperation to form future coalitions in voting on other is-
sues. This process of forming and reforming different coalitions 
also promotes the deliberation of issues, which facilitates the de-
velopment of the views of citizens and representatives and also 
helps to develop the menu of political choices on which they 
vote. Intransitivity in social choice thus enables public goods to 
be more effectively distinguished from private goods and more 
clearly compared with private goods and other public goods 
that compete for the same resources. Far from being a problem 
for democratic government, intransitivity makes democracy 
possible and helps it work.
The problem of distinguishing public from private goods and 
vice versa is a real one. In some cases, citizens may have a great 
deal of difficulty in doing this and much disputation may occur 
before a widespread appreciation emerges that what was widely 
considered to be a private good or a bundle of these actually 
includes important public goods. Slavery provides a dramatic 
illustration. In Britain and America this issue generated much 
confusion, argument and strife for almost two centuries before a 
widespread appreciation developed that slaves as well as (other) 
citizens should all have the same liberties. In effect, over many 
generations citizens slowly recognised that these freedoms were 
public goods of such importance that the competing private 
good of slave ownership must be obliterated. The idea of human 
equality as a public good has now been extended widely but not 
completely in democratic societies, in terms of race, sexual ori-
entation, gender, religion and broad degrees of personal wealth. 
As a general rule, the provision of the public good of equality 
requires the restriction of the private good of being able to dis-
criminate against others.
If public opinion about a particular public good becomes 
significant in a democracy, citizens or their representatives may 
need to decide the issue with a vote, either by referendum or by 
representatives voting in the legislature. Any such vote requires 
a menu of the most important choices involving the good that 
is at stake. Eminent political scientist Elmer Schattschneider 
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(1960) has emphasized that politics is primarily conflict, not 
choice, and that a central objective of the battle is to define the 
alternatives for choice, for whoever succeeds in this has the ad-
vantage. Political scientist Albert Weale (1992) recognizes this 
by rejecting the use of social welfare functions and emphasiz-
ing the need for the battle to be civilized into a contest of ideas 
via public debate and deliberation, which then culminates in a 
vote. This view is consistent with McGann’s argument that social 
welfare functions are irrelevant for the social choice of public 
goods because they produce social welfare orderings that are, 
by definition, transitive. As Weale expresses it, effective social 
choice should be seen not
as a process of preference aggregation, in which there is a mapping 
from a set of individual orderings to a social ordering, but as a pro-
cess of dialogue in which reasons are exchanged between partici-
pants in a process that is perceived to be a joint search for consen-
sus … [This procedure would work] not with fixed preferences to 
be amalgamated, but with preferences that were altered or modi-
fied as competing reasons were advanced in the course of discus-
sion … There are other values that we expect political institutions to 
satisfy apart from efficient preference amalgamation; for example, 
procedural fairness, lack of corruption and tolerable problem-solv-
ing capacity. (Weale 1992, 215, 227)
It seems clear, then, that mathematical procedures such as that 
employed by Arrow ‘should help to design voting systems to 
elect politicians, rather than to choose policies’ (Stretton and 
Orchard 1994, 61). McGann (2006) argues that the seat allo-
cation rule (the voting system for electing politicians) should 
produce proportional representation and the social decision 
rule (for choosing policies) should be simple majority vote. 
These twin approaches are seen as necessary in three ways: for 
equality among citizens, for deliberated choice of policies and 
for the protection of minorities. McGann specifies that, ideally, 
the simple majority vote excludes all devices that produce some 
degree of supermajoritarianism, examples of which are federal-
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ism, bicameralism, presidentialism, judicial review, referenda, 
the filibuster and voting rules that require a supermajority to 
pass a motion. 
With these requirements for social choice in mind, the con-
sequences of five fundamental features of liberal democracies 
are now inspected, to see whether they inhibit or promote effec-
tive social choice of public goods. These features are common to 
all representative democracies and are as follows: (1) the regular 
holding of elections; (2) high frequency (on the timescale of the 
human life-span) of these elections; (3) eligibility of incumbents 
for re-election; (4) universal franchise; and (5) equality of the 
vote. In liberal democracies, these elements of electoral struc-
ture function within a recognition that citizens are fundamen-
tally free and equal. This includes: equality before the law; pro-
tection of minorities; the right to private property and privacy; 
and freedom — of speech, of assembly, of the media and of the 
formation and operation of independent political parties.
In the next three sections of this chapter (§2.2, §2.3 and §2.4) 
it is argued that these five elements of electoral structure tend 
to create dysfunction in liberal democratic government, debili-
tating it with confusion, conflict and ignorance. The confusion 
arises because the first three of these five elements (elections, 
their frequency and the eligibility of incumbents) produce doubt 
about whether government is directed by politicians or citizens. 
This means that neither party has unambiguous incentive to ful-
ly shoulder the responsibility of choosing public goods, an effect 
that is here called ambiguous delegation. The same three ele-
ments of electoral structure also produce severe conflict in the 
form of pervasive, sometimes intense competition between pol-
iticians for votes, which further cripples the provision of public 
goods by distracting politicians from that task. The last two of 
the five elements of electoral structure (universal franchise and 
equal votes) compel politicians to make social choices of some 
ignorance, as they often must follow a constituency by compro-
mising the informed opinions within that group with its narrow 
and ill-informed opinions. This analysis of dysfunction arising 
from the fundamental structure of liberal democratic govern-
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ment may not seem to offer anything new in that it reviews the 
well-known problem of the ‘electoral cycle’ or the ‘dynamics of 
the electoral contest’. However, its focus on three effects of this 
cycle — confusion, conflict and compromise — together with its 
emphasis on confusion, may be a significant innovation.
2.2 Ambiguous delegation
It is proposed that democracies are significantly confused about 
who chooses public goods because of ambiguity in their system 
of delegating authority and responsibility. Such ambiguity is a 
fundamental problem for any group, because uncertainty about 
who is delegated to choose its public goods will allow many of 
these to be neglected and perhaps other such goods to be over-
provided.
It might be thought that democracies devote plenty of atten-
tion to delegating the authority and responsibility for choosing 
public goods as they hold elections in which the people delegate 
leadership to representatives and presidents, who then further 
delegate leadership by appointing prime ministers, ministers 
and heads of agencies. Agency heads further delegate to their 
subordinates and so on. However, the first link in these chains 
of delegation is ambiguous. When voters elect politicians, they 
tend to assume those they elect will give them leadership, but 
this is not wholly the case, because the voters themselves pro-
vide much of the leadership by choosing to follow those politi-
cians. Nobel laureate economist George Akerlof (Haslam et al. 
2011, xiv) describes this effect in his foreword to The New Psy-
chology of Leadership:
Leadership has been perhaps one of the most written about subjects 
in all of history … But … there is something missing in the previous 
works … Leadership is … only partially about individual personal-
ity traits (the elementary psychology approach … ). Leadership is 
also only partially about setting the right incentives (the elementary 
economics approach … ) … It is not just about what leaders say and 
do; it is about what they say and do in the context of their follow-
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ers’ willingness to identify as a we, who accordingly accept or reject 
what the leader wants them to do.
The followers’ collective self-identification ‘as a we’ is their social 
identity and what they see this as being directs them in a more 
fundamental way than a leader can. So, to the extent that voting 
in elections encourages the people to think they are delegating 
leadership for their group, they are largely mistaken. After the 
people vote, they essentially remain in charge because their so-
cial identity has not only determined the type of leaders they 
have elected, but it also determines whether they will ‘accept or 
reject what the leader wants them to do’. Their ultimate expres-
sion of acceptance or rejection will usually be at the next elec-
tion and, until then, the mere prospect of this expression does 
much to control the leaders, whether they are members of the 
legislature, prime ministers or presidents.
Of course a leader may try to expand her influence by inter-
preting the social identity of her followers, but it is they who 
have the last word by accepting or rejecting the interpretation. 
Leadership, therefore, is produced by both leader and followers. 
For the leader’s part, it is about getting people ‘to want to do 
things … [It] is about shaping beliefs, desires and priorities. It is 
about achieving influence, not securing compliance. Leadership 
therefore needs to be distinguished from such things as man-
agement, decision-making and authority’ (Haslam et al. 2011, 
xix, emphasis in original). For the followers’ part, they only ac-
cept as a leader one of their group who embodies its social iden-
tity. This prototypicality of the group
gives leaders authority to interpret the nature of social identity and 
its application to specific circumstances. Someone who encapsu-
lates the group position should be in a position to tell us what being 
a group member means — but only up to a point. This means that 
even the most prototypical leaders cannot go against clear, consen-
sual, and long-standing group norms without throwing their pro-
totypicality into question and sending their leadership into decline. 
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Leaders can be ahead of the group, but never so far ahead that they 
are out there on their own. (Haslam et al. 2011, 106)
In this sense it is followers who secure compliance, not lead-
ers. But when followers choose leaders in elections, two types of 
confusion are produced if those elections are frequent relative to 
the human life-span and if they allow incumbents to be re-elect-
ed. One confusion is about whether any, or how much, respon-
sibility and authority has been delegated from citizens to those 
they elect, and the other is about its specific area, that is, the am-
bit or type of responsibility and authority that citizens have del-
egated. The first confusion, about how much is delegated, arises 
because voters tend to assume that by electing someone they 
have selected a leader who will exercise the responsibility and 
authority of choosing public goods for their group. However, as 
we have seen, leaders cannot provide leadership on their own: 
it is ‘a relationship between leaders and followers within a social 
group’ (Haslam et al. 2011, 45, 73, emphasis in original). What 
the delegation (the election) does, therefore, is merely establish 
this relationship by identifying who leads and who chooses to 
follow. The nature of that leadership then emerges as leader and 
followers relate to each other. However, if the followers do not 
realise that their role in leadership is pivotal or are not in a posi-
tion to do much about this, then they will fail to contribute to 
that relationship and it is likely to be dysfunctional.
While elections indicate to citizens that their vote delegates 
responsibility and authority to those they elect, the prospect of 
the next election indicates to elected politicians that citizens 
have actually retained much or all of this responsibility and au-
thority. As this is not clearly and urgently obvious to citizens, 
who in any case individually lack the incentives and tools to do 
much about it, they fail to contribute effectively to their leader-
ship.
The second confusion from ambiguity of delegation — vague-
ness about the type of responsibility and authority that is in-
tended to be delegated — is also important because, for the lead-
ership relationship to work well in choosing and executing an 
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optimal provision of public goods, each party (the citizens or 
‘principals’ and their ‘agents’, the elected politicians) must know 
(or have incentives to behave as if they know) what type of these 
goods they should specialize in choosing. This will help these 
parties make an effective division of labour, so that one does not 
repeat choices that the other makes, that they address all of the 
essential choices and that they make these in the right sequence, 
such that, for example, the choices of each party support or do 
not obstruct the other.
As noted above, what appears to be accomplished by elec-
tions is that while citizens think they delegate much responsi-
bility and authority, they actually delegate much less, for their 
attitudes and values have a pervasive influence on public pol-
icy. As discussed below in §2.2.2, this influence affects policy 
whether it is short term (which will be referred to here as ‘op-
erational’ policy and covers something like the next few months 
or years — such as annual budgets as discussed in §6.5.2.3) or 
medium term (‘tactical’ policy, encompassing perhaps three 
to twenty years into the future) or long term (‘strategic’ policy, 
which addresses the future beyond tactical policy). As well as 
varying in their range across time, these categories of policy also 
tend to have similar ranges across space (geography) and across 
other issues, so that strategic policy tends to affect a wide area 
and many other issues, while operational policy tends to be lo-
cal and affect few other issues. It is the influence of citizens on 
tactical and especially strategic policy that often creates the big 
problems, for while they might think effectively about the public 
goods they currently need, they are much less likely to consider 
carefully those they and their descendents need for the longer 
term. Not only are these needs less obvious because they are 
away in the future but choosing them is often more difficult, not 
least because their provision may constrain current operational 
and tactical policy and incur immediate costs without quick 
benefits.
Not only does current strategic policy impact on current op-
erational and tactical policy, but its future results may constrain 
the options for operational, tactical and strategic policies at that 
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future time. Strategic policy-making is therefore not only long 
term, but fundamental to much other policy. A potentially ma-
jor aspect of strategic policy is its capacity to induce paradigm 
change, the overturning of pervasive conventional assumptions. 
Examples of issues that appear to require paradigm change are 
given later, such as problems of population size (§4.2.1), global 
warming (§4.2.2), unemployment (§4.2.3) and excessive growth 
(Chapter 5). Another facet of strategic policy is that it covers 
issues of national constitutions and conventions, such as those 
that determine the institutions of government, including wheth-
er government will be representative rather than direct and if so, 
how the representatives will be selected.
Although citizens generally do not have the time, interest, 
knowledge and facilities to do much long-term fundamental 
thinking, they unwittingly produce much of this strategic ‘poli-
cy’ because their persistent demands for short-term private and 
public goods constrain options for the longer term. The result is 
major policy failure such as the examples discussed later in this 
chapter and also in Chapters 3 (in §3.2), 4 and 5. In line with this 
view, environmental scientist James Gustave Speth (2012, 87–
88) has identified ‘strategic deficit disorder’ as the major failure 
of democratic governments. So, if democracies are to sustain an 
optimal provision of private and public goods, their division of 
labour must be clear: Both citizens and those they elect must 
know who chooses public goods for the short to medium term 
and who chooses those for the long term.
In their book Intelligent Governance for the 21st Century, phi-
lanthropist Nicolas Berggruen and press entrepreneur Nathan 
Gardels (2013, 124–5) draw attention to the problem of demo-
cratic division of labour, referring to it as ‘scaling governance’ 
and ‘decision-division’. They acknowledge the need to divide 
decision-making in both spatial and temporal dimensions and 
they endorse the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, in which responsibil-
ities are only taken up at a higher level if they cannot be fulfilled 
at a lower one. In spatial terms, subsidiarity means that local 
problems are best managed only by the communities they af-
fect, while regional, national and global problems must be han-
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dled by people with responsibility and expertise at those scales. 
This spatial division of labour often coincides with the neces-
sary temporal division, so that effects likely to occur far off in 
the future must be anticipated and taken into account primarily 
by those who develop policy at large spatial scales. However, in 
democracies it is essential that these political agents work with 
citizens to ensure popular support for long-term and spatially 
expansive policy. As it is often the case that what a government 
does now determines what it can do later, temporal policy is ar-
guably more fundamental than spatial policy. Strategic policy is 
therefore a central concern in the following discussions of am-
biguous delegation and decision-division.
The first effect of ambiguous delegation, confusion about 
whether any or how much responsibility and authority has been 
delegated, has long been recognized by debates about whether 
a political representative is, or should be, a delegate or a trus-
tee. Political ‘trustees’ are given autonomy to deliberate about 
what constitutes the common good and to choose whether and 
how it is to be provided. ‘Delegates’ are not granted autonomy; 
they must reflect the wishes of their constituents. The oft-quot-
ed case of choosing between these roles was the speech to the 
electors of Bristol by Irish statesman and liberal conservative 
Edmund Burke (1774), in which he advocated trusteeship. ‘Par-
liament … is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one in-
terest, that of the whole … You choose a member indeed; but 
when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he 
is a member of parliament’ (emphasis in original). Unsurpris-
ingly, Burke lost the next election.
The eminent political theorist Iris Marion Young has argued 
that representatives must combine both delegation and trustee-
ship, and that this requires sustained, effective communication 
between citizens and representatives.
The representative’s responsibility is not simply to express a man-
date, but to participate in discussion and debate with other repre-
sentatives, listen to their questions, appeals, stories, and arguments, 
and with them try to arrive at wise and just decisions … The respon-
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sibility of the representative is not simply to tell citizens how she has 
enacted a mandate they authorized or served their interests, but as 
much to persuade them of the rightness of her judgement … Strong 
communicative democracy, however, also requires some processes 
and procedures where constituents call representatives to account 
over and above reauthorizing them [by means of re-election]. 
(Young 2000, 131–32)
Young’s recommendation that good representation comprises 
both delegation and trusteeship conforms to the view of social 
psychologists Alexander Haslam, Stephen Reicher and Michael 
Platow (2011) that effective leadership requires followers and 
leaders to work together, with followers making choices for the 
leader (acting as a delegate) and the leader (acting as a trustee) 
making choices for followers. If such ‘strong communicative de-
mocracy’ is not achieved then citizens and their political agents 
may fail to recognize and appreciate important public goods. 
We now take a closer look at the obstacles to this communica-
tion that are raised by ambiguity in delegation.
2.2.1 Obstructions to communicative democracy
As noted in §2.1, the work of liberal democratic government 
is basically to recognize public goods that are — or may be-
come — important and to make good social choices of them. In 
addition to making these choices, those governments must also 
execute them. The social choice part of democratic government 
is performed by elected representatives rather than by citizens 
because citizens do not have the resources for this and are far too 
busy with their own occupations. As Young points out, strong 
communication between citizens and representatives would 
help representatives recognize and choose the public goods that 
citizens would want if they were able to give them full consid-
eration. However, ambiguous delegation interferes with this 
communication by placing representatives in a position where 
their primary incentive is not to attend to social choice, but to 
get elected or re-elected. As observed above, the delegation is 
ambiguous because it is done with frequent elections in which 
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incumbents may run for re-election. The fact that elections are 
frequent (relative to the span of a human life) is a significant 
cause of ambiguity because an incumbent’s performance in the 
last few years of a term of office is likely to be increasingly in-
fluenced by the state of public opinion that he or she anticipates 
for the looming election. This influence will cover more of the 
incumbent’s term if it is short. But if incumbency is limited to 
one term only and if representatives are elected for terms of, say, 
twenty to thirty years instead of two to six years, their respon-
sibility to act as trustees and their freedom to fully attend to the 
social choice task of government would be clear. This would, of 
course, virtually eliminate their accountability to the electorate, 
but as discussed below in §2.2.5, the accountability provided by 
the current electoral system is defective, so this is not quite the 
problem it may seem to be.
At this point, a sketch of the representative process may help 
illustrate the blocking of communicative democracy by ambig-
uous delegation. To the extent that electors consider that they 
elect trustees, they transfer to politicians the responsibility and 
authority to execute the social choice task of government. In this 
mode, electors may not think much about these choices, as they 
are leaving them to their representatives. If their representatives 
act accordingly, as trustees, and think seriously about issues, 
they are likely to develop views that are more sagacious than 
those of most electors, who will then not appreciate the utter-
ances and actions of their representatives. Such incomprehen-
sion by voters would tend to make them hostile to trustees, who 
would then lose votes at the next election. Representatives will 
therefore allocate a lower priority to trusteeship than to the task 
of performing as delegates for electors. As delegates they are 
concerned to show that they are carrying out the wishes of elec-
tors and will be reluctant to point out that this means they, the 
representatives, are not fully focused on social choice. This lack 
of openness will be encouraged by representatives’ awareness 
that they do actually attend to some of that choice, as it will be 
some of what citizens want them to do as delegates. In addition 
to this element of deception by representatives, they will also 
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be reluctant to ask citizens to think more carefully about pub-
lic policy when the people have largely given this task to them, 
as trustees. Another way of describing this deceptive behaviour 
is that citizens elect representatives to provide leadership, but 
as citizens expect this to come from their representatives they 
neglect their own role in that relationship (as discussed above 
in §2.2), making it dysfunctional. However, in order to get re-
elected, representatives must pretend that their leadership is in 
excellent shape and doing a great job of providing public goods.
It might be expected that deficiencies in public policy gener-
ated by ambiguous delegation would be corrected by the expert 
knowledge and professional behaviour of public servants. But 
bureaucrats have limited freedom to act. When upper echelon 
bureaucrats are appointed by politicians, the bureaucracy will 
only offer advice that politicians can implement to enhance (or 
at the very least, to not endanger) their prospects for re-election. 
Public choice economist Bryan Caplan describes the situation 
as follows.
In complex modern political systems, leaders can only make a hand-
ful of big decisions. The rest must be left in subordinates’ hands. 
High level subordinates face the same dilemma, pushing concrete 
decisions further down the bureaucratic food chain. This fosters the 
sense that elected leaders are not in charge. The real power, suppos-
edly, is the ‘faceless bureaucracy.’
The economics of principal-agent relations cuts against this in-
version. When a principal delegates a task to a subordinate, his tacit 
instruction is, ‘Do what I myself would have done if I had the time,’ 
not, ‘Do as you please.’ The former does not have to evolve into the 
latter. Common sense tells a principal to occasionally audit his sub-
ordinates to see how well they mimic the decisions he would have 
made himself.
It makes little difference if there is one principal and one agent, 
or one principal at the top of a tall bureaucratic pyramid. The pref-
erences of the apex trickle down to the base … 
In a deep sense, the leader of an organization is responsible for 
everything his organization does … Those who have been a cog in 
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the political machine frequently relay a different impression, but 
their objections are fairly superficial. The fact that you have some 
latitude over the cosmetics of a delegated decision hardly shows that 
you — not your nominal superior — control its substance. (2008, 
172–73, emphasis in original)
Bureaucrats are therefore unable to influence very significant ar-
eas of policy, and major policy flaws generated by the ambiguity 
of delegation are likely to remain uncorrected.
Because ambiguous delegation produces not only some in-
competence in democratic public policy, but also a lack of can-
dour and even direct deception by many politicians, electoral 
politics arouses the distrust of electors. In other words, it ap-
pears that the ambiguity of delegation creates what political sci-
entist Paul Whiteley (2004, 7) calls the ‘paradox of trust’. As he 
describes it, this is the flouting of the classical Greek ‘elected 
principle’ that citizens will trust representatives they can throw 
out more than those they cannot. According to this principle, 
citizens should trust people who are elected and the institutions 
they run, more than those that are not based on elections. How-
ever, surveys in Britain have shown the opposite to be true, with 
low public trust in politicians and only modest trust in govern-
ment and the House of Commons, compared with high trust in 
the courts and the public service (Whiteley 2004, 7). The same 
result is shown by surveys in Sweden, where institutions whose 
leaders are elected, such as political parties, unions, the Euro-
pean Union Parliament, the Swedish Parliament and city coun-
cils, generate less confidence than those in which citizens do not 
elect leaders, such as the public health care system, universities, 
the courts, the police, the Central Bank and the Royal Family 
(Rothstein 2011, 84). However, if one recognizes that delegation 
by means of fairly frequent elections is somewhat ambiguous, 
then there is no ‘paradox’ of trust at all, for the ambiguity should 
make those who delegate suspicious of those they delegate to.
The effect of ambiguous delegation might be summarized as 
being to hobble democratic government with a failure of leader-
ship in which leader and followers do not relate effectively be-
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cause followers neglect to make crucial contributions to their 
leadership while the leaders have an incentive to pretend that it 
is working well. To rectify this, followers must contribute, first 
by deliberating their choices of public goods and then by influ-
encing their representatives with those well-considered choices. 
As indicated in the preceding section with its discussion of op-
erational / tactical / strategic policy and also in this section by 
Caplan’s views on delegation, the essential role for citizens — es-
pecially in view of their limited time for this — is to focus on 
strategic policy. If such participation could be institutionalized, 
it should place citizens very ostensibly in the role of directing 
their democracy, and that would oblige them to do it carefully.
The conventional terms for political influence by citizens are 
‘popular control’, ‘popular rule’ and ‘popular sovereignty’, but 
‘directing’ and ‘directorship’ will be used here, to indicate that 
citizens must determine strategic or fundamental policy. As dis-
cussed below in §2.2.3 and §2.2.4, citizens do provide much of 
this direction, but as their awareness of this is very limited, their 
guidance lacks thought. Directorship is not the same as leader-
ship because, as noted above, leadership is the relationship be-
tween leader and followers and does not include management, 
decision-making and authority. These other functions are those 
of directors and as democracy is ‘government by the people’, it 
is they who must direct government. As a democratic state has 
thousands or millions of such directors there is an obvious need 
for facilitators to coordinate their work. These facilitators might 
be the elected politicians, but if the people regard them as their 
leaders rather than as their facilitators, then they will follow 
rather than direct. A democratic state therefore requires that the 
people curb their need for leaders so that they can clearly see 
themselves as its directors. Such a replacement of the focus on 
‘leadership’ with an emphasis on ‘directorship’ may help clear 
the fog observed by communication theorist John Gastil (1994), 
as he wrote that ‘conceptual ambiguity and operational incon-
sistency has clouded the findings of the last four decades of re-
search on democratic and autocratic leadership.’ Political scien-
tist Marjan Brezovsek (2009, 641) describes this fog as follows.
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Despite the modern flood of literature on leadership generally, the 
specific problem of democratic leadership seldom appears. We ar-
gue that this strange silence is in fact symptomatic of the ambiguous 
place leadership occupies in a democracy, being both essential to 
democratic government yet finding no secure justification within 
a theory resting on the concept of popular sovereignty. The present 
scholarship on democratic leadership is deficient precisely because 
it is unwilling to contemplate the possibility that the tension be-
tween leadership and popular sovereignty is incapable of resolution. 
We claim that this is not a political problem to be overcome, but 
rather a theoretically invaluable starting point for understanding 
both the unique authority of democratic leaders and the perennial 
challenges they face … 
A few years after Brezovsek, political scientists John Kane and 
Haig Patapan (2012, 170) also noticed ‘this strange silence’ on 
democratic leadership and came to the same conclusion: It is 
‘not a political problem to be overcome’. In their words,
leadership is absolutely necessary and yet in permanent tension 
with the democratic principle of popular sovereignty … In com-
pelling leaders perpetually to negotiate the problem of leadership 
legitimacy, democracies constantly reaffirm the sovereignty of the 
people even while enjoying the benefits of leadership.
So it is suggested here that democracies should ‘constantly reaf-
firm the sovereignty of the people’, by having them act as a board 
of directors that chooses strategic public policy. If the people 
perform this role with full awareness that they are doing this, 
then they may be able to transform their sovereignty into an 
intelligent directorship that, over time, develops into a broad 
management of all public policy, from strategic through tactical 
to operational.
To summarize this introduction to ambiguous delegation, we 
might begin by recognizing that democratic leadership is a re-
lationship in which it is fundamentally the followers who make 
the social choices. It is they who direct government. If these fol-
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lowers do not clearly see this and thus do not think and act as 
directors, some — or many — public goods will be neglected. As 
confusion in a democracy about who directs it is crucial, am-
biguous delegation is now surveyed in more detail, in the fol-
lowing six stages.
•	 Although politicians are popularly regarded as the policy 
makers, research indicates that citizens are the basic direc-
tors of policy in liberal democracies.
•	 Research also indicates that citizens are generally ignorant of 
many issues concerning public goods. It is argued that this 
is partly because ambiguous delegation allows citizens to be 
unconscious of their role as directors and thereby feel free to 
focus on private goods and ignore important public goods. 
Six specific motivations for this bias are proposed.
•	 The unconsciousness of citizens’ directorship allows them to 
strengthen that unconsciousness by seeing others as direc-
tors. Five motivators of this perception are suggested.
•	 Democratic accountability and legitimacy are flawed by the 
ambiguity of delegation.
•	 Supermajoritarianism is a type of ambiguous delegation in 
politics, albeit less fundamental than the type being consid-
ered here.
•	 An objection to ambiguous delegation being considered a 
major problem is described — and assessed as misleading.
2.2.2 Citizens as directors
Although the ambiguity of electoral delegation means that nei-
ther citizens nor politicians perceive a clear responsibility to 
direct government policy, many observers of US democracy 
conclude, in effect, that citizens are the directors. As political 
scientist James Druckman (2006, 405) observes, a ‘defining 
feature of democracy is government responsiveness to citizens’ 
preferences’. Michael Xenos (2005, 164), who studies political 
communication, observes that politicians ‘and candidates are 
remarkably responsive to public sentiment … [because citizens 
who are] politically uninformed and apathetic … nonetheless 
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occasionally engage in the active disciplining of representatives 
through electoral rewards and punishments’. Sociologist Paul 
Burstein (2003, 29) states that ‘public opinion influences policy 
most of the time, often strongly. Responsiveness appears to in-
crease with salience, and public opinion matters even in the face 
of activities by interest organizations, political parties, and polit-
ical and economic elites.’ Druckman (2006, 406, 408) notes that
presidents will make appeals for policies when the public already 
supports the president’s position … particularly on domestic is-
sues … the bottom line is that public opinion affects the direction 
of policy … the president does not manipulate public preferences by 
going public; rather he highlights certain issues, making them sali-
ent, and as a result, public opinion subsequently has an impact on 
these issues (because Congress follows this opinion on these issues).
Political scientist James Stimson has analysed the political influ-
ence of citizens in Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes 
American Politics. His assessment is summarized by political 
scientist Mark D. Brewer (2005, 632):
The bottom line of this book is that public opinion, specifically, pub-
lic opinion change, is the most important factor in American poli-
tics. Political conflicts and strategies are dictated in good measure 
by its shapes and contours. Political elites (at least astute ones) are 
attentive of it and responsive to it. Policy formation is dependent on 
it, and policy outputs are ultimately reflective of it. In short, Stimson 
argues that public opinion drives American politics, and that politi-
cal change is the result of shifts in public opinion.
For Stimson, not all opinion change is the same. Sometimes, 
opinion change is fast and responsive, such as the spikes in presi-
dential approval immediately after a national crisis or the fluctua-
tions in presidential horserace polls during election campaigns. 
Other change is so slow as to be almost glacial or tidal in pace 
(hence, the ‘tides’ of the title) and occurs in such small increments 
that it is almost always overlooked as it is occurring. In other in-
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stances, opinion change falls somewhere between these two types. 
Each type is important here.
Legal scholar Ilya Somin (2000, 147, 153) notes that although 
some researchers find that public opinion is followed much less 
slavishly than others report, ‘the case studies they themselves 
rely on show that public opinion constrains policy makers more 
than they claim.’ He concludes that ‘flouting centrist public 
opinion poses severe risks for politicians … [raising] the danger 
that close adherence to ill-informed public opinion might lead 
to disastrous, internally contradictory policies.’ Political scien-
tist Derek Bok (2001, 359) has stressed the sensitivity of US poli-
ticians to voters’ opinions, with government involving ‘minute 
measurement of public appetites’.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, evidence of directorship by 
the people appears to be provided by this account from political 
scientist Graham Smith (2009 17, 18, emphasis in original).
Evidence from consultation exercises suggests that the deep scep-
ticism expressed by citizens about their capacity to affect the de-
cision-making process is often justified … Janet Newman and her 
colleagues argue there is often an orientation towards ‘enabling the 
public to operate within the norms set by the bureaucracy … a pro-
cess of possible incorporation of the lay public into official institu-
tions’ … While public policy may praise the virtues of participation 
(and may even make it a statutory requirement), evidence suggests 
that organisational and professional resistance to participation is 
often an obstacle for successful engagement … It is not unusual to 
find the belief amongst agency officials that citizen involvement is 
not suitable for strategic level decisions.
If directorship by the people is taking place largely uncon-
sciously through the electoral process, as would be expected 
from ambiguous delegation (see §2.2.4 below), then when pub-
lic authorities ask for input from citizens on specific projects or 
policy areas, these authorities will be constrained by the broad 
directorship of the mass public to ignore any contrary recom-
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mendations from such consultations. This is because that input 
lacks political power because it comes from a small subsection 
of the mass public and/or because the subject of the consulta-
tion is relatively specific policy that is subservient to broader 
policy controlled by the directorship of the mass public. What 
agency officials and politicians like to think of as their strategic 
or fundamental policy may in fact be tactical or operational, for 
much of the policy that is really strategic may be invisible to 
them as it is predetermined by the prevailing attitudes, values 
and assumptions of most citizens. If politicians are to be elected, 
they must embrace these mind-sets, either unconsciously or 
with conscious agreement or in Machiavellian conformity with 
the rule of the political game that says voters will not allow their 
major mind-sets to be overruled.
So it is concluded here that public policy in democracies is 
basically directed by citizens. This is, of course, what elections 
and their frequency are intended to achieve. Politicians usually 
follow this directorship by making decisions (often presented 
as leadership) that carefully avoid clashing with the values and 
strongly held opinions of the majority of the public. Fukuyama 
(2014, 519) provides a military analogy for this: ‘The autonomous 
platoon leader … does not weigh in on grand strategy; that’s the 
appropriate function of generals. In a democracy, the people are 
ultimately the generals.’ Political scientists Bruce Bueno de Mes-
quita and Alastair Smith (2012, 281) concur: ‘Democratic leaders 
listen to their voters because that is how they and their political 
party get to keep their jobs.’
2.2.3 Ignorant directors
Directorship by citizens is perversely strengthened by their 
well-documented reluctance to discuss and deliberate policy 
with each other (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Because 
most citizens pay limited attention to public policy it is very dif-
ficult for politicians to lead by attempting to develop or change 
the political views of citizens. The people are thereby left firmly 
in charge, because, as we have seen, politicians are responsive 
to their opinions. Political scientist Stephen Bennett (2006, 
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120) has described this general disinterest in policy in emphatic 
terms: ‘Low levels of political information among the mass pub-
lic have been observed again and again.’ The editor of Critical 
Review, Jeffrey Friedman (cited in Bennett 2006, 120), describes 
this as ‘one of the strongest findings that have been produced 
by any social science — possibly the strongest.’ In 1964, political 
scientist Philip E. Converse made the first attempt to statisti-
cally describe the competence of citizens to offer sensible advice 
on affairs of state with his paper ‘The Nature of Belief Systems 
in Mass Publics’. Bennett (2006, 105) notes that this research 
served ‘to overwhelmingly confirm the worst fears of … demo-
cratic skeptics’. Somin (2006, 255) notes that these observations 
remain valid: ‘More than 40 years after the pioneering work of 
Converse, political ignorance remains as widespread as ever.’ 
Many others agree (e.g. Hardin 2006; Kinder 2006; Zaller 1992). 
Surveys have shown this ignorance to be profound in something 
like 80% of the population. Friedman assesses the current sig-
nificance of the work of Converse and his University of Michi-
gan colleagues in the following terms.
Subsequent research, inspired by the work of the Michigan school 
has amply borne out its ‘bleak’ findings. Whether the question is 
what the government does, what it is Constitutionally authorized 
to do, what new policies are being proposed, or what reasons are 
being offered for them, most people have no idea how to answer 
accurately … 
Most of this scholarship establishes that the public lacks the 
most elementary political information. It is paradoxical, then, that 
nothing more dramatically brought public ignorance home to pub-
lic opinion scholars than Converse’s paper, which focused on the 
public’s ignorance of relatively esoteric knowledge: knowledge of 
political ideology … 
The chief prescriptive implication is, I believe, that the will of 
the people is so woefully uninformed that one might wonder about 
the propriety of enacting that will into law. (Friedman 2006, iv, v)
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Political scientist Larry Bartels (1996, 194) has observed that 
the ‘political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best 
documented features of contemporary politics, but the political 
significance of this is far from clear.’ The competence of voters 
depends not only on their levels of information but on how they 
use the information they have. Some scholars have suggested 
that one or both of two processes could cause a mass public of 
fairly uninformed citizens to act as if it were well-informed. One 
process is that the statistical aggregation of voters’ choices may 
cause the uninformed votes to cancel each other — if the un-
informed error is random — so that the informed votes decide 
the issue. The other process is that uninformed voters use heu-
ristics (cues or information shortcuts) as labour-saving devices 
to guide their vote. It is suggested that merely by observing the 
opinions of like-minded citizens or groups, a citizen can vote 
the way she would if she were fully informed. Empirical studies 
(e.g. Lupia 1994; Bartels 1996) have shown that in some cases, 
voters can use heuristics as substitutes for being well-informed, 
while in other cases neither heuristics nor the cancellation of 
ignorance through the aggregation of votes can compensate for 
voter ignorance.
The right question to ask is not whether heuristics always (or never) 
yield competent decisions, because we know the answer is no. The 
right question to ask is about the conditions under which use of 
particular proxies is necessary or sufficient for competent voting. 
(Lupia 2006, 229)
Heuristics may fail when elites do not understand an issue well, 
perhaps because of partisan bias, or insufficient public debate 
and deliberation, or lack of information. Bias or insufficient de-
bate may mean there has been an inadequate demand for in-
formation, so more research is needed to produce it and then 
subsequent public discourse to process and disseminate it. In-
sufficient deliberation often occurs because an issue can only be 
understood by considering consequences that may follow the 
initial results of the action aimed at resolving it. This problem 
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is explored later with descriptions of feedbacks in §5.3 and a 
discussion of ‘thinking beyond stage one’ in §5.4. Where politi-
cians serve as elites or proxies, citizen ignorance may constrain 
them to have partisan attitudes and limited understandings of 
issues in order to attract votes. An illustration of how this effect 
has distorted and constrained public debate on the issue of the 
desirable future size of Australia’s population is given later in 
§4.2.1.
Public opinion scholar Scott Althaus (2003) has observed 
that while
many respondents may use heuristics, on-line processing, and in-
formation shortcuts to arrive at the political opinions they express 
in surveys, these substitutes for political knowledge do not neces-
sarily help ill-informed people express policy preferences similar to 
those of well-informed people. If they did, surveyed opinion across 
the board should closely resemble fully informed opinion (2003, 
143) … Despite assurances by public opinion researchers that the 
public’s low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowl-
edge are relatively benign to the functioning of democracy, the mass 
public is often unable to make up for its inattentiveness. (2003, 311)
As indicated above, this inattentiveness means that not enough 
accurate and crucial information is sought out and publicised. 
Political scientist Doris Graber (2006, 176) has expressed con-
cern at this situation:
Decision quality is very much constrained by the information avail-
able to decision makers at the mass as well as at the elite level. When 
that information is incomplete or wrong, it may be very difficult for 
mass publics and even elites to detect the inaccuracies and discover 
the truth … [for example,] the question of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq.
Four current and persisting issues that are difficult for both 
elites and citizens to be sufficiently informed on are discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. These are global warming, unemployment, 
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overpopulation and the closely related syndrome, the ‘scarcity 
multiplier’, in which scarcities are exacerbated by short-sighted 
attempts to avoid them. To prepare for those discussions, as well 
as to add to our understanding of citizen ignorance, six incen-
tives for that ignorance are presented below. These are all mo-
tivations to ignore public goods in favour of private goods and 
they have the effect that (especially as these two types of goods 
compete for resources (see §2.1)) public goods are neglected and 
underprovided. The first three of these six motivations are fairly 
stable over time, but the other three tend to grow through posi-
tive feedback. This bias, of citizens being much more motivated 
to consider and choose private rather than public goods, is not 
only likely to have trivial private goods chosen instead of im-
portant public goods, but it is also likely to prevent citizens from 
getting practice at understanding and evaluating public goods.
Later, in §4.1 we will add to this understanding of ignorance 
of public goods by describing several characteristics of many is-
sues concerning public goods that make it difficult for citizens 
to recognize and evaluate them. Then in section §8.1 it is sug-
gested that these cognitive obstacles to choosing public goods 
might explain some of the difference in the policy preferences of 
conservatives and liberals.
2.2.3.1 Fairly stable motivations of citizens’ ignorance of 
public goods
the relative ease, urgency and effectiveness of the choice of 
private goods. In a democracy, the choice of a private good is 
much easier than the choice of a public good because the latter 
requires social or collective choice while the former only needs 
the decision of one person or entity, that is, individual choice. 
The non-excludability of public goods requires the members of 
a democracy to discuss each issue concerning these goods to 
try to understand what private and public goods are compet-
ing in the issue, then decide what trade-offs they want between 
these goods, and, finally, aggregate their preferences in some 
way. In contrast, the individual choice of private goods is merely 
the choice of a person or an entity to either make it, or take it, 
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or purchase it, or go without. Purchasing is facilitated by the 
market, as its ‘invisible hand’ automatically elicits supplies and 
computes prices. The market also gives an impression that pri-
vate goods have a very definite value — their price — but price 
actually registers exchange power rather than value. In contrast, 
those public goods that have to be purchased are not priced di-
rectly to consumers because they are non-excludable, so their 
value appears vague and perhaps inconsequential. Moreover, 
many public goods are not priced as they are freely available to 
all from nature or society, so their value and even their existence 
tend to be overlooked. The urgency of looking after oneself with 
many excludable goods such as food, shelter, clothing, enter-
tainment, recreation equipment and facilities, and medical care, 
adds to the attraction of individual choice. In addition to these 
seductions of private goods and the individual choice that se-
cures them, people are decisive in individual choice, whereas in 
social choice they know they are non-decisive, being merely one 
of thousands or millions of people voting together to choose or 
reject a non-excludable good or an uncertain bundle of these 
(Brennan and Lomasky 1989, 49–50). As public policy scholar 
Anthony Downs (1957) observed, it is therefore rational for vot-
ers to remain ignorant of issues concerning public goods. This 
‘rational ignorance’ makes many citizens vote expressively, in 
which they choose policies that make them feel good, without 
having any interest in whether those policies actually work; and 
they also vote with the ‘rational irrationality’ of believing, with-
out any supporting evidence, that feel-good policies actually do 
work (Caplan 2008, 138–39).
In these ways, the comparative ease, urgency and effective-
ness of the individual choice of private goods encourage people 
to focus on choosing these instead of giving serious attention 
to public goods. This tendency is generated with incentives cre-
ated by the excludability of private goods. And it is encouraged 
because the ambiguity of electoral delegation allows citizens 




citizens’ fear of free-riders. Political scientist Kevin Smith 
(2006, 1015, 1013) notes considerable cross-disciplinary empiri-
cal evidence of a human predisposition to avoid ‘being played 
for a sucker … It is not just what they get from decisions, but 
whether they perceive the process of decision-making as fair 
that leads people to view the decisions as legitimate’ (see also 
Hibbing and Alford 2004; Orbell et al. 2004). ‘Sucker aversion’ 
can have a powerful effect on the provision of public goods be-
cause their non-excludability leads some people to consider that, 
because this makes them vulnerable to free riding, private goods 
must be preferable. In this view, the ‘higher the proportion of 
resources that are allocated in a market way, where there’s no es-
cape from paying for what you get and getting what you pay for, 
the more just and efficient the economy is likely to be’ (Stretton 
and Orchard 1994, 55–56). This motivation for overvaluing pri-
vate goods is also facilitated by ambiguous delegation, for this 
allows citizens to neglect their responsibility to reject such heu-
ristic shortcuts and to carefully consider needs for public goods.
citizens’ fear of government incompetence. Observations by 
citizens of government incompetence may lead them to see the 
market as more reliable, in which case they may focus on ob-
taining private rather than public goods. This attitude will fur-
ther erode the competence of democratic government and help 
to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. As hedge fund manager 
George Soros (2010, 16) observes for the US: ‘A large majority 
of the population is convinced that the government is incapa-
ble of efficiently managing investments. Again, this belief is not 
without justification: a quarter of a century of calling govern-
ment bad has resulted in bad government.’ Again, it might be 
expected that such irresponsibly convenient thinking by citizens 
is invited by the ambiguity of electoral delegation.
Whether Americans’ experience of political bungling has 
produced scepticism of the capacity of government to produce 
public goods or whether other factors cause it, fear of govern-
ment incompetence and the resultant bias towards private goods 
is strikingly influential in the United States (for a discussion of 
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this see §3.2). Economics journalist Robert Kuttner (2008, 75) 
describes this fear as an ‘undertow’ on US government: ‘Regula-
tion is still widely considered a pejorative word. Obama … must 
hose away a prevailing ideology in which large government 
endeavours are deemed to be outmoded by modern markets’. 
Kuttner (2008, 75–76) notes several American expressions of 
this ideology: ‘Government is generally perverse or incompe-
tent … Tax cuts are one of the few benefits that governments 
can reliably deliver … Private markets invariably work better 
than government … [and] Democrats need to talk more like Re-
publicans’. Within the last four decades, three presidents have 
strongly expressed this mindset. Jimmy Carter, in his 1978 State 
of the Union address, declared: ‘Government cannot solve our 
problems, it can’t set our goals, it cannot define our vision’. In 
1981 Ronald Reagan observed in his Inaugural Address: ‘In this 
present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; 
government is the problem.’ And in January 1996, Bill Clinton 
stated, in his State of the Union speech: ‘We know big govern-
ment does not have all the answers … . The era of big govern-
ment is over’ (Kuttner 2008, 87–88).
As Soros observed, reluctance to correct financial markets 
is a very significant rejection of solutions from government 
by US citizens. Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009, 
46) has assessed that ‘confidence in financial markets will not 
be restored unless governments take a stronger role in regulat-
ing financial institutions … Even former Federal Reserve Sys-
tem chairman Alan Greenspan, the high priest of deregulation, 
admits he went too far.’ Amartya Sen (2009) has given similar 
advice. At George Mason University on 8 January, 2009, Presi-
dent-elect Barack Obama (FederalNewsService 2009) appeared 
to recognize that the ‘undertow’ required an emphatic rebuttal: 




2.2.3.2 Relatively dynamic motivations of citizens’ 
ignorance of public goods
distraction by positional competition. Economist Eban 
Goodstein (2005, 218–19) has observed that ‘when relative 
consumption becomes important … people tend to overvalue 
increases in private consumption (given the negative externali-
ties imposed on others), and undervalue noncompetitive public 
goods’. The externalities he refers to are the costs of ‘positional 
competition’, some of which are described by economist Richard 
Layard (2005, 7, 44) as follows: ‘Our wants are not given … We 
are heavily driven by the desire to keep up with other people. 
This leads to a status race, which is self-defeating since if I do 
better, someone else must do worse.’ Doing better provokes re-
taliation, then counter-response, which provokes more retalia-
tion and so on. Positional competition is not only a zero-sum 
game but it continues indefinitely in a positive feedback. Also, as 
its consumption produces no ultimate benefit (which would be 
the social status it tries to establish) the players of the game reap 
only the repetitive costs of their consumption (e.g. Frank 2005).
Positional competition occurs not only as status rivalry, but 
also as people try to buy products or services that are in scarce 
supply relative to the number of people in a society, such that 
not everyone can have access to them. Examples are land suit-
able for leisure living and leadership positions in politics and 
business. This competition becomes strong when people are 
well-provided in basic needs such as shelter, food, security and 
companionship. They can then afford to focus more on com-
paring their private goods with those of their neighbours, so, as 
Goodstein puts it, their ‘relative consumption becomes impor-
tant’. Citizens in democracies are encouraged to overlook the 
public costs of positional competition by ambiguous delegation 
confusing them about who should take care of public goods. As 
citizens expect their politicians to do this, they tend not to no-
tice when they themselves are destroying these goods with their 
positional competition.
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distraction by adaptation. People are distracted from appreci-
ating and choosing public goods by another failure to anticipate 
the consequences of choosing private goods. This is that their 
satisfaction with these depends not only on how well they are 
doing relative to their neighbours, but also on how well they are 
doing relative to what they are used to having (Layard 2005, 42, 
48). This is known as adaptation or habituation. It operates vig-
orously on some things, but not on others, such as the pleasures 
of friendship and sex, and the miseries of unpredictable loud 
noises, widowhood and caring for someone with Alzheimer’s 
disease. Layard (2005, 49) makes the point that the ‘things we 
get used to most easily and most take for granted are our mate-
rial possessions’. Adaptation therefore escalates our desires for 
private goods rather than for public goods. One manifestation 
of this is that the level of income that people feel they require is 
usually not much below what they currently have. For example, 
over the period 1952 to 1987, the income that US citizens con-
sidered they required increased by 70% of their increase in real 
income (Layard 2005, 42–43). Another indication of adaptation 
is given by survey results that show if one’s real income rises by 
a dollar, then after a while one’s required income will rise by at 
least 40 cents (Layard 2005, 49). As with positional competition, 
adaptation tends to re-establish wants for private goods after an 
increase in their supply, which produces a tendency for posi-
tive feedback in wants for private goods and a corresponding 
decline in wants for public goods. This feedback is encouraged 
by ambiguous delegation, because confusion about who directs 
public policy leaves citizens free to ignore the impacts of their 
adaptation on the provision of public goods.
distraction by advertising. Half a century ago the iconoclastic 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith pointed to sales promotion 
as another motivation of neglect of public goods. He called this 
a ‘problem of social balance’ and described it as a lack of 
satisfactory relationship between the supply of privately produced 
goods and services and those of the state … The problem of social 
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balance is ubiquitous, and frequently it is obtrusive … [Every] cor-
ner of the public psyche is canvassed by some of the nation’s most 
talented citizens to see if the desire for some merchantable product 
can be cultivated. No similar process operates on behalf of the non-
merchantable services of the state. (Galbraith 1958, 198, 202–3)
‘Social balance’ is a straightforward concept when it compares 
purchases of private goods with purchases of those ‘non-mer-
chantable services of the state’ that are funded from taxes, such 
as law enforcement, national defence and the construction and 
maintenance of public infrastructure. However, the ‘problem 
of social balance’ is subtle in the case of public goods that are 
free and therefore do not directly compete with private goods 
for purchasing power, but which nevertheless do compete with 
them because both types of good require the same resources. 
The largest class of such resources is natural capital, much of 
which is a public good. Natural capital is defined as the stock 
of natural (or ‘non-produced’) things that are the means of 
producing flows of natural resources and services that people 
may utilize. Such flows are termed natural income. Examples 
of natural capital are stocks such as: soil, biodiversity, forests, 
wilderness, natural scenery, the sun and its distance from earth, 
a stable climate, geographic space and air, seas, rivers and lakes. 
In the cases of soil, forests and rivers we have stocks that may 
produce flows of produce such as food, timber and fish. When 
natural capital is increasingly used to produce private goods it 
becomes scarcer and its public component may thereby be al-
located a price, transforming it into a private good (e.g. Daly 
and Cobb, 1989). Such transformations and the resultant rising 
scarcities of natural capital are also problems of social balance.
As Galbraith described it, the problem is one of democratic 
governments being compelled to underprovide public goods by 
the advertising industry focusing citizens on private goods. An 
example of this is given in §4.2.3 with a discussion of the bias-
ing of society’s labour-leisure choice (which should produce the 
public good of optimizing the availability of leisure) towards ex-
cessive hours of work. The advertising industry is permitted to 
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do this at least partly because the ambiguity of electoral delega-
tion leaves citizens without a firm obligation to recognize and 
consider public goods.
In common with positional competition and adaptation, 
advertising tends to escalate wants for private goods through 
positive feedback. By increasing sales, advertising provides 
more funds for more advertising to further increase sales and 
so on. Galbraith (1958, 124) called this feedback the ‘dependence 
effect’; a cycle in which ‘wants are increasingly created by the 
process by which they are satisfied’. Sales promotion works by 
encouraging both positional competition and adaptation, so the 
three mechanisms form a feedback complex in which two posi-
tive feedbacks, those of positional competition and adaptation, 
are boosted by sales promotion, which tends to boost itself in 
another positive feedback. This complex is referred to later in 
§5.3.1 in an analysis of addiction to economic growth by mod-
ern industrial societies. It is depicted diagrammatically there in 
Figure 5.1 (p. 211).
The six incentives described here that nudge citizens to ne-
glect public goods all work by making private goods appear 
more attractive. As noted for each incentive, citizens allow 
themselves to be swayed by them at least partly because they 
are confused about their role in democratic government. This 
confusion is now examined more closely.
2.2.4 Unconscious directors
We have seen that the ambiguity of delegation by frequent elec-
tions leaves citizens partly or even largely unaware of their posi-
tion as the directors of government policy. Citizens therefore 
feel free to want private goods, with little sense that they should 
consider restraining these desires to allow, and to demand, the 
production or protection of public goods. Politicians are pres-
sured by these private wants to make social choices that tend 
to express aggregations of wants for private goods rather than 
wants for public goods. Over time, this will progressively destroy 
public goods that require resources needed for private goods, 
such as environmental quality versus commercial consumption 
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of natural capital, fair-minded foreign policy versus access to 
markets and commercial resources, and equality among citizens 
versus financial incentives for private innovation and produc-
tivity. If we are to correct such erosions of public goods we must 
fully understand why citizens lack consciousness of their demo-
cratic role as directors. Six causes of this have been described 
above, in the form of incentives for citizens to be ignorant of 
public goods. In addition, the following five factors have a simi-
lar effect, as these are incentives for citizens to be unconscious of 
their democratic responsibility to direct public policy.
personal involvement in passing power to a figure of 
authority. Citizens lack consciousness of their role as directors 
partly because the delegation of that authority and responsibility 
from citizens to politicians by means of elections is a very pub-
lic, formal procedure in which many or most citizens are per-
sonally involved. They therefore get a strong impression that it 
transfers their directorship until the next election. The selection 
of leaders is thereby conflated with the selection of directors. 
Democratic systems that hold popular elections of presidents 
are likely to accentuate this cause of unconscious directorship 
by the people, as those events dramatically appoint figures of 
supreme authority. Historian Dana Nelson (2008, 183–85) la-
ments this effect in Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Un-
dermines the Power of the People.
The sway of presidentialism reduces our democratic skill-set … and 
has made it all the harder to imagine not only how to make demo-
cratic community together but even how to picture why we would 
want to … I’m arguing that we imagine democracy as something we, 
the people lead together, amid our differences … . that democracy 
is not served by the president. Rather it is served by us, the people, 
working together for its present and its future.
Not only may the ambiguity of delegation be greater in presi-
dential democracies than in other types, but the huge amount 
of money required for presidential campaigns helps the wealthy 
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to influence the president, making government even less demo-
cratic. Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign showed that 
the internet may be used to counter this effect, but such facilita-
tion of small donations to presidential contests brings millions 
of ordinary citizens into more intimate contact with that pro-
cess, so it may strengthen the ambiguity of delegation by rein-
forcing citizens’ impressions that it is not them, but presidents 
who govern. Presidential campaigns can be emotionally engag-
ing, drawing many citizens into politics with great enthusiasm. 
But this participation is largely driven by the emotional appeal 
of personalities, so the pros and cons of issues are neglected and 
public deliberation virtually nonexistent. After a new president 
is elected, the opinions and attitudes of the people are likely to 
be little more developed than before and the new leader must 
then basically follow these or be replaced by one who does. In 
parliamentary systems the head of government is chosen by pol-
iticians, which may allow citizens more freedom to see that it is 
they who must govern, for that head is not directly their leader, 
but the leader of their representatives.
appearance of authority. As politicians appear to be the ones 
who direct public policy, citizens tend to regard themselves as 
bystanders and not as democratic directors. However, as dis-
cussed above, because politicians have to face elections fre-
quently, their policy decisions tend to be within the bounda-
ries of the opinion of the general public — or if they are outside 
these, then they tend to be within the boundaries of the opinion 
of their constituencies — or if they are beyond these limits on 
particular issues, then they attempt to counter the electoral cost 
with policies on other issues that satisfy more urgent desires of 
their constituencies. This gives an appearance of — rather than 
real — directorship by politicians. The appearance is reinforced 
when they are called ‘leaders’, which is the case at least when 
they are presidents, prime ministers or heads of parties. Ha-
slam, Reicher and Platow (2011, 218) call for this appearance to 
be changed, hoping that 
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by articulating a new psychology of leadership that focuses equally 
on leaders and followers within the group, we … hope to open up 
the possibility of a new politics of leadership centered on inclusive 
debate about what our groups stand for and where they are heading.
pragmatism. Citizens tend to be unconscious of their director-
ship because they want delegates to do this for them. This is be-
cause citizens recognize to some degree that they do not have 
the time, the interest, the expertise, the institutional support 
and the incentives for them to competently identify and choose 
public goods.
psychological predispositions. As with the pragmatic mo-
tive, psychological predisposition is another case of citizens not 
thinking of themselves as directors because they want others to 
do the job. However, this want arises not from the practical need 
for specialists to handle a complex task, but in human nature: 
We have a genetic predisposition to belong to a group and in 
doing so, to either lead the group or follow its leader. Therefore, 
when a group tries to be democratic and be governed by all the 
people, a few of them try to lead while the great majority look 
for the leader that they feel like following. This is rather different 
from all citizens regarding themselves as the members of a very 
large board of directors. To understand this democratic prob-
lem and gain some perspective on how it may be countered, it is 
looked at here in some detail.
Primate ethologist Frans de Waal (2005, 232) has described 
humans as ‘Janus-headed’, that is, egalitarian but with a desire to 
control and dominate. He (2005, 78–79) notes that we ‘often per-
mit certain men to act as first among equals. The keyword here is 
‘permit’, because the whole group will guard against abuses’. De 
Waal (2005, 232–33) notes that this ‘bipolar’ balance of egalitar-
ian and hierarchical dispositions makes people both dependent 
on, and sensitive to, hierarchies. The dependency arises from 
the need for harmony, which requires stability, which depends 
on a well-acknowledged social order. We therefore ‘crave hierar-
chical transparency’, which produces the paradox ‘that although 
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positions within a hierarchy are born from contest, the hierar-
chical structure itself, once established, eliminates the need for 
further conflict’ (de Waal 2005, 64). Thus, in De Waal’s view, 
humans have an instinctive desire for leaders who are strong, 
reliable and seen to be good for the group. This is consistent 
with evolutionary psychology, which recognizes that we are so-
cial animals who instinctively form and join groups. As this has 
been a basic survival strategy during our most recent evolution 
we fall into the zoological category of ‘obligatorily gregarious’ 
(de Waal 2005, 231). This has exposed us to the pressures of 
group life and these are conjectured to have selected predisposi-
tions for individuals to adopt social roles, such as leading, or fol-
lowing a dominant individual who leads in the interests of the 
group (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Barkow et al. 1992; Dugatkin 
et al. 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Keltner and Haidt 2003; 
Smith et al. 2007; Van Vugt et al. 2008).
The physical activation of the predisposition to follow has 
actually been observed. Neuroscientist Uffe Schjoedt (2010) and 
colleagues have done this with functional magnetic resonance 
imaging that shows when a person listens to someone they re-
gard as authoritative and trustworthy, they shut down parts of 
their prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices. These parts of 
the brain play key roles in vigilance and scepticism when judg-
ing the importance and truth of what others say, so their de-
activation would permit the listener to be motivated to follow 
authoritative and trustworthy figures. Subjects who do not re-
gard a speaker as being charismatic do not have this response. 
Although these tests were done using religious authority figures, 
Schjoedt speculates that the deactivation should also be stimu-
lated by listening to people such as doctors, parents and politi-
cians.
In line with the opening paragraph of this section, social psy-
chologists Mark van Vugt, Robert Hogan and Robert B. Kaiser 
(2008, 186) suggest that human ‘populations contain individuals 
with genotypes predisposing them to either leadership or fol-
lowership’. They argue that the predisposition to follow will be 
the more prevalent in any population because any ‘increase in 
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the frequency of leader genotypes reduces the payoffs for this 
strategy — because many would-be leaders compete and fail 
to coordinate — thus selecting against leader genotypes’ (Van 
Vugt et al. 2008, 186). Van Vugt and his colleagues argue that 
these predispositions evolved over 2.5 million years of Pleisto-
cene hunter–gatherer life in small groups of 50–150 individuals, 
creating an innate preference for reverse dominance hierarchy. 
In that type of hierarchy (as observed by De Waal) leadership 
is desired but evaluated by group members ‘against egalitarian 
‘hunter–gatherer’ standards such as fairness, integrity, compe-
tence, good judgment, generosity, humility, and concern for 
others’ (Van Vugt et al. 2008, 188).
This power reversal made it possible for our ancestors to reap the 
benefits of cooperation and conquer the world. When leaders are 
kept in check, as has happened throughout most of human evolu-
tionary history, and others are permitted to reproduce, then follow-
ers have a vested genetic interest in protecting the welfare of the 
group and stability results. (Van Vugt and Ahuja 2010, 192)
In the small groups typical of our environment of evolutionary 
adaptation (EEA, see Thornhill 1997), intra-group communica-
tion was easy and effective, allowing members to make accurate 
evaluations as they approve a suitable leader. The difficulty of in-
tra-group communication in very large groups such as modern 
nation-states means that such evaluations in these circumstanc-
es may be superficial, producing poor collective judgement.
Van Vugt and his colleagues (2008) suggest that in current 
circumstances, predispositions to lead and follow make leader-
follower patterns emerge more quickly in situations that resem-
ble adaptive problems of the EEA, such as internal group conflict 
and external threats such as natural disasters or attacks on the 
group. In such emergencies, followers will readily defer to the 
decisions of a single individual because the interests of leader 
and followers have converged. Natural selection in the EEA ap-
pears to have produced predispositions for followers to prefer 
different leaders depending on the problem they face. For exam-
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ple, US voters tend to choose hawkish presidents when threat-
ened by war and ‘show an increased preference for charismatic 
leaders and a decreased preference for participative leaders 
when reminded of their own mortality’ (Van Vugt et al. 2008, 
189). This corresponds with the behaviour of people in hunter-
gatherer societies, in which ‘Big Men wield influence only with-
in their realms of expertise, and they lead by example … Pres-
tige is given to individuals with specific skills who can help the 
group achieve its aims’ (Van Vugt and Ahuja 2010, 158). As Van 
Vugt and his colleagues (2008, 191) express it, leadership ‘in the 
ancestral environment was fluid, distributional and situational.’
Such specificity of leadership response by both leader and 
followers may have been occurring recently in Russia. The con-
fusion, corruption and stress of attempting to replace commu-
nism and the command economy with democracy and capital-
ism may have helped to make the autocratic style of Vladimir 
Putin popular with many Russians. In such situations, the in-
stinctive response does not promote democracy. As political 
scientist Ellen Carnaghan (2007, 64) observes, 
emerging democracies are vulnerable, not because unprepared citi-
zens do not like democracy as they understand it, but because many 
average citizens do not understand the intricacies of democratic 
practice well enough … The fate of democracy in Russia remains 
vulnerable, then, in part as the result of actions by people in power 
who do not seem to value democratic institutions, but also because 
citizens may not sufficiently appreciate the opportunities that de-
mocracy provides to protect the future they want.
corruption by special interests. A fifth cause of citizens lack-
ing consciousness of their directorship may be that some of 
them consider it is not them, nor politicians, but special inter-
ests who largely perform this role. These interests usually have 
financial resources or very large memberships or other forms 
of power that they can use to deliver votes or other favours to 
politicians, who, in return, produce laws, policies and programs 
that those interests want. One indication of this power of special 
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interests is the scale of their lobbying expenditure, as discussed 
in Chapter 1 and below in §2.3.2.
summary. There appear to be five ways in which citizens of lib-
eral democracies are kept unconscious of their responsibilities 
as directors: 1, citizens personally elect politicians to direct gov-
ernment; 2, citizens see politicians directing it; 3, citizens want 
them to do it because citizens don’t have the necessary time, in-
terest and resources; 4, it is also likely that citizens want politi-
cians to be the directors because most citizens are genetically 
predisposed to follow; and 5, to some citizens, special interests 
seem to direct the government.
If democracies are to function effectively, this unconscious-
ness of their citizens must be dispelled, for as long as they elect 
representatives via frequent elections, citizens are the ultimate 
authorities, essentially directing government by setting its stra-
tegic goals. They do this with their attitudes and values, such as 
assigning low importance to long-term probabilities and insist-
ing on the provision of short- and medium-term private and 
public goods (which has strategic effects). It is therefore essen-
tial that the people clearly recognize that they are the directors, 
for it is only then that their democracy can perform well.
2.2.5 Failure in accountability and legitimacy
A slightly different way of describing democratic government 
being made irresponsible by citizen directors who are largely 
politically ignorant and also unconscious of their role is that 
the accountability of politicians to citizens is defective because 
citizens are too ignorant of public policy to use that account-
ability wisely. Over time, this failure of accountability may reg-
ister with citizens despite their disengagement, for many will be 
affected by the resultant underprovision of public goods. This 
could damage the legitimacy of government, so that when it is 
inclined to implement good policy it cannot muster the political 
will to do it, producing adverse consequences that further dam-
age its legitimacy. Such deterioration appears to be especially 
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well-developed in the US, where distrust of government has a 
firm hold, as discussed later in §3.2.
Unconscious directorship by citizens further damages the 
legitimacy of government by facilitating corruption by special 
interests. When citizens do not realize that they are the direc-
tors, when they expect to be led and when they lack institu-
tions that would help them to direct in a considered, competent 
manner, their directorship is open for others to exploit. Ma-
nipulation by special interests was noted previously as possibly 
facilitating citizens’ unconsciousness of their directorship, but 
at the same time their unconsciousness facilitates the manipula-
tion. To some degree, then, public goods will suffer, the politi-
cal process will be seen as corrupt, the legitimacy of politicians 
and government is damaged and more citizens will disengage, 
perhaps with some becoming actively hostile to government. 
Public-minded citizens may be discouraged from trying to im-
prove their government by becoming well-informed voters, or 
by offering themselves as political campaigners and candidates, 
or by working honestly and constructively as bureaucrats and 
politicians. Public goods may then suffer further, escalating the 
illegitimacy of government. Such alienation may at times flare 
into the outrage and protest of civil disobedience, such as the 
Franklin River protest in Tasmania (noted below in §4.1(3) and 
§5.1). The Tea Party movement in the US may be another expres-
sion of this distrust, as discussed later in §3.2.
Of course, even in issues where special interests do not in-
fluence outcomes, unconscious directorship by citizens is still 
likely to underprovide public goods because the ‘rational igno-
rance’ (Downs 1957) of citizens and their feeling that they have 
delegated the task to politicians leaves them feeling free to focus 
on private goods. Perhaps such malfunction was observed by 
Richard Clarke (2004, 238–39), National Security Coordinator 
for US presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush, as he declared: ‘Amer-
ica, alas, seems only to respond well to disasters, to be undis-
tracted by warnings. Our country seems unable to do all that 
must be done until there has been some awful calamity that vali-
dates the importance of the threat’. Clarke was referring to the 
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management of national security, but his observation could also 
be applied to other public issues in the US, such as the National 
Health Service, global warming, energy supply, oil industry reg-
ulation (highlighted in April 2010 by the explosion and blowout 
of BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico), financial 
regulation (failure of which caused the 2007–8 global financial 
crisis, as analysed in Soros 2010, Madrick 2010 and Stiglitz 2010) 
and, as discussed below in §2.3, foreign affairs. The Secretary-
General of the UN, Kofi Annan (2006), appeared to agree with 
Clarke’s assessment with thinly veiled criticism of the US at the 
Nairobi Climate Change Conference. He declared that, as we 
consider how to proceed beyond the Kyoto Protocol, ‘there re-
mains a frightening lack of leadership.’
Clive Hamilton, public ethics scholar at the Australian Na-
tional University, has described what appears to be another 
symptom of the lack of accountability and the resultant irre-
sponsibility to be expected from ambiguous delegation. Ham-
ilton (2011) calls it 
the riddle of Australian politics: voters want a strong leader, but one 
who will deliver only symbols of action on climate change. Austral-
ians want to feel good about themselves without making any sac-
rifices.
The source of the venom directed at [Prime Minister] Gillard 
seems to lie in this flaw in the modern Australian character. Con-
fusing what Australians say they want with what they actually want, 
her plan to push through a carbon tax has turned her into a hate 
figure.
Perhaps the problem is not a uniquely Australian character 
flaw, but a predictable response of citizens who consider that at 
the last election they delegated their democratic authority and 
responsibility to politicians, chief of whom in this case is the 
Prime Minister. Citizens thereby feel relieved of responsibility 
and act accordingly. So it seems that the question is: How can 
citizens be given the feeling that it is they who are responsible 
for government policy? Without trying to completely substitute 
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direct democracy for representative democracy, this might be 
done with a new institution that gave citizens a very public, in-
fluential and deliberate role in choosing specific policies. If this 
institution was very easy for citizens to use, it should give them 
an ownership of policy that prepares them for any sacrifices they 
must make in order to have it executed. This objective for insti-
tutional design will be addressed in Part 2.
2.2.6 A less fundamental type of ambiguous 
delegation — supermajoritarianism
The idea that confusion of authority and responsibility produces 
defective public policy has a wider application than the situation 
covered here, of citizen principals failing to clearly delegate from 
themselves to political agents. In §2.2 this failure was described 
in terms of uncertainty about two aspects of delegating author-
ity and responsibility: whether any or how much is delegated; 
and its ambit or type. But in addition to these problems, ambi-
guity about which agent or group of agents the citizen princi-
pals are attempting to delegate authority and responsibility to, 
will also hinder the development and implementation of good 
public policy. McGann (2006) argues that this happens with 
supermajoritarianism, damaging policy by establishing differ-
ent and competing agents, sometimes as ‘checks and balances’. 
Supermajoritarian devices are those that require more than sim-
ple majorities for decisions, such as federalism, bicameralism, 
presidentialism, judicial review, the 60 per cent cloture rule to 
end a filibuster in the US Senate, the two-thirds requirement to 
overrule a US presidential veto and the need for a supermajority 
to amend the US Constitution. McGann’s (2006, 115–52) argu-
ment is that these devices all damage political equality and pub-
lic deliberation and therefore tend to prevent the development 
and implementation of good public policy. As supermajoritari-
anism generally arbitrarily promotes the status quo, it may dam-
age public policy by preventing informed judgement from pre-
vailing. Another aspect of supermajoritarianism is that it blurs 
accountability with ambiguity about which agent or group of 
agents has been delegated authority and responsibility. Political 
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scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2012, 56) observe 
that this makes
it easier for politicians to depart from voters’ priorities. In parlia-
mentary democracies, voters can relatively easily reward or punish 
politicians. The party or coalition in power, from the prime minister 
to the backbenchers, must bear responsibility. In the United States, 
responsibility is much harder to assign — especially now that a party 
needs at least sixty votes in the Senate to overcome the omnipresent 
filibuster. GOP leaders know the president and his party are likely 
to receive most of the blame for poor economic performance, even 
if the scorched-earth resistance of conservative Republicans is the 
biggest obstacle to enacting the president’s policies.
The concept of ambiguous delegation could therefore be broad-
ened from ambiguity about whether principals have actually 
delegated and what they have delegated, to include ambiguity 
about which agents the principals have delegated to. In this book, 
however, we focus on the ‘whether and what’ ambiguity, as this 
is the fundamental one, being a direct consequence of electoral 
systems. The supermajoritarian, or ‘which-agents’, ambiguity 
is not a necessary outcome of frequent elections that are open 
to incumbents but is imposed independently of that electoral 
structure by other, less fundamental institutional arrangements.
2.2.7 An objection to ambiguous delegation being 
seen as a major problem
Citizens who are particularly concerned about special interests 
pursuing private goods at the expense of public goods might re-
spond to the suggestion that democratic governments malfunc-
tion because of ambiguous delegation by proposing that the real 
problem is manipulation by special interests. This view has two 
errors. The first is that if we choose to view special interests, 
rather than the institutions of government, as being responsible 
for its failure we are assuming that we need not design govern-
ments to be capable of governing in the real world, where self-
interest is a powerful motivation. The second error is that even 
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if blaming special interests succeeds in stopping their manipula-
tions, electors would still make defective inputs into public af-
fairs, because ambiguous delegation means they are not clearly 
asked to deliberate these. However, notwithstanding these prob-
lems with that conspiratorial view, it actually implies that am-
biguous delegation is significant. Seeing the solution as blaming 
manipulators is to see it as provoking outrage in citizens so that 
they take charge by demanding that their manipulated repre-
sentatives outlaw, or otherwise prevent, their own manipula-
tion. But getting citizens to ‘take charge’ is what the ambiguous 
delegation view of democratic dysfunction calls for — not only 
to prevent manipulation by special interests, but to take charge 
of public goods in general. Whereas the blaming view is that we 
must empower citizens by making them angry, the ambiguous 
delegation view is that we must empower citizens by clarifying 
delegation. Making citizens angry provokes action, but not nec-
essarily deliberation; however, clarifying delegation produces 
division of labour, which should facilitate both deliberation and 
action.
Two decades ago, in a review of the capacity of democracies 
to make collectively binding decisions and carry them out, po-
litical sociologist Claus Offe concluded that it has declined.
To be sure, states and governments, citizens and social movements, 
social classes and political parties, elites, administrative authorities, 
interest groups, coalitions, nations, blocs and associations are all 
well and alive; it is just that neither the spectators nor they them-
selves seem to have a very clear notion about their distinctive do-
main of action … What turns out to be surprisingly and essentially 
contested is the answer to the question ‘who is in charge?’ (Offe 
1996, vii–viii)
Offe suggested several causes of this uncertainty, such as the 
growing permeability of national borders due to globalization 
and multinational agreements, and the decline of traditional po-
litical activity such as voting turnout and party membership as 
activism on specific issues becomes more attractive to increas-
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ingly individualistic citizens. He does not mention ambiguous 
delegation, but if frequent elections have this effect, they should 
indeed have citizens wondering ‘who is in charge?’
2.2.8 An overview of ambiguous delegation
The idea of ambiguous delegation is primarily that democracies 
are confused about whether they are run by the people or by 
their political agents. Supermajoritarian devices produce a less 
fundamental confusion of responsibility and authority by ob-
scuring which political agent or group of agents this obligation 
and power may have been delegated to. Much of the confusion 
of the fundamental form of ambiguous delegation is caused by 
citizens wanting good leaders whereas democratic government 
demands that they want to be good directors. Their desire for 
good leaders is the biological urge of a deeply social species and 
it is partly because citizens expect any government, including 
democratic ones, to satisfy this desire that they neglect to en-
gage as its directors. As we have seen, leadership is produced 
by both followers and leaders, whereas directorship is produced 
by directors choosing policy and then instructing operatives 
to execute it. In a democracy, those operatives are the elected 
representatives, but this is not clearly recognized because citi-
zens’ primal urge to be led makes them regard their operatives 
as their ‘leaders’. Citizens are confused about whether they 
should direct, not only because that means they actively lead 
their ‘leaders’, but also because they have few specific ways of 
directing. If they had easy and effective ways of doing this they 
would be deliberating and choosing public policies and then in-
structing their operatives to execute them. But it is easier and 
more natural for citizens to embrace leadership. This merely 
requires them to be followers, looking for leadership qualities 
such as charisma, strength of purpose and apparent concern for 
the group.
Electorally representative democracy demands that citizens 
grow out of their primal need for leaders and develop the self-
reliance and maturity that will enable them to select representa-
tives according to their policies rather than their leadership 
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qualities. They will then be directing their democracy instead 
of looking for good leaders. But exhorting citizens to grow up 
will not move them. Instead, new institutions are needed that 
would transform them into mature democrats by giving them 
the incentives and tools to collectively deliberate issues and di-
rect their political agents accordingly. A design for such an insti-
tution is offered in Part 2 — but before we go there, the analysis 
of dysfunction that must guide such design is pursued by iden-
tifying two more democratic dysfunctions. We then test the re-
sultant threefold view of government failure by seeing whether 
it appears to account for such failure in several different liberal 
democracies and also in a few major public policy issues.
2.3 Excessive competition
In democracies, the competitive device of election is used to 
select representatives in a manner that is intended to generate 
energy, ideas, truth and accountability (e.g. Shapiro 2012, 200–
207). The competition here is between politicians and political 
candidates and it is almost continuous because of the regular 
repetition of elections, usually at intervals of from two to eight 
years. This periodicity was described in §2.2.1 as frequent be-
cause it is a small part of the human life span. As it makes elec-
tions an almost constant threat to incumbents who are eligible 
for re-election, they tend to focus on holding office rather than 
on choosing good policy. In order to attract votes they often 
simplify the voter’s choice by aligning themselves with a party. 
Political scientist Ian Marsh and environmental scientist David 
Yencken (2004, 82) observe that in Australian politics, this sim-
plification (driven by the imperatives of political survival and 
dominance) is so pronounced that the ‘familiar competitive two 
party system is now itself a principal obstacle … to wise policy 
choices.’ They describe one form of this as ‘fake adversarialism’.
If the government declares a contentious issue to be white, and 
public opinion is divided or uncertain, the Opposition almost in-
variably declares it to be black. Yet in government, the Opposition 
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may often have supported a similar approach … It happens because, 
when public opinion is divided or uncertain, rewards accrue to 
leaders who champion contrasting alternatives, even if they are hol-
low or only manufactured for political impact … The present system 
is distorted by the way electoral incentives trump attention to argu-
ments based on considerations of merit and prudence. (Marsh and 
Yencken 2004, 32–33)
In the UK, the contrasting performances of the unelected House 
of Lords and the elected House of Commons illustrate the dis-
tractions of competition between elected representatives.
The Lords often scrutinises legislation that the Commons has not 
had time to look at (it has carved out an important role examining 
edicts from the European Commission) … Members are astonish-
ingly polite to each other. ‘It can become quite syrupy at times,’ says 
Meg Russell, who watches the upper house from University College 
London. When asked how they would like their elected politicians 
to behave, voters tend to describe something that sounds a bit like 
the unelected Lords. (Economist 2012, 48)
Electoral competition encourages blatant corruption in politi-
cians by tempting them to rig the economic / social / political 
situation in favour of their election and re-election. An example 
of this is South Africa under President Jacob Zuma, where it 
has been reported, ‘Freedom of the press is being chipped away 
under an embattled ANC’ (Economist 2015b). However, electoral 
competition can be much more destructive than provoking bad 
manners, irrelevance, fake adversarialism and corruption.
For two months, Kenya, East Africa’s most prosperous and suppos-
edly stable country, hovered on the brink of self-immolation as two 
warring factions ripped the country apart after a disputed election 
at the end of 2007. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the 
United Nations was brought in to try to resolve the conflict … As 
ethnic violence raged nearby, negotiators from the two sides would 
sometimes almost come to blows themselves as Mr. Annan tried 
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to find common ground between them … Rival politicians can be 
brought into open conflict by elections, such as in Kenya, or now in 
Zimbabwe. (Economist 2008a, 67)
Legal scholar Amy Chua (2003) has described examples in 
which electoral competition inflamed long-suppressed hatred 
against market-dominant prosperous ethnic minorities: for 
example, the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Croats in parts of the former 
Yugoslavia following the first free post-WWII elections in 1990; 
attacks on the Chinese minority in Indonesia as the autocrat Su-
harto retired and elections were held in 1998; and the massacre 
of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 as the corrupt totalitarian President 
Habyarimana responded to pressure from the west by making 
a show of abandoning dictatorship in favour of pluralism and 
multiparty democracy. Zakaria (2003, 114) has observed that 
‘without a background in constitutional liberalism, the intro-
duction of democracy in divided societies has actually fomented 
nationalism, ethnic conflict and even war.’ The example of Ja-
maica indicates that such background must be very strong if it is 
to prevent destructive competition.
A relatively stable, peaceful, and ‘good natured’ democracy started 
to go astray in the 1970s. A political confrontation between the two 
parties that escalated out of control drove Jamaica into a vicious 
circle of corruption, favoritism, clientelism, and organized crime. 
The Jamaican case shows that in developing countries, unchecked 
democratic competition can destroy a civil service and a law en-
forcement sector of relatively high quality by politicizing them for 
clientelist purposes. (Rothstein 2011, 202)
This spectrum — from bad manners to deception and lethal 
violence — indicates that the relentlessly competitive nature of 
electoral politics encourages politicians to be impatient with 
careful deliberation. It is also likely to attract political candi-
dates with combative dispositions. Democratic politicians may 
therefore have a tendency to treat issues as fights rather than as 
cases where pros and cons must be carefully understood and 
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compared. Examples of such combativeness are given by the 
journalist and historian Peter Scoblic in Us vs Them: How a Half 
Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America’s Security. 
In one of these he sympathetically describes US President Ron-
ald Reagan’s shift from denunciation to negotiation in talks on 
nuclear arms reduction with the President of the Soviet Union, 
Mikhail Gorbachev. But he also observes that it had previously 
not ‘even occurred’ to Reagan
that adopting a war-fighting strategy, beginning with a widespread 
missile defense program, researching a missile shield, while in-
creasing the military budget by 35 per cent, starting a new bomber 
program, deploying a new ICBM, and deploying missiles in Europe 
could be construed as threatening. (cited in Power 2008, 68)
Scoblic also sees dangerous combativeness in US President 
George W. Bush. Samantha Power (2008, 68), a scholar of for-
eign policy and special assistant to President Obama, observed 
that
Scoblic’s account becomes most chilling at the end, when the same 
conservative voices that had long preferred confrontation to coop-
eration — such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld — actually 
become dominant players in George W. Bush’s executive branch. 
On January 21, 2000, a year before he would move into the White 
House, Bush said:
‘When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world. And we knew 
exactly who the ‘they’ were. It was us versus them, and it was clear 
who ‘them’ was. Today we’re not sure who the ‘they’ are but we know 
they’re there.’
Having suffered through what one diplomat called the ‘enemy 
deprivation syndrome of the 1990s,’ September 11 gave hard-line 
conservatives an opportunity to apply their pre-hatched theories; 
and from the start they sought to unshackle the United States from 
international agreements and to reduce reliance on diplomatic en-
gagement.
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The great influence of the conservative politicians that Scoblic 
and Power criticize means that both scholars are troubled by 
American democracy. The combativeness that alarms them 
is also evident in the record of the US ignoring human rights 
such as political freedom and self-determination by support-
ing authoritarian regimes where this has been convenient for 
US interests, such as backing Israel (e.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 
2007), fighting communism and securing access to markets and 
resources such as oil (e.g. Perkins 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2012). For example, although the US upheld the princi-
ple of self-determination for Kosovo (versus Serbia) in 1999, it 
abandoned this rule in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(versus Georgia) in 2008, apparently because it wanted to con-
trol oil pipelines (Lantier 2008; Orlov 2008). Russia took the op-
posite attitude on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although it had 
ignored self-determination in its two wars against Chechnya in 
1994–96 and 1999–2000. On those separatist movements the 
Russian daily Kommersant compared the [Russian] recognition of 
the Georgian territories with 9/11, stating that world politics would 
never be the same again. ‘For the first time in history, Russia de-
monstrably undermined the principle of territorial integrity, giving 
preference to the principle of self-determination of peoples’ (Week-
endEditor 2008, 32) … 
[This has produced] a chill directed towards Russia by its usual 
allies — and the most important part of this is China’s appalled reac-
tion … For years it has joined Russia in defending the notion of ter-
ritorial integrity, saying that sovereign borders were inviolable. Now 
it sees Moscow jettison this principle to both countries’ potential 
cost. (Maddox 2008, 15)
We have strayed here from democracies to authoritarian re-
gimes, but the digression illustrates a need for democracies to 
provide a strong lead, not only by promulgating principles for 
the just conduct of international affairs, but by adhering to them 
even if the immediate cost to those democracies is considerable. 
Unfortunately, it appears that competitive reflexes prevent de-
114
rescuing democracy
mocracies from doing this. Other impacts of these reflexes are 
now inspected.
2.3.1 Competition distracts politicians from producing 
public goods
As political scientist Ian Shapiro (2012, 202) emphasizes, ‘com-
petition for power is indispensable’ as it gives ‘political aspir-
ants incentives to shine light in dark corners and expose one 
another’s failures and dissembling.’ But electoral competition in 
democracies also limits the openness and honesty of politicians 
because they are tempted to win the competition by pandering 
to the ignorance of electors. Politicians will rarely risk alienat-
ing electors with benevolent policies that electors do not un-
derstand. Pandering can produce bad legislation and policy not 
only as an immediate result, but also as a delayed effect because 
it inhibits the development of public opinion by preventing or 
distorting inputs to public debate. Instead of discussing issues 
in public with constructive candour, politicians often person-
ally attack their opponents, indulge in fake adversarialism and 
respond to difficult questions from journalists and others with 
irrelevant answers or by raising and answering another ques-
tion that they prefer. Such bluster, spin, concealment and even 
lying (e.g. Mearsheimer 2011) hinders the development of pub-
lic opinion and thereby constrains the provision and protection 
of public goods. Some of this corruption is obvious to many 
citizens and thereby helps to produce the ‘paradox of trust’ de-
scribed in §2.2.1.
In Australia, as well as many other democracies, the com-
petitive electoral environment cultivates a popular obsession 
with leaders of parties and governments, which distracts citi-
zens from being aware that it is they who basically direct gov-
ernment policy. It focuses their attention on personalities and 
on character assassination rather than on discussing and debat-
ing issues, an effect that joins with the evasiveness of politicians 
observed above to hinder the development of public opinion. 
Another consequence of competition in Australian politics is a 
rigid insistence by politicians that government is formed virtu-
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ally exclusively from the party with the most members in the 
legislature, so that when the two major parties have almost the 
same number of members a minor party may exert unrepre-
sentative influence — a ‘balance of power’ situation. This insist-
ence on opposition politics often prevents much public opinion 
from being represented in government and deprives it of much 
talent in the legislature. The oppositional fetish motivates par-
ties to try to destroy each other’s public image rather than to 
devise and negotiate good policy. It also tempts governments 
to seek electoral advantage over the opposition by using public 
money to sell their policies to the public, especially before elec-
tions. Instead of opposition politics, parliaments could form a 
governing legislative majority in the lower house from a coali-
tion of minor parties, or they could have the all the members 
of the lower house work as the government. In Australia, both 
arrangements are repugnant to most representatives. This com-
bative attitude is fuelled by the need to attract votes, because a 
fairly disengaged populace will only register simplistic images 
and messages from their political agents. The same competi-
tive approach may also make the internal affairs of each party 
a fractious business. Abandoning opposition politics would not 
eliminate competition, but it should moderate it to be more 
constructive because politicians would still compete with each 
other to propose the smartest policy ideas and to gain positions 
of status and influence within the legislature. The consensual 
democracies of Scandinavia demonstrate that there is no ab-
solute requirement for electoral democracy to be fiercely op-
positional, for those polities mostly govern with coalitions of 
minority parties.
2.3.2 Competition tempts politicians to sell legislation
Shapiro (2012, 203) points out that a major difficulty with po-
litical competition ‘is that, particularly in the United States but 
increasingly in other democracies, politicians compete first for 
campaign contributions and second for votes.’ Al Gore (2007) 
has corroborated this by stressing that the costliness of televi-
sion advertising exerts extreme pressure on US politicians to 
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raise money. In order to get it, they will be tempted to produce 
the legislation that lobbyists will pay for. Television campaign-
ing not only corrupts democracy in this way, but it also trun-
cates the public debate that is essential for the development of 
the mass opinion that democratic governments basically follow. 
Television promotions do this by being made very brief in order 
to have impact and to minimize their cost, but this eliminates 
balance and rational argument. 
Payments for legislation also pose temptations for both lob-
byists and politicians to use this money for personal financial 
gain as well as for political campaigns. The Abramoff Indian 
lobbying scandal illustrates the complexity and scale of such 
corruption. This erupted over work performed by political lob-
byists Jack Abramoff, Ralph E. Reed Jr., Grover Norquist and 
Michael Scanlon for Indian casino gambling interests who paid 
them fees of an estimated US$85 million. Abramoff and Scan-
lon grossly overbilled their clients and orchestrated lobbying 
against them in order to force more payments for counter-
lobbying services. The lobbyists were accused of illegally giving 
gifts and making campaign donations to legislators in return for 
legislative action. Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) and two aides 
to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) were directly im-
plicated. Both Ney and DeLay were forced to give up their Re-
publican leadership posts. Ney was sentenced to thirty months 
in prison and Abramoff to five years, ten months (Schmidt et al. 
2005). The fact that they were caught demonstrates that liberal 
democracy works at the level of limiting the extent of corrup-
tion, but the case also indicates that the competitive pressures of 
electoral politics coerce politicians to accept — and seek — the 
bribes of lobbyists.
Corporations may, in effect, buy legislation and government 
projects by rewarding a representative who favours them by es-
tablishing a business in that legislator’s district to improve their 
electoral prospects, or by offering a post-political career as an 
executive or consultant (Freedland 2007, 20). Such favours may 
be ‘earned’ by politicians introducing bills, lobbying, log rolling, 
earmarking and introducing tax credits. Log rolling is the bar-
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tering for votes to support a bill by its proponent undertaking 
to vote for the bills of other legislators. Log rolling also covers 
the bundling together of diverse measures into a single package 
to broaden their basis of support. Earmarking is inserting a spe-
cial provision favouring one constituent or a very narrow group 
into an appropriations bill (Kirkpatrick 2006; Kuttner 2008). In 
March 2010 the House Appropriations Committee banned ear-
marks to for-profit organizations. Such insertions are permitted 
by the legislator who proposes a bill in order to get votes for it, 
or to allow that legislator to insert earmarks in the bills of other 
representatives in return for the favour. Tax credits create simi-
lar corruption of legislation. As Kuttner (2008, 96) points out, 
these ploys ‘are hardly ever subjected to normal legislative hear-
ings; rather, deals are cut behind doors and the general public 
only learns of the intended beneficiary afterward, if ever.’ Pork 
barrelling is another attempt to pay for favours in which repre-
sentatives bribe electors for votes by spending public funds or 
locating government agencies or businesses in their electorate. 
Such deals often allow policies and programs to be dictated by 
the interest groups able to lobby for or buy them, rather than by 
the strengths of arguments for and against policies, as judged on 
their merits, either by the public or by their representatives. As 
a result, US scholar of international relations Chalmers Johnson 
(cited in Freedland 2007, 20) has observed that ‘the legislative 
branch of our government is broken’.
Such manipulation of electoral and legislative affairs could 
be reduced by legislation, but special interests pursuing private 
goods make it virtually impossible to enact. That subversive ef-
fect was described by Mancur Olson (1965) and public choice 
theorist Gordon Tullock (1993, 39–40) assessed it as ‘the crucial 
weakness of democracy’,
the evident bias of the political process in favour of voters who are 
concentrated and well-informed on issues that are significantly rele-
vant to them and against voters who are dispersed and ill-informed 
on issues that are less directly relevant … . [This is how] special in-
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terests penetrate in order to rent-seek, to the general detriment of 
society as a whole.
But in electorally representative democracies, special interests 
are only able to ‘penetrate’ by helping politicians to compete 
with each other; primarily for votes but also for money. Tull-
ock’s ‘bias of the political process’ — which has been dubbed 
‘Olson’s Law’ (Mickelthwait and Wooldridge 2014, 111) — might 
be mitigated or eliminated in two ways. The first is to reconfig-
ure the political process so that it brought together ‘voters who 
are dispersed and ill-informed on issues that are less directly 
relevant’ (to them). The second way is for the reconfiguration 
to provide incentives for voters to become better informed. 
The new institution proposed in Part 2 is designed to produce 
both reforms. This would change democratic government into a 
less representative and more direct form. If it worked, it would 
demonstrate that Tullock’s ‘crucial weakness of democracy’ is a 
weakness only of electorally representative forms of democracy 
and not necessarily of other forms. But as Zakaria (2003, 177) 
observes, this weakness
is the heart of America’s dilemma today. The American people be-
lieve that they have no real control over government. What they 
do not realize is that the politicians have no control, either. Most 
representatives and senators believe that they operate in a political 
system in which any serious attempts at change produce instant, 
well-organized opposition from the small minority who are hurt by 
the change. And it is these minorities who really run Washington.
Public choice theory has much to say about such corruption in 
electoral democracy, but it is viewed by some as misguided be-
cause it tries to explain and predict political behaviour as ration-
al utility maximization by actors such as voters, politicians and 
lobbyists, while ignoring their benevolent and irrational moti-
vations. However, the simplification of assuming that politicians 
are purely self-interested may be accurate enough because the 
competition that threatens to put them out of politics makes 
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self-interest their overriding priority. For example, public choice 
economist Peter Leeson (2006, 357, 364) has given a theoretical 
demonstration that
even when policymakers are partially benevolent towards the pub-
lic, they are still led to cater to special interests and society fares 
no better off than if politicians were strictly self-interested. Politi-
cal agent benevolence is thus an all-or-nothing proposition. Unless 
benevolence is total, policy looks the same … Despite its departure 
from motivational realism, if we get the same results with partial 
political agent benevolence as we do with zero, the standard public 
choice assumption is vindicated predictively.
Leeson’s analysis is based on competition between political 
agents for votes from citizens. The latter generally pay inade-
quate attention to public issues, so each agent must be at least 
as willing as her competitors to ignore public welfare by taking 
advantage of public ignorance to pander to special interests who 
may deliver votes. As Leeson (2006, 357) writes: the ‘absence of 
an effective enforcement mechanism for punishing politicians 
who cater to special interests gives political agents strong reason 
to doubt the commitment of their fellow statesmen to the public 
welfare’. His analysis indicates that this doubt will coerce politi-
cians to produce defective public policy as they compete with 
each other for votes.
Selectorate theory (which is outlined later in Chapter 10) is 
a public choice (‘rational choice’) approach to political science, 
as it uses the economist’s method of explaining and predicting 
political behaviour by looking for incentives, especially those 
appealing to the self-interest that is mandatory for success in 
the highly competitive environments of markets and politics. 
The major incentive recognized by selectorate theory is that 
competition for political office is so persistent and potentially 
lethal (at least politically lethal, and in some autocracies, bio-
logically lethal as well) that it compels each politician to make 
political survival his top priority. Selectorate theory therefore 
regards competition for office as a fundamental feature of poli-
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tics, across the entire spectrum from democracy to autocracy. 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 25)
2.3.3 Political competition intensified by commercial 
competition
In the last few decades, competition between politicians has 
been heightened by the media manufacturing and dramatizing 
it for commercial advantage. Public communication scholars 
Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman (2001) claim that this sen-
sationalism has been facilitated by a growing fickleness in pub-
lic opinion, which arises from increasing individualism and its 
weakening of traditional social ties such as political parties, the 
nuclear family, mainstream religion, the workplace and social 
class.
Relations between journalists and politicians have been transformed 
as a result. Given the fluidity and fickleness of public opinion, news 
coverage matters enormously to politicians and their advisors. They 
consider they are engaged in a daily competitive struggle to influ-
ence and control popular perceptions of key political events and is-
sues through the major mass media. They aim therefore to permeate 
and dominate the news agenda so far as possible. 
But political journalists have not taken such attempts to narrow 
and determine their news choices lying down. Wherever possible, 
they impose their own interpretive frames on politicians’ state-
ments and initiatives, limiting the latter to compressed quotes and 
soundbites. They concentrate on issues that politicians cannot keep 
under control, ones that reporters can run and break open doors 
with and apply conventional news values to. They put a spotlight 
on any weaknesses, failings, and blunders that the professionalised 
politicians may happen to commit. In particular, they continually 
‘unmask’ politicians’ publicity efforts, often saying more about the 
PR motives behind them than about the substantive pro’s and con’s 
of their records and proposals … The logic of this is like submit-
ting political communication to the ravages of a shoal of piranha 
fish … Thus, in democracies where measures across a series of re-
cent election campaigns are available, the balance of the evidence 
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shows that media coverage of politics is diminishing in amount and 
becoming more ‘mediated’ (dominated more by journalists and 
their frames of reference), more focused on power tactics at the ex-
pense of issue substance, and more negative. (Blumler and Coleman 
2001, 9, 10, 11)
Commercial competition does more than exacerbate the com-
petitiveness of democratic politics through the media. It is also 
a pervasive influence on the lives and attitudes of all citizens in 
democracies, for they must continually cope with and contrib-
ute to commercial competition as they consume and work. In 
some personalities this may encourage an ethos of looking for 
advantage to the limits of law, so that ethical judgment is ne-
glected and self-interest is followed to excess. Australian exam-
ples of this are given by journalist and public relations analyst 
Bob Burton (2007) in Inside Spin: The Dark Underbelly of the 
PR Industry. The title of the autobiography of a ‘numbers man’ 
for the Australian Labor Party, Graham Richardson (1994), ex-
presses a similar view of democratic politics: Whatever It Takes. 
Perhaps their training in, their experience in, and their inclina-
tion for adversarial behaviour is why lawyers and businessmen 
often do well in democratic politics. Bryan Caplan has observed 
that as the modal US politician has a law degree (with 70% of the 
presidents, vice presidents and cabinet officers and more than 
50% of the US senators and House members being lawyers) it is 
clear that ‘the electoral process selects people who are profes-
sionally trained to plead cases persuasively and sincerely regard-
less of their merits’ (Caplan 2008, 169, emphasis in original).
2.3.4 Exacerbation of political competition by 
ambiguous delegation
Ambiguous delegation may have a tendency to exacerbate com-
petition between politicians because uncertainty about who di-
rects government invites them to try to show the people that 
they, the politicians, are the directors. So they are encouraged 
to compete with each other to be the most powerful, as in con-
tests for leadership of their party, state and nation. If delegation 
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unambiguously gave the director’s role to the people, all actors 
would see those contests as less important and politicians would 
be able to restrict more of their competition to getting elected. 
They would also be able to reduce their competition by leaving 
argument over strategic policy to the people.
It is also likely that rancourous competition between politi-
cal agents encourages voters to either ignore politics or debate it 
with less civility and reason. This may produce a polarization in 
the community that further encourages rancour between their 
agents. As political scientists Marc Hetherington and Jonathan 
Weiler (2009) report, political polarization is now a problem in 
the United States, so it would seem that any measures that might 
reduce competition and foster understanding and cooperation 
in politics would be beneficial, certainly in that country and 
probably in many others as well.
2.3.5 Minimizing the damage from competition
Two general approaches can be employed to reduce the damage 
done to public goods by competitive struggles between politi-
cians. One is to produce as much policy as possible without hav-
ing politicians do it, which may be achieved by helping citizens 
to be more effective as the directors of government, as discussed 
above in §2.3.4. This calls for the ambiguity to be eliminated 
from delegation, and it would not only take strategic policy out 
of the hands of politicians but it would guide the tactical and op-
erational policy that it leaves them with, for strategy eventually 
determines the broad directions and limits of all other policy.
The other damage-reduction approach is to reduce the com-
petition between politicians. Here again, eliminating ambiguity 
in delegation is essential. If there is no confusion about who di-
rects the polity, then the competition between politicians might 
be reduced in two stages. The first is that the clarification of re-
sponsibilities would help to confront citizens with the fact that it 
is up to them to devise rules that moderate competition between 
politicians. These rules are a matter of strategic policy, so their 
determination by the people is a part of their job as directors. 
Moreover, this particular policy is a type that politicians cannot 
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be expected to make because, as a general rule, regulators are 
more objective and effective when they regulate others, rather 
than themselves. Any improvement in the responsibility of poli-
ticians that is achieved through their regulation by citizens may 
then produce a second stage of competition reduction: politi-
cians being more responsible about considering and choosing 
or accepting other changes that could further moderate incen-
tives for them to compete with each other.
2.4 Excessive compromise
As political scientist Mark Warren (2002a, 192) observed, the 
‘most famous objection to democracy, immortalized by Plato, is 
that democratic decisions are likely to be worse than decisions 
made by those better qualified by virtue of their knowledge’. 
Psychiatrists Wilfred Abse and Lucie Jessner (1962, 86) have de-
scribed the problem as follows:
In the democratic system of values, men have equal rights, but they 
are not equal in ability, personal development, and education. A de-
mocracy which promotes illusions in this respect is undermining 
its own strength: its power to foster and release the full capacity of 
the group.
Liberal democracy ensures that this problem will be ever-pre-
sent because of its universal franchise with one vote per person 
and equal power for each vote. One vote per person means each 
person has one vote for one objective: for example, in presiden-
tial systems each elector has one vote for a presidential candi-
date and also one vote for a member of each legislative body, 
such as a house of representatives or a senate. In mixed member 
proportional electoral systems such as in New Zealand, Bolivia, 
Germany and Italy, the elector has one vote for a member of a 
legislature and also one vote for a party.
One vote of equal power for each citizen ensures that high 
ideals, imagination and cultivated tastes are blended with low 
aims, insensitivities and disengagement in the public opinion 
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that representatives respond to with their policies and legisla-
tion. So competence is heavily compromised and the public 
goods that politicians deliver reflect average ideals and aware-
ness. Philosopher John Lucas (1976, 254) bluntly described part 
of the problem by observing that where
a democracy altogether rejects the aristocratic principle, and re-
gards it as undemocratic for anyone to acknowledge anyone else as 
his superior in artistic taste … artistic creativity is stunted, and the 
whole of society is submerged in a tide of tasteless mediocrity.
However, it is not only artistic taste in the sense of taste in mu-
sic, literature, art, architecture and so on that is overruled in 
this way. Any public goods whose values only become appreci-
ated through some form of learning are also likely to be ‘sub-
merged’ — either by being consumed to produce other things, 
or by being converted from public to private goods. Public 
goods of this more subtle type are often essential for the provi-
sion of other goods, for example: the public good of a high ratio 
of natural capital to population may permit a widely available 
lifestyle of residence in spacious rural or coastal environments 
and good opportunities for outdoor recreation such as hobby 
farming, rafting, wilderness backpacking, fishing, hunting and 
the observation of wildlife. Likewise, the public goods of free 
education, economic equality and political equality may foster 
responsible foreign policy and human rights. To illustrate the 
dependence of the quality of foreign policy on another public 
good we might turn again to Samantha Power. The public good 
that she discusses here is the competence of American public 
opinion.
Bush’s stated goals were to strengthen the US military, bring stability 
to Iraq and Afghanistan, combat terrorism, prevent rogue states and 
militants from acquiring nuclear weapons, and promote democracy 
around the world. In each case, two terms of Republican rule have 
been disastrous for US national security. The question is: Have Amer-
ican voters noticed?
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Joe Biden has. In an interview with MSNBC, Senator Biden, the 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was asked 
whether Democrats could be trusted on national security. He erupt-
ed:
‘I refuse to sit back like we did in 2000 and 2004. This admin-
istration is the worst administration in American foreign policy in 
modern history — maybe ever. The idea that they are competent to 
continue to conduct our foreign policy, to make us more secure and 
make Israel secure, is preposterous … Every single thing they’ve 
touched has been a near disaster.’
Poll data show that voters are in fact beginning to share Biden’s 
view and at last question Republicans’ reliability on national se-
curity. On Election Day in 2004 exit polls showed that a majority 
of voters (49–44 per cent) believed that the war in Iraq had made 
the country less safe. Yet those same exit polls gave Bush an 18-per 
cent edge in handling national security. (Power 2008, 68, emphasis 
added)
Power is observing that the average US voter is not well-informed 
about public policy, is slow to learn and that the US government 
has performed at about the same level. These observations are 
in line with the results of the empirical studies noted above in 
§2.2.2 and §2.2.3.
The problem of excessive compromise was indicated earlier in 
§2.2.5 by observing that the accountability of politicians to elec-
tors is defective because the ignorance of most electors on many 
aspects of public policy means that they are often poor judges 
of the performance of their representatives. However, excesses 
of compromise may be reduced by eliminating the ambiguity in 
delegation. This should work by making the people more aware 
that it is they who direct their government, which should spur 
them to give their political influence to those among them who 
are most likely to have informed and sensible views. The new 




The dysfunctional tendencies of liberal democracies discussed 
above are summarized by Figure 2.1. This shows three dysfunc-
tions producing two expressions or types of behaviour, which 
in turn produce government failure, that is, an underprovision 
of public goods. This view of democratic failure is called the tri-
ple dysfunction hypothesis. The five elements of the electoral 
process that are proposed to cause these three dysfunctions are 
separated into two groups in Figure 2.1 to indicate their differ-
ing effects. The upper group comprises elections, their frequen-
cy and the eligibility of incumbents to run for re-election; the 
lower group is universal franchise and equality of the vote. The 
upper group produces ambiguity in the delegation of authority 
and responsibility, causing confusion about whether electors or 
politicians are the directors of the polity. It also creates com-
petition between politicians, which is excessive as it interferes 
with the formulation and implementation of good policy. These 
two dysfunctions are indicated to interact by two arrows that are 
drawn thin, meaning that these effects may be slight. The short, 
thin, downwards arrow indicates that excesses of competitive 
struggle may be exacerbated because confusion about director-
ship widens the area in which political agents may compete with 
each other. Without this confusion they would compete primar-
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Fig. 2.1. The triple dysfunction hypothesis
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ily for election to the legislature and, to a lesser degree, for dom-
inance over each other for factional political influence and party 
leadership. But as this confusion exists, political agents are also 
invited to compete with each other for directorship of the whole 
polity, or leadership of the state or nation. The short thin arrow 
that points up from ‘Excessive competition’ to ‘Confusion of di-
rectorship’ indicates that the need for politicians to compete for 
votes encourages them to act as if they are the directors in order 
to impress electors, which may encourage electors to neglect to 
carry out their democratic role of directorship, adding to the 
confusion about who directs democratic government.
The third dysfunction is that universal franchise and equality 
of the vote make the polity compromise knowledge, ideas and 
sensitivity with ignorance and indifference. As described above 
in §2.4, this effect is also encouraged by confusion about direc-
torship. If the system of delegation was very clear that it is the 
people who direct government (with mass opinion more clearly 
controlling public policy), then citizens may be more likely to 
minimize any compromising of their wisdom with their igno-
rance. Because this impact of confusion about directorship may 
be slight, it is indicated here by a thin arrow. Excesses in com-
promise are also affected by competition between politicians 
because this coerces them to express and enact the views of the 
majority of their constituents, regardless of the wisdom of these 
views, in order to secure electoral support. This effect is shown 
by an arrow from ‘Excessive competition’ to ‘Excessive compro-
mise’. It is drawn thin to minimize emphasis, because the major 
compromising effect is considered to be indicated by the thick 
arrow pointing to ‘Excessive compromise’ from ‘Universal fran-
chise’ and ‘Equality of the vote’.
Confused directorship and excessive competition are expect-
ed to be expressed as an element of irresponsibility in demo-
cratic government. Confusion about who directs will do this by 
preventing electors and those they elect from being clear about 
which group has the responsibility to deliberate and develop 
policy. So both groups tend to leave this work up to the other. 
If one group does try to assume responsibility, the ambiguity 
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obscures whether that group should address strategic, tactical 
or operational policy, so irresponsibility still tends to occur, es-
pecially at the strategic end of the spectrum, as both groups have 
more incentive to focus on the other end. Competition between 
politicians for both electoral success and ultimate directorship 
(state or national leadership) will encourage irresponsibility by 
focusing them on choosing policies that appeal to, or at least 
do not offend, the ignorance of somewhat disengaged electors. 
The third dysfunction (excessive compromise) may have a rath-
er different expression: a degree of ignorance that then limits 
the competence of public policy. These tendencies towards irre-
sponsibility and ignorance thus cause democratic governments 
to fail, to some extent. In other words, as explained in §2.1, they 
underprovide public goods.
The two-way vertical influence between the expressions of 
dysfunction indicates that irresponsibility and ignorance each 
tend to strengthen the other. It should be noted that these ex-
pressions are tendencies only, not complete irresponsibility and 
ignorance. The triple dysfunction hypothesis thus offers at least 
a partial model of deficiencies in the behaviour of democratic 
governments and appears to indicate that confusion about who 
directs is the major cause.
This hypothesis describes government failure partially as 
an ‘agency problem’ (e.g. Stiglitz 2010, 13), which is that when 
agents (in this case, political representatives) are appointed by 
principals (in this case, citizens) to act for them, then the prin-
cipals may not be able to make sure that the agents act in the 
principals’ interests rather than in the agents’ interests. Agents 
often have some advantage over principals in that their agency 
gives them access to information that principals do not have and 
also some scope for action that principals cannot see or control. 
The first two parts of triple dysfunction are agency problems. 
Ambiguity in delegation gives agents a degree of freedom to 
further their own interests rather than the interests of the prin-
cipals, which is the public good. Excessive competition between 
political agents gives them a very strong incentive to look af-
ter their own interests rather than those of their principals. The 
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third part of triple dysfunction is not a classic agency problem 
because excessive compromise is a failure by the principals to 
fully consider their own good — the public good — as they issue 
directions to their agents and monitor their performance.
2.6 Checking the hypothesis by backward mapping 
from two democratic failures
The prediction of democratic failure given above could be de-
scribed as a mapping of consequences. It starts from basic dem-
ocratic structure to predict any consequences of this that would 
be failures of performance (‘dysfunctions’) by democratic prin-
cipals and their agents. It then looks for probable consequences 
of those failures (‘expressions’ of dysfunction) and then for like-
ly consequences of those consequences (government failure). 
However, instead of referring to this systems thinking as a map-
ping of consequences, it is here called ‘forward mapping’, a term 
that was adapted from public affairs academic Richard Elmore 
(1980) by two scholars of public policy and administration, Bri-
an Head and John Alford (2008, 16). I now compare the results 
of this particular forward mapping with two causal mappings 
that proceed in the reverse direction, which Head and Alford 
call ‘backward mappings’. In these, the circumstances of an ad-
verse consequence are inspected to see what may have caused it 
and then probable causes of this cause (or causes) are investigat-
ed for their likely causes and so on, as far back along the causal 
web as appears clear and useful for identifying points where ef-
fective corrections may be possible. Backward mapping should 
identify the same causal chain or web that a forward mapping 
of the same system reveals. The first backward mapping that is 
presented here investigates causes of neglect of the long-term in 
Australian politics and the second asks why many US environ-
mental policy problems recur. These problems are both failures 
in strategic policy, and as this is predicted by triple dysfunction 
theory, these mappings should test the theory.
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2.6.1 Neglect of the long term in Australian politics 
Marsh and Yencken (2004) have investigated why Australian 
politics neglects the long term, as shown by problems such as 
salinity, land degradation, deteriorating rivers, the effects of 
globalization on employment, inadequacy of research and in-
novation, public cynicism about politics, massive expansion of 
foreign debt, problems in the health and development of chil-
dren and youth, energy issues and greenhouse emissions. This 
political failure is widely recognized, as environmental scientists 
David Mercer and Peter Marden (2006) observe: ‘There is little 
doubt that Australian politics has failed to grapple with the chal-
lenges posed by a post-sustainable development society. The un-
willingness of liberal democracy to resolve environmental prob-
lems has been recognized for a considerable time’. Judith Brett 
has backed this assessment with her scrutiny of Prime Minister 
John Howard’s legacy of federal government in Australia. She 
suggested that his performance on global warming, related en-
vironmental issues and dependence on oil made him
similar to the now faceless and nameless men who condemned 
Galileo for claiming that the world went round the sun … after ten 
years in power we know far more about how he sees the past 100 
years than how he sees the next. (Brett 2006)
Marsh and Yencken (2004, 31–41) diagnose the causes of this 
neglect of long-term issues in Australia as threefold: ‘fake ad-
versarialism’; limitations of the policy-forming structure; and 
limitations in the availability of information. As they start with 
symptoms and then look for causes, their analysis tends to fo-
cus on those which are most immediately responsible for the 
neglect. The fundamental changes that are required to produce 
lasting corrections of the neglect of long-term issues therefore 
tend to escape attention. Marsh and Yencken (2004, 83) appear 
to acknowledge this in their closing two sentences. ‘All these 
changes will be in vain if they do not lead to effective action. 
There is therefore a final requirement — political leadership of 
vision, courage and conviction’. This conclusion agrees with the 
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diagnosis of forward mapping: that leadership is confused and 
therefore seriously deficient. The cause of this confusion — fre-
quent elections that are open to incumbents — is recognized by 
Marsh and Yencken (2004). They observe that the first of their 
three causes of policy neglect, fake adversarialism,
arises from the dynamics of the electoral contest between par-
ties … The present system is distorted by the way electoral incen-
tives trump attention to arguments based on considerations of mer-
it and prudence … electoral needs have required public contention 
between the major parties. Issues have been distorted or fabricated 
to create the appearance of difference or to undermine opponents. 
(Marsh and Yencken 2004, 31, 32–33)
This means we may replace ‘fake adversarialism’ with a more 
fundamental cause, ‘the dynamics of the electoral contest’, the 
operative parts of which have been suggested above to be am-
biguous delegation and excesses in competition and compro-
mise.
To explain their second cause of neglect, ‘limitations of the 
policy-forming structure’, Marsh and Yencken observe that the 
‘inability to create a public conversation about longer-term is-
sues is partly caused by the dynamics of electoral competition 
between the major parties. It is also caused by a number of 
organisational features of the formal policy-making structure’ 
(2004, 35, emphasis added). They list those organisational fea-
tures as (a) work overload created by the restricted size of the 
policy-making executive; (b) lack of access for interest groups; 
(c) inability of the policy-making system to create interest coa-
litions around longer-term issues; and (d) weak working rela-
tionships between the federal and state governments. Feature 
(b) here refers to a lack of formal access structured for fairness 
to all stakeholders, not a lack of the underhand access for special 
interests discussed above under ‘Excessive competition’. Marsh 
and Yencken do not remark that their four organisational fea-
tures (a) to (d) are also likely to be largely caused by ‘the dy-
namics of the electoral contest’. This is suggested to happen as 
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follows. The restricted size of the executive referred to in (a) is 
likely to be a response to the electoral imperative of being seen 
to provide strong, decisive leadership free of drawn-out inter-
nal argument, an imperative that arises from ambiguous del-
egation and excessive competition between politicians, which 
as noted above are two parts of ‘the dynamics of the electoral 
contest’. Problems (b) and (c) may be responses by politicians 
to the electoral imperative to be seen to be catering to the broad 
mass of voters, so they appear to be cases of excessive compro-
mise. Politicians are reluctant to confuse their simplistic appeal 
to disengaged electors by being seen to cooperate with minority 
opinions, however benevolent to the public interest these might 
be, because these minority opinions are not well understood 
by the mass of voters. Finally, problem (d) arises because fed-
eral–state conflict is almost obligatory for politicians wanting to 
demonstrate their allegiance to their constituents and impress 
them with their leadership qualities. Such demonstrations are 
driven by excessive competition and permitted by the ambiguity 
of delegation. We may thus alter most of Marsh and Yencken’s 
second cause of neglect of the long term from ‘limitations of the 
policy-forming structure’ to ‘dynamics of the electoral contest’ 
and in turn alter this to ambiguous delegation plus excesses in 
competition and compromise. So their second cause of neglect 
of the long term appears to be fundamentally the same as their 
first cause.
Their third cause of neglect, ‘limitations to the availability of 
information’ may also be largely ascribed to the ‘dynamics of the 
electoral contest’, which in this case is the influence of ambiguous 
delegation. To see this we may start with Marsh and Yencken’s 
observation that, with the exception of well-established regimes 
of economic reporting at every level of Australian government, 
the reporting of trends and conditions is inadequate, especially 
in social reporting. They point out that these deficiencies mean 
‘issues are buried, neglected by the media and given scant at-
tention by politicians’ (2004, 38), but they do not mention that 
these deficiencies are likely to be caused by a lack of demand for 
that information, which in turn would be caused by a lack of 
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interest from the public. But such disinterest is what one would 
expect from ambiguity in delegation, for this allows citizens to 
think they have given the entire task of choosing public goods to 
politicians — so they can focus on their private goods, including 
their purchasing power. Of course, analysts, media and govern-
ment respond to this strong interest by citizens in business and 
the economy by providing the relevant information.
Marsh and Yencken (2004, 40) observe that the limitations 
they postulate as causing neglect of the long term, ‘political, or-
ganisational and information limitations … are widely acknowl-
edged as the cause of present public disaffection with the major 
parties. They are at the root of public cynicism about politics.’ 
However, as indicated above, inspection for possible causes of 
these causes appears to show more fundamental causation: the 
democratic structures of frequent elections, eligibility of incum-
bents, universal franchise and equal vote, which produce ambi-
guity in delegation, excessive competition and ignorance from 
compromise. Marsh and Yencken’s analysis amounts to an ex-
hortation to politicians or to the disengaged electorate or to any-
one who might have influence to fix the political, organisational 
and information deficiencies that they identify. This seems un-
likely to work for several reasons. One is that few citizens are 
listening, as discussed above in §2.2.2 and §2.2.3. Another is the 
number of defects to be corrected. A third problem is that of 
making any corrections continue to work. If an underlying cause 
such as counterproductive structure is not corrected or persis-
tently countered by a new, permanent institution, it will pre-
vail by continuing to exert its effects. The reforms suggested by 
Marsh and Yencken are likely to be ignored or to fail because the 
existing electoral structure provides little incentive for citizens 
and politicians to support them. As these scholars recognize in 
their conclusion, the crux is leadership, so the major task is to 
make this effective and to do it in a way that is self-maintaining. 
However, the analysis of leadership given above indicates that, 
as this is the relationship between leaders and followers, then 
the performance of followers is at least as crucial as that of lead-
ers. Following the terminology used above, we might define the 
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problem of government failure more usefully by revising Marsh 
and Yencken’s view that the crux is leadership, by saying that the 
crux is directorship. This invites us to consider whether we can 
improve directorship by eliminating ambiguity in delegation.
2.6.2 Recurrence of environmental policy failures
In Table 2.1, the University of Michigan’s Steven Yaffee (1997) 
ascribes several types of failure in ecosystem management by 
successive administrations in the US to five behavioural biases 
of humans and human institutions. He proposes that the solu-
tions listed in the right-hand column may eliminate these biases 
and thereby produce better policy. This analysis was focused 
mainly on repetitive mismanagement of the northern spotted 
owl, but it recognizes similar behavioural biases in attempts to 
manage other species, such as the red-cockaded woodpecker, 
black footed ferret, California condor, whooping crane, grizzly 
bear, gray wolf and whales. Yaffee’s method is a short backward 
mapping as it identifies ‘policy problems’ and inspects these for 
likely proximal causes. 
To compare the forward mapping of the triple dysfunction 
analysis with Yaffee’s backward mapping, each one of his five 
biases (in the left-hand column, ‘Behavioural bias’) and each 
suggested correction for these (in the right-hand column, ‘Solu-
tions’) is followed in the table by a bracketed comment of D, C 
or I. These letters indicate that the relevant behavioural bias or 
solution identified by Yaffee is judged equivalent to one or more 
of the dysfunctions or solutions suggested by our forward map-
ping. In these bracketed comments, D stands for directorship 
(so under ‘Behavioural bias’, D is confusion about who directs 
and under ‘Solutions’, D is clear responsibility for directorship); 
C is for competition (so under ‘Behavioural bias’, C is exces-
sive competition; and under ‘Solutions’, C is the moderation of 
competition, for example by cooperation); and I is for ignorance 
by the polity (so under ‘Behavioural bias’, I is ignorance from 
excessive compromise; and under ‘Solutions’, I is dissemination 
of information or greater political influence for those citizens 
who are relatively well informed). The particular allocation of 
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Behavioural bias Policy problems Solutions
Short-term rationality 
outcompetes long-term 
rationality (D, C, I)
Poor long-term direc-
tion
Learn about the future. 
(D, I); Bind ourselves 
to the future through 
directives, informa-
tion and ‘fixers’. (D, C); 
Promote innovation and 
experimentation. (D); 
Find creative ways to 








that promote sharing 
and develop trust and 
relationships. (D, C); 
Protect those who may 
be exploited. (D, C); 
Focus on super-ordinate 
goals. (D, C); Be firm on 
ends; flexible on means. 
(D, C)
Fragmentation of inter-
ests and values (D, C, I)
Impasses; inferior solu-
tions
Promote discourse & 
values ratification. (D, 
C, I); Build political 
concurrence. (D, C); 
Promote education of 








Foster leadership. (D); 
Create coordinating 
mechanisms. (D, C); 
Structure incentives. 
(D); Develop clear 
measures of success and 
an ability to monitor 
performance. (D)
Fragmentation of infor-
mation and knowledge 
(I)
Inferior solutions Promote informa-
tion flows within and 
between organizations. 
(D, C, I); Invest in better 
data bases. (D, I); Build 
centres of up-to-date 
expertise. (D, I); Use 
data negotiation. (C)
Table 2.1. Behavioural biases that generate environmental policy problems and 
suggest solutions. Based on Yaffee 1997, 330.
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comments D, C and I that is made in this table is necessarily 
a subjective set of judgements and each reader might prefer a 
somewhat different set. But on the allocation suggested here, the 
broad impression is that Yaffee’s biases and solutions tend to be 
covered by the dysfunctions and solutions suggested by our for-
ward mapping. However, in addition to this broad agreement of 
forward and backward mapping, forward mapping yields some-
thing that Yaffee’s truncated backward mapping falls short of 
doing: It prescribes fundamental structural reform that appears 
necessary if Yaffee’s ‘Solutions’ are to be systemically introduced, 
driven and given permanent incentives to be maintained. 
Yaffee’s backward mapping indicates five policy problems be-
ing caused by five behavioural biases that might be ameliorated 
by thirteen different actions (the ‘Solutions’ in the right-hand 
column). Forward mapping produces a simpler set of solutions 
by suggesting that a multitude of policy problems (far more of 
these exist than just those in this particular set of ecosystem 
mismanagements) are at least partly caused by just three politi-
cal dysfunctions. Table 2.1 indicates that confused directorship 
(D) is probably the most damaging of these dysfunctions, as it 
is suggested to be roughly equal to excessive competition (C) in 
producing behavioural bias (both are noted 4 times here, com-
pared with 3 times for I) while it may be much more influential 
in producing solutions (D is suggested 18 times) than both C 
(suggested 10 times) and I (suggested 6 times) taken together. 
On this rough assessment, the most useful single solution might 
be to eliminate ambiguity in delegation. This is also the conclu-
sion reached in comparing Marsh and Yencken’s backward map-
ping with the forward mapping analysis of triple dysfunction.
It appears that forward mapping tends to find something 
that backward mapping may have trouble reaching far enough 
back to see. In analysing government failure, forward mapping 
starts with fundamental structure, so as soon as it sees problems 
near this level it suggests systemic solutions in the form of either 
changes to basic democratic structures or designs for new insti-
tutions that should prevent or rectify the failures produced by 
these structures. Such changes or new institutions should estab-
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lish and then maintain better governance, and they will tend to 
be a smaller set of remedial actions than backward mapping will 
initially find, for this starts with a multitude of symptoms that 
need correcting. On the other hand, backward mapping should 
produce operational and tactical solutions that complement the 
strategic solutions indicated by forward mapping.
2.7 Summary and implications
As the preceding two backward mappings of government failure 
appear to support the triple dysfunction hypothesis, it seems to 
point us toward corrections that are systemic and very few in 
number. As triple dysfunction locates failure in the structure 
of democratic government — rather than in particular circum-
stances or in particular actors such as politicians, bureaucrats, 
citizens and special interests — it suggests one of two major 
remedies. Either the democratic delegation of directorship from 
the people to politicians is completed by making the latter the 
absolute rulers, or the nature of the incomplete delegation is 
made explicit, so there is no ambiguity for politicians and citi-
zens. A third strategy, that of making the people the absolute 
rulers at all levels of public policy, is impractical because citizens 
do not have the time to devote to this. Some form of represen-
tation is necessary. The first strategy of making politicians the 
absolute rulers or directors calls for eliminating the frequency 
of elections, either by greatly lengthening the interval between 
elections, to, say, twenty years or more, or by eliminating elec-
tions altogether, for example by selecting representatives by lot. 
This strategy eliminates much of the accountability of politi-
cians to the electorate, so it risks the quality of public policy. 
And that risk makes it extremely difficult to get citizens to ac-
cept this strategy.
For the second strategy of making the incomplete delega-
tion explicit, the people and their politicians must be continu-
ally reminded of their respective responsibilities under current 
systems of electoral delegation. As these systems leave electors 
in the position of directors, they can only produce good public 
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policy if they realize they must determine the broad objectives 
that they want for public goods and if politicians know they are 
restricted to choosing the relative details of how to achieve those 
objectives. Under this strategy, politicians must regard them-
selves as executives or managers for electors who are their di-
rectors, so it is confusing for both them and citizens when they 
are called, or when they call themselves, ‘leaders’. However, it is 
unlikely that these roles will be permanently clarified by merely 
renaming or describing them. Most citizens would not hear the 
descriptions and in any case would soon forget them. Some 
politicians may ignore descriptions or titles that demote them 
from leader to manager. Descriptions will also do little to help 
either citizens or politicians to perform these functions. But 
new institutions may be able to continually remind citizens and 
politicians of their different roles while providing them with 
permanent incentives and assistance to perform in those ways. 
However, that problem of institutional design is set aside here, 
to be taken up in Part 2. At this stage we may begin to elimi-
nate the confusion arising from the word ‘leader’ by being care-
ful to use it with the specific meaning discussed above in §2.2, 
§2.2.1, §2.2.4 and §2.2.8, while using ‘director’ when we mean 
that, rather than leader. Both terms are needed to describe how 
a democratic government functions and how it should function 
if it is to be fully effective.
In respect of the citizen’s job of director, political scientist Di-
ana Mutz (2006, 150) cautions that deliberation and active polit-
ical participation are seriously incompatible. A citizen who par-
ticipates vigorously is unlikely to deliberate much and one who 
deliberates fully is unlikely to be an active participant. Mutz of-
fers two mechanisms to explain this: The cross-cutting exposure 
to policy issues that deliberation produces creates ambivalence 
about political decisions, which inhibits action; and crosscut-
ting exposure heightens awareness of the potential for involve-
ment in controversy, which also deters many from participation. 
Mutz’s first mechanism may include the following two influ-
ences: Paying attention to crosscutting arguments takes time 
and energy, so the deliberant has less of these for participation; 
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and this attention also demands and may cultivate an analytical 
or reflective attitude, which is the antithesis of the impulsive, 
action-demanding mood that may be needed for participation. 
The difficulty of producing both deliberation and participation 
in the same citizen must be ameliorated or overcome by institu-
tions that execute the second strategy noted at the outset of this 
summary, which is to encourage citizens to deliberate strategic 
policy and then assist them to participate by helping them to get 
their politicians to execute their findings.
The corruption of the democratic system of social choice that 
has been described in this chapter means that individual choice 
of private goods is very often able to take advantage of the weak-
ness in social choice to replace or overrule it. A major way in 
which this occurs is that citizens find it rewarding to avoid the 
ineffectuality and frustration of the muddled and rancourous 
system of social choice by focusing on individual choice. The 
market is adept at encouraging them to do this, as Reich (2007) 
describes in Supercapitalism and political scientist Michael San-
del (2012) laments in What Money Can’t Buy. So people focus 
on ‘me, now’, their narcissism grows, private wealth flourishes 
(for those who can get it) and the public domain decays. In Aus-
tralia, sociologist Michael Pusey (2003, 183) is deeply troubled 
by this progression, noting that with 
economic reform has come a thinning of democracy and an in-
duced retreat of the people into a purely private sphere of caring 
only for one’s own, of mood states, of consumption, of recupera-
tion, of therapy, and incommunicable anger at what is being done 
to them.
After many years of social research in Australia, psychologist 
Hugh Mackay (2004, 7–8) observed that Australians have be-
come 
[i]nfinitely more snobbish, infinitely more stratified, with a much 
stronger sense of there being a wealth class … who think they’re 
there, they’ve made it, we deserve to be here, we’ve got to look after 
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our children and those people well that’s just how it is … nothing to 
do with us.
Mackay’s (2004, 7) conclusion is that we need a much more 
‘compassionate, harmonious, generous, accommodating so-
ciety, paying excessive regard to the disadvantaged, the poor, 
the unintelligent.’ Triple dysfunction is a way of understanding 
why many democracies are in this crisis and others appear to 
be drifting towards it. In Chapter 6, this prediction is used as 
a diagnosis to guide the prescription of a remedy. Before this is 
done, the next three chapters further investigate the accuracy 
of the diagnosis. In Chapter 3, the performances of some lib-
eral democracies with structures and cultures that minimize 
triple dysfunction are inspected and compared with one that 
cultivates it. Chapter 4 looks at the characteristics of issues that 
make triple dysfunction liable to produce serious mismanage-
ment. It then gives examples of this occurring in three issues, 
each of which has several of those troublesome characteristics. 
The diagnosis of Part 1 is concluded in Chapter 5 with a more 
detailed inquiry into the way in which a fourth issue is misman-
aged by triple dysfunction: the issue of human wants for scarce 
natural capital.
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3 
SuSCeptibility to DySfunCtion:  
typeS of DemoCraCy
As the triple dysfunction hypothesis predicts that a major cause 
of underprovision of public goods is confusion about whether 
citizens or politicians direct this provision, it indicates that the 
underprovision should be less pronounced in polities that facili-
tate overt, deliberative directorship by electors. Some democra-
cies tend to do this with features such as proportional represen-
tation of multimember electorates (Milner 2002, 89), not having 
their head of government directly appointed as such by popular 
election, and having a consensual political tradition. That tradi-
tion includes governing with coalitions of minority parties and 
developing social choice with discussion and negotiation among 
all interested citizens rather than by concentrating on securing 
power. Citizen initiated referendums may be viewed as assisting 
such direction by the people, but they tend to neglect delibera-
tion. The Netherlands and the Nordic countries have several of 
these characteristics (Arter 1999, 151–55) and as a consequence 
they rank at the top of The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democ-
racy Index (Economist 2008c). The Nordic nations have been 
described as state-friendly societies with society-friendly states 
(Grenstad et al. 2006, 122) and they are investigated below, fol-
lowed by the contrasting case of the United States of America.
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3.1 The Nordic democracies
Political sociologist Jørgen Goul Andersen (2007) participated 
in a project investigating power and democracy in Denmark 
from 1978 to 1982. He observed that among the committee of 
parliamentarians that initiated this work ‘there clearly was a 
feeling of losing power, and more generally … that there are in-
creasing threats to the democratic idyll in the Nordic countries.’ 
This feeling was endorsed by that investigation, in which the 
‘most original result … probably was the finding that wherever 
we sought to measure power perceptions, we always found the 
feeling that ‘power belongs to the others’’. This echoes the tri-
ple dysfunction view that a major problem is confusion about 
who directs. A subsequent study of power and democracy in 
Denmark in 1998–2004 produced mixed results, but identi-
fied problems of declining political party membership, a grow-
ing gap between a competent and resourceful majority and a 
marginalized minority that is becoming more disadvantaged, 
increasing influence of the media, and a transfer of power from 
the political to the judicial system (Christiansen and Togeby 
2006). A similar study was carried out in Norway from 1998 to 
2003 and its chair, political scientist Øyvind Østerud (cited in 
Gjessing 2003, 1), concluded that democracy ‘as a chain from 
elections to decisions is weakened all the way … Parties don’t 
mobilize many voters any more, and young people are less ac-
tive than before, so the trend is likely to gather pace’. Together 
with political scientist Per Selle (2006, 564–65), Østerud has 
observed that ‘the Norwegian political system is becoming less 
distinct’ as large-scale ideological movements decline and inter-
est grows ‘in smaller and nimbler associations better at catering 
for individual needs and wishes, but also less able to plug mem-
bers into the central decision-making institutions’. Along with 
other developments, these have been interpreted as revealing no 
general civic decline (Listhaug and Gronflaten 2007, 272), but as 
Selle and Østerud indicate, they appear to weaken the political 
role of the people.
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For Sweden, it is relevant to note that in 1969 Prime Minister 
Olof Palme (cited in Oliver 1987, xviii) observed that his nation 
‘is to a considerable degree a study circle democracy.’ Study cir-
cles are self-organizing groups of 5–20 citizens who choose to 
meet several times to learn about a public issue. This is done in a 
democratic manner aiming at freedom of choice, critical think-
ing and exchange of ideas and knowledge. These groups meet 
throughout Scandinavia, in some other European countries and 
have been introduced to the US, Australia and a few developing 
countries. Study circles have operated for a century in Sweden, 
where they are financially supported by government and reflect 
a strong commitment by the people to use adult education for 
social change (Oliver 1987, xv, xvii).
Swedish political scientists Johannes Lindvall and Bo Roth-
stein (2006, 48) have observed that a 1985–1990 study conclud-
ed that their polity was ‘turning into a new kind of democracy, 
more ‘individualistic’ and more similar to political systems 
elsewhere’. Ten years after this investigation, its assessment was 
endorsed by a large Swedish government commission led by 
politicians, which called for the strengthening of civic society, 
more responsiveness by political institutions and a more ‘par-
ticipatory democracy with deliberative qualities’ (Lindvall and 
Rothstein 2006, 60). Lindvall and Rothstein argue that in Swe-
den there are 
troubling indications for the operation of democracy … One com-
mon, if maybe simple view of the democratic ideal is that the state 
should do what the people want it to do. With the development of 
ideological state apparatuses, Swedish democracy looks more like a 
society where the state decides what the people ought to think and 
do … The system still spins, but it spins backwards … The question 
for the future is whether the strong state will be replaced by some 
new model that provides the necessary focal points for debates on 
public policy, or whether stable norms will remain absent due to an 
inherently obscure division of labour within Sweden’s policy-mak-




Triple dysfunction, of course, suggests that this ‘inherently ob-
scure division of labour’ is at least partly caused by the ambigu-
ity of the delegation performed by the electoral system. Despite 
this, it seems that the ‘strong state’ in Sweden is supported by a 
relatively sophisticated public. For example:
Sweden has long implemented one of the most progressive en-
ergy policies in Europe. The national government enacted one of 
the world’s first carbon taxes in 1990. Ministers announced further 
ambitions last week through a plan that would increase renewable 
energy production to 50 per cent by 2020, transition the Swedish 
vehicle fleet to fossil fuel independence by 2030, and reach complete 
carbon neutrality by 2050. (Block 2009, 1)
On the other hand, perceptions of a weakening of the socialis-
tic qualities of Swedish democracy appear to be confirmed by 
the 2010 election, in which, for the first time since the Second 
World War, a centre-right government has been re-elected after 
serving a full term.
Svanur Kristjánsson (2004, 172, 153), a political scientist at 
the University of Iceland, observes that the semi-presidential 
constitutional framework in his country makes the role of the 
voter complex. Together with the decline of the party system 
and its membership, this means that active citizen control of 
government has all but disappeared. Instead, politicians cater 
to a fickle electorate, which means that they restrict their pol-
icy development to a narrow focus on economic stability and 
growth. Kristjánsson’s (2004, 153) conclusion is that ‘the Icelan-
dic system of governance has become a rather messy and com-
plicated political arrangement, thereby resembling the situation 
in other modern democracies.’
Reviewing the results of the Power and Democracy projects 
for Denmark, Norway and Sweden, Andersen (2007) observes 
that by comparison with other democracies they remain quite 
healthy, and from what was known at that stage it would be sur-
prising if the current study on Finland did not largely support 
this picture. He described the Nordic countries as having strong 
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representative democracies that rest on a solid popular base with 
high and equally distributed political participation conducted 
through capable mass-based parties and people’s movements. 
They have rich economies with solidary (pro-social) wage poli-
cies that ensure redistribution for a high degree of economic 
equality. Gender equality is highly developed and the regulation 
of business to make it comply with social goals is strong. Levels 
of political literacy, political engagement, electoral turnout and 
trust in politicians are mostly high.
However, in agreement with the Danish parliamentarians, 
Andersen (2007) notes signs of trouble: declines in party mem-
bership, in electoral turnout and in political trust; increased 
electoral volatility; weakening of voluntary associations; exces-
sively competitive behaviour among the media; concentration 
of economic wealth and power; and an increase in the impor-
tance of the market, not only relative to the state (both inter-
nally and internationally) but in the management of the state. 
Some of this growth of market power is indicated by lowered 
ambitions for macro-economic steering and fewer instruments 
available to government for economic regulation. As Andersen 
and Hoff (2001, 75) observed six years before, in some ways ‘the 
period of Scandinavian exceptionalism is coming to an end.’ 
Andersen (2007) points out that the decline of parties raises 
questions: What is to replace this linkage between citizens and 
political decision-makers? Are there new forms of participation 
building up to replace those which decline? He suggests there 
is a need in Scandinavia for a public debate on new democratic 
criteria for citizen participation, dialogue, deliberation and gov-
ernment responsiveness.
This sketch of democracy in Scandinavia suggests that tri-
ple dysfunction also occurs here, but to a much lesser degree 
than in many other democracies, presumably because the char-
acteristics listed at the beginning of this chapter tend to pre-
vent them. Proportional representation, non-presidential gov-
ernance (except for Finland and to some extent Iceland) and 
consensual cultures may all give the people a feeling that they 
have a significant role as directors of public policy. In addition 
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to citizens in Nordic countries having somewhat less cause for 
confusion about who directs government than citizens of most 
other democracies, there also tends to be less strident competi-
tion between politicians because their political institutions and 
cultures support a more cooperative style of politics. Moreo-
ver, compromise in public opinion may not be as damaging as 
elsewhere because less confusion over directorship means that 
citizens feel more in charge, so they give considerable support 
to institutions that help them think constructively about public 
policy, such as consensus conferences and study circles.
3.2 The case of the United States
The structure and performance of government in the United 
States provides contrasts with the Nordic democracies that also 
appear to illustrate triple dysfunction. Before we look at this di-
agnosis, consider the symptoms, such as those noted by devel-
opment economist Jeffrey Sachs (2009, 20–22).
When you compare the US with Canada, Western Europe and Ja-
pan, the news is sobering. Its child-poverty and infant-mortality 
rates are the highest, its life expectancy is the lowest, its budget defi-
cit as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is the highest, and its 
15-year-olds rank among the lowest on tests of math and science.
A big difference between the US and the rest of the rich world 
is that for the past 30 years or so, Americans consistently rejected 
‘government solutions’ to the problems of health, poverty, educa-
tion and the environment … 
In the past 50 years, arguing for tax increases to fund the expan-
sion of federal programs has been a political death wish … Jimmy 
Carter failed to close the deficit through higher taxes in the late 
1970s. And Ronald Reagan made tax cuts the down payment on 
every election since.
Gus Speth (2011) gives a more extensive list of problems, prefac-
ing it by noting
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a deepening sense that this nation’s challenges have grown so large 
that they exceed current capabilities. Reflect for a moment on the 
magnitude of the challenges America confronts. For example, in a 
20-country group of America’s peer countries in the OECD, the US 
is now worst, or almost worst, on nearly 30 leading indicators of 
social, environmental and economic well-being.
Even a well-intentioned and highly capable government in 
Washington, DC, would have severe difficulty addressing the cur-
rent backlog of major challenges. And, of course, the good gov-
ernment the American public needs is not the one that it has or 
is likely to have anytime soon. Indeed, right now Washington isn’t 
even trying to seriously address most of these challenges. Neglect, 
stalemate, and denial rule the day.
To our great shame, among the 20 major advanced countries 
America now has
•	 the highest poverty rate, both generally and for children;
•	 the greatest inequality of incomes;
•	 the lowest government spending as a per centage of GDP on so-
cial programs for the disadvantaged;
•	 the lowest number of paid holiday, annual, and maternity leaves;
•	 the lowest score on the United Nations’ index of ‘material well-
being of children’;
•	 the worst score on the United Nations’ gender inequality index;
•	 the lowest social mobility;
•	 the highest public and private expenditure on health care as a 
portion of GDP,
yet accompanied by the highest
•	 infant mortality rate;
•	 prevalence of mental health problems;
•	 obesity rate;
•	 portion of people going without health care due to cost;
•	 low birth-weight children per capita (except for Japan);
•	 consumption of anti-depressants per capita;
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along with the shortest life expectancy at birth (except for Denmark 
and Portugal);
•	 the highest carbon dioxide emissions and water consumption 
per capita;
•	 the lowest score on the World Economic Forum’s environmental 
performance index (except for Belgium) and the largest ecologi-
cal footprint per capita (except for Belgium and Denmark);
•	 the highest rate of failing to ratify international agreements;
•	 the lowest spending on international and humanitarian assis-
tance as a per centage of GDP;
•	 the highest military spending as a portion of GDP;
•	 the largest international arms sales;
•	 the most negative balance of payments (except New Zealand, 
Spain and Portugal);
•	 the lowest scores for student performance in math (except for 
Portugal and Italy) (and far from the top in both science and 
reading);
•	 the highest school dropout rate (except for Spain);
•	 the highest homicide rate;
•	 the largest prison population per capita.
In looking at some of this performance, economics journalist 
Jeff Madrick (cited in Parker 2009, 40) alleges that such ‘facts 
amount to about as conclusive a proof as history provides that 
the ideology applied in this generation has failed.’ Much of that 
ideology is an upholding of libertarian rights such as: freedom 
from restriction by government (for example, in gun owner-
ship); unfettered access to the entrepreneurial opportunities of 
free markets; and freedom from obligations to think carefully 
about the welfare of large publics, whether they are only of the 
present or whether they include future generations. This ideol-
ogy has been interpreted as driving the US to trigger the 2008 
global financial crisis (e.g. Stiglitz 2010; Madrick 2009; Krug-
man and Wells 2011) and its irresponsibility does nothing to re-
place faith-based thinking with the discipline of reasoning from 
critically scrutinized evidence. Perhaps this (along with the fear 
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aroused by highly competitive working conditions and poor 
social security) encourages religious belief to flourish in the 
United States, a phenomenon that evolutionary biologist Rich-
ard Dawkins (cited in K. Muir 2008, 17) sees as a major problem: 
‘In a Gallup poll 44 per cent of the American people said that 
they believe the world is less than 10,000 years old’. As a culture 
of excessive libertarianism is, in itself, an underprovision of a 
public good, it is arguable that government in the US is failing 
in this way as well as in the others listed above. But do these 
failures result from triple dysfunction? Ambiguous delegation 
encourages them by granting both citizens and representatives 
a licence to neglect the common good. Excessive competition 
between politicians must support this neglect by focusing these 
agents on opportunities for personal advantage. And excessive 
compromise must permit it by directing and constraining poli-
ticians with ignorance from the mass public.
Excessive competition is implicated as a strong factor by 
British political scientist Anthony King (1997), for he ascribes 
US neglect of public goods largely to the exceptional need of 
American federal politicians to focus on campaigning for elec-
tion rather than on governing. King describes American citi-
zens as ‘hyperdemocrats’, partly because they hold their repre-
sentatives accountable to a very high degree and partly because 
of their pride in their political system. This accountability is ac-
centuated in three ways: with the very short two-year terms of 
office for members of the House of Representatives; by selecting 
candidates via primary elections; and through weak support for 
politicians by parties, which makes elections very candidate-
centred. The system of primary elections in electoral colleges 
forces new candidates and incumbents to assiduously cultivate 
local activists, which means that Congress is fraught with dog-
matic conflict. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012, 269) have 
called for the electoral college to be abolished as it is (in the lan-
guage of their ‘selectorate theory’) a mechanism for keeping ‘the 
winning coalition smaller that it could be and, thereby, to em-
power politicians more and the people less.’ As ambiguous del-
egation stunts voters’ incentives to develop broad understand-
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ings of public affairs, their tight control over members of the 
House of Representatives will produce poor policy. This damage 
is reinforced by an aspect of excessive competition in which the 
enormous personal expense of campaigning focuses candidates 
on raising funds by pleasing wealthy special interests.
King’s description of the second part of the hyperdemocratic 
problem is that,
as everyone who visits the United States quickly realizes, they 
are … inordinately proud of their government, or at least of their 
system of government. Far more than people in other countries, 
Americans are brought up to idolize, almost literally, both their gov-
ernmental system, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution, and the heroes of American political history. 
(King 2000, 85)
As noted under ‘Personal involvement’ in §2.2.4, Dana Nelson 
(2008) has investigated this attitude by focusing on the prestige 
and power of US presidents, which is both desired by citizens 
and cultivated by presidents. This is such a prominent feature 
of American politics that Nelson gives it a label — ‘presidential-
ism’. She argues that it diminishes democracy by encouraging 
citizens to limit their participation to choosing their next chief. 
So when Americans feel a need for better national government, 
they look for a better president, rather than for ways of improv-
ing the quality of their own input. This reaction is encouraged by 
ambiguous delegation, but it would also seem that the absence 
in the US of two major characteristics of the Nordic democracies 
adds to the confusion about who directs government. These are 
the lack of proportional representation and an approach to poli-
tics that is less diverse and open-minded than that of the Nordic 
countries, as politics in the US lacks both a left wing and con-
sensual motivation. It is arguable that the citizen disengagement 
encouraged by ambiguous delegation is accentuated by the ab-
sence of proportional representation because this discourages 
minorities from debating, developing and promoting innova-
tive policy positions. As there is little prospect of such policy 
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gaining public attention through debate in Congress, citizens 
may turn away from trying to direct their government, either 
by ignoring politics or by focusing on political personalities and 
partisanship instead of on policies.
In addition to King’s observations, hyperdemocracy is also 
evident in the exceptionally extensive use of elections in the 
United States, with over one million offices being filled in this 
way. This is probably the most complicated electoral system in 
the world (see, e.g. Streb 2008). It asks citizens to make more 
decisions more frequently than citizens of other democracies, 
with the likely result that many fail to vote because they are 
overwhelmed by the task. At state and local government levels, 
elections may appoint not only the members of legislatures, but 
the executive (such as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney 
General and Secretary of State), the judiciary, sheriffs and school 
board members. According to the paradox of trust (see §2.2.1), 
this heavy reliance on elections should exacerbate citizens’ dis-
trust of government. The triple dysfunction hypothesis suggests 
that such distrust is well-founded, for selecting public servants 
as well as political representatives by popular election should 
further encourage underprovision of public goods. Political sci-
entists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2001) have, in 
effect, declared that the paradox of trust is alive and well in the 
US with their assessment that Americans’ disapproval of govern-
ment is provoked largely by the political process.
Another cause of government failure in the US may be the 
strong American emphasis on the production and consumption 
of private goods, as it directly competes with the provision of 
public goods (see §2.1). This emphasis is likely to be facilitated 
by ambiguous delegation because its confusion about who di-
rects government leaves citizens very free to focus on private 
goods. As this is the main focus of the majority of citizens, ex-
cessive compromise makes it politically influential. The history 
of the United States, right from the arrival of the Puritans, is one 
of seeking freedom from oppression in Europe, of displacement 
of the American Indians, of exploitation of abundant natural 
resources and then subsequently, of exploitation of slaves — a 
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history that appears to have fostered an individualistic, materi-
alistic and competitive culture. Perhaps this is why the United 
States has the most enterprising and vigorous market economy 
in the world. As King (2000, 81) observes, there
are few countries in the world whose collective ideology is more 
pro-business than that of the United States and where the climate of 
opinion is more favourable to free-enterprise capitalism. Yet Ameri-
can businesspeople — an immensely influential force in American 
society — do not love their government … This underlying suspi-
cion and mistrust extends well beyond the large corporate sector 
and is also deeply embedded in the small business and entrepre-
neurial psyche.
Kuttner (2008, 75) laments the damage inflicted by this suspi-
cion of government:
Obama is constrained by a fiscal climate of opinion in which right-
thinking people are supposed to be more alarmed about budgetary 
threats than about either the risks of another depression or a con-
tinued slow decline in the economic security and opportunity of 
most Americans. Regulation is still widely considered a pejorative 
word … large government endeavours are deemed to be outmoded 
by modern markets … 
As a consequence it appears that while presidentialism encour-
ages US citizens to neglect their democratic role of considering 
and choosing public goods, their libertarian and pro-business 
mistrust of government drives their politicians to neglect it as 
well. Under these conditions, government must fail to provide 
many important public goods, and as Sachs and Speth observe 
at the beginning of this section, this is happening in the US. 
The libertarian impulses driving this are acute. As King (2000, 
97–98) observes, much of the mistrust of federal government 
has ‘extreme intensity … of anger, frustration and betrayal’. It has 
been reported as driving the 2009–2010 rise of the Tea Party 
(Drehle 2010). Political scientist Alan Abramowitz (2013) sup-
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ports that view with a multivariate analysis of factors that are 
likely to attract people to the Tea Party. He found that the con-
servatism of their ideology was the most powerful, but next and 
more important than factors such as age, gender, income and 
church attendance was racial resentment and dislike of Obama. 
The Tea Party is disproportionately supported by Republicans 
who are white, conservative and very upset about the presence 
in the White House of a black man.
Some of the mistrust of government by US citizens may arise 
in them feeling robbed by it because their focus on partisan-
ship and presidentialism means that they lack practice at per-
ceiving needs for public goods. The taxation needed for good 
governance therefore seems like theft to them. King (2000, 91) 
observes that another
reason for declining trust in government in the United States since 
the 1960s has almost certainly been that a significant proportion of 
those at the head of the government have proved untrustworthy. 
They have cumulatively deprived the American presidency of much 
of its dignity.
This is likely to be decisive. It will cut through the usual dis-
engagement of most citizens on issues and politics because, as 
political scientist Susan Pharr (2000, 201) points out,
misconduct reports are likely to trigger what cognitive psycholo-
gists call ‘hot cognitions,’ judgments that carry powerful emotions, 
facilitating the retention of such reports … And indeed, empirically 
speaking, we know that across class, educational, and age lines, peo-
ple tend to be remarkably aware of major misconduct cases, often 
far more than they are about many other domains of government 
action or policy.
As ambiguous delegation fosters the delusion that the president 
directs the country, it allows the people not only to ignore many 
important public goods but to focus so intensely on political 
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personalities that, sooner or later, the presidency discredits it-
self.
In addition to these problems of citizens’ mistrust and dis-
engagement, the US system has another major flaw, the policy 
‘drift’ created by its separation of powers (Hacker and Pierson 
2010). Separation of powers is employed to produce checks and 
balances and operates between the executive, the legislature and 
the judiciary, between state and national governments, between 
the Senate and the House and between the people and their po-
litical agents through referendums such as citizen initiated ref-
erendums and recalls. Other checks and balances are the Senate 
filibuster, the two-thirds requirement to override a presidential 
veto, supermajority voting to amend the Constitution and pass 
legislation in the Senate, the committee system and the Senate’s 
excessive representation of small states. As discussed in §2.2.6, 
checks and balances are labelled by McGann (2006, 89–112) 
as ‘supermajoritarian’ because each one interferes with simple 
majority voting and thereby obscures the accountability of gov-
ernment to the people. McGann (2006, 115–52) argues that this 
underprovides public goods by damaging both political equal-
ity and public deliberation. This underprovision, or policy drift, 
might be illustrated by comparing legislation for sustainability 
in Germany with that in the US.
Germany’s policy portfolio comprises more than 30 legislative 
measures that address all aspects of sustainability, with binding 
long-term targets guiding implementation efforts and the neces-
sary review of policies at regular intervals. In the United States, by 
contrast, short-term incentives, fragmented regulations, and a lack 
of planning certainty — in the absence of a binding policy frame-
work — have dampened private-sector investment and technology 
deployment. (Buehler et al. 2011, 8)
Yet another problem for the US has been noted by political sci-
entist Peter Beinart (2010): a tendency for politicians to delib-
erately incapacitate federal government. The motivation for this 
started to develop when Bill Clinton became president. Bein-
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art observes that with the GOP no longer controlling the White 
House, a new group of aggressive Republicans such as Newt 
Gingrich, Tom DeLay and Trent Lott began trying to discredit 
Clinton by discrediting government itself.
Rhetorically, they derided Washington as ineffective and conflict-
ridden, and through their actions they guaranteed it. Their greatest 
weapon was the filibuster, which forced Democrats to muster 60 
votes to get legislation through the Senate. Historically, filibustering 
had been rare … 
With these acts of legislative sabotage, Republicans tapped into 
a deep truth about the American people: they hate political squab-
bling, and they take out their anger on whoever is in charge … Re-
publicans [had] learned the secrets of vicious-circle politics: When 
the parties are polarized, it’s easy to keep anything from getting 
done [because of the checks and balances in the US system]. When 
nothing gets done, people turn against government. When you’re 
the party out of power and the party that reviles government, you 
win … 
In recent years, Republicans have played this style of politics bet-
ter than Democrats. Winning elections by making government look 
foolish is a more natural strategy for the anti-government party. 
But there is no guarantee Democrats won’t one day try something 
similar … At its core, vicious-circle politics isn’t an assault on liberal 
solutions to hard problems; it’s an assault on any solutions to hard 
problems. (Beinart 2010, 14, 15, 16)
From the viewpoint of the triple dysfunction hypothesis, Bein-
art’s ‘vicious-circle politics’ is a product of excessive competition 
between political agents in the institutional environment of the 
USA.
On 5 August 2011, after America’s lamentable performance 
of initially triggering the global financial crisis, failing to ad-
equately reform its financial regulation and then indulging in 
political confrontation on the federal debt ceiling, the credit rat-
ing agency Standard & Poor’s made the unprecedented move 
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of downgrading the AAA credit rating of the US to AA+. On 13 
August The Economist reported that 
S&P’s political analysis is spot on. In light of the brinkmanship of the 
recent months, it argues, America’s governance and policymaking 
are becoming ‘less stable, less effective and less predictable’ … The 
gap between the parties had become ‘extraordinarily difficult’ to 
bridge, and ‘the statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have 
become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy’ 
… Other sober institutions concur. The World Economic Forum 
has downgraded America from second place in 2009 to fourth place 
in 2010 in its annual global competitiveness rankings. By the Fo-
rum’s reckoning, America comes a lowly 40th for the quality of its 
institutions, 54th for trust in its politicians, 68th for government 
waste and a dismal 87th for its macroeconomic environment. The 
World Bank sees a relentless decline in various indicators of Ameri-
can governance. Daniel Kaufmann of the Brookings Institution 
notes that last year 33% of American business leaders told pollsters 
that a big constraint was the ‘instability of the policy framework’. 
The figure for France was 14%; for Chile, 5%. (Economist 2011b, 23, 
50)
But respected congressional scholars Thomas Mann and Nor-
man Ornstein (2012) have proclaimed that It’s Even Worse Than 
It Looks. Their subtitle explains this as a product of How the 
American constitutional system collided with the new politics of 
extremism. In reviewing the book, Paul Krugman and Robin 
Wells (2012, 9) note that Mann and Ornstein
argue that Congress — and indeed the whole American political 
system — is close to complete institutional collapse. We have en-
tered a new politics of ‘hostage taking,’ they tell us, epitomized by 
but by no means limited to the 2011 fight over the debt ceiling … 
What the country faces, they write, isn’t a problem with parti-
sanship in the abstract; it’s a problem with one party:
‘However awkward it may be for the traditional press and non-
partisan analysts to acknowledge, one of the two major parties, the 
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Republican Party, has become an insurgent outlier — ideologically 
extreme; contemptuous of the inherited social and economic policy 
regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional un-
derstanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the 
legitimacy of its political opposition. When one party moves this 
far from the center of American politics, it is extremely difficult to 
enact policies responsive to the country’s most pressing challenges.’
… But ultimately the deep problem isn’t about personalities or 
individual leadership, it’s about the nation as a whole. Something 
has gone very wrong with America, not just its economy, but its 
ability to function as a democratic nation. And it’s hard to see when 
or how that wrongness will get fixed.
It is clear that the US is in a difficult position. The weakness of its 
democratic system invites wealthy interests to manipulate both 
public opinion and politicians. Government failure is evident, 
widely acknowledged and theoretically predicted, but counter-
measures appear difficult to devise. Moreover, any that are pro-
posed are not likely to be implemented by government because 
of its incompetence. As we have seen, this failure is a function 
not only of the inadequacy of US institutions, but also of their 
multiplicity and that many are intended to check each other.
As government failure underprovides public goods in the US 
it might be anticipated that it exacerbates citizens perceptions 
of uncertainty and threat. They might therefore have relatively 
elevated levels of fear and, as discussed later in §8.1, fearful re-
sponses are especially strong in conservatives. This may explain 
the extreme antagonism towards government by many of those 
people. As their attitude blocks government from limiting and 
reducing uncertainties and threats it is likely to amount to self-
fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps that is propelling the US in a spiral 
to the bottom, where strident self-interest and antagonism rule.
King and Nelson recommend several remedies for these 
democratic difficulties, such as: lengthening the term of office 
for the House of Representatives; strengthening the role of par-
ties (for example by replacing primaries with candidate selec-
tion by party caucuses and by allowing parties to contribute 
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more funds to their candidates’ campaigns); and replacing the 
presidential system with a head of government that is not elect-
ed by the people but by their representatives. The last change 
should help shift the public image of responsibility for the delib-
eration of public policy away from the head of state and towards 
citizens. However, if this shift is to be made constructive, new 
institutions are needed that assist the people to deliberate policy 
and to have political impact when they do. Such innovations are 
also needed for the implementation of King and Nelson’s rec-
ommendations. Those new institutions must be independent of 
government so that its failure does not obstruct them, yet they 
must influence government. This seems a formidable set of re-
quirements. The abolition of the US presidency is the last thing 
that the well-cultivated awe of this office would countenance. 
Moreover, few proposals have been made for new institutions 
that could facilitate deliberation by citizens while giving their 
conclusions political influence. Descriptions of these designs, 
together with assessments of their probable effectiveness and 
their feasibility of implementation, are given in Part 2.
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4 
SuSCeptibility to DySfunCtion: 
typeS of iSSue
The triple dysfunction hypothesis only looks at trouble and does 
not attempt to indicate the positive contributions of the five ele-
ments of the electoral process that it is based on. This search 
for weakness is crucial because, as observed in §2.1, private and 
public goods usually compete with each other for the resources 
required to provide them. These resources may be human, ar-
tificial or natural and any failure by government may be taken 
advantage of by interests that want to use them to produce pri-
vate goods, which may then create an underprovision of public 
goods.
To begin to see how pronounced triple dysfunction might 
be and to help recognize the situations where it would be costly, 
several possible characteristics of public goods issues are now 
suggested as being likely to produce some failure of democratic 
responsibility towards public goods. This failure includes lack 
of consideration of the interests of external states, groups and 
individuals, which is a failure not only because inconsiderate 




4.1 Issue characteristics that create problems for 
liberal democratic governments
It is suggested that the following eight characteristics that may 
be found in issues concerning public goods are likely to cause 
liberal democratic governments to neglect or mismanage these 
goods. The first five characteristics are suggested to have this 
effect because triple dysfunction tends to make democratic gov-
ernment ignorant (see Figure 2.1, p. 126). The last three — per-
vasiveness, competitiveness and ‘externalizability’ — are sug-
gested to evoke dysfunction even if these governments are 
well-informed, because they are likely to lack the high degree 
of responsibility (also in Figure 2.1) required to effectively ad-
dress issues with one or more of those three characteristics. The 
more of these eight characteristics that occur in any one issue, 
the more it will tend to be mismanaged by democratic govern-
ments, because of the ignorance and irresponsibility that their 
triple dysfunction generates.
1. complexity. Issues with this characteristic may have long 
causal chains, feedback loops, or be part of an interrelated web 
of issues. Social and ecological systems are rich in feedback and 
web structure, but as politicians tend to use short, linear think-
ing for easy comprehension by electors (H. Muir 2008, 41), their 
‘solutions’ to social and environmental issues may make them 
worse (e.g. Forrester 1971; Yaffee 1997).
2. abstraction. Constructive social, economic, environmental 
and international policies may be ignored by politicians focused 
on more material monuments to achievement such as buildings, 
bridges, trade profits and quick employment, because the visual, 
monetary, or personal impact of these immediately impresses 
constituents (Bennett 2008, 2–3). Abstract social problems such 
as the development of equality, public trust, community solidar-
ity, public rationality and education tend to be too cerebral for 
easy communication to a largely disengaged electorate. Prob-
lems of risk are abstract when presented in statistical terms, 
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so people and societies are inclined to ignore events with low 
short-term probability even if this becomes very high or certain 
over the longer run. Psychologist Elke Weber (cited in Bennett 
2008, 2) states that for ‘most of us, risk is not a statistic. Risk 
is a feeling … If I feel scared, that overshadows any amount of 
pallid statistical information.’ Abstract risks can therefore lead 
to disastrous inaction if they have high stakes, such as with 
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, 
earthquakes, pandemics, global warming and space weather 
events such as coronal mass ejections (for a discussion of these 
see Brooks 2009).
3. obscurity. Obscurity describes situations that societies 
have no previous experience of, or they have forgotten, or, as 
Weber (cited in Bennett 2008, 3) observes, they do not recog-
nize because humans have not evolved an innate response to 
the situation, through lack of evolutionary experience. Lack 
of recognition may also occur because electors who are not 
focused on governance do not recognize the issue as a public 
goods problem. Another form of obscurity is imperceptibility 
of the development of the problem, variously known as ‘land-
scape amnesia’ and ‘creeping normalcy’ (Diamond 2005, 425), 
the ‘shifting baseline syndrome’ (Arbesman 2012, 38) and the 
‘boiling frog syndrome’. Lack of an obvious threshold or dead-
line for action may also amount to obscurity. Climate change 
presents this type of vagueness. An example of creeping nor-
malcy being overthrown by the arrival of a threshold to produce 
an active democratic social choice is given by the Tasmanian 
issue of whether to dam the Franklin River for hydro-electricity. 
The physical start of dam construction scheduled for late 1982 
presented citizens with a dramatic deadline that galvanized civil 
disobedience, ultimately protecting the river. That threshold 
spurred into action a very direct democratic social choice by the 
people that may otherwise not have been made.
Another galvanizing effect in the Franklin River dam issue 
was the fact that the crisis was directly attributable to people. 
These can easily be demonised, such as business people asking 
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for cheap electricity (‘greedy capitalists’) and politicians and 
engineers wanting to build monuments to themselves (‘hubris’, 
‘empire-building’, ‘political dinosaurs’). Psychologist Paul Slovic 
(cited in Bennett 2008, 3–4) provides another example of this 
emotional responsiveness to human actors by contrasting the 
muted response of the US to hurricane Katrina of 2005 with the 
far more significant and long lasting response to the 9/11 ter-
rorist attack in 2001. Although it may have been contributed to 
by anthropogenic global warming, Katrina was an act of nature 
and therefore failed to trigger the millennia-old fear of having 
our homes and lives invaded by strangers that was evoked by 
9/11. Evolutionary psychologists point out that a major part of 
our environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) was a social 
existence of dependence on, and vulnerability to, other people. 
This situation created an ‘evolutionary ‘ratchet’’ or ‘evolutionary 
arms race between manipulation and mindreading’ (Orbell et 
al. 2004, 3, 13) that produced ‘the extraordinary sensitivity hu-
mans have to other humans’ (Smith 2006, 1021). As this sensitiv-
ity to others appears to be ‘a predisposition ‘hardwired’ into our 
biology’ (Smith 2006, 1016) it will express itself in democracies. 
As we have predicted, democratic polities have a tendency to be 
irresponsible and ignorant, so we might expect such hardwired 
instincts in the people to prevail without their appropriateness 
being examined for each issue. Conversely, the appropriateness 
of inaction may not be examined if human predispositions are 
not aroused by an issue because it is unlike those that were cru-
cial in our EEA. Such an issue can therefore be classed as hav-
ing ‘obscurity’. Global warming has this characteristic, as noted 
by Andrew Simms, policy director for the UK New Economics 
Foundation.
In their inability to take action commensurate with the scale 
and timeframe of the climate problem, the [UK] government is 
mocked … by Britain’s own history … The challenge is rapid tran-
sition of the economy in order to live within our environmental 
means, while preserving and enhancing our general wellbeing. In 
some important ways, we’ve been here before and can learn lessons 
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from history. Under different circumstances, Britain achieved as-
tonishing things while preparing for, fighting and recovering from 
the second world war [sic]. In the six years between 1938 and 1944, 
the economy was re-engineered and there were dramatic cuts in re-
source use and household consumption. (Simms 2008)
4. temporal remoteness of consequences. Issues with this 
characteristic are long-term problems. Slovic (cited in Bennett 
2008, 3) notes that it is ‘a very well established fact about human 
behaviour that we discount future negative outcomes a great 
deal, especially if it means having to postpone some immediate 
positive benefit’. As discussed above in §2.6.1, Marsh and Yenck-
en analyse the impact of this issue characteristic of democratic 
government in Into the Future: The Neglect of the Long Term in 
Australian Politics.
5. spatial remoteness of consequences. Problems of this type 
are geographically distant from decision makers and thus often 
easy to neglect (Diamond 2005, 424–25).
6. pervasiveness. The size of an issue, or habituation of citizens 
to it, may require a massive effort by democracies to generate 
the political will needed to manage the problem. This includes 
making sure that most citizens are informed and concerned 
as well as mutually supportive, so they have the solidarity that 
enables them to take responsibility and produce effective col-
lective action. Confusion in democracies about who directs 
public policy hobbles their capacity to create solidarity, with the 
result that pervasive problems such as overpopulation, species 
extinction, risks of pandemics and global warming are likely to 
produce dire consequences before the political will to confront 
them can be generated. Authoritarian regimes may find it easier 
to forestall such calamities — if they anticipate them, and if they 
choose to act. An example of this facility is the ability of China 
to introduce strong measures to control the birth rate in order 
to limit overpopulation, in contrast with the inability of demo-
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cratic India to make such a resolute attempt to face the same 
problem (see §4.2.1 below).
7. competitiveness. Rivalry over issues that divide the com-
munity can be magnified to a destructive degree by excessive 
competition between politicians in representative democracies 
(Dahl 1998, 150, 154–55). This may inhibit responsibility towards 
public goods, as described in §2.3. The difficulty that all nations 
have in acceding to calls for secession appears to demonstrate 
this as these situations are competitive, with separatists compet-
ing with the tribal instincts of the rest of the nation, which tells 
people that the members of their group must be loyal and show 
solidarity. It appears that one of the causes of the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda was exacerbation of Hutu–Tutsi rivalries by the com-
petitive struggle of democratic politics (Courtemanche 2003, 
191–93). Ecological geographer Jared Diamond (2005, 317–8) 
supports this view by stating that, in addition to desperate com-
petition for land because of overpopulation, genocide resulted 
here from hatred and fear deliberately fostered by the political 
elite in order to retain power.
8. externalizability. ‘Externalizability’ is used here to indicate 
the openness of a problem to interpretation by citizens and their 
political agents that it does not exist, or that it is caused or per-
mitted by something outside them or the groups with which 
they feel some affiliation, when it is either those citizens or their 
groups that are partially or wholly responsible for the problem. 
Two examples of groups that may have this role are political 
parties and nations. Such irresponsible denial of a problem or 
misinterpretation of its cause is here called externalization. One 
form of this is conspiracy theorizing, in which citizens blame 
evil intentions in others instead of blaming the circumstances 
in which those others are placed, or blaming themselves or their 
group. For example, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was 
blamed by many Americans on greedy bankers rather than on 
themselves for electing politicians who advocated deregulation 
of the financial market (Stiglitz 2010, 6). Three ways of external-
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izing are: (a) psychological denial, which is usually avoiding the 
anticipation of a painful outcome by refusing to recognize real-
ity; (b) groupthink, in which ‘the need for mutual support and 
approval may lead to suppression of doubts and critical think-
ing’ (Diamond 2005, 435–36); and (c) avoiding responsibility by 
neglecting to anticipate the subsequent effects of the immediate 
results of attempting to solve a problem. As discussed later in 
§5.4 this last form of externalization (i.e. not ‘thinking beyond 
stage one’) is very common, no doubt largely because ambigu-
ous delegation gives little incentive for either citizens or their 
political agents to thoroughly think things through. An example 
is given in §4.2.3, in which the provision of the public good of 
full employment is doggedly attempted by externalizing much 
of the solution from politics to the market. For the adverse im-
plications of this and other externalizations of associated prob-
lems, see §5.3. In that case study, externalization produces feed-
backs that stop problems from being solved.
The openness of an issue to the lazy, impulsive or wishful 
thinking of externalization may depend to a large degree on 
whether it has any of the preceding seven difficult characteris-
tics. For example, complexity may invite neglectful thinking or 
obfuscation by blaming others rather than confronting reality. 
Similar responses may be encouraged by abstraction, obscurity, 
temporal remoteness, spatial remoteness and pervasiveness. 
Competitiveness may present a more direct motive for exter-
nalization. However, although externalization is often encour-
aged by these characteristics in an issue (e.g. denial by perva-
siveness; groupthink by competitiveness; and neglecting to fully 
anticipate the chain of consequences by complexity, abstraction 
and obscurity), it may also depend on other characteristics of 
the issue, such as its social context making it attractive for other 
agents to be portrayed as responsible and its capacity to evoke 
horror or contradict a world view, as this can arouse denial.
Externalizability invites the irresponsibility that is predicted 
here for liberal democracies by triple dysfunction. Confusion 
of directorship and fierce competition for votes give politicians 
strong motives to respond to externalizable issues by choosing 
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‘solutions’ that do not require effort or sacrifice by their electors, 
regardless of whether they cause the problem, or contribute to 
it, or are best placed to fix it. This propensity to externalize solu-
tions is likely to be considerable, for evolutionary psychology 
indicates that the capacity for deceiving not only others, but also 
oneself, is highly developed in humans (Trivers 1991). Politicians 
will therefore be supported in their externalizing by the egoistic 
and pro-social predispositions of each citizen to do it as well.
A powerful motivation for the wishful thinking in which 
people externalize solutions to problems is their inclination to 
reject evidence that clashes with their world view. Slovic (cited in 
Bennett 2008, 5) explains that people ‘do their best to hold onto 
their worldviews … because so much of their personal identity 
and social networks are tied up in maintaining [them]’ He notes 
that the two world views with the most influence on percep-
tion and action appear to be the egalitarian and the hierarchist 
(Bennett 2008, 4). The egalitarian world view is a preference for 
a society where wealth, power and opportunity are broadly dis-
tributed and the hierarchical world view is a preference for lead-
ers on top and followers below. Slovic observes that what 
we’ve seen through this research is that egalitarians are generally 
more concerned about environmental risks over a range of haz-
ards, including global warming. Hierarchists tend to be less con-
cerned … The truly disconcerting thing about this work is that it 
shows how difficult it is to change people’s views and behaviours 
with factual information … People spin the information to keep 
their worldview intact. (cited in Bennett 2008, 4, 5)
This adherence to world view appears to encourage the develop-
ment of enclaves of people with similar views (Sunstein 2002). 
In wealthy societies people have considerable ability to form 
and join such enclaves by choosing their place of residence, by 
selecting those with whom they interact and by selecting the 
information that they find most congenial. So wealth tends to 
activate externalization in peoples’ thinking about issues by in-
sulating them from contrary views and evidence. 
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a comment on these eight characteristics. It was predicted in 
§2.5 that triple dysfunction would produce government failure 
mainly in strategic policy. The eight troublesome characteristics 
of issues described here support that prediction as they are more 
likely to be found in strategic than in tactical and operational 
issues. This means that the ignorance and irresponsibility gen-
erated by triple dysfunction is more likely to produce neglect in 
addressing issues that are strategic, than in addressing those that 
are tactical or operational.
4.2 Three cases of irresponsibility by liberal 
democratic governments
The eight characteristics of difficult issues described above may 
produce a degree of failure by democratic government that var-
ies from issue to issue according to the strength of these char-
acteristics in each issue. As triple dysfunction produces a de-
gree of irresponsibility and ignorance in government it tends 
to focus democracies on providing those public goods that are, 
from the citizen’s perspective as an individual, personally and 
immediately important. Examples of such goods are the avail-
ability of work, a prosperous economy, good public educational 
and medical facilities and freedom from crime. The irresponsi-
bility of triple dysfunction will also incline democracies to aim 
for quick results by treating symptoms rather than underlying 
causes, so most government failure will occur in the provision 
of public goods that are net benefits only over the long term. 
This patchiness and the delayed effects of failure conceals much 
of it from many citizens. Other government failures that citizens 
may overlook are problems for minority groups within their 
polity and problems in their nation’s relationships with other 
nations. These group-based issues may be spatially remote from 
most citizens and often characterized by competitiveness and 
externalizability, both of which invite citizens to react instinc-




Three public goods issues of strategic significance that are of-
ten mismanaged by democracies are now described, to see how 
significant such government failure can be and whether triple 
dysfunction appears to explain it. Triple dysfunction will be in-
dicated when one or more of its three components (ambiguous 
delegation, excessive competition and excessive compromise) 
appear to contribute to, or cause, the failure. The three stra-
tegic issues selected here are overpopulation, global warming 
and unemployment. Their management strongly affects the per 
capita availability of natural capital (defined in §2.2.3.2, Distrac-
tion by advertising) and this common thread is pursued further 
in Chapter 5 by analysing a fourth strategic public goods issue, 
the problem of democratic governments inflaming the wants of 
their citizens so that sooner or later they become frustrated by 
limits to their natural capital.
This focus on natural capital may seem curious to those who 
have not given much thought to sustainable development but it 
is essential when the sustainability of civilizations over decades, 
centuries or millennia is being considered. On such time scales, 
cultures can evolve and economies adapt to focus on whatever 
is most useful, be it services, intellectual property, commodities, 
manufactured goods and so on. But quality of life will always 
depend to a large degree on the ratio of natural capital to popu-
lation, for this gives people their biophysical requirements of 
space, land, fresh water, clean air, a stable and amenable climate, 
wildlife, fisheries, wilderness, ecological capacity to assimilate 
wastes, and many other renewable and nonrenewable assets. If 
this ratio is high, then these things will be perceived as abun-
dant and those that are marketed will be more affordable for 
citizens. Because the ratio of natural capital to population is a 
matter of strategic policy, issues that affect this ratio are used 
below in this section and in Chapter 5 to test triple dysfunction 
theory. As that ratio is of great importance to people, these tests 
also indicate that eliminating triple dysfunction is crucial for 
their welfare.
It is interesting to note that after the following three cases 
of government failure had been written, Jeffrey Sachs indepen-
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dently drew attention to two of them — global warming and un-
employment.
Climate science tells us unequivocally that we need to ‘decarbonize’ 
much of the energy system by the middle of this century. Yet ad-
vanced techniques for extracting fossil fuels — fracking, new deep 
ocean drilling and the like — dominate today’s economic and politi-
cal discussion. These measures may temporarily boost the economy 
but they would end up crowding out investments in low-carbon tech-
nologies. A boom in fossil fuels is bound to be a dead end. Short 
term priorities and long-term needs are at odds.
This disconnect also exists in the realm of jobs policy. Youth un-
employment is stuck in the stratosphere because conventional jobs 
have succumbed to advances in information technology, robotics 
and outsourcing, leading to lower employment and a decline in 
earnings among unskilled youth in particular. In response, econo-
mists obsess about policies to manage [consumer] demand. But that 
will not address these structural changes. New strategies in educa-
tion and training, and in smoothing the tricky school-to-work tran-
sition, are also needed.
These examples illustrate the difference between mainstream 
economics and the policies that are needed to deliver sustainable 
development … Mainstream economics divorces the short term 
from the long term. There may be big problems ahead — climate 
change, food scarcity, demographic shifts and poorly trained young 
people — but macroeconomists prefer to improvise today and wor-
ry about the future later. That approach also suits politicians, align-
ing the policy cycle with the electoral cycle. But it is not a recipe for 
producing robust, inclusive growth. (Sachs 2013, emphasis added to 
highlight a crucial strategic aspect)
We now inspect this chapter’s three cases of failure in strategic 
policy, to gauge their significance and assess whether triple dys-
function is the culprit. 
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4.2.1 Size of population
The reluctance of democracies to take the problem of overpopu-
lation seriously is consistent with triple dysfunction, as it is both 
ignorant and irresponsible. This reluctance has been noted by 
a host of observers (e.g. Butler 2004, 194; Attenborough 2011, 
Sulston 2012). After a surge around 1960–70 in public concern 
about growth of the human population, which was largely stim-
ulated in 1968 by Paul R. Erhlich’s The Population Bomb, inter-
est then began to subside and overpopulation is now, in effect, 
a politically incorrect topic. That attitude has been called the 
‘Hardinian taboo’ in memory of ecologist Garrett Hardin (n.d.), 
who noted that
Pacific islanders apparently have no hesitancy in explicitly giving 
taboo as a reason for stopping a discussion. By contrast, Westerners, 
with their cherished tradition of free speech and open discussion, 
would be embarrassed to say (for instance), ‘We will not discuss 
population because it is under a taboo’. Instead, they change the 
subject.
The Director of the UK Science Museum, Chris Rapley (2006) 
has observed that
so controversial is the subject [of population size] that it has become 
the ‘Cinderella’ of the great sustainability debate — rarely visible in 
public, or even in private. In interdisciplinary meetings addressing 
how the planet functions as an integrated whole, demographers and 
population specialists are usually notable by their absence … Unless 
and until this changes, summits such as that in Montreal (‘Beyond 
Kyoto’) which address only part of the problem will be limited to 
at best very modest success, with the welfare and quality of life of 
future generations the ineluctable casualty.
The very personal basis of this taboo is described by World-
Watch vice president Robert Engleman (2008):
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Discomfort with the topic is everywhere, not least among envi-
ronmentalists, who grapple daily with the ways human beings are 
altering the natural world … Who wants to reduce humanity to a 
number, or to see themselves as one? And population trends touch 
on some of the most sensitive issues in our experience: sex, race, 
childbearing, family size, abortion. Yet anyone paying attention to 
human-induced climate change or the ongoing surge in global en-
ergy and food prices must sometimes pause to think about just how 
many we are.
As predicted by the ambiguous delegation and excessive com-
promise of triple dysfunction, in democracies such personal 
sensitivity and aversion will be transmitted to politicians with 
little of the reflection or critical thought that might control it for 
the common good. Perhaps this is why democratic governments 
are unable to develop rational policy responses on population.
People who have strong interests in public goods that are vul-
nerable to population pressure, such as environmentalists and 
green politicians, appear to have quickly recognized this irre-
sponsibility of the political system. They have found that talk-
ing about physical and social carrying capacities and suggest-
ing corresponding limits to populations arouses political scorn. 
However, their resultant aversion to trying to reduce growth of 
population may not be entirely due to the obstacle of lack of 
thought encouraged in citizens by the ambiguity of delegation 
and then given political expression by excessive compromise. 
Excessive competition may also be seen to play a part, for ex-
ample in the following account by Mark O’Connor and William 
Lines (2008, 11) in Overloading Australia: How Governments and 
Media Dither and Deny on Population. They observe that 
more than a decade ago, Labor strategist Gary Johns, the former 
Special Minister for State, identified high immigration and the lack 
of a population policy as key reasons for the Keating [Labor] gov-
ernment’s fall. As Johns put it, ‘The Australian population has over-
whelmingly disapproved of the level of immigration to Australia 
under both Labor and Coalition administrations for many years.’
172
rescuing democracy
In his analysis, Johns endorsed a recommendation by Doug 
Cocks that Australia should aim to stabilize population at between 
20 and 23 million, with immigration kept to about 50,000 a year. 
To introduce such a policy might be difficult, said Johns, but it was 
a potential election-winner for Labor. It would be ‘overwhelmingly 
positive in national interest terms’ and would also show respect for 
the electorate’s opinion.
But even with victory at stake, did Labor have the ‘ticker’ to take 
on the immigration lobbies? At the Labor Party’s national confer-
ence in Hobart in 1998, Kim Beazley, Labor’s then leader, broke 
through the Keating era’s wall of silence, and promised that Labor 
would give Australia a population policy.
Unfortunately, Beazley was soon trimming his rhetoric in other 
directions, so that at business dinners and fund raising occasions he 
gave the opposite impression: that Labor’s new population policy 
would be one of rapid growth … Before long, Beazley was talking of 
ensuring that we reached 50 million people. No doubt his director 
of campaign funding was breathing easier.
This account indicates that although Australians have some 
concern that there are — or soon may be — too many of them, 
their politicians sense that they are more personally concerned 
about their employment and income and therefore want eco-
nomic growth. At the same time, politicians want financial and 
other support from business in their campaigns for re-election 
and this also compels them to promote economic growth, which 
is easily done by encouraging immigration. The vote-getting 
motivation that drives this blend of policies is basically the ex-
cessive competition of triple dysfunction.
Another indication of democratic dysfunction in the choice 
of the size of Australia’s population is that this failure appears to 
have been quickly recognized by the two political parties with 
very strong reasons to speak out about the pressure of popu-
lation on limited natural resources: the environmentally con-
cerned Australian Democrats and Australian Greens (O’Connor 
and Lines 2008, 166–75). By 1984, racist interpretations and the 
personal implications of the issue had made population too 
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electorally damaging for these parties to handle, so they ignored 
it until late in 2008, when Greens leader, Senator Bob Brown 
(2008), was spurred into action by the concerns of his constit-
uents about the effect of population growth on global warm-
ing, peak oil, a virtually nationwide shortage of fresh water and 
many other issues. He called for a national debate in an attempt 
to break the national policy paralysis on the problem.
The paralysis had been observed in 2002 by the Australian 
Minister for Immigration Philip Ruddock (2003, 108): ‘Two 
population inquiries in the past decade have … highlighted the 
very limited range of policy levers available for governments to 
influence population size … we have a very limited capacity to 
ensure any particular population target is actually delivered.’ 
The inquiries Ruddock referred to were that of the National 
Population Council in 1991 and that of the House of Representa-
tives Standing Committee on Long Term Strategies (into ‘Aus-
tralia’s Population Carrying Capacity’) in 1994. These were not 
the only ones. In 1975 the ‘Borrie Commission’ reported for the 
Commonwealth Government on population policy and then is-
sued a supplementary report in 1978.
In recent years net overseas migration into Australia has 
been rising, reaching a record level of 253,400 in the year ending 
December 2008 (Australian Government 2010) that provoked 
public expressions of concern at the population exceeding 40 
million by 2050. Although arrivals of refugees as ‘boat people’ 
create intense political debate, the annual maximum was 6,535 
in 2010, whereas the official Australian refugee intake is ap-
proximately 14,000 per year (Economist 2011c). In April 2010, 
the federal government announced it was to have yet another 
inquiry into the desirable future size of the population. Submis-
sions closed in 2011 and, in the words of economist and agricul-
tural scientist Doug Cocks (2012, 28), who has carefully studied 
Australia’s carrying capacity, this was ‘an inquiry which, in the 
blink of an eye, produced a 150 page masterpiece of glossy spin 
and bullshit. Talk about groundhog day. Very little has changed 
in 20 years’. Although the 1994 Committee had stressed ‘the dire 
need for a solid and comprehensive data base from which to 
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project in detail the consequences of various population sce-
narios’ (Newman 1994–5), the government has subsequently 
done no research into the desirable ratio of sustainable natural 
capital to population and ignores contributions of this type such 
as those of Cocks. He initially wrote a report for that Commit-
tee (see Cocks 2012, 28) and then, in view of its unwillingness 
to deal with the problem, put the issue before the public with a 
book (Cocks 1996).
The aversion of politicians in democracies to limiting the 
size of population may be seen in the contrast between the re-
sponses made by China and India to their population problems. 
The authoritarian regime in China implemented a one-child-
per-family policy in 1979, whereas democratic India has been 
unable to respond so decisively to the same challenge. As Za-
karia (2003, 251) observes: ‘India has been unable to engage in 
sustained reform largely because its politicians will not inflict 
any pain — however temporary — on their constituents.’ In 2008 
the Chinese government estimated that by the middle of that 
year the country would have had a population of 1.6 to 1.7 billion 
without this policy, instead of the 1.3 billion it had at that time. 
China has thereby ensured that its growth of GDP produces a 
greater per capita increase in wealth than India has been able to 
achieve (as noted later in §7.3 under the heading ‘PO2’, providing 
for a 1% per annum growth of population can consume more 
than 12% of GDP). China has also increased its per capita wealth 
with less decrease in per capita availability of domestic natural 
resource, than it would have done with a larger growth in popu-
lation (for a discussion of this effect, see §5.3). The Economist 
(Economist 2009, 31) reports that cutting the fertility rate (the 
number of children that an average woman has during her life) 
from, say six down to two, can help an economy in several ways. 
First, it increases the size of the workforce relative to the num-
bers of dependent children and old people. Part of that effect is 
that when women have fewer children to care for it is easier for 
them to engage in paid work. Another way in which lowering 
the fertility rate helps the economy is that with fewer depend-
ents households have more money for savings, which can be in-
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vested, producing capital. In addition, minimizing growth of the 
population maximizes per capita growth of capital, which is part 
of the per capita increase in wealth referred to above in compar-
ing China with India. Economist Hu Angang (Economist 2009, 
31) of Tsinghua University has estimated that half of the increase 
in Chinese GDP from 1978 to 1998 came from the per capita rate 
of accumulation of capital.
Another indication of the aversion of democracies to deal-
ing with growth of population appears to be that ‘the role of 
rapid demographic change in China (from large to small fami-
lies, with an average of two or fewer children) is rarely credited 
as central to the Chinese economic miracle’ (Butler 2004, 193). 
Instead, for example, Mahbubani (2008, 67–78) ascribes China’s 
economic effectiveness relative to India as due to China making 
much better use of the abilities of its citizens. Under commu-
nism the Chinese had eliminated class distinctions, whereas in 
India the caste system continued to block much of the popula-
tion from educational, political and economic participation. So 
when Deng Xiaoping, as chairman of the Communist Party of 
China, decided in 1978 to convert China’s command economy 
into a market economy, the country was able to develop quickly. 
Deng’s pragmatic insistence on meritocracy in both the Chinese 
Communist Party and business greatly assisted this process. 
From 1980 to 2005 China’s economy grew at an average of 9.5 
per cent per year, compared with India’s 5.5 over the same pe-
riod (Gittins 2006).
The omission by observers in democracies of crediting popu-
lation control with a role in China’s economic success may be 
another indication of triple dysfunction, for the effects of am-
biguous delegation may have taught these democratic observers 
not to expect a policy problem to be solved by citizens mak-
ing the necessary sacrifice, which in this case is restricting the 
size of their families. Liberal democracies tend not work in that 
way, except in desperate emergencies such as war. It is usually 
only in a sudden life or death crisis for a group (such as when 
outsiders threaten it) that the human solidary reflex is aroused 
to the extent that individuals willingly acknowledge that each 
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of them must pay a price for the common good. Only in such 
unusual occasions can citizens overcome ambiguous delegation 
by shouldering their social responsibility.
The following grim perspective on the importance of the 
democratic failure to address population growth may be worth 
keeping in mind. It was offered by someone who thought a lot 
about the future, the prolific author of science fiction, Isaac Asi-
mov. When asked by political journalist Bill Moyers, ‘What do 
you see happening to the idea of dignity to human species if 
this population growth continues at its present rate?,’ Asimov 
replied:
It’s going to destroy it all … Democracy cannot survive overpopu-
lation. Human dignity cannot survive it. Convenience and dignity 
cannot survive it. As you put more and more people onto the world, 
the value of life not only declines, it disappears. It doesn’t matter if 
someone dies. (Moyers 1988)
4.2.2 Global warming
A striking example of democratic irresponsibility is the re-
sponse of the United States to the reality and prospect of global 
warming. Most other liberal democracies also react to this issue 
with some irresponsibility, as indicated by their deficient perfor-
mances on Kyoto targets, by the EU taking thirteen years after the 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change to implement 
a dysfunctional Emission Trading Scheme and by democracies 
refusing to provide leadership at the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
summit, at its sequels in Cancun 2010 and Durban 2011 and also 
at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(the 2012 Rio+20 Earth Summit). However, these failures may 
be seen as less reprehensible than that of the US as that country 
was the world’s pre-eminent emitter of greenhouse gases while 
the problem developed and the US continues, together with Chi-
na, to emit more of these gases than other countries. Until De-
cember 3, 2007, Australia had followed the US in refusing to sign 
the Kyoto protocol. At the end of the Bush administration in 
2008 the US had no intention of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on 
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global warming and offered no credible alternative procedure. 
At the time of writing, it retains much of that attitude because 
of Republican intransigence, although President Obama is try-
ing to change it with regulatory restraints on emissions and his 
agreement with China’s President Xi Jinping of November 2014 
to combat climate change, which they reaffirmed in September 
2015. In view of the history of scientific knowledge on this issue, 
it is arguable that by 2008 the response of the US was 20 years 
behind where it should have been (Stern 2009). Global warming 
has been known to be a high probability, extremely high-stakes 
risk for more than 30 years. In 1979 the US National Academy of 
Sciences warned that a ‘wait-and-see policy may mean waiting 
until it is too late’ (Environmental Defense 2003). International 
recognition of the problem prompted the formation of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, and 
the urgency of the need for preventive action was emphasized in 
1990 with a declaration by 49 Nobel laureates, 700 scientists and 
the IPCC (Environmental Defense 2003).
This issue has always been recognized as politically very dif-
ficult to tackle, but each year of procrastination multiplies the 
magnitude of the task of curbing greenhouse gas emissions. It 
raises the speed at which that must be done to stop the warming 
and increases the cost of reforming economies that grow more 
dependent on emitting these gases with every year that passes. 
This failure of government is actually worse than a failure to 
face global warming as it is also a failure to deal with acidifica-
tion of the world’s oceans and with ‘peak oil’ — the prospect that 
world production of oil is currently near its historical maximum 
and within a few years will enter an accelerating decline while 
demand continues to rise. That third failure has recently been 
masked by the prospect of new drilling and ‘fracking’ technol-
ogy that opens up vast reserves of oil and gas from shale and 
coal seams. However, studies show that the production rate of 
each fracking well declines quickly so this technology may not 
be able to prevent peak oil (Strahan 2012).
As the country that has emitted the most greenhouse gas, 
consumes the most petroleum and is also the wealthiest and 
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most technologically advanced, the US has the greatest respon-
sibility to lead in forging the transition to carbon-free energy. 
That revolution requires new systems of supply, distribution and 
consumption which are extremely difficult to establish against 
the competition of cheap fossil fuels. The Obama administra-
tion is starting to address this situation with many billions of 
dollars being poured into reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and by stimulating scientific research, but this reversal may not 
be sustained and developed as opposing political voices are very 
strong.
A few details of the history of the US response to global 
warming illustrate its irresponsibility, while also indicating that 
triple dysfunction is the cause. At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit 
in Brazil, US President George H.W. Bush (cited in McKibben 
2005) appeared to follow the unconscious directorship of US 
citizens (which would be a case of confusion from ambiguous 
delegation), as well as the interests of his financial support base 
(a case of the pressure from excessive competition), when in 
response to suggestions that emissions of CO₂ be controlled he 
declared that ‘the American way of life is not up for negotiation’. 
The following Clinton administration talked in a more environ-
mentally responsible way, but had basically the same approach 
(McKibben 2005). In July 2001, George W. Bush’s Press Secre-
tary Ari Fleischer was asked if the new President would call on 
US car drivers to reduce fuel consumption to help tackle global 
warming. He replied: 
That’s a big no. The President believes that it’s an American way of 
life and that it should be the goal of policy makers to protect the 
American way of life. The American way of life is a blessed one. 
(cited in Miller 2001)
But in 2006, as the impending oil crisis became obvious to grow-
ing numbers of electors, America’s ‘addiction’ to foreign oil was 
at long last acknowledged by President G.W. Bush (KRT-Wash-
ington, 2006). This was 27 years after President Carter tried to 
tackle the problem by asking voters to take responsibility for 
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their democracy’s actions (Elliott 2006). In doing that he was, in 
effect, trying to overcome the confusion of ambiguous delega-
tion. Carter delivered his speech on the energy crisis on July 15 
1979, and although he had been intending to talk to the people 
earlier, he delayed for ten days so that he could consult more 
widely and give the matter deeper thought. Andrew Bacevich 
(2008, 31), a scholar of international relations, describes Carter’s 
earnest attempt as a resounding failure to understand American 
democracy, even as it ‘demonstrated remarkable foresight’ on 
the energy issue. Bacevich writes:
He began by explaining that he had decided to look beyond energy 
because ‘the true problems of our Nation are much deeper.’ The en-
ergy crisis of 1979, he suggested, was merely a symptom of a far 
greater crisis … 
In short order, Carter then proceeded to kill any chance he had 
of securing reelection. In American political discourse, fundamen-
tal threats are by definition external … That the actions of everyday 
Americans might pose a comparable threat amounted to rank her-
esy … 
The nation as a whole was experiencing ‘a crisis of confi-
dence … growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in 
the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation … too many of us now 
tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity 
is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns’ … 
Carter outlined a six-point program designed to end what he 
called ‘this intolerable dependence on foreign oil’ … 
Although Carter expressed confidence that the United States 
could one day regain its energy independence, he acknowledged 
that in the near term ‘there [was] simply no way to avoid sacrifice’ … 
The response to his address — instantly labelled the ‘malaise’ 
speech although Carter never used that word — was tepid at best … 
As an effort to reorient public policy, Carter’s appeal failed 
completely. Americans showed little enthusiasm for the president’s 
brand of freedom with its connotations of virtuous austerity. Pre-
sented with an alternative to quantitative solutions, to the search for 
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‘more’, they declined the offer. Not liking the message, Americans 
shot the messenger. Given the choice, more still looked better … 
Far more accurately than Jimmy Carter, Reagan understood 
what made Americans tick: They wanted self-gratification, not self-
denial … Whereas President Carter had summoned Americans to 
mend their ways, which implied a need for critical self-awareness, 
President Reagan obviated any need for soul-searching by simply 
inviting his fellow citizens to carry on. (Bacevich 2008, 32–41)
For a description by Bacevich of the American quest for ‘more’, 
see §5.2.1 in the next chapter. The democratic failure to act on 
energy that Carter attempted to correct appears to be due to 
confusion about who directs, i.e. ambiguous delegation. It is 
primarily the people who are confused in this way, but Carter 
was also confused in that he did not recognize the depth of their 
confusion and therefore the strength of their consequent disen-
gagement.
President G.W. Bush’s acknowledgement in 2006 that the 
US was addicted to foreign oil differed from Carter’s by allow-
ing for this democratic flaw. As the people were the directors 
he could not, and therefore did not, ask them to help (by con-
serving energy). If he had, the ambiguity of electoral delegation 
would have frustrated an exceptionally conscientious minority 
who complied while the rest chose not to. So Bush external-
ized the responsibility for solving the energy issue: he pushed 
it away from a confused, impotent system of government by 
giving nonconfrontational incentives to business to rescue the 
US with new sources of energy. Bush also continued this dys-
functional behaviour with his proposal for a counter-Kyoto 
AP6 group, which did not specify limits for carbon emissions 
(Hamilton 2007). This is consistent with the performance of the 
White House over the previous two decades, in which it had 
suppressed, altered or dismissed a dozen major reports on cli-
mate change, including the September 2002 annual report of the 
EPA in which the entire section on climate change was deleted 
(Flannery 2005). Such behaviour may be partially understood 
as excessive competition coercing successive administrations 
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to avoid alienating their ill-informed constituencies by asking 
them to pay for action on global warming. Ambiguous delega-
tion also plays a part by inviting voters to remain unprepared 
for their democratic responsibilities and ready to vote for politi-
cians who do not disturb their somnolence.
In his 2006 movie An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore despaired 
at the inability of democracies, especially his own, to face glob-
al warming. Staff writer for the New Yorker Elizabeth Kolbert 
(2006) lamented the studied inaction of the Bush administra-
tion on this issue: ‘It may seem impossible to imagine that a 
technologically advanced society could choose, in essence, to 
destroy itself, but that is what we are now in the process of do-
ing’. The head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 
James Hansen (cited in Herrick and Owens 2006), has assessed 
that if greenhouse gas emissions are not being curbed and re-
duced by 2015, there is a strong chance that positive feedbacks 
will tip the planet into an irreversible runaway global warming 
sequence. He warned that the Bush administration is blocking 
the transmission of this message to electors. By doing this, Bush 
was (in effect) recognizing ambiguous delegation and declining 
to try to remove the ambiguity. By this interpretation, Bush’s 
recognition told him not to disturb the people by pointing out 
their responsibility to perform as directors of their democracy 
by paying their share of the costs of halting global warming. 
Bush’s political experience would also have attuned him to ex-
cessive competition, conditioning him to avoid losing votes by 
confronting voters with their responsibilities. As pointed out 
above, President Carter appeared to be less politically percep-
tive, which would have made him less acutely aware of the am-
biguity of delegation, of the threat of political competition and 
of the need for compromise. He came to Washington as the ulti-
mate political outsider, having served only one term as governor 
of Georgia, thus apparently never mastering the arts of inspiring 
the people, of working with Congress, and of working with his 
own party (Kuttner 2008, 55–57).
A well-known aspect of democratic performance on global 
warming is the manipulation of policy by sections of the fos-
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sil fuel industry such as ExxonMobil, who are more concerned 
about their immediate sales prospects than the future of society 
(e.g. Bull 2007; Hamilton 2007). These special interest groups 
distort public information and offer incentives to politicians to 
bias policy, with the result that Mark Chandler (cited in Wil-
liams 2006), a palaeoclimate modeller at the Columbia Uni-
versity Center for Climate Systems Research, observed: ‘we are 
not getting our politicians to vet their comments based on sci-
ence … Instead we have a situation where our scientists are hav-
ing to worry about what they say — can you see me sweating 
right now?’ Hansen (2006, 12) evinced this fear by invoking the 
protection of the First Amendment of the US Constitution be-
fore warning of the dire consequences of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. However, some fossil fuel-dependent companies are very 
concerned (either for society or for their public image of social 
responsibility or for future profits from their investments), so 
they warn government and the public about the need to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions. Their long time-horizons for returns 
on capital expenditure (for example a 50-year life for a coal-fired 
power station) encourage them to try to get sound public policy 
developed, as a more reliable basis for investment. A scathing 
Washington Post op-ed (Worldwatch 2006) has noted that busi-
ness activism may offer the best hope of moving the US govern-
ment to address global warming, observing that several large 
companies are pushing the UK government to increase its efforts 
to reduce carbon emissions. Cinergy, a corporation that oper-
ates nine coal-fired power plants in the US, asked President G. 
W. Bush to regulate its industry for greenhouse gas emissions 
(Fonda 2006). Linda Fisher, DuPont’s chief sustainability offic-
er, reports: ‘We learned that we have to be ahead of legislation’ 
(cited in Kluger 2007, 42).
In contrast with the failure of federal US policy on global 
warming, California has a more constructive approach, which 
nevertheless also appears consistent with triple dysfunction. 
In September 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger approved the 
Global Warming Solutions Act, which requires a 25 per cent 
cut in the state’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and 80 per 
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cent by 2050. In doing this he virtually defied his own party, as 
the bill received only a single Republican vote (Breslau 2007). 
Early in 2007 he issued an executive order requiring a 10 per 
cent reduction in the carbon content of all transportation fuels 
by 2020. Schwarzenegger (cited in Breslau 2007, 70) regarded 
federal denial on this issue as ‘embarrassing’ and observed 
that what ‘we’re basically saying to the federal government is 
‘Look, we don’t need Washington’ … let us let the world know 
that America is actually fighting global warming’. Several other 
US states are taking a similar line, although not to this degree. 
Schwarzenegger’s approach reflects both his long-standing con-
cern for the environment and his confidence in the ability of 
technology to solve problems. But an enabling factor may be 
what New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (Breslau 2007, 70) 
terms Schwarzenegger’s ‘star power’. His popularity as a former 
macho muscle-man and film star may give him a freedom to 
choose policies that would cripple the electoral prospects of 
politicians without such a backup source of public approval. 
However, journalist Karen Breslau (2007, 72–73) notes
there is concern that his approach places too little emphasis on the 
need for Americans to reform their consumption habits, from run-
ning their air conditioners around the clock to driving (yes) their 
SUVs. ‘He likes to give the impression that you can have it all,’ says 
Bill Magavern, a Sierra Club representative in Sacramento. ‘He is 
overly optimistic about the ability of the market to solve our prob-
lems.’
So although it looks as though ‘star power’ in a politician may 
enable him to withstand the pressure of triple dysfunction’s ex-
cessive competition to some degree, that pressure may still make 
him espouse populist policy. And this is often dysfunctional, for 
the ambiguity of delegation encourages citizens to think that 
they do not have to give careful consideration to public affairs.
Australian federal government behaves in a similar way to 
that of the US. An illustration was given by ‘The Greenhouse 
Mafia’ on ABCTV 4Corners (Cohen 2006), in which former Cli-
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mate Director for the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO), Graeme Pearman, stated that 
‘scientists are no longer as free to speak as they were’. Barrie 
Pittock, former CSIRO Climate Impact leader, backed this up: 
‘I was expressly told not to talk about … how you might reduce 
greenhouse gases’. In the same program, Guy Pearse, former 
speechwriter for an Australian Minister for the Environment, 
claimed that ‘greenhouse policy is being driven by the mining 
and energy sectors.’ This irresponsibility by Australian govern-
ment has been summed up by Tim Flannery (cited in Hodge 
and Wahlquist 2006, 8).
What we do with coal is shovel it out of the ground as quick as 
we can, contribute to a global pollution problem, and then say we 
don’t want to have anything to do with the international treaty that 
is meant to deal with this problem, which is Kyoto. We do the same 
thing with uranium. I just think that is morally abhorrent and very, 
very wrong.
Such behaviour appears to show ambiguous delegation facilitat-
ing the expression of the egoistic interests of disengaged elec-
tors, while excessive competition between politicians does the 
same for the narrow interests of wealthy special interest groups. 
Responding to this government failure, the president of Aus-
tralasian BP, Gerry Hueston (The Mercury 2005, 4), appealed to 
his industry to work together to develop renewable alternatives 
to hydrocarbon fuels: ‘My view is that we are running out of 
time to deal with the environmental consequences of fossil fuels 
much faster than we are running down our stocks of them.’ The 
Business Council of Australia has indicated a similar concern 
about deficiencies in public policy by calling for more effective 
strategic planning in politics (Marsh and Yencken 2004). So we 
see a few attempts by Australian private enterprise, whose role 
is to supply private goods, to try to do government’s job as well, 
that of providing public goods. As with Du Pont’s Linda Fisher, 
some Australian businesspeople realize they must intervene to 
try to produce a stable and productive environment for their 
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investments. But part of their reaction may also be social re-
sponsibility: Business managers are members of the community 
and as they are often comparatively well informed they may de-
velop concerns for society’s future well before the average voter 
perceives those problems.
A complaint by the former Beatle, Paul McCartney — lat-
er to be echoed by environmental writer George Monbiot 
(2015) — provides another indication of triple dysfunction in 
responses by democracies to global warming. McCartney was 
reacting to the situation reported in 2006 by the United Nations 
that, world-wide, cattle-rearing generates more greenhouse ef-
fect through methane emissions than the carbon dioxide emit-
ted by transportation.
The biggest change anyone could make in their own lifestyle would 
be to become vegetarian … It’s very surprising that most major envi-
ronmental organisations are leaving the option of going vegetarian 
off their lists of top ways to curtail global warming. (cited in Reuters 
2008)
By staying silent on vegetarianism, environmental NGOs (EN-
GOs) avoid confronting their members and supporters with the 
challenge of a very personal discipline. Perhaps they recognize 
that such advocacy risks damaging their causes by asking more 
of people than many will tolerate, especially if they have no as-
surance that most citizens will join with them to make their 
effort effective. ENGOs’ avoidance of asking people to become 
vegetarian may also indicate that they recognize politicians 
in democracies are in a similar position. They too cannot ask 
citizens to pay significant additional personal costs for public 
goods, especially if most of them have little appreciation of the 
need for these goods (which produces the ‘excessive’ in excessive 
compromise) and no assurance that an effective majority will 
respond to the appeal (as ambiguous delegation does not make 
it clear to all citizens that they are jointly responsible for pub-
lic policy). The same situations were observed above for both 
environmental organisations and politicians on another very 
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personal issue: size of population. These two examples of policy 
paralysis indicate that citizens of democracies are (1) divorced 
from feeling responsible for crucial public goods, which gives 
them a tendency (2) to be ignorant of those goods and of their 
needs for them, while (3) politicians follow this irresponsibility 
and ignorance. This is triple dysfunction, as the first and third 
of these circumstances would be respectively produced by am-
biguous delegation and excessive competition, while as noted 
above, the second is what produces the ‘excessive’ in excessive 
compromise.
4.2.3 Unemployment
When a lack of employment is significant, the almost invariable 
response of liberal democratic governments is to externalize 
their responsibility to provide the public good of employment 
for all, by looking outside the political world of electors and 
politicians to the world of industry and commerce for an an-
swer. They do this by trying to produce more economic growth, 
in order to provide more work, which hopefully will produce 
jobs for those who need them. Private enterprise welcomes this 
approach, for it means more profit. And pleasing private enter-
prise seems good to politicians, for it funds much of their elec-
tion campaigns and runs most of the media. Pleasing business is 
thus at least partly a response of politicians to the competition 
between them.
The alternative to producing more economic growth in order 
to minimize unemployment is to share more equitably what-
ever work already exists (e.g. Bosch 2000), but this is usually 
ignored by politicians because it requires them to internalize 
the issue within politics by organizing that sharing. This would 
have them asking the majority of electors to change their life-
style by earning less income through working fewer hours, days 
or weeks, so that the minority that are unemployed may have 
a share. It also appears to require politicians to ask businesses 
to reorganize themselves to facilitate the sharing of work. That 
appearance is created by ambiguous delegation, because this 
leaves citizens free to assume that it is not them but politicians 
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who are responsible for public goods such as the availability of 
work. Excessive competition between politicians supports that 
appearance by coercing politicians to avoid pointing out to citi-
zens that in a democracy it is citizens who are ultimately respon-
sible for public goods. Politicians usually do not risk losing votes 
at the next election by asking electors to pay personal costs for 
public goods, such as the time and effort of contributing to pub-
lic campaigns to get businesses to provide more part-time work.
So both politicians and citizens externalize the problem from 
democratic politics, by trying to expand the economy instead of 
by sharing employment. Ambiguous delegation and excessive 
competition thus produce the absurdity that the introduction of 
labour-saving technology is used to make people work as much 
as before and possibly even more (an effect described below in 
§5.3.1 as ‘affluenza’), rather than to give them more leisure time. 
As ambiguous delegation allows citizens to avoid taking on the 
responsibility for eliminating unemployment, it may also allow 
them to develop a culture of complaint, in which they react to 
difficult personal circumstances by blaming politicians instead 
of dealing with these situations themselves. Citizens might as-
sume this responsibility by being more appreciative and sup-
portive of government unemployment benefits, by regarding 
changes of work as a normal occurrence that may happen sev-
eral times during their life (and thus being more prepared to 
relocate or retrain for future employment) and by demanding 
that their politicians organize incentives and opportunities for 
work-sharing.
Excessive compromise also plays a part. Most citizens do not 
think enough about unemployment to realize that work sharing 
is a practical solution to the problem that can also improve their 
quality of life, both in the short term via the work-leisure bal-
ance of the individual and in the long term by limiting impacts 
on natural resources (as discussed in the next chapter). So mass 
opinion neglects this option and excessive competition coerces 
politicians to implement the neglect.
Economist Herman Daly has emphasized the adverse impact 
on quality of life of the inflexibility of working time, calling for 
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restrictions on advertising so that it no longer drives people to 
spend more and therefore to work long hours.
For the Classical Economists the length of the working day was a 
key variable by which the worker (self employed yeoman or artisan) 
balanced the marginal disutility of labour with the marginal utility 
of income and leisure so as to maximize enjoyment of life. Under 
industrialization the length of the working day became a parameter 
rather than a variable (and for Karl Marx was the key determinant 
of the rate of exploitation). We need to make it more of a variable 
subject to choice by the worker. And we should stop biasing the 
labor–leisure choice by advertising to stimulate more consumption 
and more labor to pay for it. Advertising should no longer be treated 
as a tax deductible ordinary expense of production. (Daly 2009, 4)
Economist Robert Skidelsky and his son, philosopher Edward 
(2012, 208–11) also argue for an end to the tax deductibility of 
company spending on advertising. They note that if ‘advertis-
ing inflames our tendency to insatiability, there is a strong case 
for restricting it’ and point out that many European countries 
already do some of this. By distorting the public good of choice 
between work and leisure, advertising causes many other public 
goods to be neglected, as discussed previously in §2.2.3.2 and 
later in §5.3. Economist David George calls this distortion the 
creation of ‘unpreferred preferences’ and, in considering how it 
may be corrected, notes that a
step that must precede public action is a growth in public under-
standing that unbridled persuasion can be harmful … A first step in 
correcting for market inefficiency in the shaping of tastes must thus 
be the project of convincing contemporary society that the evalua-
tion of tastes is a coherent and legitimate exercise. Only then will 
the spreading legitimization of market forces be slowed and will 
concrete steps emerge for the efficient channelling of the forces of 
preference creation. And only then will private desires to work long 
hours be lessened. (George 2000, 138)
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Tim Jackson (2009, 180) sees work sharing as essential in pro-
viding the public good of economic sustainability. ‘In an econ-
omy in which labour productivity still increases but output is 
capped (for instance for ecological reasons), the only way to 
maintain macro-economic stability and protect people’s liveli-
hoods is by sharing out the available work.’ Jackson notes that 
reduced working hours are usually beneficial for other reasons 
as well, such as increasing labour productivity and improving 
the work-life balance. However, it only tends to succeed under 
certain conditions. Sociologist Gerhard Bosch (2000, 185) ob-
serves that experience in Germany and Denmark shows that 
a fundamental precondition for reducing working hours is ‘a 
stable and relatively equal earnings distribution. Neo-liberal 
policies of income differentiation undermine attempts to redis-
tribute working time because employees are unwilling to accept 
reductions in their hours’.
Daly calls for the US to tackle this problem, not only with 
legislation that may limit perceptions of inequality by minimiz-
ing advertising (as quoted above), but also with legislation that 
limits inequality itself, by mandating
a minimum income and a maximum income … Complete equal-
ity is unfair; unlimited inequality is unfair. Seek fair limits to the 
range of inequality. The civil service, the military, and the university 
manage with a range of inequality of a factor of 15 or 20. Corporate 
America has a range of 500 or more. Many industrial nations are 
below 25 … A sense of community necessary for democracy is hard 
to maintain across the vast differences current in the US. Rich and 
poor separated by a factor of 500 become almost different species. 
(Daly 2009, 3, 4)
As discussed later in Chapter 8, conservatives are relatively un-
concerned about — and even supportive of — inequality. That 
disposition makes them a major political obstacle to work-shar-
ing as a remedy for unemployment and they may be strength-
ened in this by their resistance to change inclining them to op-
pose the industrial changes that work-sharing would require.
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Bosch (2000, 192–93) warns that a number of such changes 
are necessary to allow additional employment to be created 
from collective working time reductions and elective shorter 
working time options.
The necessary conditions under which employment expands must 
be created. These conditions include an active training policy, wage 
increases in line with productivity gains, the standardization of ac-
tual hours worked, the reduction of differences in hourly rates for 
full-timers and part-timers, better social security for flexible work-
ing lives, a change in the deep-seated full-time culture in the work-
place and social security contributions that are proportional to the 
paid hours of work. Many of these conditions can be met only if a 
consensus can be forged between the social partners, as in the Neth-
erlands or in Scandinavia.
Bosch adds two other conditions: That sharing employment 
purely by increasing the proportion of part-time workers is dif-
ficult to sustain in the long run; and working time reductions 
must be achieved by work reorganizations that improve efficien-
cy in order to succeed in a global economy where competitors 
are using longer working hours. All these difficulties mean that 
if a democratic government is to manage its economy to provide 
employment for all without relying on endless growth, then it 
must be very competent and therefore, on this analysis, virtually 
free of triple dysfunction.
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5 
a pervaSive Symptom of 
DySfunCtion: 
eSCalating the SCarCity of 
natural Capital
This chapter describes what is arguably the biggest failure of 
democratic government and explains it in terms of triple dys-
function. In doing so it makes three claims. The first is that, as 
a broad rule for advanced economies, economic growth fails to 
deliver on its promise and yields net costs instead. The second is 
that triple dysfunction renders democratic governments blind 
to this problem, so there is virtually no chance that they will 
correct it. Instead, they resolutely make it worse; exacerbating 
costs in what may be the greatest manifestation of triple dys-
function — addiction to economic growth. The third claim fol-
lows from these two and is that further economic development 
should not be undertaken in relatively well-developed demo-
cratically governed economies until their triple dysfunction is 
corrected to enable them to make competent decisions on such 
development.
The second claim, of addiction to economic growth, is a ma-
jor failure of citizens compensating for their ignorance of poli-
tics and public policy by using heuristics (mental shortcuts or 
cues, as discussed in §2.2.3). As the political groups, elites and 
others who provide these heuristics neither recognize nor un-
derstand the addiction and its costs, they mislead citizens. This 
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lack of understanding is due not only to the addiction process 
being a little complex and obscure (which invokes excessive 
compromise), but also because electoral incentives (excessive 
competition) constrain the attention of political agents to the 
concerns of voters. But ambiguous delegation allows those con-
cerns to focus on the short term and ignore the longer term, 
where the costs of the addiction arise. 
The promise referred to in the first claim is that economic 
growth will satisfy society’s wants for more employment and 
more income. This is taken to be the promise of economic 
growth because it is the rationale that politicians routinely es-
pouse as they pursue that growth. It is also a politically legiti-
mate promise as it offers a public good — the satisfaction of the 
wants of all or most citizens for more employment and more 
income. As we will see, growth not only fails to deliver on that 
promise but it produces the reverse; it increases wants for more 
employment and more income. Worse still, it also reduces the 
availability of the natural capital (defined in §2.2.3.2, Distraction 
by advertising) required to satisfy not only many of those wants 
(which, taken individually, are for private goods) but many 
wants and needs for public goods as well. 
According to these first and second claims, triple dysfunc-
tion must be minimized or eliminated; otherwise growth will be 
both futile and damaging. So the third claim is that until triple 
dysfunction is rectified, governments should eschew economic 
growth. This reversal would require wants for more employ-
ment to be addressed by sharing work more equitably and, as 
indicated in §4.2.3, in most countries that requires measures to 
reduce inequality of incomes. Those measures would also help 
to moderate wants for more income. But none of this will be 
politically feasible until triple dysfunction is corrected. So that 
is the key, not just to progress, but to preventing further deterio-
ration. The argument in this chapter, together with the postula-
tion of triple dysfunction in previous chapters, elaborates on the 
original publication of these three claims in an article in Ecologi-
cal Economics (P. Smith 2009).
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The policy failure postulated by the second claim is a blind-
ness or myopia that preserves the idée fixe that a positive net 
monetary return from a commercial development is always a 
benefit provided that the development does not directly produce 
costs that outweigh the benefit, such as immediate environmen-
tal damage. However, as explained below in §5.2.1 and §5.3, the 
net monetary return may itself be a cost because it produces 
damaging consequences. Such damage may start to develop 
during the implementation of a project and grow for many years 
after its completion. In this process the bigger the net financial 
gain from the development, the bigger its ultimate net cost. If 
the reader considers that the description given in §5.3 of this 
effect mirrors the progress of economic growth in developed 
economies (perhaps especially those with relatively high ratios 
of natural capital to population such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada), then its reliance on the triple dysfunction hypoth-
esis might be taken as another indication that this hypothesis 
has some reliability and could therefore be used as a theory for 
guiding reforms in democratic government.
The idée fixe that positive financial returns are always good 
in themselves appears to be sensed or understood by many en-
vironmentalists as a mistake and bad for public policy, because 
they tend to rank the value of development projects — and eco-
nomic growth in general — lower than less environmentally 
concerned people do. To the latter, this sense of values in envi-
ronmentalists may seem wishful, selfish and destructive, but the 
political and psychological processes described below indicate 
that assigning a low or negative value to economic growth can 
be wise.
Democratic governments feel compelled to give their citizens 
what they most strongly want, which is essentially more income 
and more employment, only to find that they then have to give 
more of it and are locked into a desperate pursuit of economic 
growth in blatant denial of obvious limits to natural capital. As 
discussed below in §5.2.1 and §5.3, when a community gets what 
it wants, it soon wants more, a response that is strongest for 
basic wants like food, shelter, energy and the education to get 
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the employment that provides such essentials in modern econo-
mies. For those who observe or sense this endless escalation of 
wants and have concerns about its impact on limited stocks of 
natural capital (and also on the personalities of those who al-
ways get what they want), rebellious questions arise: What is the 
point of giving citizens the things they want, especially those 
they want most urgently, when they will then expect even more? 
Why produce more economic growth when it recreates and 
even enlarges the dissatisfactions that demand it?
5.1 Illustrating the problem
The triple dysfunction hypothesis, along with much public 
choice theory and the other indications of democratic failure 
discussed in Chapter 2, implies that there will be times when 
citizens would be justified in engaging in civil disobedience, 
if this is their only way of trying to influence governments on 
important issues. Government policy will sometimes be badly 
mistaken because some irresponsibility towards public goods is 
built into the democratic system. At times, therefore, citizens 
are likely to perceive a moral obligation to challenge democratic 
government in order to try to correct such mistakes. If just a 
small minority of citizens recognize such a case, they may see 
civil disobedience as the only way in which they could alert 
the mass public with enough urgency to create political pres-
sure that might change the offending policy. In addition, such 
disobedience could be their best — or only — prospect for push-
ing government to reform its basic processes so that it becomes 
more responsible. Protest and civil disobedience occasionally 
erupts in democratic countries, but the protestors usually do 
not call for fundamental reform of government. Instead, they 
demand removal of the symptoms of dysfunction, or for reform 
of government processes at relatively superficial levels, such as 
laws for freedom of information, commissions of enquiry into 
corruption and limits to private funding of electoral campaigns. 
No doubt their focus avoids fundamentals because very few 
promising reforms for democratic government have been sug-
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gested at that level. Several proposals that try to do this are de-
scribed and compared in Chapter 6.
A major Australian case of civil disobedience occurred in 
1982–83 when hundreds of citizens made illegal attempts to 
physically block construction of the Tasmanian ‘Gordon-below-
Franklin’ hydro-electric project. A total of 1272 people were ar-
rested and nearly 450 remanded in gaol (Thompson 1984, 174). 
Before that protest and continuing to the time of writing, nu-
merous demonstrations have been made in Australia against 
developments such as other hydro-electric schemes, the logging 
of old growth forests and mining projects. Property and jobs 
have been destroyed, people endangered and many have been 
arrested and fined. In parallel with similar developments in 
many other democracies, public anger over environmental de-
struction has inspired the establishment of a political party, the 
Australian Greens, to try to more effectively address not only 
the environment, but all public goods. These tactics of protest, 
civil disobedience and new political parties have produced some 
protection for public goods, but it is suggested that because they 
do not address triple dysfunction, serious neglect of these goods 
will continue and hostility will smoulder and at times explode 
between environmentalists and supporters of economic devel-
opment. However, if both sides of these disputes understand the 
effect of triple dysfunction on natural capital as described below 
in §5.3, then they should be more able to understand each other 
and thus to negotiate constructive solutions.
Damage to natural capital from economic growth is apparent 
in many countries, whether they are governed democratically or 
not, so it is clear that different types of political systems have of-
ten been unable or unwilling to adequately control that growth. 
The ‘scarcity multiplier’ analysis developed in §5.3 attempts to 
explain this failure only for liberal democracies, but such failure 
in other political systems may have similar dynamics.
The scarcity multiplier describes liberal democratic gov-
ernments as often unjustifiably depleting natural capital by 
the choices they make on the issue of whether to expand the 
economy. These political choices are likely to be incompetent 
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not only from triple dysfunction but because this particular is-
sue has seven of the eight characteristics that are described in 
§4.1 as posing difficulties for decisions by democracies. Before 
setting out the scarcity multiplier analysis, these difficulties are 
reviewed, and then two concepts that are crucial for the analysis 
are explained in §5.2.
5.1.1 Characteristics of the choice on economic 
growth that confuse democracies
The question of whether to have more economic growth creates 
the following seven difficulties for political choice by democrat-
ic governments.
complexity. As explained below in §5.3, expansion of the econ-
omy may produce positive feedbacks that defeat the social ob-
jectives of the expansion. These feedbacks create a complexity 
in the issue that is not seen by voters as they are busy with their 
lives and mostly do not think deeply about public policy.
abstraction. Future expansion of the economy and the likely 
consequences of this are just ideas. As such, they have little per-
sonal impact and voters will give limited thought to them.
obscurity. Important adverse consequences of economic 
growth develop slowly and may thus be imperceptible. Moreo-
ver, the people who produce these costs may be difficult for citi-
zens to recognize and hold responsible because they are them-
selves. These effects may induce citizens to neglect to think in 
any depth about this issue.
temporal remoteness of consequences. The adverse conse-
quences of growth are mostly in the distant future; the beneficial 
ones are largely in the near future.
pervasiveness. As almost all citizens support economic growth 
and thereby contribute to its consequences, avoiding these con-
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sequences poses the massive problem of developing solidarity 
for unconventional (and counterintuitive) public policy.
competitiveness. Attempting to resolve the issue inflames con-
flict between those concerned primarily with private goods 
and those with strong concerns for public goods such as the 
environment and the equitable sharing of employment and/or 
wealth. This polarity is close to the power — universalism polar-
ity in human values that is discussed later in §8.1, which is simi-
lar to the hierarchist — egalitarian polarity described in §4.1. It 
is noted in §8.1 that, partly due to genetic predisposition, these 
diverging worldviews resist modification and have large and 
stubborn influences on human perception and action.
externalizability. The issue of whether to have more economic 
growth invites externalization of responsibility. It does so by 
posing the choice of how to match supply and want, which 
tempts voters to prefer the match to be made by managing their 
supplies rather than their wants. If wants are to be managed, 
citizens will have to be very well informed, not only about rel-
evant issues that might persuade them to modify their wants but 
they would also need to be well informed about the readiness 
of fellow citizens to support them in such self-restraint. From 
the perspective of democratic government, managing the wants 
of voters internalizes the way the match is made — it is taken 
into the core of democratic politics — whereas if the matching 
is done by manipulating supply, it is largely externalized from 
politics. As internalizing the matching is extremely difficult for 
democratic politicians (see, e.g. §2.2.2), they externalize it.
The combination of these seven difficult characteristics in the 
issue of whether to have economic growth produces an almost 
‘perfect storm’ of democratic failure. It is therefore chronic and 
widespread across democracies. It also has enormous impact, 
although this may only gradually accumulate. It is a failure of 
government that allows citizens to continue with accustomed 
ways of acting as individuals rather than as responsible mem-
bers of society, so they reproduce and consume according to 
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private considerations and with scant regard for public goods. 
For some people, consumption may mean migrating to wher-
ever they can do more of it. Such continuation of self-interested 
behaviour amounts to collective irrationality if it persists when 
it has become destructive for the society in which it takes place. 
When democratic dysfunction allows such persistence we have 
a boom constructing a bust, for consuming and populating will 
collide with the limits of natural capital. As we see below (e.g. 
5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3), although technological innovation may 
delay this impact, it is ultimately inevitable if the dysfunction 
persists. Global warming and ocean acidification are two cur-
rent indications of the scale of some of these problems.
The mechanisms producing irrational preoccupation with 
economic growth are explained below in §5.3, but before this 
is done two essential concepts are now introduced. These are 
‘inflating want by supply’ and the ‘private goods bias’.
5.2 Two key concepts for the scarcity multiplier 
analysis
5.2.1 Inflating want by supply
The first primary democratic dysfunction, ambiguous delega-
tion causing confusion about who directs public policy, allows 
citizens to neglect their role as directors of their democracy and 
focus on narrower interests. These interests may be those of in-
dividuals or sub-groups within that democratic society. Such 
narrow focus allows an apparently instinctive behaviour to as-
sert itself without being disciplined by broader considerations 
of public goods. This particular behaviour is that of wants inflat-
ing when they are supplied — and also when such supplies are 
increased. This is referred to here as IWS: ‘inflating want by sup-
ply’ or ‘inflation of want by supply’. As discussed later in §5.3.1, 
the IWS response means that the supply of a good or service 
tends to inflate wants not only for it (referred to below simply 
as a ‘good’) but for other goods as well. IWS applies to the supply 
of both private and public goods, but, as discussed in §5.3.1, this 
response is most pronounced with private goods.
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IWS is a ubiquitous tendency and it has destructive aspects, 
one of which is that the satisfaction of having wants met by an 
increase in supply is subsequently at least partially eliminated 
by wants being stimulated by that increase. This decay of sat-
isfaction often persists indefinitely through positive feedback, 
for when an increase in supply stimulates more want, the larger 
want provokes more effort to find, or buy, or make, bigger sup-
plies, and if this succeeds, more want is evoked and so on. That 
erosion of satisfaction may escalate into outright frustration 
when expanding wants collide with the limits of finite natural 
resources. The natural human response of IWS therefore obliges 
societies to exercise strong self-discipline, which as discussed 
below under ‘The scarcity multiplier’ is a challenge that democ-
racies are not equipped to meet. Adam Smith (1976 [1790], 140) 
identified this challenge when he wrote that
man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself, not as some-
thing separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a mem-
ber of the vast commonwealth of nature … [and] to the interest of 
this great community, he ought at all times to be willing that his 
own little interest should be sacrificed.
Andrew Bacevich (2008, 16) sees the United States as failing 
badly to recognize and rise to that challenge. He considers
what it means to be an American in the twenty-first century. If one 
were to choose a single word to characterize that identity, it would 
have to be more. For the majority of contemporary Americans, the 
essence of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness centers on a re-
lentless personal quest to acquire, to consume, to indulge … Yet the 
foreign policy implications of our present-day penchant for con-
sumption and self-indulgence are almost entirely negative. 
IWS is a positive feedback response not only by individuals, but 
also by whole populations. A society is likely to grow in response 
to an increase in the supply of something that its members want, 
either by more people being attracted to migrate into that com-
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munity to take advantage of its increased supply, or by its birth 
rate being inflated by the increase in supply, or by its death rate 
being reduced by it, or by a combination of these reactions. If 
the increased supply creates a bigger population it will also have 
created a bigger aggregate want for supplies of everything that 
people want. More effort will then go into expanding the sup-
plies of all these goods and any success in this may encourage 
the population to grow further and so on.
The general example of IWS is the propensity of all species 
to fully exploit their ecological niches. All replicating entities 
consume the food, oxidants, energy (e.g. sunlight), shelter and 
other things that are available to them that they need for replica-
tion, thereby enlarging their populations to the extent permitted 
by these supplies. If the limiting extent of supplies is expanded 
by more supplies becoming available, the replicator’s population 
invariably increases to the new limit established by this expan-
sion. In this situation, predation might be thought of as a nega-
tive ‘supply’, a reduction in the supply of shelter. The universality 
of such growth of consumption or ‘want’ as a response to an 
increase in supply suggests that it is a product of natural selec-
tion. Replicators that did not behave in this way would find their 
supplies taken over by those that did and would be more vul-
nerable to elimination by predators, especially those with IWS 
behaviour.
In the case of humans, an apparent exception to the popula-
tion growth form of IWS is demographic transition, a failure of 
populations to respond in this way to expansion of their sup-
plies of goods and services. This ‘failure’ usually occurs as a hu-
man population progresses from a low state of economic devel-
opment to a more prosperous state where most citizens are well 
educated, child mortality is reduced, contraceptives are available 
and acceptable, and food, housing, transport and other goods 
and services are relatively well supplied. However, the lack of 
population growth IWS with demographic transition tends to be 
compensated for with an enhanced IWS in the individual, as in-
creasing supplies of goods and services encourage each of them 
to want more. In addition, recent research indicates that when 
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a country develops beyond the human development index of 9, 
birth rates then tend to increase (Myrskyla et al. 2009), which 
would diminish the strength of demographic transition and en-
courage population growth IWS.
Organisms that show no evidence of consciousness, such 
as viruses, bacteria, plants and the simpler animals, cannot be 
described as displaying IWS because it seems unlikely that they 
experience wants. But their behaviour is similar, so perhaps IWS 
should be changed to ‘inflation of consumption by supply’ (ICS), 
as the universal biological response. This behaviour, whether we 
call it IWS or ICS, is so pervasive that when we consider humans, 
we might anticipate that extremely competent social choice is 
required if societies are to have the capacity to resist it when it is 
prudent for them to do so.
In economics, demand is want that is backed up by the pur-
chasing power of the individual or entity that wants the relevant 
good or service. As used here, ‘want’ refers to such demand as 
well as to want for things that are not paid for by the individual 
consumer, such as public goods available to all for free from na-
ture and also other public goods that are paid for only indirectly 
by consumers via taxation, such as government decisions and 
actions on such things as public infrastructure, public health, 
justice, education, foreign relations and economic management. 
In what follows, statements such as ‘matching want and supply’ 
should be understood to include ‘matching demand and supply’. 
Similarly, ‘IWS’ includes ‘inflating demand by supply’.
One form of IWS has long been recognized by economists: 
‘In the economics literature it is … well known that increased 
efficiency in the use of a resource leads over time to greater 
use of that resource and not less use of it’ (Ekins, cited in UK 
Parliament 2006, 3). Increasing the efficiency of the use of a 
resource is equivalent to increasing its supply and the result-
ant ‘greater use of that resource’ is equivalent to a greater want 
for it, so this effect is IWS. This ‘efficiency’ form of IWS was first 
noted by the nineteenth century economist William Stanley Je-
vons, when improvements in the design of steam engines were 
making them more efficient in their use of coal. He wrote: ‘It 
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is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical 
use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very 
contrary is the truth’ (cited in Owens 2011, 104). In 1979–80, the 
‘Jevons’ paradox’ was stressed by economists Daniel Khazzoom 
and Leonard Brookes as a crucial consideration for public en-
ergy policy. American economist Harry Saunders (1992) sub-
sequently called this concept the Khazzoom-Brookes (or K-B) 
postulate. It has also been identified in agriculture, where it was 
dubbed the Borlaug paradox (Pearce 2011) after Norman Bor-
laug, the pioneer of the green revolution in agricultural produc-
tivity. The ‘paradox’ in that case is that when yields from agricul-
tural land are increased there is no reduction of deforestation by 
farmers trying to increase their harvests, but the reverse because 
agricultural yields produce more money for clearing forest. As 
this type of effect is now well recognized it is no longer seen as a 
paradox or postulate and has been renamed the ‘rebound effect’ 
(Herring and Sorrell 2009). This term covers all commercial re-
sources, not just those of energy and agriculture. Rebound is 
thus the effect that when a technological improvement allows a 
resource to be used more efficiently it raises its productivity, so 
that more of it is wanted and consumed. Those increases of want 
and consumption are driven in two ways: the reduced cost of 
use makes the resource more attractive as a substitute for other 
resources; and the money that can now be saved in using that 
resource can be used to increase investment in production ca-
pacity of any type and also to increase consumption in any good 
or service, so economic growth is boosted, which then further 
raises the demand for that resource. Economic growth also rais-
es the demand for other marketed goods and services, which is 
a part of the comprehensive boost to many other wants for both 
private and public goods that is hypothesized as IWS. Because 
of the complexity of the rebound effect, Brookes considers this 
term misleading as it implies a simple one-input / one-output 
problem, when in reality it is more like a chain reaction with 
feedbacks (Owen 2011, 118). Energy experts Horace Herring and 
Steve Sorrell (2009) point out that for energy resources, the ef-
203
a pervasive symptom of dysfunction
fect can be very significant but the ways in which it takes place 
are often not amenable to reliable measurement.
As noted above, the rebound effect is only a subset of all IWS 
responses. The complete set is larger in two ways. The first is that 
IWS describes inflations of want from increases in the quantity 
of supply as well as from increases in the efficiency of the use of 
that supply. The second is that IWS covers wants for public goods 
as well as for private goods. IWS may be thought to resemble 
Say’s Law, the historically controversial early nineteenth century 
idea that was expressed by French businessman and economist 
Jean-Baptiste Say as ‘products are paid for with products’. In 
1808 James Mill restated Say’s Law by writing that the ‘produc-
tion of commodities creates, and is the one and universal cause 
which creates a market for the commodities produced’. This is 
because the money paid for a supply immediately enables the 
supplier to exert a new demand of the same magnitude, which 
John Maynard Keynes summarized as ‘supply creates its own 
demand’. IWS is quite different as it applies to public as well as 
private goods (so IWS refers to ‘want’, not ‘demand’) and also 
because it postulates that supply creates wants that are not just 
equal to wants for that supply, but which may be greater. This 
exacerbation of wants may occur through the positive feedbacks 
in per capita consumption and size of population that are noted 
above and explored below in §5.3.
The next subsection reviews the tendency for public goods to 
be underprovided by democratic governments. §5.3 then shows 
how this underprovision permits a complex of four IWS systems 
to indefinitely escalate the scarcity of natural resources within 
democratic jurisdictions.
5.2.2 Private goods bias
It was noted in §2.1 that public and private goods usually com-
pete with each other for the resources needed for their produc-
tion and maintenance. An underprovision of public goods will 
therefore usually signify, if not actually be caused by, a bias to-
wards the provision of private goods. As triple dysfunction, in 
common with much other political theory and observation, in-
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dicates that democratic governments often under-supply public 
goods, we may express this by saying that they have a ‘private 
goods bias’. Notwithstanding this bias to choose private goods to 
the detriment of public goods, it is obvious that democratic gov-
ernments do make some attempts to discourage wants for, and 
supplies of, private goods. Examples are differential taxes (such 
as excises and progressive income tax) and labelling laws aimed 
at protecting consumers. However, such measures are usually 
introduced only after considerable pressure (either from special 
interests or from the general public) that largely results from 
the development over time of the recognition by many citizens 
that there are good reasons why some of their wants for private 
goods should not be satisfied. However, triple dysfunction in-
dicates that such reforms will not entirely eliminate the private 
goods bias.
It should be noted that the idea of a private goods bias in 
democracies is not contradicted by the recognition that these 
polities may also have some anti-market bias. Anti-market bias 
might appear to be a bias against the provision of private goods, 
as the market provides many or most of these goods. Caplan 
(2008, 30–36) describes anti-market bias as a tendency among 
citizens to reject market solutions to problems in favour of gov-
ernment solutions because they feel that the market is unethi-
cal, as buyers and sellers are driven by self-interest. As a result, 
crucial functions of the market are often treated with suspicion 
and, in some parts of the world, rejected. Four examples of this 
behaviour are: (1) interest payments are considered to be out-
right gifts to the rich instead of payments for delaying consump-
tion and risking failure to repay; (2) profits are regarded as gifts 
to the rich instead of earnings for providing goods and services 
that people will pay for; (3) prices on pollution are viewed as 
permission to pollute instead of incentives to improve environ-
mental quality as cheaply as possible; and (4) paying a price for 
something that is offered for sale may be considered to be largely 
a gift to rich business-people who conspire to extort monopoly 
prices. Anti-market bias in citizens, to the extent that it occurs, 
tends to make their democratic governments decide issues that 
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would be more sensibly resolved by the market. Public and/or 
private goods may thereby be underprovided. The private goods 
bias of democratic government differs from anti-market bias 
in that it directly under provides only public goods. So, while 
anti-market bias tends to have democratic governments making 
a wider range of decisions than they should, the private goods 
bias distorts those decisions to select private goods at an exces-
sive cost to public goods.
supply bias. A special form of private goods bias is supply bias, a 
tendency of democratic governments to supply goods (whether 
private or public goods), rather than to ignore, or try to disci-
pline, citizens’ wants for these in situations where this supply 
will cause some public goods to be underprovided to an extent 
that outweighs the satisfactions of wants that the supply is in-
tended to create. Supply bias is a type of private goods bias be-
cause it is a tendency for government to choose the private good 
of supplying the wants of individuals or sub-national entities 
(which are usually wants for private goods) instead of choos-
ing the public good of ignoring or disciplining these wants in 
the interests of broad public welfare. Supply bias, along with any 
other form of private goods bias, reflects the strong tendency 
for politicians to follow the wishes of citizens, as noted in §2.2.2 
(‘Citizens as directors’). These wishes, as discussed in §2.2.3 (‘Ig-
norant directors’), tend to focus on private rather than public 
goods.
Some observers have recognized supply bias by remarking 
on a tendency for politicians and citizens to try to solve public 
issues with technical solutions that produce greater or more effi-
cient supplies, rather than by controlling wants. For example, in 
his renowned essay ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Garrett Har-
din (1972, 251) noted that ‘change in human values or ideas of 
morality’ was required if problems with ‘no technical solution’ 
were to be solved. An example of supply bias is the reluctance of 
the Australian and US governments, for example under Howard, 
Rudd and Gillard in Australia and G.W. Bush and Obama in 
the US, to respond to problems of global warming, peak oil and 
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energy independence by trying to get their publics to minimize 
their wants for energy. One way they might approach this is to 
limit the size of their populations through policies to reduce 
birth rates and immigration. Instead, they have preferred to 
supply whatever energy is demanded, with technology that ei-
ther reduces emissions (such as nuclear, wind and solar energy) 
or expands the supply (for example, by fracking shale and coal 
seams for oil and gas) or uses the existing supply more efficient-
ly (for example, by more effective insulation of buildings) (e.g. 
Bush 2006). Of course the deployment of such supply strategies 
are constrained by politicians’ desires that their costs for citi-
zens do not conflict with citizens’ wants for personal purchasing 
power.
Thus, for both private and public goods, democratic govern-
ments tend to match wants and supplies by managing supply 
more readily than want. This supply bias is a type of private 
goods bias as it damages and neglects public goods by supply-
ing wants for private goods that are not disciplined in order to 
protect public goods.
5.3 The scarcity multiplier
The following analysis describes democratic governments pro-
ducing mounting problems by inflating want with supply (IWS) 
through decisions that have a private goods bias (including its 
supply bias variant). This mirrors and reinforces similar, con-
current decision-making by private enterprise, so that both 
behaviours together produce the problem of economic growth 
pushing against both social limits (e.g. Hirsch 1977) and the 
physical limits of natural capital. Scarcities in positional goods 
(see §2.2.3.2) and natural capital are thereby escalated with posi-
tive IWS feedbacks. As this process is self-reinforcing it is la-
belled the ‘scarcity multiplier’.
The example of the multiplier described below is the invari-
able response by democracies to opportunities for economic 
growth in which natural capital can be ‘macro-allocated’ from 
the ecosystem into the market, which will then ‘micro-allocate’ 
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it (Costanza and Daly 1992). Macro-allocation of natural capital 
is the transfer of materials or energy from the ecosystem (which 
is the macro-system that holds stocks of material and energy 
that may be extracted without paying a price) to the market 
(a subsystem of the ecosystem) for micro-allocation, in which 
those stocks are converted to priced goods and services.
A crucial observation on the macro-allocation of natural 
capital to the market is that of ecological economists Robert 
Costanza and Herman Daly (1992, 41), who state that it ‘should 
be viewed as a social or collective decision rather than an in-
dividualistic market decision.’ This is because most natural 
capital comprises public goods, such as rivers, air, soils, mineral 
deposits, stocks of fish and wildlife, native vegetation, natural 
genetic diversity, wilderness, much of the physical space on 
land, sea and in the air, solar radiation and the climate. The 
market is unable to sensibly allocate public goods because they 
are freely available to all and therefore do not have a market 
price that could guide their allocation. It thus falls to govern-
ment or some other non-market institution to allocate public 
goods. This makes politics of fundamental importance for the 
rational macro-allocation of natural capital. When government 
malfunctions, this macro-allocation may be destructive and, in 
democracies at least, it drives scarcity multipliers.
5.3.1 The mechanism
The conditions under which a scarcity multiplier will be driven 
by democratic political decisions within a given region are as 
follows.
1. The region in which it occurs has a resident population with 
an electorally representative liberal democratic government.
2. Migration to and from other regions is possible.
3. Economic conditions are well developed, so a basic level of 
affluence has been achieved: say over US$15,000 per capita 
(Common and Stagl 2005, 199). This has produced demo-
graphic transition, so the size of the population is currently 
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controlled largely by the influence on migration of the eco-
nomic opportunities in the region.
4. Other regions present higher and lower opportunities for 
earning income. These induce emigration and immigration 
for this region, which in combination with its birth and death 
rates may produce a tendency over time for its population to 
grow, shrink, or maintain its size.
5. The natural capital (both public and private) of the region is, 
with few exceptions such as air, limited. The per capita avail-
ability of natural capital to residents is higher than that in 
many other regions.
6. Virtually all types of natural capital (both public and pri-
vately owned) in the region are in some type of use to some 
extent, so there is a degree of competition between wants for 
these uses. Many of these wants may be expressed as politi-
cal wants rather than as economic wants (which are called 
demands).
To illustrate these conditions and their multiplication of the 
scarcity of natural capital, I describe a case from an Australian 
state. In the first decade of this century there was considerable 
public dispute over whether to: (a) dam the Meander River in 
northern Tasmania, to produce private goods in the form of em-
ployment and income from agricultural irrigation and hydro-
electricity (plus, as a secondary effect, the public ‘good’ of trout 
fishing in an industrial impoundment); or (b) not dam the river, 
to protect opportunities for Tasmanians and tourists to enjoy 
the mainly natural public goods of the area. These goods were: 
the exceptional scenery of a forested mountain valley (which 
would be damaged by both the dam and its reservoir with a 
summer draw-down zone hundreds of metres wide); rare na-
tive quolls (carnivorous marsupials, approximately the size of a 
domestic cat); and forms of appreciation of the river based on 
natural seasonal flows and largely natural surroundings, such as 
trout fishing, rafting and canoeing. The dispute arose because it 
became apparent that projected economic returns from a dam 
in this place might pay for its construction and operation, so op-
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tion (a) became attractive to farmers in the region and to other 
Tasmanians favouring economic growth.
It must be noted that the private goods primarily produced 
by (a) would be taxed to finance consequent new public goods 
such as infrastructure and government services. Moreover, the 
production of those private goods and consequent public goods 
would tend to make the economy of the region grow further, 
producing more private and public goods. The same effects will 
be produced to some degree by (b) if its primary protection of 
natural capital supports commercial activity such as tourism 
and/or the immigration of creative and entrepreneurial talent 
seeking an attractive environment for work and residence. As in 
(a), any private goods produced by (b) will be taxed to finance 
consequent new public goods, and all these activities help the 
economy to grow. The possible chain of consequences for each 
option may therefore be summarized (without quantification) 
as follows.
a. Dam → private goods → public goods (services, infrastruc-
ture) → more private and public goods (services, infrastruc-
ture) → etc.
b. Not dam → public natural capital protected → private goods 
→ public goods (services, infrastructure) → more private 
and public goods (services, infrastructure) → etc.
The essential difference in possible outputs is that (a) does not 
protect public natural capital (denoted below as PuNC) whereas 
(b) does. Politicians will react to these options with a private 
goods bias, including its supply bias variant. So if (a) seems to 
offer a greater or more certain supply of private goods than (b), 
then politicians will tend to favour (a) and ignore its damage 
to PuNC. The following four-step sequence gives the likely po-
litical choice and its chain of consequences. This sequence is 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.1, where the steps have the 
same numbers and are prefixed with letters indicating what pro-
duces them. For example, the figure shows step 2 occurring in 
two ways, labelled A2 and P2. It is the P process (P for popula-
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tion growth) that is described in the following sequence. The A 
process is introduced later.
1. Public dispute arises on whether to dam or protect the river, 
signifying some scarcity of both private goods (water rights, 
electricity, employment and income) and public goods 
(PuNC in the forms of natural scenery, endangered quolls 
and freeflowing rivers). A political decision is required on 
which scarcity is the greater cost to society and therefore 
warrants mitigation, or prevention of its escalation. The de-
cision is made with a private goods bias, including its supply 
bias variant, so it is likely to be political decision (a), to dam 
the Meander to convert PuNC public goods into a supply of 
private goods in the form of irrigation water and hydroelec-
tricity. This political decision and consequent development 
is shown in the centre of Figure 5.1 by ‘Political decisions … ’ 
producing ‘More development’. Step 1 is shown there as A1 
together with P1 and is a political decision that is driven in 
two ways (P and A). As indicated above, the A process is de-
scribed later in this section (§5.3.1), after the description of 
the P process is completed. The development produced in 
step 1 by political decision (a) will create more employment 
and income in the region — which could be considered to 
be either the whole of Tasmania or its central northern part, 
which is an area of about 15,000 square kilometres support-
ing around 150,000 residents.
2. Those increases in employment and income in this region 
(say, all of Tasmania) encourage its population to grow as 
indicated by P2 in Figure 5.1. They do this by attracting mi-
grants from other regions (outside the state) and by retaining 
Tasmanian residents who might otherwise migrate to other 
regions for more employment and income (see conditions 2, 
3 and 4 above).
3. That expansion of population increases aggregate want in the 
region for all the private and public goods that people want 
(arrows P3 in Figure 5.1).
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4. Some of this increase in want is for more of the public and 
private goods that are provided from the natural capital of 
the region, which is indicated by W4. This natural capital is 
limited, so the increase in wants for it means that its per-
ceived scarcity rises (see the Natural Capital box in Figure 
5.1). That rise lifts the scarcity of both PuNC and privately 
owned natural capital (PrNC — for example, freehold land) 
above their scarcities at the time of the initial step 1 from po-
litical decision (a). The scarcities of both PrNC and PuNC 
will be further increased if step 1 physically depletes them 
(Dpr4 and/or Dpu4 in Figure 5.1).
The rise in scarcity of any type of PuNC (such as our free-flow-
ing river in a beautiful, largely natural valley with endangered 
native fauna) means that this type becomes more valuable in the 
eyes of the public, so it then appears less likely that politicians 
will repeat their step 1 decision to convert more of that type into 
private goods. However, Step 3 (P3 in Figure 5.1) pushes them 
to provide more private and public goods so they respond with 
a second political decision. That decision will have a private 
goods bias, so it will tend to be for more private goods at the 
cost of public goods, so we have a second step 1 (P1). A sec-
ond phase of development follows, converting more PuNC into 
PrNC or other private goods. This expansion of the supply of 
private goods evokes a second step 2 (P2), followed by a second 
step P3 and step W4. The second step 3 will tend to repeat the 
effect of the first step 3 and so the 1–2–3–4 sequence may be re-
peated several times. This feedback is basically the loop of steps 
1–2–3–1–2–3 and so on, with W4 (wants for natural capital) as 
well as step 1 being caused by step 3. Step 1 then causes Dpr4 and 
Dpu4 (depletion of private and public natural capital) as well as 
causing P2.
To see how long this feedback will continue to operate and 
therefore how scarce it may make PuNC (PrNC will be consid-
ered later), we must inspect the process more closely. Each step 
1 diminishes the quantity of PuNC that remains (via Dpu4 in 
Figure 5.1), making it scarcer and thus perceived as more valu-
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able by citizens, so that they give more emphasis to politically 
protecting its remnants. In the case of PuNC in the form of free 
flowing rivers, as more of them get dammed, those citizens who 
become concerned about this will place a higher value on the 
remaining natural and wild rivers. This means that the step 1 
political decision of the multiplier will tend to shift from choice 
(a) to choice (b). However, such a shift will not take place un-
til the private goods bias of the political process has cycled 
the multiplier to produce some underprovision of this PuNC. 
However, as particular types of PuNC become underprovided 
in this manner, the exploitation that does this is shifted away 
from these PuNC by the rising public perceptions of their val-
ues, onto other PuNC that have not yet gone (or gone so far) 
through this process. This substitution of less scarce PuNC for 
more scarce types tends to stop the rising scarcity of any par-
ticular PuNC from shifting the political decision at step 1 from 
(a) to (b), so the under provision spreads widely across different 
types of PuNC. In the example of hydro-electricity and freshwa-
ter from freeflowing rivers, as such rivers become rare the sat-
isfaction of rising wants for energy and water will tend to shift 
from damming more rivers to using PuNC that is perceived as 
being more available because there is less want for it, such as (for 
energy) windy sites for wind turbines and (for irrigation) urban 
waste water, which is likely to be more expensive to treat and 
deliver than river water. The result is that the scarcity of PuNC 
as a whole continues to escalate and the costs of using PuNC 
increase as less economically attractive PuNC (e.g. waste water 
and wind) are substituted for PuNC resources that are becom-
ing scarcer (such as rivers for freshwater and hydro-electricity). 
Such substitutions often further raise the scarcity of PuNC by 
creating new environmental costs, for example, wind farms may 
damage scenery, worry people with low frequency noise and 
kill native birds. In Tasmania, the latter problem is threatening 
the endangered wedge-tailed eagle and may finish off one of 
the world’s rarest and most endangered species, the migratory 
orange-bellied parrot. Such gradually rising costs of growth, 
both monetary (costs of private goods) and intangible (losses 
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of public goods), tend to be overlooked by citizens focused on 
the immediacy of the private goods of employment and dispos-
able income. This compels politicians to pursue private goods 
via economic growth and minimal taxation, with muted regard 
to whether those goods are worth the concomitant erosion of 
public goods.
The 1–4 sequence thus produces a feedback loop that pro-
gressively converts more and more PuNC to private goods. As 
this loop continually escalates the scarcity of the natural capital 
of the region in which it occurs, it is called the scarcity mul-
tiplier. This process will persist until the natural capital of the 
region becomes scarce enough to lower its economic opportuni-
ties to the level of those in places that were previously less well-
endowed in terms of their ratio of natural capital to population. 
As this may eliminate the incentives driving the migration ef-
fects of step 2 (P2), it may block further feedback and scarcity 
multiplication may cease. However, while this block is develop-
ing, the remnant relatively high per capita availability of natural 
capital in this region may attract people looking for the lifestyle 
that it provides. As the Department of Economic Development 
in Tasmania (Tasmania 2007) has boasted: ‘More and more peo-
ple are flocking to Tasmania because we offer a lifestyle that has 
almost disappeared from the modern world.’ In its enthusiasm 
for economic growth, the Department appears determined to 
ignore the awkward fact that this ‘flocking’ will erase that life-
style. We have here an unabashed display of the private goods 
bias of democratic government. As growing scarcities of natu-
ral capital in Tasmania (or in any other region with the condi-
tions specified above for the multiplier) reduce both economic 
and lifestyle attractions, the migration effects producing growth 
of population will diminish and the loop may break when the 
scarcity of natural capital here is equivalent to that elsewhere. 
The early stage of this process is described for Tasmania in the 
Appendix, which looks at the effect of natural capital on growth 
of population over two centuries of colonization and industrial 
development.
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The scarcity multiplier is a positive feedback because its ini-
tial input and drive, the step 1 political decision (a) to allocate 
natural capital from public to private uses, is repeated to some 
degree by each cycle. It is also an IWS response, in which supply 
increases wants by increasing the size of the population (step 
P2). Although net immigration is predicted to eventually halt 
with increasing scarcity of natural capital, the scarcity multi-
plier will keep operating past that point because it has another 
drive operating in parallel with that of growth of population and 
which is less affected by rising scarcities of natural capital. This 
second drive makes the multiplier stronger as well as more per-
sistent. It is the IWS signified in Figure 5.1 as A, which we might 
consider to start with A2, where the increase in supply of private 
goods from more development stimulates a rise in consumption 
by each citizen because the increase in supply of private goods 
reduces prices and increases incomes. The ‘A’ label for this IWS 
stands for ‘affluenza’, an ailment described by economists Clive 
Hamilton and Richard Denniss (2005, 3) as the ‘unfulfilled feel-
ing that results from efforts to keep up with the Joneses’. This sta-
tus rivalry is part of the socioeconomic competition for what are 
known as positional goods. In addition to goods valued for the 
social status they confer, positional goods include other prod-
ucts or services that are in scarce supply relative to the number 
of people in a society, such that not everyone can have access to 
them. For example, as Hirsch (n.d.) explains, education can be 
at least partially a positional good: ‘The value to me of my edu-
cation — the satisfaction I derive from it [i.e. the interesting and 
well paid work it gives me access to] — depends on how much 
education the man ahead of me in the job line has.’ Competition 
for positional goods is therefore a ‘zero-sum game’ in which my 
gain creates your loss and vice versa (Hirsch 1977, Frank 2005, 
Schneider 2007). 
Three consequences of A2 result in an aggregate increase in 
want from step 3, which is shown in Figure 5.1 as Ap3 and Aa3 
reinforcing P3, while they themselves are strengthened by As. 
Ap3 and Aa3 increase want for private goods only, whereas the 
population growth step 3 (P3) increases wants for PuNC and all 
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other public goods as well as for private goods, including those 
that are natural capital (PrNC). So the two types of step 2 (A2 
and P2) work together to push wants at step 3. Although this 
process increases wants for public goods (including PuNC) and 
private goods (including PrNC), these increases are biased by 
affluenza towards more wants for private goods. Political deci-
sion-making then adds its private goods bias to this emphasis 
on private goods, so each cycle of the feedback converts more 
and more PuNC to private goods and the scarcity of PuNC is 
multiplied.
The affluenza drive of the scarcity multiplier is persistent 
and strong. As indicated in Figure 5.1 it arises primarily in po-
sitional competition and adaptation and, as previously noted in 
§2.2.3.2, both these behaviours escalate wants for private goods 
and thus increase efforts to supply them. Consequent increases 
in supplies of these goods enable positional competition and 
adaptation to further increase wants for them (Ap3 and Aa3), 
so both responses produce their own IWS positive feedbacks 
by stimulating development projects. In addition, both posi-
tional competition and adaptation are intensified by sales pro-
motion (labelled As in Figure 5.1), which as noted in §2.2.3.2 
may also maintain itself as a positive feedback that strengthens 
if it increases sales, as it is designed to do. We therefore have 
another IWS in which advertising raises sales (i.e. supply) that 
increases producers’ revenues, enabling them to increase their 
advertising, further increasing wants and thereby sales (supply) 
and so on, which is Galbraith’s ‘dependence effect’. Affluenza is 
thus a compound positive feedback of three IWS feedbacks, one 
of which, sales promotion, boosts the other two and may get 
stronger over time.
The three components of affluenza cooperate to overturn 
the law of diminishing marginal utility. This has been a funda-
mental principle of economics, that while extra income makes 
a big difference to people’s happiness when they are struggling 
with physical poverty, it contributes very little to the happiness 
to those who are no longer poor. Affluenza erases this effect; it 
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re-establishes people’s wants as they are ‘satisfied’ by increased 
income. 
An important difference between affluenza IWS and popu-
lation IWS is that affluenza IWS inflates aggregate want by in-
creasing the wants of each individual, whereas population IWS 
inflates aggregate want by increasing the number of individuals. 
The total impact of these two IWS on aggregate want is therefore 
calculated by multiplying the population and affluenza impacts 
together — not by summing them.
The simultaneous operation of the affluenza IWS complex 
(the A steps in Figure 5.1) and the population growth IWS (the 
P steps) means that even after the latter has been stopped by 
natural capital depletion becoming as acute as that elsewhere 
(see condition 5 above), the A feedback will persist. The scarcity 
multiplier will therefore keep running to produce indefinitely 
deteriorating living conditions as the ratio of natural capital to 
population declines. Economist Michael Schneider (2007) has 
expressed this as follows.
Recognition of the importance of positional goods leads to two pes-
simistic prophecies relating to the future of mankind. It suggests, 
first, that even if an infinite quantity of consumer goods could be 
produced in an infinitesimally short period of time, individual hu-
man beings would not be happy with their economic lot; Veblen 
[1899] can be ‘credited’ with being the first to have implied this 
prophecy. It suggests, second, that even if the rate of growth of the 
world’s population were zero the world’s non-renewable resources 
would ultimately be exhausted, due to human beings’ infinite pur-
suit of status; the ‘credit’ for being the first to imply this prophecy 
goes to Hirsch [1977]. All is not lost, however. We could all become 
stoics, accepting that status is available only to a minority. This does 
not imply the abolition of ambition, however. To adapt Alain de 
Botton, Stoicism does not recommend inferior status; ‘it recom-
mends that we neither fear nor despise it’ (Botton, 2000, p. 98).
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5.3.2 Extreme scarcity from the private goods bias
As discussed in §2.2.2 and §2.2.3, the basic themes of govern-
ment policy in liberal democracies are driven mainly by public 
opinion, but most citizens are disengaged from thinking widely 
and deeply about public goods, especially PuNC, so the minor-
ity of public opinion that expresses careful thinking about this 
tends to be ignored by government. This is ‘excessive compro-
mise’, one of the three ways that the triple dysfunction hypoth-
esis views as producing the private goods bias in the political 
decisions that drive the scarcity multiplier.
Excessive compromise might be expected to drive the mul-
tiplier to exacerbate scarcities of PuNC and PrNC to the extent 
that these become so obvious and serious that the attention 
and concern of the usually disengaged majority is aroused, so 
that those citizens also demand that their government prevents 
natural capital from becoming more scarce — even if their pri-
vate goods (such as employment and income for employees and 
profits for employers) must be restricted in order to achieve 
this. However, it is difficult to see this happening because the 
disengagement of most voters prevents them from realizing 
that the rising scarcities they experience are caused, not only 
by each person wanting private goods to an extent that reduces 
the quantity and quality of natural capital, but also by the pres-
ence of too many people, most of whom are doing this wanting. 
Moreover, the inattentiveness and ignorance of voters on this 
problem of population size is cultivated by the business lobby, 
which presents only those aspects of the problem that favour 
its interests as it argues for cheap labour, for ready-made ex-
pertise in the form of skilled immigrants and for larger popula-
tions of consumers and investors. This lobby has considerable 
financial ability to manipulate both public opinion and politi-
cians, not only on the issue of the size of the population, but 
also to get them to want more private goods, which is partially 
indicated by As, Ap3 and Aa3 in Figure 5.1. The part that is not 
indicated there is the influence of business lobbyists in encour-
aging the private goods bias in political decision-making. The 
combination of excessive compromise and the business lobby 
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may therefore eventually push the A and P feedbacks to escalate 
the scarcity of both PuNC and PrNC to extremes that produce 
such hardship and stress for the mass public that democratic 
government becomes impossible across large jurisdictions such 
as provinces and nations.
5.3.3 Three reinforcements of the scarcity multiplier
So far in this analysis, the scarcity multiplier looks like a persis-
tent social mechanism that eventually produces severe degrada-
tion of natural capital, then social stress that may foster religious 
fanaticism and political collapse — unless it can be stopped by 
reforming the political system so that it no longer has a private 
goods bias and is therefore able to control both affluenza and 
growth of population. The urgency of such reform is empha-
sized by the three following reasons why a multiplier may be 
even stronger and more persistent than indicated by the fore-
going description. The first two of these reasons are likely ad-
ditional stimulations of wants for private goods and the third 
is a positive feedback in which the private goods bias supports 
affluenza while affluenza fosters the bias.
possible accentuation of wants for private goods from 
growth in population. It might be anticipated that the multi-
plier’s population growth step 2 (P2) will not affect the political 
decision made (with a private goods bias) at step 1 in the con-
sequent cycle of the multiplier because a bigger population has 
a proportionally bigger aggregate want for both public and pri-
vate goods. However, if that growth of population adds more (or 
less) wants for private goods than for public goods, then it will 
reinforce (or reduce) the effect of the private goods bias in the 
political decision at step 1. It will not increase (or decrease) the 
bias, but will push political decisions in the same (or opposite) 
direction that the bias tends to take them.
What will actually happen depends on the circumstances, 
but one that seems likely to occur would reinforce the multiplier 
by adding more citizen want for private goods than for public 
goods into the choice between (a) and (b) that precedes step 1. 
220
rescuing democracy
As much of the growth of population will come from immigra-
tion, the desires of migrants will affect the ratio of private/public 
goods wants that politicians express in their policies. The new-
comers will often be from less affluent places, many of which are 
heavily populated and therefore have a relative per capita scarci-
ty of natural capital, which may have cultivated a strong focus on 
earning a living or acquiring financial wealth. Immigrants may 
therefore have a higher want for private goods than the popu-
lation they are joining. Another source of this attitude may be 
that such immigrants have had relatively limited opportunities 
(such as access to high quality outdoor environments, to leisure 
time, to education and to income) to learn how to use natural 
capital to enhance their quality of life. To be specific, they may 
not be accustomed to living and holidaying in spacious rural or 
natural situations that facilitate pursuits such as fishing, hunt-
ing, horse-riding, gardening, hobby-farming, all-terrain vehicle 
use, observing wildlife, surfing, diving, skiing, mountaineering, 
wilderness backpacking, kayaking and river rafting. Any such 
effects of immigration at step 2 would strengthen the cultural 
drift noted above as being produced by affluenza, towards great-
er wants for private goods.
accentuation of wants for private goods from human adapta-
tion to loss. The distress of citizens at losses of PuNC due to 
the scarcity multiplier will fade as time and generations pass, 
leaving them with lower expectations or wants for these goods. 
As De Waal (1996, 201) observes, humans are ‘born adaptation 
artists.’ Layard (2005, 229) notes that if ‘things get better, we after 
a while take them for granted. If they get worse, we also even-
tually largely accept them’. Adaptation to loss occurs not only 
within the individual, but between generations, for when chil-
dren grow up in a situation that the older generation recognizes 
as degraded because of the earlier experiences of its members, 
the new generation will consider it normal. These young people 
have known nothing better so they unconsciously tolerate the 
situation, no doubt employing instinctive coping responses, as 
observed by De Waal below in §5.3.6.
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This inter-generational adaptation to loss takes much longer 
than the adaptation to gain described above for affluenza and 
is a different process. With affluenza, a gain in the supply of 
private goods is fairly quickly adapted to by the individual; so 
that after a few months or perhaps years she feels that she really 
requires a higher level of supply. Both inter-generational and 
intra-generational adaptations to loss occur with natural capi-
tal whether it is PuNC or PrNC. Although humans are more 
sensitive to losses than to gains, their feelings of loss usually 
fade with time (Layard 2005, 141–42, 167–68, 229) so the indi-
vidual’s sense of loss of natural capital may diminish over their 
lifetime. Both intra-generational and inter-generational adapta-
tions to loss will therefore work together with the private goods 
bias (without changing that bias) to escalate public support for 
the choice of (a) in step 1 of the scarcity multiplier, assisting it 
to convert PuNC into private goods. Adaptation to loss thereby 
shifts the culture from having strong interests in the natural en-
vironment, towards a greater focus on people, the artefacts they 
make and the things they do. This raises the question of whether 
a culture adapted to crowding is healthier, more fulfilling and 
more sustainable than one that is not. Evolutionary psychology 
should help to answer it (for an example of this approach, see 
the Schwartz analysis of motivational values presented later in 
§8.1).
the private goods bias supports affluenza while affluenza fos-
ters the bias. The private goods bias is likely to cause the public 
cost of the influence of affluenza (a negative public good) to be 
ignored, so that affluenza (sales promotion, positional competi-
tion and adaptation) remains unregulated and free to focus citi-
zens more and more onto private goods. So the private goods 
bias supports affluenza. At the same time, politicians tend to 
compete with each other in following citizens as affluenza inten-
sifies their wants for private goods, which means that politicians 
tend to accentuate their private goods bias. In other words, the 
bias strengthens because citizens and their political agents pay 
progressively less attention to public goods. So affluenza fosters 
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the private goods bias, while it supports affluenza. Affluenza 
therefore drives the scarcity multiplier not only by producing 
more want by citizens for private goods (as seen in steps Ap3 
and Aa3) but also by tending to strengthen the private goods 
bias at step 1, with each cycle of the multiplier.
summary. It seems likely that although escalating scarcities of 
PuNC should increase its value to citizens, this may not happen 
because the escalation will be concealed from them, in three 
ways: (a) by affluenza increasingly focusing their wants onto 
private goods; (b) possibly by immigration focusing their wants 
more strongly onto private goods; and (c) by their intra- and in-
ter-generational adaptation to loss. While citizens are prevented 
in such ways from perceiving increasing values of PuNC, politi-
cians will also undervalue PuNC with their private goods bias. 
That undervaluation is likely to be maintained or even exacer-
bated over time because the private goods bias is encouraged 
by affluenza, distracting politicians from appreciating public 
goods, including the public good of eliminating affluenza.
Democratic governments will therefore persist in the face of 
increasing scarcities of PuNC to further diminish it wherever 
this supports the production of more private goods. The scar-
city of PrNC escalates at the same time, as a growing economy 
demands more of it. This escalation may occur more easily 
than that of PuNC because the private ownership of PrNC may 
inhibit citizens at large from viewing its growing scarcity as a 
problem they have in common and which therefore requires 
correction by collective action. Instead, those who own PrNC 
may welcome its growing scarcity, as they can make more mon-
ey by selling it as its price inflates. So citizens may fail to recog-
nize the growth of scarcity of PrNC as a negative public good 
(it raises costs for subsequent generations) that they should ask 
their politicians to halt. With such behaviour, each generation 
will create more scarcity for the next, in both public and pri-
vate natural capital. This syndrome is alive and flourishing in 
Australia as its government allows foreigners to buy Australian 
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PrNC (such as Darwin’s port, residential properties and other 
freehold land) which accelerates the escalation of its price.
5.3.4 The influence of each iws system and their 
control 
Either population IWS or affluenza IWS may be enough on its 
own to drive a damaging scarcity multiplier. If affluenza IWS 
is blocked, immigration from other regions with fewer PuNC 
exploitation opportunities may continue to drive population 
growth (P2) as long as such a difference between this region and 
any others lasts. As noted above, relatively high wants for pri-
vate goods by immigrants may assist the private goods bias to 
drive the multiplier through its step 1 political decisions of type 
(a) to convert PuNC into private goods. Immigration may thus 
overcrowd this region to the extent of overcrowding elsewhere 
on the planet, so the multiplier could eventually produce a very 
high scarcity of natural resources through population IWS alone. 
If this is prevented by government restriction of immigration 
but the affluenza IWS is permitted to operate, that alone may 
drive the multiplier to indefinitely high levels of scarcity of both 
PuNC and PrNC.
Affluenza may be countered by devices that provide incen-
tives for people to minimize their positional competition and 
adaptation. These devices should focus on public goods as well 
as on private goods. The private goods focus should give in-
centives for people to refrain from wanting more — including, 
as Hamilton and Denniss (2005, 34–35) put it, to ‘want what I 
have’ rather than to ‘have what I want’. One such device would 
be laws restricting sales promotion. A modest start in this di-
rection was suggested in §4.2.3 with Herman Daly’s (2009, 4) 
call: ‘Advertising should no longer be treated as a tax deductible 
ordinary expense of production.’ Devices that focus on public 
goods may combat affluenza by helping citizens with collective 
choice, so that their choices of public goods are easier, clearer, 
better informed and more deliberative; therefore more able to 
compete against the choices for private goods that they could 
make instead. Such facilitation of collective choice appears to 
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require a public forum that assists citizens to jointly deliberate 
and select strategic public goods, such as controls on advertising 
and goals on population size. A proposal for this type of institu-
tion is given in Part 2.
5.3.5 Motivators of the scarcity multiplier other than 
political decisions to privatise public natural 
capital
The multiplier may be stimulated in more ways than that shown 
above — which is a conversion of public goods into private 
goods, as by damming the Meander River. The central box of 
Figure 5.1 indicates that a crucial drive in that version of the 
multiplier is the political choice of whether to privatise PuNC. 
There is however, another drive that is assumed for the same 
step but not explicitly stated there: the desire of private entre-
preneurs for development projects. As discussed below, this 
alone will propel the multiplier in the case of proposals that do 
not require political approval to privatise PuNC. There are three 
types of such proposals: To add value to existing privatisations 
of PuNC; to produce more income from existing PrNC; and to 
produce more income without utilizing natural capital. As the 
last of these would not directly deplete natural capital and the 
first two may deplete it as collateral damage (such as new forms 
of management further damaging wildlife, scenery and so on), 
much of their exacerbation of its scarcity may be by elevating 
wants for it (indicated by W4 in Figure 5.1) producing crowding 
effects and raising prices of PrNC. 
adding value to privatised public natural capital rather than 
privatising more of it. Consider, for example, a new value-
adding (‘downstream processing’) project in a region, such as 
a pulp mill that would use public forest already commercially 
used in that place to produce wood chips for export. If this new 
project was environmentally benign, it would appear to be an 
unmitigated benefit for the region as it would produce more 
market return from PuNC (public forest) that is already used 
for private goods (the income and employment from wood chip 
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sales). However, the increase in income and employment from 
the pulp mill would fuel both A2 and P2, generating scarcity 
multiplication.
In 2003 a proposal for a project of this type in Tasmania be-
gan a controversy that became increasingly acrimonious, social-
ly divisive and politically corrupt (Beresford 2015). The propo-
nent was the timber company Gunns Ltd., which by 2006 was 
the largest wood chip exporter in the southern hemisphere. It 
proposed to build and operate a AUD$2.5 billion pulp mill (Wells 
2011), which would be the biggest private project ever under-
taken in the state, with the potential to sustainably boost its 
population by 2%. This proposal created intense public dispute 
over potential environmental impacts and associated damage 
to tourism, fishing and wine production, but those arguments 
did not include the scarcity multiplication that the development 
would produce (even if it adversely affects other industries to 
cause some loss of production in those areas). Despite the pub-
lic’s environmental concerns, the state government approved 
the proposal and, in its eagerness for economic growth, circum-
vented the official assessment process being undertaken by its 
own Resource Planning and Development Commission. This 
display of private goods bias provoked widespread public out-
rage against corruption in government. Notwithstanding this 
deficit of political legitimacy, the federal government exercised 
its own private goods bias to support the state government by 
approving the proposal in 2007. Part of this bias was govern-
ment failure (arguably an unwillingness) to recognize the falsity 
of the promise of such developments: As shown by the scarcity 
multiplier analysis, contrary to expectations they do not satisfy 
citizens’ wants for more employment and more income, instead 
they are likely to increase them. In this case the private goods 
bias is expressed by public policy that ignores longer-term pub-
lic goods.
In September 2012, Gunns Ltd. became insolvent and col-
lapsed, abandoning its mill proposal. This was due to a combi-
nation of factors, including the demise of the East Asian mar-
ket for wood chips from Tasmanian old-growth forests (due to 
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cheaper, higher-quality resource from regrowth plantations in 
Vietnam and South America), the high value of the Australian 
dollar (due largely to Australia’s mining boom) and the expense 
for Gunns of coping with the anti-pulp mill campaign in Tas-
mania, which included the revision of the design of the mill, 
revising environmental impact assessments, legal action against 
twenty prominent environmentalists and changing its supply 
source in Tasmania from old-growth to plantations (partly in 
response to environmentalists pressuring Asian paper makers 
to avoid using pulp made from high conservation value old-
growth forests). In addition, Gunns had difficulty obtaining 
financing for the project because the vociferous and sustained 
public opposition made potential creditors wary of being seen 
to be associated with it and also because of its doubtfulness as 
an investment in view of competition from cheaper pulp on the 
world market.
The intensity of public argument over this project indicates 
that even though it had official approval, it did not have a firm 
‘social licence’. If scarcity multiplication had been included with 
the other arguments against the pulp mill, it is possible that 
the dearth of social licence would have intensified and become 
politically recognized as quite rational, forcing the state and 
federal governments to withdraw their approval. In the future, 
unless scarcity multiplication is made a public consideration, it 
appears inevitable that sooner or later another proposal for a 
pulp mill will be made and that this will follow the pattern dis-
cussed above for the dam on Tasmania’s Meander River. That 
project was approved by the state government and water flowed 
over the spillway in September 2008. In the case of the pulp mill, 
the necessary resource is still there and growing — as regrowth 
forests and plantations. The temptation that this offers requires 
Tasmanians to think carefully about whether they want their is-
land to carry a bigger population. If they do, then a new pulp 
mill will help them get it.
development that officially utilizes either no natural capital 
or just prnc. Decisions to initiate these two types of project 
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tend to be a matter for private entrepreneurs acting within ex-
isting environmental and other laws and permits, rather than 
requiring environmental impact studies and high-level politi-
cal approval. In the scarcity multipliers generated in these two 
ways, as well as in the preceding two versions, PuNC might 
be unofficially utilized and damaged by the externalization of 
costs, such as by discharging unlicensed wastes.
To visualize the scarcity multiplier with no official use of 
PuNC and with or without the use of PrNC, Figure 5.1 would 
give the picture with only two alterations. One is to replace the 
wording in the central box ‘Political decisions on development 
proposals (Proposals usually approved … )’ with just ‘Private en-
terprise decisions on development projects’. The other is to add 
the label ‘Externality’ to the arrow Dpu4 (from ‘Public’ natural 
capital to ‘More development’) to indicate that in this case of 
basically private enterprise decision-making, any such use of 
PuNC is neither officially sanctioned nor is the state paid for it; 
so it is a cost externalized from the market to the public at large.
As this modification of Figure 5.1 substitutes private enter-
prise decisions at step 1 for political decisions at this point, it 
substitutes one form of private goods ‘bias’ (a private enterprise 
motive) for another (government failure), so that a similar ori-
entation of decisions is still the central drive of the multiplier. 
The focus of private enterprise on producing private goods will 
therefore provide drive for the multiplier whether government 
approval to use PuNC is required or not — provided that other 
conditions are conducive to it, which are those specified at the 
outset of §5.3.1 together with the circumstances necessary for 
business, such as the availability of markets, labour, materials, 
infrastructure, energy, technology and finance.
When such conditions are conducive to the scarcity multipli-
er, government action is required if any of its four versions are 
to be stopped. The causal chains of Figure 5.1 indicate that this 
may involve one or more of the following measures: (a) refusal 
to allow more PuNC to be privatized (whether as an externality 
or not); (b) combating positional competition and adaptation 
(for example, with laws that limit sales promotion, with incen-
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tives for citizens to deliberate and choose public goods rather 
than private goods, and with measures to reduce inequality); 
(c) taking measures that slow or halt growth of population; or 
(d) refusing to approve many proposals for commercial devel-
opment. Tourism and eco-tourism ventures are often viewed as 
highly acceptable forms of such development, but as they also 
may contribute to scarcity multiplication in any of the modes 
described above, they too should be assessed for this effect as 
part of any governmental approval process.
5.3.6 Costs and benefits of the multiplier
The scarcity multiplier operates as self-propagating, expand-
ing sequences of commercial developments of all sizes, many of 
which are encouraged by political decisions that appear rational 
to both voters and their political agents because the political and 
market systems present them with incentives to favour private 
over public goods. Two major costs of this process are that it 
makes development reproduce needs for more employment and 
income similar to and possibly bigger than those the develop-
ment was politically intended to satisfy, and at the same time 
it increases the scarcity of natural capital. These two costs are 
experienced as frustrated wants for private and public goods 
and they may subsequently produce a third cost: forced changes 
to the culture as successive generations try to cope with the in-
creasing scarcities.
The version of the multiplier shown in Figure 5.1 produces 
the second cost (making natural capital more scarce) by pro-
gressively converting PuNC into private goods and also by in-
creasing the number of people wanting to use both PuNC and 
PrNC. Although this process produces other public goods by 
generating tax revenue, those goods must serve more citizens 
and they will be limited by the private goods bias in govern-
ment decisions on tax rates. In addition, the extra public goods 
provided in this way cannot substitute for some of the types of 
PuNC that are lost, such as wilderness, biodiversity, living space, 
arable land and natural stocks and flows of freshwater. Moreo-
ver, those extra, tax-financed public goods require paid work by 
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citizens, in contrast with the free services from the PuNC that 
was eliminated to produce them. These frustrations of increas-
ingly scarce public and private natural capital appear likely to 
doom citizens’ aspirations for a higher quality of life. The rise of 
environmental disputes over the last half-century indicates that 
this regression has now become a very real problem. Over the 
decades ahead it is possible that the inexorability of this escala-
tion, combined with the very apparent inability of democratic 
governments to recognize it, let alone prevent it, will frustrate 
those with a social conscience so that fewer citizens may at-
tempt to resist it. An example of such resignation may be the 
recent diminution of concern about global warming by citizens 
in many democracies, as indicated by a ‘shocking deficit of po-
litical will’ at the Rio+20 conference (Pearce 2012b). This may be 
an example of the multiplier’s third cost noted above, of forcing 
change in the culture as a coping measure.
The multiplier also produces a fourth and fifth cost. The 
fourth is that it encourages inequality of wealth with its pri-
vate goods bias and its affluenza IWS. As people are enticed to 
consume more, some have the ability or the position to gain 
consumptive advantage over others. Inequality was described 
in §4.2.3 as discouraging work-sharing, which fuels unem-
ployment while limiting quality of life and productivity. And 
unemployment fosters inequality so that the situation tends 
to deteriorate in a positive feedback. Richard Wilkinson and 
Kate Pickett (2009) have found that unequal societies have sig-
nificantly worse health and social problems than societies with 
more economic equality. Moreover they found that the relation-
ship is causal (2009, 190–96), with inequality creating or exac-
erbating problems in social trust, mental illness (including drug 
and alcohol addiction), life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, 
children’s educational performance, teenage births, homicides, 
imprisonment rates and social mobility. To explain this, they 
note that inequality
is a powerful social divider … Our position in the social hier-
archy affects who we see as part of the in-group and who as out-
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group — us and them — so affecting our ability to identify with and 
empathize with other people … The search for a mechanism [that 
causes inequality to damage health] led to the discovery that social 
relationships (as measured by social cohesion, trust, involvement in 
community life and low levels of violence) are better in more equal 
societies. (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, 51, 192)
They conclude that the major cause of the relative success of 
more equal societies is that people relate to each other in a more 
supportive way (2009, 192–93). Rather predictably, as will be 
seen later from the discussion in Chapter 8 of liberal-conserv-
ative differences, Wilkinson and Pickett’s work has provoked 
much criticism, such as that published by the Democracy Insti-
tute, from writer Christopher Snowdon.
The fifth cost of the multiplier is also produced by its afflu-
enza feedback. Hirsch (1977, 87) called this the ‘commercializa-
tion effect’, the
effect on the characteristics of a product or activity of supplying it 
exclusively or predominantly on commercial terms rather than on 
some other basis — such as informal exchange, mutual obligation, 
altruism or love, or feelings of service or obligation. 
This effect is generated by the positional competition, adapta-
tion and sales promotion of the affluenza side of the scarcity 
multiplier. As they focus people increasingly on earning and 
spending money and on valuing things in monetary or com-
mercial terms, the prospect of such external reward crowds 
out the valuing of things by internal motivations such as those 
quoted above from Hirsch. As Sandel (2012, 122) puts it: ‘When 
people are engaged in an activity they consider intrinsically 
worthwhile, offering them money may weaken their motivation 
by depreciating or ‘crowding out’ their intrinsic interest or com-
mitment.’ One of his illustrations is the following exchange.
The American Association of Retired Persons asked a group of 
lawyers if they would be willing to provide legal services to needy 
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retirees at a discounted rate of $30 an hour. The lawyers refused. 
Then the AARP asked if they would provide legal advice to the needy 
retirees for free. The lawyers agreed. Once it was clear they were 
being asked to engage in a charitable activity rather than a market 
transaction, the lawyers responded charitably. (Sandel 2012, 121)
Economists Bruno Frey and Reto Jegen summarize the implica-
tions of the commercialization effect as follows:
Arguably, the ‘crowding-out effect’ is one of the most important 
anomalies in economics, as it suggests the opposite of the most fun-
damental economic ‘law’, that raising monetary incentives increases 
supply. If the crowding-out effect holds, raising monetary incentives 
reduces, rather than increases supply. (quoted in Sandel 2012, 122)
This means that the commercialization effect can make the pro-
duction of goods and services less efficient because intrinsic mo-
tivations that produce them quite well without external mon-
etary incentives are crowded out when the latter are applied. 
For example, in donating or selling blood, the replacement of 
‘feelings of service or obligation’ in donating with the monetary 
incentive in selling (as is done to some extent in the USA) results 
in chronic shortages, wasted blood, higher costs and greater risk 
of contamination (Sandel 2012, 123). However, a more signifi-
cant cost of the commercialization effect is that it fosters a selfish 
attitude, such as that described by economist Larry Summers. 
We have only so much altruism in us. Economists like me think 
of altruism as a valuable and rare good that needs conserving. Far 
better to conserve it by designing a system in which people’s wants 
will be satisfied by individuals being selfish, and saving that altru-
ism for our families, our friends, and the many social problems in 
this world that markets cannot solve. (quoted in Sandel 2012, 130)
To which Sandel (2012, 130) replies:
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This economistic view of virtue fuels the faith in markets and pro-
pels their reach into places they don’t belong. But the metaphor 
is misleading. Altruism, generosity, solidarity, and civic spirit are 
not like commodities that are depleted with use. They are more 
like muscles that develop and grow stronger with exercise. One of 
the defects of a market-driven society is that it lets these virtues 
languish. To renew our public life we need to exercise them more 
strenuously.
Perhaps the US displays the commercialization effect writ large, 
as its politics lacks a left wing that stresses the importance of 
sharing and other civic virtues and is dominated by individu-
alism such as that of the gun culture and the Tea Party, while, 
as King observes, there ‘are few countries in the world whose 
collective ideology is more pro-business than that of the United 
States’ (see §3.2). Perhaps the strong tradition of philanthropy in 
the US is an individualistic response to atrophy of civic virtue at 
the collective scale. 
Against these five ways in which the multiplier is costly, a 
possible benefit is that it helps more people to live in the region 
in which it operates. However, sooner or later this is at the cost 
of rising scarcities of natural capital, which creates an increas-
ingly technological, commercialized, expensive and narrow 
lifestyle. This combination of having a bigger population while 
each person has a higher cost of living and lower quality of life is 
very hazardous, because increasing the population at the risk of 
the happiness of the individual may result in a rapid and severe 
reversal from a situation of moderately positive value where 
the average person generally feels somewhat satisfied, to one of 
strongly negative value in which there are more people, most of 
whom feel more or less stressed from crowding effects. In this 
connection, it is relevant to note De Waal’s (1996, 200–201) as-
sessment that
coping with stress is not the same as getting rid of it; constant be-
havioural (and probably also physiological) countermeasures are 
necessary under crowded conditions. All of these techniques are 
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part of the impressive adaptive potential of the primate order … Hu-
man populations with long crowding histories, such as the Japanese, 
the Javanese and the Dutch, each in their own way emphasize toler-
ance, conformity and consensus, whereas populations spread out 
over lands with empty horizons may be more individualistic, stress-
ing privacy and freedom instead … Adjusting the definition of right 
and wrong is one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of Homo 
sapiens, a species of born adaptation artists.
The possibility of rapid and severe reversal of quality of life is 
envisaged because as people get more stressed, they are likely to 
become more conservative, less tolerant and more religious. Al-
though such responses may strengthen cohesion within groups, 
that cohesion may increase conflict between groups. Such ten-
dency for social instability may make the ethical theory that in-
creasing the size of the population compensates for lower qual-
ity of life much too simplistic (for discussions of that theory, see 
Ryberg and Tännsjö 2004). 
Many years ago, zoologist Desmond Morris (1967, 177) as-
serted that we
already know that if our populations go on increasing at their pre-
sent terrifying rate, uncontrollable aggressiveness will become dra-
matically increased. This has been proved conclusively with labora-
tory experiments. Gross overcrowding will produce social stresses 
and tensions that will shatter our community organizations long 
before it starves us to death.
The results of laboratory experiments may not translate well to 
human society, but if ‘gross overcrowding’ progresses at a ‘ter-
rifying rate’, then De Waal’s ‘behavioural countermeasures’ of 
‘born adaptation artists’ may be overwhelmed. This type of so-
cial collapse may be happening now with the failure of the ‘Arab 
spring’ (except for Tunisia), the collapse of Syria and the rise of 
the ‘death cult’ Islamic State. It is frequently depicted in film and 
literature, such as Shane Meadows’ 2007 movie This Is England 
and J.G. Ballard’s 2006 novel Kingdom Come. Such works focus 
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on social dysfunction that appears to be caused by poor quality 
of life. Prudence dictates that we allow ourselves either plenty of 
‘Lebensraum’, or several generations to adapt to crowding. The 
former appears far less risky and much more pleasant, but it re-
quires each nation to restrict the size of its population so that (a) 
its domestic natural capital seems abundant to each citizen and 
(b) their wants for external natural capital do not compete too 
much with the wants of others.
5.4 Implications of the scarcity multiplier
The scarcity multiplier is an example of the government fail-
ure of underproviding public goods that is predicted by the 
triple dysfunction hypothesis (see §2.5 and Figure 2.1, p. 126). 
The multiplier underprovides public goods by making benefits 
(in the form of supplies of private goods) produce costs (in the 
form of scarcities of public goods). This means that the bigger 
the benefits, the bigger the consequential costs, an effect that 
can make conventional cost–benefit analyses (CBAs) of develop-
ment projects totally misleading. To avoid this, CBAs must be 
preceded by competent political decisions on whether to limit 
the IWS feedbacks that drive the multiplier — those of popula-
tion, positional competition, adaptation and sales promotion. 
In order to achieve that political competence, our hypothesis 
suggests three democratic dysfunctions must be corrected so 
that the people then provide good directorship for their democ-
racy. This threefold correction appears to require one or more 
new institutions that reduce ambiguity of delegation by giving 
citizens the incentive and assistance to deliberatively participate 
in government, especially in developing strategic public policy.
In doing this, citizens may see a need to choose limits for the 
size of their population. To see such a need and also to choose 
limits, they will need information about the long-term costs 
and benefits of both high and low ratios of population to natural 
capital. Unfortunately, research on this is neglected and public 
debate about it is rare, superficial and distorted by xenophobic, 
racial, religious and cultural attitudes on immigration and birth 
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control. As observed in §4.2.1, scholars have noticed that an ini-
tially widespread public debate on overpopulation and human 
carrying capacity was quickly followed by aversion to further 
participation in such discourse. Forty-four years after Paul Ehr-
lich’s The Population Bomb, the Rio+20 summit failed to make 
an explicit link between population growth and sustainable 
development (Sulston 2012). This ‘Hardinian taboo’ (see §4.21) 
could be, at least partly, a learned response to the inability of 
democracies to rationally deliberate desirable sizes for their 
populations, and it blocks attempts to develop effective public 
policy for sustainability. The quality of life that can be sustained 
in a particular region or nation largely depends not only on the 
quantity and quality of its natural capital, but on limits to both 
the size of the population using this capital and the wants of 
each individual. The public choices that must be made to select 
and attain a desirable carrying capacity therefore require a high 
level of deliberative public participation and cannot be done by 
most (perhaps all) democracies without new institutions to fa-
cilitate it.
To use Tasmania as an example, controlling the operation of 
the scarcity multiplier in this state demands a sustained pub-
lic deliberation on the long-term size of population that Tas-
manians wish to have. This deliberation must be facilitated by 
social science data on the costs and benefits of low and high 
ratios of natural capital to population, and these evaluations 
must be expressed as sustainable quality of life, not as monetary 
yields or losses. If such public deliberation resulted in citizens 
consistently expressing — say every year, for a decade — a de-
sire for a particular firm limit to the size of their population, 
the discourse could then concentrate more on selecting their 
method for achieving or maintaining that limit. The mechanics 
of the scarcity multiplier suggests that if Tasmanians chose to 
stop their numbers growing further, they would have two op-
tions for implementing that choice: (a) restricting the size of the 
Tasmanian economy (so that the state becomes less attractive 
for migrants to enter and for residents to stay in); or (b) that 
the state secedes from Australia so that it can directly control 
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the size of its population through Tasmanian laws and policies 
that restrict its immigration and perhaps manipulate its birth 
rate. The choice of option would require sustained public de-
liberation among Tasmanians, and this may indicate to them 
that restricting the size of their economy will not only produce 
economic hardship but may even fail to achieve its objective by 
encouraging the birth rate to climb in a reversal of demographic 
transition. Public discussion of secession may indicate to both 
Tasmanians and other Australians that the growth issue would 
be tackled most effectively at the national level — and that this in 
turn would be assisted by greater international efforts to restrict 
growth of the global population. As with state and national pub-
lic policy, at the global level there is also an urgent requirement 
for new institutions that facilitate the sustained public delibera-
tion required by such issues. For more on the Tasmanian case, 
see the Appendix.
The scarcity multiplier is a complex of interacting positive 
feedbacks that are classified in §5.2.1 as IWS — feedbacks that in-
flate the wants of citizens for public and private goods by sup-
plying their wants for private goods. This concept of ‘inflating 
want with supply’ is proposed as a crucial replacement for the 
conventional but myopic assumption that wants are satisfied 
by supplying them. IWS accepts that this is the initial response, 
but it then looks further by asking: ‘so what is the effect of that 
satisfaction?’ As we have seen, the answer is often that the sat-
isfaction increases aggregate want and thereby produces future 
dissatisfaction, which turns the conventional idea on its head. 
The initial satisfaction of want does this by driving population 
IWS and affluenza IWS (positional competition IWS plus adapta-
tion IWS, both being stimulated by sales promotion IWS) so that 
more unsatisfied want is produced. The current assumption that 
‘supply satisfies’ must therefore be replaced by its approximate 
antithesis, that ‘supply is likely to dissatisfy’. This replacement 
becomes necessary when we take into account the medium to 
long term as well as the short term. IWS thereby describes an 
important effect of economic growth in developed economies 
over the last half-century: Despite doubling and tripling of real 
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incomes (the supply of individual wants) in many developed 
economies, the percentage of citizens in those countries that re-
port themselves as ‘very happy’ has hardly altered and in the US 
and the UK has declined (Jackson 2009, 40). So despite increase 
in supply, or because of it (according to scarcity multiplication), 
individual wants have not been satisfied and in some cases have 
been inflated. A survey of 61 countries has shown that above 
an average annual income of around US$15,000, life-satisfaction 
hardly responds to increases in income (Jackson 2009, 40–42). 
As noted in §2.2.3.2 (‘Distraction by adaptation’), the level of 
income that citizens regard as being what they require closely 
follows real increases in their income.
To apply the concept of IWS at a global scale, we might con-
sider the hypothetical (but likely) case of future industrial uti-
lization of the natural capital of Antarctica. In June 2012 the 
former leader of the Australian Greens Bob Brown and vet-
eran Australian environmentalist Geoff Mosley proposed that 
Antarctica, the world’s largest remaining wilderness, be more 
firmly excluded from commercial use by declaring it a World 
Heritage Area. Currently, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental 
Protection (the Madrid Protocol) to the Antarctic Treaty com-
mits the Parties to the Treaty to comprehensive protection of 
the Antarctic environment, including dependent and associated 
ecosystems. This protection encompasses a ban on mining and 
makes Brown and Mosley’s proposal seem superfluous. How-
ever, perhaps their thinking might be understood as embodying 
a recognition of IWS that has led them to apply its logic in two 
ways. The first application is that the IWS systems of the scarcity 
multiplier indicate that global economic growth will persist de-
spite rising scarcities of natural capital. Of course, this applies 
IWS to authoritarian regimes as well as to democracies, but that 
seems appropriate as around half of the world’s nation-states are 
democratic to some degree and even authoritarian ones may 
exhibit IWS behaviour. This implies that, sooner or later, these 
scarcities will become so acute that the Madrid Protocol will 
be abandoned, as either individual nations or the global com-
munity as a whole resort in desperation to utilizing the natural 
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capital of Antarctica. Something like this is already happening 
in the Arctic as the sea ice retreats, but this is more predictable 
as that region is not covered by a protective protocol. The pros-
pect of the Madrid Protocol eventually collapsing starts to make 
it sensible for conservationists to try to develop a more impres-
sive international taboo on Antarctic exploitation by having the 
region declared World Heritage. The prudence of this move is 
bolstered by applying IWS in a second way. This is that IWS in-
dicates that supplementing the global supply of private goods 
by using the natural capital of Antarctica will not satisfy global 
human wants for these. To the contrary, it is likely to further in-
flate them. Supply from Antarctica is therefore very likely to put 
off the day when humanity recognizes (not just with words but 
also in behaviour) the physical limits of the planet, so that when 
it finally recognizes them and then tries to curb its growth of 
population and consumption, the accumulated damage to plan-
etary natural capital, the task of curbing growth and the risks of 
conflict will all be greater.
As scenarios such as this suggest, IWS may be the most im-
portant of many issues that require much more thought than 
is usually given to public policy by citizens and their political 
agents. This type of requirement for more thought has been 
called ‘thinking beyond stage one’ by public policy scholar 
Thomas Sowell (2004, 4). He describes it as responding to the 
promise of the benefits of a new public policy by asking: ‘And 
then what will happen?’ On further thought, consequences of 
those benefits may be predicted, which is a ‘stage two’ realiza-
tion and should be responded to with: ‘And what will happen 
after that?’ More thought may reveal the likelihood of stage 
three consequences, to which the rejoinder is: ‘And then what 
will happen?’ And so on, if that appears useful. Sowell (2004, 5) 
claims that thinking
beyond stage one is especially important when considering policies 
whose consequences unfold over a period of years. If the initial con-
sequences are good, and the bad consequences come later — espe-
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cially if later is after the next election — then it is always tempting 
for politicians to adopt such policies.
As the scarcity multiplier is a complex of several IWS feedbacks, 
each of which extends beyond the view of ‘stage one’ thinking, it 
is well hidden from citizens. Major effects of economic growth 
are thus ignored, with citizens and their political agents assum-
ing that the production of more income and employment will 
satisfy their wants for those things. The first of the three claims 
made at the beginning of this chapter is that economic growth is 
now failing to deliver on that promise, so that rather than satisfy 
wants for more employment and income, it exacerbates them. 
The falsity of that promise is seen here through the scarcity mul-
tiplier analysis, but it was much earlier seen by Hirsch as being 
guaranteed by competition for positional goods alone — without 
invoking the other drives of the scarcity multiplier (adaptation, 
sales promotion and population growth). The New York Times 
reported him on January 12, 1978 as observing that, because of 
widespread and growing demands for positional goods, mate-
rial growth can ‘no longer deliver what has long been promised 
for it — to make everyone middle-class’ (Hirsch 1978).
The second claim listed at the outset of this chapter is that 
it is no accident that the deceit of this false promise rules de-
mocracies, for triple dysfunction limits their capabilities to ana-
lyse such problems to their root causes and then to apply the 
systemic remedies that such analysis may discover. Ambiguous 
delegation means that neither citizens nor their political agents 
are clearly charged with those responsibilities of diagnosis and 
prescription. Excessive competition between political agents 
further diverts them from providing public goods, creating op-
portunities for wealthy private enterprise to use its money and 
influence to manipulate public opinion and politicians. And 
the final element of triple dysfunction, excessive compromise, 
means that the ignorance of most citizens overrules the wisdom 
of the few, so that public policy suffers and, in particular, the 
falsity of the promise of economic growth goes unnoticed.
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The scarcity multiplier analysis may be categorized as eco-
logical economics for two interrelated reasons. The basic rea-
son is that in its step 1, the analysis utilizes the recognition of 
ecological economics that decisions on macro-allocating pub-
lic natural capital from the ecological system to the economic 
subsystem must be made by government (as noted above in the 
preliminary section of §5.3). These macro-allocation decisions 
cannot be left to the market because that system allocates ex-
cludable goods according to prices determined by their supply 
and demand. As public natural capital is non-excludable, it has 
no price unless government chooses to impose one and can en-
force it. Therefore only a non-market institution such as gov-
ernment can make rational choices on the macro-allocation of 
public goods to the economic subsystem, including the macro-
allocation of public natural capital. A further motive for having 
government make macro-allocation decisions on this natural 
capital is that they will confront government with the country’s 
per capita levels of this capital, which should remind politicians 
(and citizens) to consider — and plan to achieve — the size of 
population that is most desirable in view of its limited stocks 
of this capital. This decision is another that cannot be made by 
markets and must be made by government, for the ratio of pop-
ulation to natural capital is a public good.
The other reason for categorizing the scarcity multiplier 
analysis as ecological economics is that it demonstrates that dis-
cipline’s dependence on political science. This is implied in the 
previous paragraph by the notion that choices to macro-allocate 
public natural capital to the economy (which are ecological eco-
nomic choices) must be made by governments. To do this com-
petently, governments must be entirely free of private goods bias 
and any other type of failure that might prevent them from pro-
viding optimal levels of public goods. As the triple dysfunction 
hypothesis indicates that democratic governments fail to some 
degree, ecological economics requires that new institutions be 
designed to reform them, which is a task for political scientists 
and is tackled below, in Part 2.
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As noted in §5.2.1, IWS is a pervasive reflex. It is a ubiqui-
tous biological response that is in no way confined to humans. 
IWS is therefore deeply embedded in our psyche, which implies 
that democratic governments must be very competent indeed 
if they are to stop driving the scarcity multiplier. The necessary 
self-restraint is counterintuitive. As Richard Dawkins (2001) 
has observed: ‘Sustainability does not come naturally.’ We must 
therefore expect that until democratic government is reformed, 
the scarcity multiplier is the norm, relentlessly producing end-
less forms of boom-and-bust. A recent example of such failure 
of government at both state and national levels is provided by 
journalist Paul Cleary’s (2011) book Too Much Luck: The Min-
ing Boom and Australia’s Future. Boom-and-busts vary in scale 
from that of a mine producing a town that becomes a ghost a 
few years or decades or centuries after the lucky strike, to a re-
gion, a country, or the whole planet overexploiting its natural 
capital, both renewable and nonrenewable, a cycle that may take 
years, decades, centuries or millennia. As the scarcity multipli-
er’s population IWS indicates, much of the boom in these cycles 
is growth in population, and as we have seen, just the popu-
lation IWS on its own may drive the multiplier to extremes of 
scarcity. If a boom and bust is local, the bust may be painful 
but not lethal as the bloated local population can move to more 
supportive parts of the country. But if the scope of the boom 
and bust is national, multinational or global, then the enlarged 
population may not be able to escape. The severity of such a 
bust is due not just to depletion of natural capital, but also to the 
number of people trying to live on what is left.
As triple dysfunction tends to make democratic govern-
ments of countries with advanced economies boost their scar-
city multiplier, they cannot be trusted with decisions on eco-
nomic growth. Those decisions have a private goods bias that 
undervalues public goods and thereby fuels damaging scarcity 
multipliers. When politicians declare they are ‘getting the bal-
ance right’ between economic growth and conservation in their 
decisions on development projects, they are wrong as they are 
not ‘thinking beyond stage one’ to anticipate inflation of want 
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by supply. Their political survival does not allow them to do it, 
because their constituents are stuck in stage one. This might be 
visualized in Figure 5.1, with public discourse and thinking gen-
erally encompassing steps 1 and 2, then failing to see further to 
steps 3, 4, back to 1 and around again and again, indefinitely. 
Until democratic governments are reformed to eliminate this 
myopia, their endorsements of further growth should be taken 
as good arguments against it. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, this is its third claim: Democratic governments of ad-
vanced economies must eschew economic growth until they are 
reformed to be able to make competent decisions on it.
5.5 Conclusions for Part I
In Chapter 2, the basic structure of electorally representative 
liberal democracies was predicted to cause, via ‘triple dysfunc-
tion’, a degree of failure in their governance. To test this hypoth-
esis, two cases of failed democratic policy were examined to see 
whether triple dysfunction could account for them. It appeared 
to do this, so Chapters 3, 4 and 5 investigated other cases of 
government failure in liberal democracies and found that they 
also seemed to be explained by triple dysfunction. All of these 
cases indicated that triple dysfunction inhibits the development 
and implementation of strategic, or fundamental, long-term 
policy, such as: the selection of desirable limits for populations; 
controls on positional competition, adaptation and inequality; 
sharing employment; and developing the intra-national and 
inter-national cooperation needed to limit global warming. It 
was predicted in §2.5 and also at the conclusion of §4.1 that tri-
ple dysfunction would make government fail mainly in strategic 
policy, and although the discussions of strategic issues in Chap-
ters 2, 3, 4 and 5 support that prediction they may be regarded as 
falling short of confirming it.
Nevertheless, as these examples of government failure appear 
to show triple dysfunction being realised, they encourage it to 
be seen not merely as a tentative ‘hypothesis’ of failure, but as a 
somewhat firmer ‘theory’ of failure that might be reliable enough 
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to guide the design of corrective measures. Triple dysfunction 
‘theory’ is therefore applied in Part 2 to design a new institu-
tion to help liberal democratic governments improve their pro-
visions of public goods. The running of that institution in the 
real world of politics might therefore provide an experimental 
test of triple dysfunction theory. In addition to the forward and 
backward mappings of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, the possibility of 
such experimental testing strengthens the idea that this theory 
is ‘falsifiable’, which (as philosopher of science Karl Popper ob-
served) is necessary if it is to be regarded as a scientific theory. 
Some discussion of this aspect is given in the Afterword, but for 
now we proceed to Part 2, employing this theory to shape a pre-







the people’S forum:  
a Deliberative aiD for liberal 
DemoCraCieS
Triple dysfunction theory views failure of liberal democratic 
governments as arising from their electoral systems. This sug-
gests three different types of remedy: (a) countering the del-
eterious effects of electoral systems, (b) altering these systems 
so that they produce better effects, or (c) eliminating these sys-
tems, perhaps by replacing them with others. The last of these 
approaches may be to use a non-electoral method of selecting 
representatives, or to eliminate representation by attempting di-
rect democracy, or to abandon democracy itself. A new institu-
tion designed to implement option (a) is now proposed because 
it appears more feasible to implement in current democratic 
contexts than either (b) or (c). If (a) works it should improve 
the political capacity to then implement either (b) or (c), as well 
as increase the competence of the polity to decide whether it is 
prudent to do so.
This new institutional design is called the People’s Forum 
(for short, PF or the Forum). In this chapter, PF is given a broad 
description and then evaluated in two ways. One evaluation is a 
comparison of this design with principles that have been theo-
rized as being required for deliberative participation in dem-
ocratic government (the categorization of PF as a deliberative 
institution is discussed below). The other evaluation is a com-
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parison of PF with eight other institutional designs of similar 
scale of operation that have been suggested for improving dem-
ocratic governance. Chapter 7 then provides more details of the 
Forum’s design and additional discussion on whether it should 
function as intended.
Triple dysfunction theory indicates that if the People’s Fo-
rum is to improve democratic government, it should do three 
things. It should remove the ambiguity of delegation by making 
it clear that it is the people who direct government policy; it 
should reduce either the excessiveness, or the destructive effect, 
of competition between politicians; and it should reduce the 
compromising of the political influence of relatively informed 
and considered public opinion by the political influence of 
less well-developed public opinion. The Forum is designed to 
achieve the first of these objectives by being a very visible public 
institution that encourages and helps the people to exercise re-
sponsible directorship. As the development of strategic policy is 
a crucial part of directorship (discussed mostly in §2.2.2, §2.2.4 
and §2.5) the Forum must help citizens to focus on this. The 
second objective is to be pursued by the Forum helping the peo-
ple to moderate the degree of competition between politicians 
and reduce the extent to which the remaining competition may 
damage policy. These effects might be achieved by the Forum 
replacing some of the political activity of politicians, and again 
the crucial area in which to do this is strategic policy, as noted 
in §2.3.5. The third objective, of reducing the compromising of 
the political influence of informed opinion by the influence of 
ill-informed opinion, is pursued by the Forum being designed 
to facilitate the development of mass public opinion and also to 
give more political influence to that section of this opinion that 
is more likely to be well developed. Again, such developed and 
influential opinion must cover strategic policy; otherwise much 
tactical and operational policy will, sooner or later, become in-
effectual or damaging. 
These three objectives for the Forum may be condensed into 
two by combining the second and third into the objective of 
improving the quality of public policy, especially strategic public 
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policy (as this is the central aim of those two objectives) and 
restating the first (which is to make it clear that it is the people 
who direct government policy, especially its strategic compo-
nent) as developing public legitimacy for government policy, espe-
cially strategic policy. The Forum’s mission may therefore be ex-
pressed as (1) improving the quality of public policy, especially 
strategic public policy and (2) developing public legitimacy for 
this policy.
The three design objectives that are specified by triple dys-
function for the People’s Forum clearly require public delibera-
tion. The first objective is for the people to direct public policy 
and to do this with special attention to strategic policy. This 
demands careful public deliberation. The second objective, of 
reducing damage to public policy from excessive competition 
between politicians, requires citizens to take over some of their 
policy work and/or devise ways of reducing their competition, 
which again demands public deliberation. The third objective, 
that the political influence of citizens’ informed and consid-
ered opinions is less compromised by the influence of their ill-
considered ones, arguably also requires public deliberation. The 
meaning of ‘public deliberation’ that is applied here is broader 
than that defined by political scientist Michael X. Delli Carpini 
and colleagues (2004, 319) as discourse with other citizens that 
helps them to ‘reach judgements about matters of public con-
cern’. Discourse includes talk, discussion and debate in formal 
or informal settings, via any medium including face-to-face ex-
changes, telephone conversations, email and internet forums, 
but it excludes ‘self-deliberation’ (Delli Carpini et al. 2004, 318–
19), which is the thinking and learning of citizens that may be 
stimulated by their observations of the views of others and of 
information and events relevant to public issues. Delli Carpini 
and his colleagues exclude self-deliberation about public affairs 
from public deliberation because it does not involve personal 
reciprocal exchange, but it is included here as part of democratic 
public deliberation because people do this when they recognize 




it remains significant how very much of the work of deliberation, 
even in external-collective settings, must inevitably be done within 
each individual’s head … The challenge facing deliberative demo-
crats is thus to find some way of adapting their deliberative ideals 
to any remotely large-scale society, where it is simply infeasible to 
arrange face-to-face discussions across the entire community.
Political philosopher James Bohman (1998, 401) has defined 
deliberative democracy as ‘any one of a family of views accord-
ing to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens 
is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-gov-
ernment’. Political scientist Michael Saward (2001, 365) offers 
a similar view. ‘That deliberative democracy comes in many 
shapes is an understatement … However, a simple dichotomy 
between circumscribed and uncircumscribed variants of de-
liberative sites and forums captures with reasonable accuracy 
the institutional aspirations of various strands of deliberative 
theory.’ Saward defines the circumscribed extreme as a con-
sciously designed forum with a limited number of participants, 
who engage face-to-face with a limited agenda of issues and use 
tight procedures for discussion. The uncircumscribed extreme 
is a spontaneous group or network of an indeterminate number 
of people who may never meet but engage for an indefinite time 
with informal procedures on a self-generated, fluid set of issues. 
As will be seen from the following description, the People’s Fo-
rum is circumscribed in several ways as it has many specific fea-
tures, such as a regular schedule for voting on a carefully com-
posed set of questions: but it is also uncircumscribed in such 
ways as a degree of adaptability of the agenda, an indeterminate 
number of participants, no organisation of group discussions 
and an indefinite period of engagement with each question.
6.1 The mission, strategies and shape of the 
People’s Forum
As stated above, the mission of the People’s Forum is to improve 
the quality of public policy — especially in strategic areas — and 
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to produce strong legitimacy for this policy in the eyes of citi-
zens. While the theory of triple dysfunction points to this as the 
necessary mission, its third dysfunction (that of excessive com-
promising of the political influence of informed public opinion 
with the political influence of ill-informed public opinion) sug-
gests two strategies for executing that mission. These are the 
two actions that appear necessary to minimize that third dys-
function. The first is to raise the standard of mass public opinion 
(especially in strategic public policy); and the second is to pro-
duce greater political influence for the part of mass public opinion 
that is likely to be better developed. As well as minimizing the 
third dysfunction, these two strategies should execute the mis-
sion of PF because, acting in concert, they should improve the 
quality of public policy (especially strategic policy) while mak-
ing it legitimate in the eyes of citizens (because in a democracy, 
political influence ultimately depends on public legitimacy). 
These two strategies also tackle the first two parts of triple dys-
function, which they must do if they are to execute the mission 
of PF. The first two dysfunctions are addressed as follows: first, 
by ambiguity in delegation being minimized by both strategies 
giving the director’s role to the people; and second, by damage 
to policy from excessive competition between politicians being 
minimized by the people’s directorship replacing some of the 
decision-making by politicians. This replacement is done not 
only with some policy being produced by citizens instead of by 
politicians, but also by citizens (potentially) devising policy or 
new rules that moderate competition between politicians. To 
summarize, then, for the People’s Forum we have:
The mission:
•	 improving the quality of public policy, especially strategic 
policy
•	 developing public legitimacy for this policy.
The strategies for achieving the mission:
•	 accelerating the development of mass public opinion, espe-
cially on strategic issues
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•	 producing political influence for the part of mass public 
opinion that is likely to be relatively well developed.
To execute its two strategies, the People’s Forum employs a re-
petitive, nonbinding referendum or poll with an agenda that is 
largely supervised by the public. These features, together with 
many others described below, are intended to stimulate and 
facilitate an unhurried and, in some respects, organized and 
careful consideration of strategic issues by citizens. As currently 
practiced, referendums cannot do this well, if at all, because 
they usually combine most or all of the following four features: 
a proposition is put to the vote only as a binary choice; it is voted 
on just once; the result binds the legislature to enact that choice; 
and propositions are chosen by elites. This gives referendums 
the image of all-or-nothing contests that cannot afford the re-
flection of deliberation. Political theorist Simone Chambers 
(2001, 231–32, 236, 240–42) describes this as happening in three 
ways: the framing of the question is not negotiable; the vote is 
irreversible; and a majoritarian situation is presented in which 
citizens’ willingness to deliberate is displaced by their need to 
win. This discouragement of deliberation is also abetted by the 
news media ‘adopting election coverage rules as the standard of 
news presentation for referendums’ (Jenkins and Mendelsohn 
2001, 229).
The question of whether heuristics can substitute for delib-
eration to assist citizens to vote on issues according to their ex-
isting interests is of limited significance for the People’s Forum 
because its major strategy is to accelerate the development of 
public opinion. Deliberation is necessary not only for this, but 
for constructive popular control of the agenda and also to stim-
ulate demands for new information that may be needed for both 
the elites who provide heuristic cues for citizens and for citizens 
themselves if either group is to be knowledgeable and compe-
tent on the strategic issues presented by the Forum. As the pur-
pose and design of the People’s Forum’s poll or referendum are 
quite distinctive, it may be useful to recognize it as a new type by 
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giving it the technical name of opinion development poll, which 
offers the attraction to sceptics of abbreviating it to ‘odpoll’.
To establish itself as a part of the system of government, the 
Forum’s poll (odpoll) must become a widely recognized event 
that attracts significant levels of public interest, public involve-
ment and public status. Development of public status would in-
dicate that the Forum was starting to execute its second strategy. 
For the execution of both strategies, the technology that is em-
ployed is important (e.g. Lupia and Sin 2003), but the essential 
feature is the way the poll is organized (Flanagin et al. 2006, 
32–33). The emphasis of the Forum’s design on effective organi-
zation should allow it to work to a useful degree with technolo-
gy no more advanced than postal mail for voting, together with 
print media to introduce the ballot paper, to facilitate much of 
the public discourse on the issues presented and to publish the 
voting results. However, modern communication technology 
makes it much easier to introduce and run this institution.
6.1.1 The focus of the Forum
The People’s Forum is not intended to do work that is suitable for 
panels of citizens that come together to deliberate issues. Such 
groups may convene as one group or they may operate as several 
that meet in plenary sessions and thereby involve hundreds of 
members. They may meet face-to-face or online. A citizen panel 
or a coordinated set of these can only be a very small sample 
of the population of a state or nation, because the participants 
must be able listen to each other. Where the legitimacy (to all 
members of a polity) of the decisions of such panels arises from 
the opportunities for participation that they offer to all mem-
bers of the polity, then these panels will restrict themselves to 
issues that can be managed by small communities, for it is only 
the members of these that will have significant opportunities to 
participate.
As the Forum is primarily designed to address issues that 
only very large communities have a prospect of managing, it 
offers participation to unlimited numbers of citizens. To create 
the prospect that their participation may be powerful it concen-
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trates on issues of strategic significance (which, as discussed in 
the introductory part of §2.2, would help reduce the ambiguity of 
delegation), so that the collective development of citizens’ ideas 
is focused on long-term, fundamental public policy of regional, 
national or wider concern. The Forum is thereby designed to 
help citizens direct government to prevent and rectify causes 
of problems, rather than to treat symptoms. To help with this 
systemic, strategic approach it must assist citizens to question 
their basic assumptions and attitudes, as these may underlie the 
problems. But this approach can influence government policy 
only if the resultant changes in attitudes are widespread through 
the polity. For this to happen, any advocacy by the Forum must 
be seen by all or most citizens as legitimate, so it should occur in 
full view of all who care to take an interest and any citizen must 
be able, if they wish, to contribute to the maintenance or reform 
of the attitudes being debated and voted on.
The type of issue the Forum is designed to deal with can thus 
be described as fundamental and long-running. As an exam-
ple, the issue of whether to have a presidential political system 
would be suitable for the Forum, but the issue of who is to be 
the next president would not. ‘Long-running’ is specified for the 
Forum not only because fundamental issues have long-lasting as 
well as systemic effects, but also because, as noted below, the in-
stitution would function by addressing the same issues for many 
years, so the issues themselves must be those that remain rel-
evant for such periods. Even after an issue is politically decided 
and acted on, the Forum may continue to address it if there is 
reason to believe that citizens want, or should want (in the opin-
ion of the Forum’s managers, as discussed below), to keep their 
choice under review.
The Forum’s focus on fundamental, long-running issues is 
necessary for it to clarify democratic directorship and thereby 
correct the first democratic dysfunction. It is only by determin-
ing strategic policy that popular rule can provide effective di-
rectorship for a polity and thereby make it a fully functional de-
mocracy. If popular rule does not consciously and deliberately 
do this (which §2.2.3 and §2.2.4 describe as largely the current 
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situation) then either the polity will drift somewhat aimlessly in 
terms of fundamental goals, or some other influence will take 
charge and direct the polity at this strategic level. Such undemo-
cratic direction will, of course, largely control the polity in fu-
ture tactical and operational policy as well.
6.1.2 The structure of the poll
Each voting event of a People’s Forum that is conducted for a 
particular society or group of societies would usually be repeat-
ed at regular intervals of sufficient length to allow some possibil-
ity of development in public opinion. In contrast with continual 
polling, such separation of polls also makes it possible for all 
those who are concerned to express themselves at the same time, 
which potentially makes the result for each poll a set of pref-
erences that amounts to a democratic social choice. An estab-
lished People’s Forum might therefore conduct its voting events 
at the same time each year. This periodicity should also prevent 
citizens becoming fatigued with too much voting. However, in 
the start-up phase of a People’s Forum, the poll might initially 
be held quarterly or half-yearly a few times to stimulate public 
interest. As noted in the previous section, this poll is repetitive, 
so it would endeavour to ask the same sets of questions on the 
same issues each time it is held. These issues, the questions, and 
the menus of answers offered for each question, are selected by 
the poll managers and set out in a ‘ballot paper’ available to the 
public as a free booklet and also on a website. An issue, or a 
question, or a menu of answers would only be changed (by the 
managers, as described in ‘Ballot paper’ below) if it is found to 
be unsuitable or if the public has made up its mind and is no 
longer evolving its view. Such stabilizations of opinion would be 
identified by the poll as it shows levelled trends in opinions over 
successive polls, as discussed below. New issues would be placed 
on the ballot by the People’s Forum managers whenever suitable 
topics become apparent to them. However, as noted below un-
der ‘Ballot paper’ and in more detail in §7.2.13 (E3, E2), the pub-
lic will have a large degree of control over this agenda-setting.
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Voting would be voluntary, a self-selecting process that in-
vites all electors (citizens legally eligible to vote) to participate. 
Voters would be free to respond to as many or as few of the 
issues and questions as they like. One ‘vote’ may comprise an-
swers to any questions on any of the issues presented at a poll-
ing event. As noted above, the poll results would not be binding 
on legislatures, merely advisory. Initially this political influence 
is likely to be much weaker than that of conventional opinion 
polls, but due to the effects of the structure of the People’s Fo-
rum described below, it should become stronger and exceed 
the influence of opinion polls as public deliberation and voting 
continues over the years. Repetition of the same questions over 
many years would provide a consistent agenda, promoting con-
tinuity in the associated public debates. This should facilitate the 
development of public opinion on these questions and create 
or accelerate trends in the opinions of that part of the commu-
nity that is voting. The annual repetition of the poll would allow 
these trends to be plotted. On those questions where partici-
pating opinion is stable, or where the trend has flattened out in 
the last few years of polling, the process would indicate that the 
community in general is satisfied with these views. These ques-
tions could then be taken out of the poll.
6.1.3 Voting process
The People’s Forum poll would be open for voting for a week 
each time it is held, to give time for public interest to be stimu-
lated by daily progressive tallies during that week and to help 
ensure that those who intend to vote do not forget to do it. Votes 
are to be lodged by telephone or internet. Tallying would be 
electronic and thus virtually instantaneous, so that each night 
of the week of polling the cumulative results on selected issues 
may be shown on television. The internet and print media could 
also give daily updates that might cover all the issues on the bal-
lot and include charts illustrating the voting trends on each is-
sue over the years up to the present event. At least in the early 
phase of operation of the Forum, this media coverage would not 
be legally required because this would make establishment of 
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the institution much more difficult by requiring strong govern-
ment support. It is hoped that many media outlets would see a 
potential for growth in public demand for their coverage of the 
Forum’s activities and therefore provide it to help that demand 
grow and expand their ratings and market. They could expect 
this effect not only during the week of voting, but also in the 
form of a sustained increase in demand for information on the 
subjects covered by the ballot paper. The manager of one televi-
sion channel in Australia has been asked about providing free 
daily coverage of voting in such a system over one week each 
year and he indicated an interest in doing this as a news and 
current affairs service. Forum managers would encourage such 
cooperation by issuing daily summaries of the voting, ready for 
transmission and printing.
Ways of ensuring one vote per elector per poll are discussed 
in §7.2.13 (E22), which focuses mainly on using the electoral 
roll in the Australian situation. The ideal voting security system 
would allow spontaneity of voting, so that registration is not a 
prerequisite and the elector can vote on impulse at any time dur-
ing the week the poll is open. Spontaneity of voting allows those 
who become concerned about the way the poll is currently go-
ing in particular issues to vote and to urge others to vote before 
it closes at the end of the week. Such interactions should help 
to get people involved in the process during the week of voting 
and this may encourage wider discussion and deliberation of 
the issues presented throughout the year in anticipation of the 
next poll. Voters who decide to change a vote they have lodged 
may do so before the poll closes. Voting on impulse would work 
against the objective of giving political influence to citizens who 
have given serious thought to issues (see §6.3.4 below), but it 
should help to draw the hitherto disengaged into the process. 
People who become involved in voting in this way may then pay 
more attention to the issues and develop their deliberative incli-
nations and skills by dealing with the types of questions posed, 
as explained under §6.1.4 below. It may be anticipated that hold-
ing the poll open for a week and allowing voters to change their 
vote during this period may encourage manipulation by special 
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interests, perhaps by scare tactics applied through the media. 
This seems unlikely to be effective because voters will have had 
the previous year to reconsider the issues and any sudden in-
tensive attempt to sway them at the time of polling may look 
obviously underhand. Interests that are attacked in this way will 
have a few days to respond to some of it before the close of the 
poll and may also carry on their counterattack through the year 
before the next poll. A positive aspect of such competition is 
that it should increase the discussion of issues and thereby fa-
cilitate deliberative effects between polls. If manipulation dur-
ing the polling event becomes a real problem, then voting can be 
made irrevocable and the event could also be restricted to one 
day. Further consideration of countermeasures against manipu-
lation is given in §7.2.10.
Having the voting event run for a week and allowing voting 
on impulse may be important practices only for the first few 
years of polling, in order to encourage as many citizens as possi-
ble to become involved. It may then seem advisable to move out 
of the introductory phase by making prior registration obliga-
tory, and/or to reduce the voting period to a weekend or a day, 
in order to make voting a more premeditated act, thus giving the 
results a more deliberated status in the eyes of the public. How-
ever, these changes may not make the poll results reflect a more 
considered opinion as they would help the strongly prejudiced 
to be well represented. This effect, together with reduction of the 
public exposure of the poll during voting, may lower its profile 
or status and thus the deliberation it stimulates. These changes 
are therefore not recommended at this stage, but experience in 
managing a People’s Forum may indicate that they are worth 
trying.
6.1.4 Ballot paper
A People’s Forum ballot paper would treat an indefinite number 
of fundamental long-running issues. As well as being extensive, 
this agenda should include the most controversial of such is-
sues, to provide something of interest to as many people as pos-
sible and to stimulate public involvement. Although the number 
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of issues treated could be very large, the attention span of the 
public will limit publication of poll results by the mass media 
to perhaps a hundred issues, and of these, less than 10 might be 
focused on at each poll. Newspapers may be inclined to cover 
a much greater number of issues than television and radio. If 
the number of issues voted on is very large, complete listings of 
the results and trends may be published in other outlets such 
as websites, magazines, technical journals and books. A Forum 
for a nation of federated states would provide different ballot 
papers for each state to pose questions on state affairs as well as 
questions on national policy, and these different papers would 
be coordinated so that the same national questions were posed 
in all of them.
The description of each issue that the ballot paper gives should 
be concise and limited to perhaps less than a page. Where appro-
priate, the description should relate an issue to others that the 
ballot paper invites respondents to consider, before answering 
the questions on that one. Several questions would be posed on 
each issue and where possible these would include ‘justification 
questions’ that inquire into the reasons for the voter’s response 
to preceding questions on that issue, in order to promote the 
questioning of prejudice, world views and values. Poll results on 
justification questions should also stimulate constructive public 
debate on those questions between polls. Each question on the 
ballot is to be accompanied by a range of answers for the voter’s 
choice. Other types of questions would also be posed where ap-
propriate and feasible, such as the action that is desired of gov-
ernment, the voter’s understanding of how that action would 
work and his or her willingness to pay, as discussed below in 
§7.2.2 (E13) and §7.2.4 (E14).
As the menus of issues, questions and answers offered to the 
voter would be on public display in the ballot paper for years, 
criticism and endorsement of these menus would be invited 
from the public and plenty of time would be available for reac-
tions by both the managers of the poll and the public. It would 
thus be an open process that places the managers under con-
stant public scrutiny to ensure relevance, comprehensiveness 
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and competence in the selection and framing of the menus of 
issues, questions and answers. The penalty for a public percep-
tion of poor performance would be the collapse of the People’s 
Forum through distrust, ridicule and boycott by citizens.
The ballot paper would help citizens deal effectively with 
an issue if the description it gave and the questions it posed 
summarized the problem to a few crucial concepts that are de-
scribed in a manner that is easily understood and helpful. Com-
plex issues of technology, risk and values must be distilled to 
their essentials and questions must be incisive and oriented to 
problem-solving. The managers of the poll should be well in-
formed on political issues and have skills in issue analysis, ques-
tion technique and the psychology of public deliberation.
6.1.5 The execution of the Forum’s strategies
The execution of both of the Forum’s strategies fundamentally 
depends on its ballot paper. For the first strategy — encourag-
ing the development of mass public opinion on strategic is-
sues — the paper must cover those that are the most important 
for citizens to carefully consider. Politicians avoid some of these 
because they confront electors with costly choices. The ballot 
paper must help to solve issues by focusing on causes and this 
may include addressing other, related issues, so these must also 
be placed on the ballot, with each referenced to the others. As 
the Forum’s polls will reflect any development of opinion that 
such tactics facilitate, its results should become widely known 
for reflecting relatively well-considered opinion and this should 
generate political influence for these polls. The Forum’s first 
strategy will therefore help to execute its second strategy as well: 
that of producing political influence for the best developed pol-
icy ideas.
The second strategy is deliberately elitist in that it aims to 
empower the views of those who are more concerned with the 
issues and therefore more likely to be well informed on them. 
Rather than being a problem for democratic equality of oppor-
tunities for participation, this elitism may help to ameliorate 
disengagement from politics by encouraging the disengaged to 
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join the ‘elite’ by voting in the Forum and publicly debating its 
questions.
If these polls are to create a strong political influence for the 
opinion they help develop, they must become popular public 
institutions. Such popularity would be indicated not just by 
whether a significant proportion of the electorate votes in Fo-
rum polls, but also — and mainly — by the status of their results 
in the eyes of the public. This status should show whether the 
general public expects government to implement the Forum’s 
findings. If these polls are actually run they would be compared 
with conventional opinion polls, which should draw the atten-
tion of the public to the hazardous influence of the latter. Public 
communication scholar Leo Jeffres (2005, 617–18) observes that 
in public opinion polls there is a
well-documented public willingness to offer opinions on topics 
citizens know nothing about and respond to ambiguous questions 
about fictitious public affairs issues … In a democracy, and the con-
sumer society, the public itself, political leadership, and influentials 
need ‘feedback’ about each other for the system to work. The ques-
tion is whether we can improve poll results to merit the position 
surveys occupy in society today.
The People’s Forum is intended to provide a positive answer to 
Jeffres’ query, for it provides a poll that should reflect less sug-
gestion and ignorance and more considered judgement. Some 
of this judgement will be developed by the continuity of debate 
and the deliberative nature of this discourse that would be pro-
moted by the Forum’s repetitive process. By showing trends 
in the development of opinion the Forum might also indicate 
whether more sophistication appears likely to be developed in 
the near future.
The five main ways by which the Forum is intended to func-
tion are given below in §6.3, followed by more detailed specifi-
cations of its mechanisms and explanations of these in Chapter 
7. The broad view in §6.3 of the functions of this design is uti-
lized there to judge its probable performance by evaluating how 
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well it should perform those functions. However, before this is 
presented, the next section develops the procedure to be used 
for that evaluation. 
6.2 Evaluating democratic institutions
As triple dysfunction theory diagnoses failure by democratic 
government, it might be expected to provide a framework for 
evaluating the potential effectiveness of new institutions for 
improving democratic government. However, perhaps it would 
place too much faith in a particular theory to use it not only to 
guide the design of a new institution to improve government (as 
done at the beginning of this chapter and in §6.1 and §6.1.1), but 
to compare the promise of this design with that of others of sim-
ilar purpose — especially as the others may have other virtues 
in addition to correcting triple dysfunction or compensating 
for it. Further reason for not using triple dysfunction theory for 
such comparisons is that a design that corrects triple dysfunc-
tion may produce other dysfunctions as it operates, or it may 
not be of a type that is politically or economically feasible to 
install and operate. The People’s Forum and competing designs 
are therefore evaluated more directly and comprehensively (be-
low in §6.3 and §6.5.2 respectively) by assessing how well they 
should assist existing representative liberal democracies to per-
form. For this purpose we must specify what we mean by good 
performance.
The specification of objectives for democratic government 
that is developed below is derived primarily from Graham 
Smith’s (2009, 12) helpful concept of the ‘desirable qualities or 
goods that we expect of democratic institutions’ (emphasis in 
original), but our derivation necessarily transforms expec-
tations of democratic institutions into expectations of what 
those institutions should do for democratic government. Smith 
proposes two classes of expectations for a democratic institu-
tion. The first is its provision of democratic goods, which ‘argu-
ably … embody Robert Dahl’s classic criteria of a democratic 
process’ (G. Smith 2009, 13). In Smith’s terminology, democratic 
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goods are effects that are, or might be expected to be, realized 
by an institution (Smith 2009, 12–13), which differs from Dahl’s 
(2006, 8–10) approach in that his democratic criteria are oppor-
tunities for the realization of such effects. Smith specifies four 
democratic goods: (1) inclusiveness, the degree to which citizens 
of diverse social perspectives are involved in the decision-mak-
ing process of the institution being assessed; (2) popular control 
of decision-making by the institution, which means control (by 
those participating in the institution) of its problem definition, 
its option analysis, its option selection and the implementation 
of the options it selects; (3) considered judgement by participants 
in the institution (G. Smith 2009, 25); and (4) the transparency 
of its process to all citizens, whether they participate directly in 
that institution or not. Smith’s second class of the goods ‘that 
we expect of democratic institutions’ (2009, 12) is institutional 
goods, which are those things that we expect of any institution. 
These fall into two subclasses: the efficiency of the institution 
and its applicability or transferability to the situation in which it 
must operate. That situation is defined by the type of democratic 
political system in which the institution must function, the scale 
of that political system (the size of the polity) and the type of 
political issue that is addressed.
We now review whether Smith’s democratic goods are goods 
that contribute to good democratic government. As democratic 
government is government by the people, good democratic gov-
ernment is good government by the people. This would seem 
to be not only good government in terms of its outcomes, but 
also good interaction among the people as they govern; that 
is, as they investigate, debate, discuss, consider, understand 
and choose those outcomes. Dahl (2006) has emphasized that 
in a democracy such interaction must express political equal-
ity among citizens. The democratic goods of an institution’s 
contribution to good democratic government might therefore 
be expected to be its contributions to both governmental out-
comes and political equality, which are here called governmental 
goods and political equality goods. Smith’s democratic goods of 
an institution are therefore replaced here with its governmental 
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goods and its political equality goods. This replacement invites 
us to exclude Smith’s fourth democratic good, transparency, 
from both these new goods and transfer it to the class of in-
stitutional goods. This is necessary because the transparency of 
an institution cultivates trust in it and acceptance of it by all 
citizens; so an institution with this good has an essential ele-
ment of transferability to democracies, which is one of the two 
subclasses of institutional goods. It should be noted here that 
institutional goods are not only goods of the institution but also 
goods of the institution’s contribution to government; because 
efficient, transferable institutions will make more contribution 
than those that are inefficient or poorly transferable.
The replacement of the democratic goods of an institution 
with its contributions to democratic government in the form 
of governmental goods and political equality goods requires con-
sideration of what those goods are. To recognize governmental 
goods, the criterion used here is the public choice notion stated 
in §2.1, that a government is good if it produces a good provi-
sion of public goods. To judge whether this provision is good, 
Beetham’s (1992, 42) fifth principle of liberal democracy is used: 
The judgement is to be made by citizens. This seems just, be-
cause it is the people who need, use and ultimately provide or 
maintain public goods. As good government does a good job 
of providing public goods, it follows that it must be very demo-
cratic because it will provide or maintain those important public 
goods that comprise political equality. But the converse is not 
necessarily the case, for although a very democratic government 
will provide political equality this may not be sufficient for good 
government. Other public goods may be neglected, not least be-
cause political equality may give some (or much) political influ-
ence to citizens who are ignorant or excessively self-centred, in 
which case government outcomes might be improved by mod-
erating this equality. One element of such moderation could be 
Dahl’s approach of specifying political equality as the opportu-
nity for equal political action, rather than as the actual realiza-
tion of equal political action.
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As good government will provide political equality, it might 
be thought that we can delete political equality goods as a sepa-
rate class and account for them as governmental goods. How-
ever, this is not done here because these two types of goods are 
significantly different. As discussed below, governmental goods 
are an institution’s capabilities to assist government to provide 
public goods of all types, whereas political equality goods are 
an institution’s capabilities to assist government to provide only 
those public goods that comprise political equality (four of 
which are identified below in 6.2.1).
This replacement of Graham Smith’s democratic goods of an 
institution with governmental and political equality goods is 
accompanied by changing the meaning of goods being realiza-
tions for participants in an institution, to being opportunities for 
realizations by all citizens, as conceived by Dahl (2006, 8–10). 
The exception to this is transparency, the only one of Smith’s 
democratic goods of an institution that may be experienced 
by all citizens of the polity (G. Smith 2009, 12). Governmen-
tal and political equality goods are thus contributions that an 
institution makes for all citizens, while it functions as a part of 
their government. Partial replacement of the democratic goods 
of an institution with goods that are an institution’s contribu-
tions to government also draws attention to what a government 
must do to perform well — that is, what it must do to make a 
good provision of public goods. Two governmental goods are 
suggested as necessary for this. One of them is a conversion of 
Graham Smith’s democratic good of the realization of consid-
ered judgment on public policy issues by the participants in an 
institution, which Dahl treated by specifying that democracy re-
quires equal and effective opportunities for citizens to develop 
enlightened understanding. As with political equality goods, 
Dahl’s concept and term are used here for this governmental 
good of enlightened understanding because specifying it as an 
opportunity rather than as a realization makes it much more 
feasible for an institution to provide it to all citizens of a polity 
as it operates as a part of government. The other governmen-
tal good suggested here is that, as it is often the case that only 
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some of the citizens of a polity have enlightened understandings 
of a public goods issue, those understandings of some citizens 
should prevail over the ignorance of the others in the shaping 
of public policy. This good is here called the political prevalence 
of enlightened understanding. We now might note what may 
be a remarkable coincidence, or an admirable consistency, or 
a sneaky manipulation: Providing the two governmental goods 
identified here turns out to be the twofold strategy the People’s 
Forum would use to achieve its mission (see §6.1 and §6.1.5).
It was noted above that a good government must be very 
democratic because it will provide or maintain the public goods 
that comprise political equality. We can therefore drop the 
specific objective of designing an institution to produce good 
democratic government and simply focus on designing one to 
produce good government. We now inspect political equality 
goods, governmental goods and institutional goods more close-
ly, to make sure that all goods in each class are covered.
6.2.1 Political equality goods
Robert Dahl (1998, 37–38; 2006, 8–9) gives the following five 
basic criteria for an ideal democracy:
1. Equal and effective opportunities for all members of the 
demos to communicate their views on public policy to other 
members, before the relevant policy is enacted (Dahl’s ‘effec-
tive participation’ criterion).
2. Equal and effective opportunities for all members to vote on 
enactment of policy (which includes equality of their votes).
3. Equal and effective opportunities for each member to learn 
about policy proposals (Dahl’s ‘enlightened understanding’ 
criterion).
4. Exclusive opportunity for the members to control the agenda.
5. Inclusion of virtually all adults and social groups as having 
these four rights as members of the demos. The inclusion 
provided by a political institution is the extent to which it 
provides both presence and voice to citizens of all social per-
spectives. Presence is active participation and voice is the 
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hearing afforded any participant, together with his or her 
influence over the output of the institution (G. Smith 2009).
It is suggested that Dahl’s third criterion of opportunities to gain 
enlightened understanding is fundamentally different from his 
other criteria, as it appears necessary for quality of participation 
rather than equality of participation. If Dahl’s equalities of par-
ticipation (criteria 1, 2, 4 and 5) are to produce good government 
(a good provision of public goods), they must be complemented 
with a high quality of participation, that is, enlightened under-
standing. The availability of equal and effective opportunities for 
enlightened understanding is therefore considered to be a gov-
ernmental good (as previously noted), while Dahl’s criteria 1, 2, 
4 and 5 are considered to describe political equality goods.
In this section, then, we have replaced three of Smith’s four 
democratic goods of an institution (inclusiveness, popular con-
trol and considered judgement) with the following five goods of 
an institution’s contribution to government: four political equal-
ity goods (opportunities to communicate, to vote, to control the 
agenda and to include citizens of all social perspectives) and 
one governmental good (opportunities for enlightened under-
standing). The attention that this replacement gives to political 
equality implements Dahl’s (1998, 36–37) recognition that this 
equality is fundamental to democracy: ‘all the members are to 
be treated (under the constitution) as if they were equally quali-
fied to participate in the process of making decisions about the 
policies the association will pursue’. In this statement, Dahl’s ‘as 
if ’ indicates a concern for the justice of all members having the 
freedom or right to participate, rather than a concern that all 
members actually do participate. Consistent with this meaning, 
Dahl (2006, 10) later emphasized the significance of rights. ‘De-
mocracy consists, then, not only of political processes. It is also 
necessarily a system of fundamental rights.’
As noted previously, Graham Smith’s democratic good of 
popular control of an institution is control over its problem 
definition, option analysis, option choice and implementation 
of the choice. Popular control of problem definition and op-
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tion analysis are addressed here at the level of an institution’s 
contribution to government by the political equality goods of 
polity-wide opportunities to communicate views and control the 
agenda (Dahl’s criteria 1 and 4), while popular control of option 
choice is addressed by the political equality good of polity-wide 
opportunities to vote on enactment (Dahl’s criterion 2). The in-
gredient of political equality that is classed by Graham Smith 
as a democratic good of an institution but which is not explic-
itly provided for a whole polity by those three political equality 
goods is popular control of the implementation of policy choice, 
but this may be considered to be produced for the whole polity 
by those three political equality goods, as it should be effected, 
over time, by political pressure applied by citizens through their 
equal and effective opportunities to communicate views, to con-
trol the agenda, and to vote on enactment. The fourth political 
equality good of inclusion should also apply pressure for imple-
mentation.
6.2.2 Governmental goods
Opportunity for enlightened understanding was classified above 
as a governmental good, which means that the degree to which 
this opportunity is provided by an institution that is performing 
as a part of a system of government is not only a part of the value 
of that institution, but a part of the value of that government as 
well. As we have seen, a good government is one that makes a 
good provision of public goods. As it is the people who need, 
use and ultimately provide and maintain or dispose of public 
goods, it is only they who have the moral authority to decide 
what provision of these is good or bad. To do this competently 
they need to be well enough informed to be able to recognize 
public goods and assess their benefits and costs. So they need 
equal and effective opportunities to gain enlightened under-
standing of these goods. Such opportunities will therefore help 
produce good government, and as this makes a good provision 
of public goods, those of political equality will be well provided 
and that government will thus be very democratic. As indicated 
above at the conclusion of the opening part of §6.2, the provi-
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sion of opportunities to gain enlightened understanding would 
essentially implement the first strategy of the People’s Forum, 
which is to accelerate the development of mass public opinion 
on strategic issues.
However, this governmental good is not enough to produce 
good government because opportunities for enlightened under-
standing will not ensure that all citizens, or even just a majority 
of them, are enlightened on every important issue, so the provi-
sion of public goods may be flawed (and as we have seen, in some 
cases such as public goods of long-term significance, very badly 
flawed) by the political influence of those citizens who are unin-
terested in, or incapable of, enlightenment on such issues. This 
problem is the third part of triple dysfunction, excessive com-
promise. There is, therefore, the need for a second governmen-
tal good from institutions: That they enable the understandings 
of relatively enlightened citizens to have much more political 
influence than the understandings of the others. It is therefore 
proposed that the other strategy of the People’s Forum, to have 
the ‘political influence of informed citizen opinion prevailing 
over that of less informed citizen opinion’, describes a second 
governmental good, which is here called the political prevalence 
of enlightened understanding. On its own, this good is antidemo-
cratic because it allows some citizens a greater presence and/or 
voice than others, thereby blocking the political equality good 
of equal and effective opportunities for all social groups to be 
fully included in communicating their views, voting on enactment 
and controlling the agenda. If political prevalence of enlightened 
understanding operates in a government that is democratic, it 
is because democracy is provided, not by governmental goods, 
but by political equality goods. These create the conditions for 
citizens who are ignored by political prevalence of enlightened 
understanding to reject this situation, or to acquiesce in it, or to 
endorse it. They may attempt to reject or endorse by using their 
equal and effective opportunities to participate.
There may also appear to be a need for innovations to provide 
‘defence against manipulation of the public interest’ (G. Smith 
2001, 77), which would constitute a third governmental good. 
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However, this defence is essentially provided by the combined 
effects of the two governmental goods described above. Equal 
and effective opportunities for all citizens to gain enlightened 
understanding, together with political prevalence of enlightened 
understanding, should protect the democratic development of 
public policy from being distorted or blocked by special inter-
ests. Accordingly, the assessment of the provision of these two 
governmental goods by an institutional design must include 
scrutiny of its capacity to resist political corruption by corpo-
rations, by other powerful private interests and also by public 
authorities. The latter may have self-serving or ignorant agen-
das that they attempt to implement with manoeuvres such as 
co-opting citizens; exhausting their capacity to participate with 
lengthy, laborious or costly procedures; exploiting their emotive 
reflexes for narrow political gains; or using public funds to blind 
them with propaganda. It is concluded that we need only two 
governmental goods.
6.2.3 Institutional goods
Institutional goods are the desirable qualities we would expect 
of institutions in general, and as the institutions we are con-
sidering are to be parts of systems of government, then ‘insti-
tutional goods’ are goods that are contributed to government 
by institutions. Graham Smith (2009, 13, 26–27) proposes four 
institutional goods: one of efficiency and three of transferability. 
Efficiency is the degree to which the institution minimizes the 
costs it imposes on both citizens and public authorities, so it 
includes economy of time and effort for participants, as well as 
financial economy. The transferability of an institution for fa-
cilitating government is its ability to work in three contexts: the 
type of political system (its political, social, economic and cul-
tural practices), the type of issue dealt with and the scale of the 
application of the institution, from local to global government.
As noted above in §6.2, one cause of failure in transferability 
might be a lack of transparency to citizens of how the institu-
tion works, which causes them to distrust and reject it. Trans-
parency to all citizens is therefore considered here to be an insti-
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tutional good of transferability to democratic political systems, 
rather than as a democratic good of an institution as in Graham 
Smith’s classification. Another characteristic of an institution 
that affects its transferability to democratic political systems is 
the feasibility of introducing the institution. This is a crucial com-
ponent of transferability because whether the institution func-
tions depends entirely on whether it can be introduced into the 
existing democratic environment and run for sufficient time to 
generate a popular support that sustains it as a part of the politi-
cal process. As deliberative democracy theorist John Parkinson 
(2006, ix) notes, proposals for deliberative institutions must 
show: ‘how to get to those end points from where we are now. 
Otherwise the dream of a genuinely deliberative democracy will 
remain just that, a dream’. The major determinant of feasibility 
of introduction in democracies appears to be whether the insti-
tution is a type that can be introduced by a private initiative or 
whether its introduction requires a political will that produces 
financial backing and executive action by government. In a de-
mocracy, such political will is usually much more difficult to 
develop than a private initiative, because while the latter may 
require the motivation of just a few people with the necessary 
money or technical expertise or other type of power, the rais-
ing of political will is likely to require the motivation of many 
thousands or millions of people. An adequate private initiative 
in this field might be to establish a small-scale version of the 
new institution that can later be expanded and converted to 
full-scale political application, or the writing and publishing of a 
book that describes the innovation and the case for implement-
ing it, which motivates interest groups or individuals with the 
resources to run a polity-wide trial. Such a demonstration to the 
public may then develop political will that elicits support from 
government so that the institution is maintained, strengthened 
and introduced into other polities.
The obstacle of the difficulty of raising political will is partly 
created by politicians being averse to new institutions that sig-
nificantly change politics because they are oriented to, self-se-
lected for and experienced in dealing with the current political 
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system. Graham Smith (2005, 113) has noted that ‘public author-
ities lack the will, resources and freedom to embrace democrat-
ic innovations.’ Observing the US political environment, Gastil 
(2007, 646) offers a similar view:
Leaders in both parties … are likely to reject any serious threat to a 
status quo that both sides believe, in their hearts, favors their own 
party. Special interests accustomed to easy access to government 
will likely resist the idea with even more ferocity, and … there is no 
reason to doubt their power.
The Citizens’ Assemblies of British Columbia and Ontario illus-
trate some of the limitations imposed by the requirement that 
political will is needed to introduce an innovation. Although this 
requirement did not prevent that device from being introduced 
in Canada, it appears to have constrained its design and applica-
tion to the extent that those Assemblies were made impotent. 
These constraints were that implementations of their findings 
were subject to both a referendum and a minimum 60% super-
majority in that vote, if they were to change the status quo. In 
addition, the need for political will to instigate these Assemblies 
has, to date, constrained their application to an issue that citi-
zens are very obviously distrustful of politicians handling — the 
issue of electoral reform. Citizens’ Assemblies provide a way for 
politicians to be seen to have that type of issue addressed with-
out being suspected of corrupting the outcome.
It seems, then, that if an innovative political institution with 
potential for significant impact requires political will for its in-
troduction, its feasibility of introduction is likely to be low, but if 
private initiative and funding is sufficient to introduce it, then 
this feasibility may be high if the design is promising in terms 
of its other institutional goods and also its political equality and 
governmental goods, for these features could make it attractive 
to potential private initiators.
The incentive given by a design, for all citizens to use it as a 
means of participating in democratic government, might appear 
to be another transferability good. As Graham Smith (2005, 113) 
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observes: ‘Citizens must believe that participation will make a 
difference … that the results of participation exercises are able 
to influence decision-makers … Citizens must be respected and 
given incentives (or a reason) to participate’. Whether a design 
is ‘open’, in that it allows participation in it by all citizens, or 
whether it is ‘closed’ to the general public, by restricting partici-
pation with mechanisms such as election or random selection, 
citizens’ incentive to use that institution is taken here to be the 
incentive they have to use it by approving it and expecting their 
government to sustain it and implement the policy choices it 
recommends. This incentive is not interpreted here as citizens’ 
incentive to use an institution by participating in it, because 
very few can experience this incentive with closed designs.
Incentive to use the institution should arise from ‘what most 
psychologists believe are the four core motives that influence our 
decision-making in social dilemmas … understanding, belong-
ing, trusting and self-enhancing’ (Van Vugt 2009, 41). However, 
the degree to which an institutional design might evoke these 
motives may be judged by inspecting the institutional, politi-
cal equality and governmental goods that have already been se-
lected. The institutional good of transparency will produce trust 
and the institutional goods that address strategic issues at the 
scale of large polities in ways that work with the political system 
(political, social, economic and cultural practices) may foster 
understanding, belonging, trust and self-enhancement. Political 
equality goods (communication between citizens, voting, agenda 
control by citizens and full inclusion) and governmental goods 
(enlightened understanding and political prevalence of enlight-
ened understanding) will also evoke understanding, belonging, 
trust and self-enhancement. Any assessment of citizens’ incen-
tive to use the institution will therefore duplicate the assessments 
of these other goods, so it is not included as yet another good 




6.2.4 Evaluating goods of democratic institutions
The foregoing adaptation of Graham Smith’s evaluative frame-
work changes the number of goods to be assessed from eight to 
twelve. Smith’s eight are his four democratic goods of inclusive-
ness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency, 
together with the four institutional goods of efficiency and of 
transferability to political system, scale and type of issue. The 
twelve that are now proposed comprise three sets: the first is a 
set of four political equality goods — those of inclusiveness and 
of opportunities to communicate, to vote and control the agen-
da; the second is a set of two governmental goods — enlightened 
understanding and its political prevalence; and the third is a set 
of six institutional goods — those of efficiency and five types of 
transferability to liberal democracies, which are suitability for 
those political systems, applicability to strategic issues, applica-
bility to polities of large scale, transparency of the institution 
and feasibility of introducing it to the political system. This 
change from eight to twelve goods enables some of them to be 
more specific and may therefore make it more meaningful to try 
to judge how well each good is likely to be provided by a par-
ticular design for the government within which it is to function. 
Such judgement may be expressed by choosing a numerical rat-
ing for each good, and this is done below in §6.3 for the People’s 
Forum, with the results summarized in Table 6.1 (p. 287). This 
assessment is repeated in §6.5.2 for the goods that appear likely 
to be generated by three more designs, and all four designs are 
compared in Table 6.2 (p. 312). This comparison is a very sim-
plified overview and must be regarded as only a rough indica-
tion of the relative promise of these four proposals. However, 
it is a comparison that may be systematically reviewed in three 
ways: by reconsidering how well each design might provide 
each good; by considering whether different goods should be 
given different weightings (Tables 6.1 and 6.2 assume that each 
is equally important); and by considering whether the evalua-
tive framework itself needs changing. As emphasized above, this 
framework assesses provisions of goods that are ‘goods’ for all 
citizens of the polity, not just for those who participate in the 
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institution being evaluated. It may be tempting to favour a de-
sign that promises high provisions of goods that are only ‘goods’ 
for those who participate in the institution, but if the institution 
does not provide those goods for government, then it does not 
warrant such approval as its purpose is to assist the provision of 
good government.
The basis for this assessment of the People’s Forum is now 
prepared by describing its five major functions. Each descrip-
tion is followed with a subjective evaluation of the likely execu-
tion of PF strategies and the likely provision of goods by that 
function.
6.3 Five major functions of the People’s Forum
The five major functions that are now described give a broad 
account of how the People’s Forum should execute its two strat-
egies and provide institutional, political equality and govern-
mental goods. These five functions are: public deliberation of 
issues; public deliberation about what issues are deliberated; 
focus on basic or fundamental issues; meritocratic influence; 
and economizing cost and the effort required from citizens. At 
the conclusion of the description of each of these functions an 
evaluation is made of how well that function is anticipated to 
contribute towards the two strategies of the Forum and its three 
classes of goods. The strength of each contribution is indicated 
by ranking them as ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘moderate’, ‘high’ or ‘very 
high’, and at the end of this survey Table 6.1 lists and adds up 
these anticipated effects on the Forum’s execution of its strate-
gies and its provision of goods.
6.3.1 Public deliberation of issues
The People’s Forum would provide a slow process that allows 
years for public judgment to evolve. Its poll would be open for 
all electors to vote. This opportunity for voluntary participation 
should encourage citizens to publicly debate and deliberate the 
issues on the ballot paper, so that this paper becomes an agenda 
for those activities. The Forum would impose minimal control 
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over citizens’ deliberations as it would not facilitate deliberation 
by mediating individual discussions, and its agenda would be 
open to citizens’ suggestions for amendments while providing 
only basic information on the issues it presents. However, the 
agenda would aim to produce more considered judgements by 
the public by facilitating greater focus and continuity in the cur-
rent processes of public argument and inquiry. It would do this 
with its selection and framing of issues, its incisive choices of 
questions and its consistent repetition of these over many vot-
ing events. Most of the changes made to the agenda would be to 
add new issues and withdraw others as they are resolved. Public 
discourse should be encouraged by the periodicity of the vote 
as this would give annual feedback to the people on what those 
who are engaged are thinking, why they are thinking that and 
how their views are changing. This should provoke and inform 
further reflection, enquiry, discussion, debate and the demand 
for accurate and relevant information. The People’s Forum poll 
would only be open for voting by citizens on the electoral roll 
of the state or nation, but as the process would be public and 
transparent, the whole community could contribute to the argu-
ments, to the search for information and to the development of 
public opinion.
evaluation. The function of public deliberation would help to 
execute the first strategy of the People’s Forum, the development 
of mass public opinion. The strength of this is rated ‘low’ be-
cause of citizens’ confirmation bias (e.g. Haidt 2012, 89–90) and 
widespread political disengagement. The function would also 
assist (as a ‘moderate’ effect) the execution of the second strat-
egy (producing political influence for the part of public opinion 
that is likely to be relatively well developed) by registering only 
the views of citizens who are interested in the issues treated by 
the Forum. 
One institutional good of efficiency and four of transferability 
should be provided by this function. Efficiency (high) is provid-
ed by eliciting deliberation with a list of crucial questions rather 
than by the direct mediation of a myriad of debates and dis-
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cussions. The four transferability goods that should be provided 
are: a widespread acceptability of this function by citizens in 
liberal democratic political systems (very high); its applicability 
to policy development on strategic issues (very high); the trans-
parency of the deliberative process (high); and the suitability of 
this process for large-scale democracies (very high). This func-
tion would also provide the political equality good of oppor-
tunity for all citizens to communicate their views to each other 
(high). As it would contribute to both governmental goods it 
would also help to execute the two strategies of the Forum. The 
first governmental good would tend to be supplied (low) by the 
function providing more opportunity and incentive for all to 
gain enlightened understanding (noted above as the first strat-
egy) and the second governmental good, political prevalence of 
enlightened understanding (noted above as the second strategy), 
would tend to be supplied (moderate) by the function produc-
ing a public recognition that the Forum registers (while also 
helping to develop) wisdom that is worthy of strong political 
influence.
6.3.2 Deliberating what is to be deliberated
The People’s Forum would assist deliberation of public policy by 
providing a forum not only for specific issues, but for debating 
at least three aspects of this process: (1) which issues should be 
run; (2) the most useful questions to pose on these; and (3) the 
scope of each menu of answers that is offered to voters. As the 
ballot paper would publish the People’s Forum menus of issues, 
questions and answers, these menus will always be open to criti-
cism or endorsement by citizens. The voluntary voting of the 
poll will thus oblige its managers to preface the ballot paper with 
an invitation for citizens to comment on it and to suggest new 
issues, questions and answer options. Any controversy on such 
aspects of the ballot paper should lift the profile of both the poll 
and the issues it treats — and if such controversy is handled well 
by the managers of the Forum, then this should encourage more 
citizens to deliberate its issues and vote in its polls.
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evaluation. As this function is an extension of the public de-
liberation function, it should also help execute both strategies 
of the People’s Forum (first strategy, low and second, moder-
ate), which is also a provision of some of the two governmental 
goods of enlightened understanding (low) and political preva-
lence of enlightened understanding (moderate). Public delibera-
tion of the agenda should also provide two institutional goods of 
transferability: transparency that will help generate the political 
will to maintain the institution (high), by making it attractive to 
citizens of liberal democratic political systems (high). This func-
tion also provides the political equality good of equal and effec-
tive opportunities to control the agenda (high).
6.3.3 Examining basics
Public polling expert Daniel Yankelovich (1992) has stated that 
public opinion on an issue often develops slowly over a long pe-
riod, such as ten years or more for one that is complex. This may 
be an understatement, for it seems likely that the process may 
stall on issues where underlying assumptions remain unrecog-
nized and/or unquestioned, as seems to have happened with ra-
cial equality in much of the US for a century after the Civil War. 
Illusions may therefore arise of public judgment having devel-
oped completely when a potential remains for it to be radically 
transformed by more thought and information. The long, slow 
and open-ended deliberation of the People’s Forum should be 
especially suited to such public examination of basic assump-
tions, ideology and world view. Its transparency to scrutiny by 
all citizens would help to raise new questions, evidence and in-
sights. The ‘justification questioning’ referred to in §6.1.4 above 
and the other types of questions discussed in §7.2.2 (E11, E12, 
E13), should facilitate critical inquiry and help the public shake 
itself free of prejudicial hang-ups. It may be found that for some 
issues deliberation may never end, as each generation may want 
to think for itself and re-examine the foundations of its opinion. 
In such ways, the People’s Forum may help citizens reassess not 
only their public policies and laws directly, but also indirectly 
by helping them review and develop their values, world view 
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and culture. Slovic and colleagues (Kahan et al. 2006) have em-
phasized that culture is a crucial determinant of the quality of 
deliberation, so a positive feedback may take place in which the 
Forum’s fostering of public deliberation helps citizens improve 
their deliberative skills. Jackson (2009, 203) regards such cul-
tural growth as crucial for our future, for example because ‘the 
cultural drift that reinforces individualism at the expense of so-
ciety, and supports innovation at the expense of tradition, is a 
distortion of what it means to be human.’
evaluation. The focus on fundamentals in public policy should 
help execute both strategies of the Forum. This may only happen 
to a ‘low’ degree with the first strategy — facilitating the devel-
opment of mass public opinion — because of the confirmation 
bias of citizens and the disengagement of many from politics. 
The effect on the second strategy is rated ‘moderate’ because as 
the Forum operates it is likely to produce a broad public reali-
zation that it focuses on fundamentals, which should create a 
public expectation that politicians be guided by its findings. The 
focus on fundamentals should promote the institutional good 
of efficiency of operation (high) by placing limited expenditure 
and citizen effort where it might be most effective in improving 
public policy. This focus also creates the institutional goods of 
transferability to fundamental or strategic issues (very high) for 
any scale of polity (very high). By laying out for inspection the 
fundamental policies that underpin other policies — those that 
are medium term (tactical) and short term (operational) — this 
function should enhance the transparency of public policy-
making (very high). It should also contribute to the political 
equality goods of opportunity for citizens to communicate their 
views to each other (moderate) and to control the agenda (mod-
erate). This function should also make a crucial but nevertheless 
faint (low) contribution to the governmental good of opportu-
nities for gaining enlightened understanding (as discussed above 
for the Forum’s first strategy). And as discussed above for the 
second strategy, the focus on fundamentals should produce (to 
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a moderate degree) the governmental good of political preva-
lence of enlightened understanding.
6.3.4 An element of meritocracy
Meritocracy is often considered incompatible with democracy. 
As it is government by those citizens with the ability to govern 
well, many citizens are excluded, so government by ‘the’ people 
(in the sense of ‘all the’ people) does not appear to be achieved. 
Those citizens lacking the capacity or interest or time for this 
work are discouraged or prevented from participating, and the 
political equality at the core of democratic practice appears to 
be thwarted. However, as discussed in §6.2 (in its opening sec-
tion and in §6.2.1), Dahl (2006, 8–10) defines this equality as 
equality of opportunity, or a right, rather than equality of action. 
To maintain this right we must be careful that a meritocratic 
institution does not prevent citizen participation but merely en-
courages those with the ability to contribute constructively to 
do so. Those who are not encouraged by a meritocratic design to 
actively engage should at least be encouraged by it to passively 
support its meritocratic function by approving it or acquiescing 
in it. Citizens may be inclined to do this if such a design allows 
them to become actively engaged at any time they choose, such 
as if they became concerned about political trends.
Conventional opinion polls have no meritocratic effect as 
they systematically sample whole communities. This sampling 
damages the competence of democratic governments with 
views that are ill-informed, as discussed in §2.4. The People’s 
Forum would limit this damage by using the self-selective sam-
pling of voluntary voting to bypass views that are ill-informed 
due to disengagement. The Forum should thereby produce 
some of the governmental good of political prevalence of enlight-
ened understanding, which may trouble those who emphasize 
the importance of political equality for democracy. However, 
as noted above, Dahl (2006, 9) specifies this equality as ‘equal 
and effective opportunities’ to participate politically, rather than 
equal participation by every citizen. The apparent conflict here 
may seem to be between good democracy (good democratic 
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government) and good government, but, as discussed in §6.2, 
there should be no conflict as a good government is a very dem-
ocratic one.
Caplan (2008, 197–98) emphasizes that as voters tend to be 
irrational, an element of meritocracy is essential if democratic 
government is to work well.
A test of voter competence is no more objectionable than a driv-
ing test. Both bad driving and bad voting are dangerous not merely 
to the individual who practices them, but to innocent bystand-
ers … Most worries about de jure or de facto changes in participa-
tion take the empirically discredited self-interested voter hypothesis 
[SIVH] for granted. If voters’ goal were to promote their individual 
interests, nonvoters would be sitting ducks. People entitled to vote 
would intelligently select policies to help themselves, ignoring the 
interests of everyone else. There is so much evidence against the 
SIVH, however, that these fears can be discounted. The voters who 
know the most do not want to expropriate their less clear-headed 
countrymen. Like other voters, their goal is, by and large, to max-
imise social welfare. They just happen to know more about how to 
do it.
The degree to which the self-selective sampling of a Forum’s poll 
will reflect more sophisticated views than opinion polls may be 
limited in the first few years of that Forum’s operation, because 
people who are concerned about public issues but do not value 
public goods or are ill-informed will vote along with others who 
are also concerned but more inclined to consider the value of 
public goods or are better informed. Across a succession of polls 
by the Forum, the encouragement that this process should give 
to broad public deliberation may succeed in increasing the so-
phistication of mass public opinion (see §6.3.1 and §6.3.2 above; 
also §7.2.2). However, any such deliberative effect is likely to be 
greatest with the section of the public that is interested enough 
to vote in the Forum’s polls, so this engagement should signifi-
cantly differentiate these results from those of opinion polls. The 
meritocratic effect of the Forum should therefore occur in two 
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ways: (1) bypassing the opinions of those who choose to remain 
disengaged and (2) facilitating the development of the opinions 
of those who do engage. In addition to being meritocratic, the 
Forum may also slightly lift the sophistication of mass public 
opinion through the public visibility of the discourse that it fos-
ters.
Any public disapproval of the meritocratic self-selection of 
the Forum’s voting should be moderated by awareness that self-
selective voluntary voting is used by almost all liberal democ-
racies to appoint presidents and representatives and by many 
for referendums. Acceptance and appreciation of this ‘elitism’ 
may increase with time, because as the Forum operates it will 
be compared with random sample opinion polls, which should 
help citizens recognize the danger of giving political influence 
to the apathy and ignorance expressed in the latter. This elitism 
may therefore come to be widely regarded by citizens as reason 
to accord special status and political influence to Forum polls, 
so that a low voter turnout (say, five per cent of those eligible to 
vote) does not impress citizens (and therefore does not impress 
their politicians) as a good reason to ignore their results and 
trends. To the contrary, low turnouts may be taken to mean that 
the results reflect only the views of those citizens who are really 
interested in the issues covered. Exposure of the general public 
to the Forum process should therefore slowly develop a public 
expectation that political representatives should be guided by its 
findings, which is the Forum’s second strategy. Of course, this 
potential for political influence will encourage special interest 
groups to mobilize their supporters to vote in the Forum and 
to produce propaganda to sway other potential voters to their 
point of view. This should help rather than hinder the public 
deliberation of issues, for such groups are likely to be opposed 
by others expressing different views and voting accordingly in 
the Forum’s polls. The Forum ballot paper should help guide 
these debates in constructive directions by its balanced descrip-




Dogmatic personalities will be attracted to vote in the Fo-
rum, but this should give them more exposure to opposing 
viewpoints and information, for the Forum’s issue descriptions 
and questions would be designed to do this. Moreover, dog-
matists, along with more reasonable people, will feel obliged to 
publicly engage with the arguments that oppose theirs. The Fo-
rum’s repetitive polling would prolong such discussions and ar-
guments and help them stay focused over many years on specific 
questions by maintaining substantially the same agenda. In this 
situation participants will need to understand opposing argu-
ments to see how they might improve their own to lift the vote 
for their view in future polls. The Forum may thus help dog-
matists, as well as open-minded participants, to develop more 
reflective, informed and socially responsible thinking. How-
ever, especially in the early years of a Forum’s operation, some 
dogmatic people may reject it as an insidious evil because its 
questioning approach calls for openness, dialogue and exchange 
of ideas, which abjures their belief in faith. As political theo-
rist John Dryzek (2006, 47) observes: ‘Those asserting identities 
may feel insulted by the very idea that questions going to their 
core be deliberated. What they want is instead ‘cathartic’ com-
munication that unifies the group and demands respect from 
others.’ As discussed in §7.2.2 (E10) and more fully in Chapter 8, 
there are genetic and learned psychological limits to the loosen-
ing of dogmatic attitudes, but any achievements in this direction 
should help improve democratic governance.
The intention of the People’s Forum to bypass those who 
remain disengaged is not so much an attempt to ignore peo-
ple who are alienated or demoralized, but to develop political 
influence for those who think about and want to express their 
views on public goods problems that are persistent and impor-
tant — which includes the problem of alienation. The Forum 
may be able to help ameliorate alienation by sustaining a public 
discourse on what to do about it and by giving public-spirited 
citizens a platform for advocating the interests of those who are 
alienated (see Caplan’s view above). The operation of the Fo-
rum also offers the marginalized an opportunity to have a say 
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that is currently not available to them. It may even give them an 
incentive to do this, for if they hear that its polls ‘bypass the dis-
engaged’ they may suspect this refers to them and rebel against 
this treatment by voting. Some of them may then discuss their 
views with others who also feel alienated and urge them to vote 
as well.
evaluation. It is noted above that the meritocratic function of 
the Forum should give it political influence, which means that 
the Forum would be executing its second strategy — the devel-
opment of political influence for that part of public opinion that 
is most likely to be well developed (moderate effect). The po-
litical influence that the Forum develops from its meritocratic 
effect should also help to execute its first strategy of developing 
mass public opinion as it should provide citizens with incentive 
to vote in the Forum and thereby to take more interest in the 
issues it covers (low effect). 
The meritocratic function will produce the institutional good 
of efficiency (high) by enabling those who are not interested in 
democratic work (such as learning about issues and contribut-
ing to public debate) to leave this to those who are. A little of 
each of the political equality goods of equal and effective op-
portunities for members to communicate their views to each 
other on public policy (rated low), to vote (low) and to control 
the agenda (low) may be generated by meritocracy because the 
political influence it creates for the Forum should encourage all 
citizens to use it — by debating the issues it deals with, by vot-
ing in its polls and by reviewing its agenda. This incentive may 
not be generated in the first few years of operation of the first 
Forum that is run in a polity, but could develop as it becomes 
established and gains a reputation for potential or actual influ-
ence. A contribution to the political equality good of full inclu-
sion (very low) will only be made if the Forum’s meritocratic 
function arouses the interest of hitherto politically disengaged 
citizens. Political influence from meritocracy should foster the 
governmental good of opportunities for enlightened understand-
ing (the Forum’s first strategy) by encouraging citizens to vote 
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in the Forum and thereby to take more interest in the issues it 
covers (low effect). The direct effect of the Forum’s meritocracy 
is to produce the governmental good of political prevalence of 
enlightened understanding (anticipated to be a moderate effect, 
as indicated above for the Forum’s second strategy).
6.3.5 Economizing citizen effort
Any attempt to increase political participation by citizens must 
minimize the time and effort it demands from them (Beetham 
1992; G. Smith 2009, 18–19). For the People’s Forum to work 
under this constraint, no more than one poll per year (after an 
initial year or two of more frequent polling to establish its public 
profile) seems both necessary and sufficient. Limiting the fre-
quency of polling to no more than once a year may also allow 
time for public discourse to produce some change in the opin-
ion that is registered by successive polls. Economy would also 
be produced by the Forum focusing on helping the public to 
indicate only the broad strategic directions in public policy, for 
this would leave the mass of detailed tactical and operational 
decision-making within these guidelines to politicians. The 
‘economy of time’ provided by the design of the People’s Forum 
is further discussed below in §7.2.13 (E10).
evaluation. Economy of effort and time invites citizens to en-
gage with the Forum and thereby assists it to execute its first 
strategy of developing mass public opinion. This is judged a low 
effect due to citizens’ disengagement from politics and their 
confirmation bias.
Economy would also produce the institutional good of effi-
ciency (moderate) by minimizing the input required from citi-
zens to make the institution work. It also helps to deliver the 
transferability goods of suitability for liberal democratic political 
systems (high) and feasibility of introduction (moderate) to these 
systems. Economy of citizen effort also helps to provide all four 
political equality goods: those of all citizens having equal and 
effective opportunities for communicating their policy views to 
each other (moderate effect); to vote (moderate); to control the 
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agenda (moderate); and to experience full inclusion (moderate). 
By minimizing the task for citizens, this function also fosters 
the governmental good of opportunities for them to gain en-
lightened understanding (low effect, as above with the Forum’s 
first strategy).
6.3.6 Summary of anticipated contributions by five 
major functions of the Forum
The contributions that are anticipated to be made by these five 
functions towards executing the Forum’s strategies and provid-
ing goods are listed in Table 6.1. The anticipated contributions 
are summed in the right-hand column by rating them on a scale 
of 0–5, where 0 means that the Forum cannot execute a strategy 
or provide a good and 5 signifies that it should be very effec-
tive in doing so. With the partial exception of the institutional 
good of feasibility of introduction (as discussed below), these rat-
ings are assessed from the preceding summaries of functions 
in which anticipated contributions to strategies and goods are 
described as being either nonexistent or somewhere on a scale 
of very low to very high. Readers may, of course, give different 
ratings according to their interpretations of how well the Fo-
rum would perform. The ratings in Table 6.1 are later compared 
in Table 6.2 with goods ratings for three other institutional de-
signs, to judge which might be the most promising to try out at 
an operational scale. 
The preceding descriptions of the five functions indicate that 
the Forum may only do a patchy job of executing its first strat-
egy — facilitating the development of mass public opinion on 
public issues of strategic importance. Those citizens who have 
some interest in these issues should be assisted by the Forum to 
develop their knowledge and opinions while the great majority 
of citizens may substantially ignore the institution, so the total 
contribution of the five functions to this strategy is given the low 
rating of 2. The Forum is given a high rating of 4 for anticipated 
execution of its second strategy (producing political influence 
for the section of public opinion that is most likely to be highly 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































well after the Forum has been running for some time and has 
become widely understood by participants, commentators and 
the general public.
From the preceding descriptions of anticipated provisions of 
goods by the five functions, the Forum should do a good job 
with the institutional good of efficiency, so the anticipated total 
contribution to this by those functions is rated 4. Of the five 
institutional goods comprising transferability, applicability to 
type of political system (liberal democracy) is given a high rating 
of 4 because the Forum is expected to be welcomed into liberal 
democracies by their citizens as a continuation of the current 
trend for them to seek issue-based ways of doing politics that 
bypass ideologies and traditional party-based work. The Forum 
should also be effective in helping to manage strategic issues (5); 
and at coping with large-scale (5) polities such as state, national, 
multinational and potentially even global governance. Trans-
parency (4) is rated high as the first three functions are expected 
to allow close public scrutiny of the Forum. The transferability 
good that is only slightly accounted for by this limited (see §7.1 
below) selection of five functions is feasibility of introduction (3), 
but this is rated fairly high as the Forum’s design allows it to 
be introduced to a liberal democracy by private action, an ap-
proach that is discussed in general terms above in §6.2.3 and in 
relation to this institution in §6.4 and §7.2.12 below.
For political equality goods, the five major functions should 
provide good opportunities for all citizens to communicate their 
views to each other (4), to vote (3) and to control the agenda (4), 
but inclusion (2) will be poor as many citizens will remain unin-
terested in public affairs, especially the strategic policy that the 
Forum will focus on. The governmental good of opportunities 
for all citizens to gain enlightened understanding (2) should only 
be slightly provided, because of the disengagement of many citi-
zens. The governmental good of political prevalence of enlight-
ened understanding (4) should be well provided, if transferabil-
ity is high, which appears likely.
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6.4 Initiating and running the Forum
The potential ‘market’ for the People’s Forum initially compris-
es liberal democratic state and national governments. It might 
then be adapted to also serve in multinational and global gov-
ernance. Its operation in liberal democracies may set examples 
that encourage publics under less democratic and even authori-
tarian regimes to press for its establishment in their polities. A 
government could finance a People’s Forum as an independent 
service to the public and in doing so may have it managed by an 
NGO or a private business to ensure that it is seen by the public 
to be free of government control. Several attempts to interest 
politicians in this system have indicated that they are unlikely 
to provide it unless citizens experience it, develop a desire for 
it and then urge their governments to fund it. A demonstration 
trial therefore appears to be a necessary first step for its imple-
mentation. The design of the Forum enables such a demonstra-
tion to be done without government support, so funds for this 
purpose might be sought from private sources such as philan-
thropic foundations, NGOs, citizens (via crowdfunding), opin-
ion polling companies, media businesses, telecommunications 
companies or corporations interested in promoting their image 
or in improving government policy to create greater strategic 
certainty for corporate investments. A trial of the Forum could 
be initiated by an existing NGO or by a few citizens who formed 
an NGO for this purpose. Such a body would attempt to raise 
the necessary money and, if successful, this would be used to 
hire a small team of perhaps ten people to establish and run the 
Forum. As noted in §6.1.4, ‘issues of technology, risk and values 
must be distilled to their essentials and questions must be inci-
sive and oriented to problem-solving.’ The management team 
must therefore include members with a good knowledge of po-
litical issues and with skills in issue analysis, in poll question 
technique, in the psychology of public deliberation, in business 
management and in information technology. This team would 
arrange for some work to be outsourced, such as advertising the 
polls and applying information technology, so that they could 
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focus on designing and compiling the ballot paper, on public 
relations, on supplying polling results and analysis to the media 
and on the overall management of the Forum. If the first year or 
two of the Forum’s operation generates positive public interest, 
this may start to develop political pressure for it to be accepted 
as a formal part of the apparatus of democratic government. If 
this pressure became strong, the state may take responsibility 
for funding the Forum, but its management must remain inde-
pendent of government and entirely in the hands of its staff. The 
regulation of these managers would be done by public pressure, 
for if the People’s Forum acquired a public reputation for bias, 
or irrelevance, or some other serious defect then citizens will 
destroy it by not voting in it and by encouraging their politicians 
not to fund it and to ignore its results.
In the Australian situation, the island state of Tasmania 
should be a good laboratory for a trial as its physical separation 
from the rest of the nation gives Tasmanians a distinct sense 
of being in a position to influence their future. The size of the 
Tasmanian population, at half a million, should be sufficient for 
vigorous debate on fundamental, long-term issues. This state 
also has an extensive and continuing experience with very divi-
sive issues so it should welcome a new way of approaching these. 
The cost of a five-year trial of the People’s Forum here, based 
on telephone and internet voting, free hard-copy plus website 
ballot papers and some advertising, may be around Aus$10 mil-
lion. After five years such a test should be indicating whether 
the poll is starting to develop public acceptance as a political 
institution. During this period it may not have generated politi-
cal influence, but may be raising anticipation of this, attracting 
increasing voter participation, facilitating public thought on key 
issues and showing trends in its voters’ opinions on the issues 
it treats. The initiation of such a trial might stage the first three 
polls at six month intervals, to generate publicity for the Forum 
and to quickly pass through any backlash vote in reaction to 
initial poll results. Subsequent polls may then be annual events.
An obstacle to such a trial in Australia is that the federal 
government is prevented by law from making its electronic 
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electoral roll available to private interests which are not legally 
authorized to use it. If a non-government group is running the 
trial, this would preclude the possibility of high security impulse 
voting as discussed above under §6.1.3, but this problem may be 
tackled by the Forum running a sequence of polls without seri-
ous voting security. If this relies on a website ballot paper with-
out free hard copy, the cost of a five year demonstration may be 
around Au$5 million. This should enable the public to see the 
potential of the system, so if citizens then wanted it trialled as a 
functioning political institution, pressure of public opinion may 
elicit cooperation from the government, together with financial 
backing from this or other sources, to permit a fully operational 
poll. Once this was established and running successfully it may 
provide an example of public participation that attracts wide in-
terest from around the world, prompting politicians or citizens 
to introduce the People’s Forum to other states and nations and 
possibly adapting it for international and global applications.
6.5 The People’s Forum compared with principles 
and designs for deliberative democracy
As the People’s Forum is designed for large-scale operation it 
has an overarching reach that could use input from other devic-
es that operate with limited scope. Such limitations may be that 
these devices cannot treat a large number of issues at the same 
time; cannot facilitate deliberation of issues with fundamental 
or systemic impacts; and cannot include very large numbers of 
citizens in their deliberations. An example of a device that has 
at least the first and last of these limitations is the Deliberative 
Poll®, which is briefly described below in §9.1. This device could 
give some indication, each time it is run, of what an operating 
People’s Forum is likely to do for public opinion some years in 
the future, on one issue — if that one is not strongly affected 
by other issues. If Deliberative Polls or other devices of lim-
ited scope are deployed carefully for this forecasting function, 
they might produce effective publicity for the People’s Forum, 
helping it to attract more voters, to generate more public de-
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liberation and to exert more political influence. Such delibera-
tive mini-publics (which are statistically reliable samples of the 
population) could also assist a People’s Forum by providing lo-
cal, intensive sites of deliberation that contribute something to 
the broader development of public opinion, adding a little to 
the wisdom registered by the Forum. In return, People’s Forums 
would assist the operation of such mini-publics by presenting 
state, national or global expressions of influential public opinion 
that they might be able to contribute to. Saward (2001) has pro-
posed that cooperation between direct and deliberative demo-
cratic devices would improve democracy and Smith (2005, 112) 
observes that if ‘different innovations are able to increase and 
deepen citizen participation in different ways, then the crea-
tive and imaginative combination or sequencing of democratic 
innovations has the potential to improve the effectiveness of 
citizen involvement in decision-making processes’. Political sci-
entist Carolyn Hendriks (2006, 499, 502–3) sees this as a neces-
sity for deliberative devices, because ‘unless a micro forum is 
closely connected to its macro discursive setting, then it risks 
drowning in a sea of other public conversations.’ She therefore 
advocates an ‘integrated system of public deliberation’ in which 
‘structured deliberative arenas work together with some of the 
more unconstrained, informal modes of deliberation operating 
in civil society’. As the People’s Forum has the potential to en-
courage very large numbers of people to simultaneously delib-
erate a large number of fundamental issues it may provide the 
basis of such an integrated system.
6.5.1 The People’s Forum compared with principles 
for deliberative democracy and public 
management
As the People’s Forum is a deliberative design, criteria for ensur-
ing public deliberation in democratic government should help 
to indicate the Forum’s potential to perform. Political scientist 
Archon Fung and sociologist Erik Olin Wright (2003) have pro-
posed such criteria in the form of principles and ‘design proper-
ties’ of ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (EPG). Their first 
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principle is a focus on practical problems and concrete concerns 
of society at local levels. The People’s Forum has this focus but 
only in an indirect way as it is designed for systemic treatment, 
which means attending to fundamental causes of problems. The 
other two principles of EPG are more easily recognized in the de-
sign of the Forum and they call for deliberative democracy. They 
are: bottom-up participation and the deliberative generation of 
solutions. In addition to these three principles, the People’s Fo-
rum broadly follows the three ‘design properties’ of EPG. The 
first of these, devolution of power, would not be to local bodies 
as in EPG, but would go further, to citizens. The second design 
property, centralized supervision and coordination, is basic to 
the Forum as this is what its managers would do. The third, a 
‘state-centered’ approach, to ‘colonize state power and trans-
form formal governance institutions’ (Fung and Wright 2003, 
22) is a crucial feature of the People’s Forum, for if it proved ef-
fective its popular acceptance would urge the state to enact the 
policy trends that evolve in its poll results.
Peter Levine, Archon Fung and John Gastil (2005, 273–74) 
have observed that within the community of political theorists 
advocating deliberative innovations for democracy, there ap-
pears to be broad agreement that any such device should:
1. have realistic expectations of political influence;
2. include key stakeholders and publics in deliberations;
3. foster informed, conscientious discussion working towards 
common ground;
4. use neutral, professional staff to help participants through a 
fair agenda;
5. earn broad public support for its recommendations;
6. be sustainable .
They also note (Levine et al. 2005, 274–77) that full consensus 
is often not possible but benefits flow from trying to develop it; 
that organization is vital; and that scale is important, i.e. scaling 
‘out’ to reach as much of the public as possible as well as scaling 
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‘up’ to address concerns at strategic levels, such as state, national 
and global. Levine, Fung and Gastil (2005, 238) stress 
the importance of an open-minded, ongoing discovery of one an-
other’s possibly changing values and interests, which we call dy-
namic updating … [P]articipants in productive deliberation should 
continually and consciously update their understandings of com-
mon and conflicting interests as the process evolves.
The People’s Forum appears to address all of these concerns to 
some degree. The specification of neutral, professional staff is 
met, not by providing facilitators and expert advice on issues for 
panels of citizens, but by having the Forum’s polls administered 
by professionally qualified staff who may consult with special-
ists on issues and on the content of the ballot paper, especially 
on the selection and description of issues, the selection of ques-
tions and the flagging of connections between different issues 
and questions.
Journalism scholar David Ryfe (2005, 59, 57, 63–64) observes 
that deliberation by citizens is episodic, difficult and tentative; 
that it is driven by feelings of accountability, by high stakes and 
by diversity of views; and also that it is facilitated by rules, lead-
ership and learning by deliberating with others who are skilled 
at it. The Forum appears to accommodate or use most of these 
responses. Its facilitation of deliberation by rules, by leadership, 
and by deliberating with those who have such skills is attempt-
ed by the presentation of a well-designed ballot paper. Eliza-
beth Theiss-Morse and John Hibbing (2005, 243) emphasize 
that face-to-face deliberation is difficult for the general public, 
mainly because many citizens are uncomfortable talking about 
policy, lack interest in politics and are busy doing other things 
that seem personally more relevant to them. They make this 
observation from numerous focus groups on politics that they 
have conducted around the US and from ‘a careful review of the 
empirical evidence [which] suggests that many people lack the 
motivation to engage in civic life generally and politics specifi-
cally … joining groups is not a way of embracing politics but a 
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way of avoiding politics’ (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005, 244). 
The People’s Forum is designed to cope with this reluctance by 
not relying on meetings of citizens; by utilizing a poll to provide 
incentives to think about issues; and by designing the ballot pa-
per to facilitate this.
Legal scholar and ex-chief of the Obama Administration’s 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Cass Sunstein 
(2002), has expressed concern that a tendency for people to dis-
cuss issues in like-minded groups or ‘enclaves’ creates extreme 
views. He notes that the individualization facilitated by wealth 
and technology divides communities because it helps people 
to associate with those who have similar views. For example, 
political blogs can create partisan communities who demonize 
each other. To try to prevent this, Sunstein (2002, 188, 195) sug-
gests that the
trick is to produce an institutional design that will increase the like-
lihood that deliberation will lead in sensible directions, so that any 
polarization, if it occurs, will be a result of learning, rather than 
group dynamics … It is desirable to create spaces for enclave delib-
eration without insulating enclave members from those with op-
posing views, and without insulating those outside the enclave from 
the views of those within it.
The People’s Forum would work against such insulation by pub-
licizing poll results that show not only the differing views of citi-
zens but some of their reasons for these differences. This would 
invite the public to debate those reasons and deliberate on them, 
so that people either get closer to consensus or understand their 
differences better, which may help them to eventually agree that 
the majority should prevail. For more on polarization and how 
the Forum would tackle it, see E13 in §7.2.2.
A potential problem for any system of governance is the 
probability that incentive compatible devices (ICDs) will im-
pair the cooperative dispositions of citizens (Orbell et al. 2004). 
ICDs are instruments such as laws or tax schemes that align the 
self-interest of the individual with the interest of the group. As 
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the framing of choices by these devices obviates the need for 
citizens to invoke ethical concerns about public goods, these 
concerns may atrophy or their development may be neglected 
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1996). This makes the fostering of 
ethical individual responsibility and the improvement of collec-
tive welfare difficult to combine in formal institutions (Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer 2003). Democratic institutions should there-
fore not rely exclusively on ICDs. The People’s Forum should not 
encounter this problem because it invites citizens to maintain 
and develop their social responsibility by involving them in de-
vising and choosing ICDs. They would do this by contributing 
to the compilation of the ballot paper and by using the Forum’s 
polls to express themselves and to hear each other.
Brian Head and John Alford (2008) report that research and 
practical experience in public management suggests that the so-
cial complexity of ‘wicked’ problems requires that they be man-
aged by wide-scale collaboration. They recommend that this 
be done with systems thinking that has an outcomes focus and 
also by ‘adaptive leadership’. Leadership scholar Ronald Heifetz 
(cited in Head and Alford 2008, 20–21) has described this as a 
‘mobilizing of adaptive work’ in which the public manager 
leads organizational members and/or stakeholders themselves in 
doing the collective work of identifying the problem and develop-
ing ways to deal with it. In effect, those who are led are asked to 
perform the shared leadership role of setting a direction (emphasis 
in original).
So those who are led are asked to lead, by ‘setting a direction’. 
This is the remedy suggested for democracies by the triple dys-
function hypothesis: that the people should become active, 
competent directors. The People’s Forum is designed to assist 
them to do this by facilitating their collaborative communica-
tion. Head and Alford specify that such institutions must build 
trust and commitment in stakeholders and other parties: the 
Forum may do this by being transparent, by being vulnerable to 
rejection by citizens and by making the execution of its policy 
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recommendations contingent on a general level of acceptance, 
as discussed below in §7.2.9. 
6.5.2 The People’s Forum compared with other 
proposed deliberative designs 
The People’s Forum is now compared with designs that are sim-
ilar in purpose, as they are intended to develop public policy 
across the large scale of liberal democratic polities, mostly by 
means of enlightened understanding by citizens. As noted pre-
viously and discussed below in §9.1, many more deliberative de-
vices have much merit, but as they do not aim for transferability 
to large scale they are not comparable with the Forum.
The comparison given below starts with descriptions of three 
previously proposed designs. Each description ends with an 
assessment of that design’s apparent capacities to provide the 
goods defined above in §6.2. In these assessments, suggested 
ratings of these capacities are given in brackets after the name 
of each good. As was done for the People’s Forum in Table 6.1 
(p. 287), these ratings are on a scale of 0 (cannot provide that 
good) to 5 (very effective in providing that good). Of course, 
readers may give ratings that differ from those allocated here, 
according to their judgements of the likely effectiveness of the 
design in question. As emphasised above in §6.2.4 each of these 
ratings is the extent to which the institution is assessed to con-
tribute a good to government, not the extent to which the insti-
tution generates that good for those who directly participate in 
the institution. A preliminary comparison of these three designs 
and the People’s Forum is given in Table 6.2 (p. 312). This com-
parison is then expanded with observations on five more design 
proposals.
6.5.2.1 The Popular Branch
The Popular Branch was proposed by legal scholar Ethan Leib 
(2004) as a mini-public that would enhance the representative-
ness of the US federal government and facilitate its policy devel-
opment. This institution would comprise 525 citizens compulso-
rily selected as a stratified random sample of all those US citizens 
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who are eligible to vote, and it would work in one location as 35 
juries, each with 15 members also selected as stratified random 
samples (Leib 2004, 23) and which compare their deliberations 
in plenary sessions. The Popular Branch would consider issues 
nominated by citizen-initiated referendums (CIR) that achieved 
a response of at least ten per cent of US voters. Each issue would 
be deliberated for a few days with facilitation similar to that of 
the Deliberative Poll, including the presentation of balanced 
information on the issue being dealt with. The findings of the 
Branch would become law, so its establishment would require 
amending the US Constitution.
It would appear that as the Popular Branch deals with one 
issue at a time, it may be limited to producing findings at rates 
that may be much slower than one issue a week, depending 
on the complexity of the issue. This may be a bottleneck and 
could produce flawed conclusions by deliberating some issues 
before fully considering others that are strongly related to them. 
Another problem is the need for political will to establish and 
maintain the Branch. Leib (2004, 135) hoped that this would de-
velop through citizens and politicians experiencing events such 
as Deliberative Polls, but he concedes ‘it is hard to expect politi-
cians, who often feel they don’t have enough power, to delegate 
it back to the people’.
institutional goods. As the structured deliberation of the Pop-
ular Branch means that only one issue can be deliberated at a 
time, the agenda of issues to be deliberated in a given period, 
say a year, is a matter of public contention that calls for popular 
control, so CIR is to be used to select the issues to be treated. This 
limits efficiency (3) as CIR is very expensive: It now costs more 
than US$1 million to place a measure on a CIR ballot in Califor-
nia (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). Leib’s design is based on the 
assumption that strictly representative samples deliberating in 
a structured manner are essential for enhancing democracy, a 
view that has also been expressed by political scientists James 
Fishkin and Cynthia Farrar (2005, 77): ‘The most significant 
challenge ahead is to find ways to adapt, institutionalize, and 
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take the deliberative poll to scale while preserving its defining 
elements.’ These elements include a large random sample of citi-
zens and their systematic exposure to different points of view.
Random sampling creates a difficulty with transparency (2) 
that may produce low transferability to democratic polities: the 
people may not have faith in deliberations from which the vast 
majority of them are excluded. Deliberation must take place at 
lower as well as at elite levels in order to develop not only laws 
and policies, but the attitudes and opinions that are needed to 
sustain them (G. Smith 2003, 86). If fundamental changes in law 
and policy are to be supported over the long run by citizens, 
then those who choose to take an interest must be able to under-
stand these changes and have an opportunity to influence them. 
John Parkinson has noted this legitimacy problem in schemes 
such as Leib’s and calls for
us to loosen the tight institutional restrictions some early theorists 
had inadvertently imposed on deliberative designs, allowing us to 
think about legitimacy as being created across multiple deliberative 
moments in a wider deliberative system … involving many more 
people in deliberative democracy than any one micro-deliberative 
process could ever manage, even though not all of them can deliber-
ate in the technical sense. (Parkinson 2006, 174)
Another problem for transferability is a lack of feasibility (1) of 
introduction that arises from the need for political will to initi-
ate and run the Popular Branch. Transferability to type of politi-
cal system (4) is anticipated to be high as some form of it should 
be applicable to any liberal democratic culture.
The Branch’s restriction to handling one issue at a time is 
likely to cripple transferability to fundamental, strategic issues 
(1), because issues that are strongly related may be overlooked. 
The root causes of many problems with public goods will be ne-
glected through attention to symptoms that are more apparent 
or urgent and thereby produce good responses to CIR. The selec-
tion of agenda items by CIR does not guarantee enough public 
deliberation on the selection and sequencing of items on the 
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agenda. On some strategic issues, competent policy may depend 
on the adjustment of popular values and priorities. At the very 
least this requires public deliberation, so the exclusion of citi-
zens by the sampling that selects the members of the Branch will 
impede or block progress. The final transferability good is ap-
plicability to large-scale (4) national government, which is high 
as the Popular Branch is specifically designed for this purpose.
political equality goods. The random sampling of the Popular 
Branch provides virtually no extra opportunities for all citizens 
to communicate their views to each other (1) on those matters it 
deals with. It also excludes opportunities for all citizens to vote 
on policy (0). In addition to deficits in efficiency and transfer-
ability, another effect of the financial cost of CIR would be to 
limit opportunities for popular control of the agenda (2). Inclu-
sion (4) of all socioeconomic, ethnic, cultural and other groups 
should be fairly well achieved by the stratification of the random 
sample.
governmental goods. Opportunities for all citizens to gain an 
enlightened understanding (1) of the issues being dealt with are 
largely absent in the Branch’s process. It appears likely that the 
special interests who manipulate the actions of elected repre-
sentatives could also influence the politics of randomly selected 
representatives. As both types of representative are a very small 
fraction of the electorate, special interest operatives will be able 
to exert some influence on how they vote and who attains lead-
ership positions within their assemblies. As journalist Jonathan 
Rauch (cited in Snider 2007, 4) observes, random sample panels 
‘won’t be insulated from politics but will be insulated from ac-
countability.’
The governmental good of the political prevalence of enlight-
ened understanding (2) would only be provided by the Popular 
Branch to a very limited degree. Although the publication of the 
considered verdicts of the Branch may give a little support and 
political influence to the views of well-informed citizens, the 
likely poor transferability of the Branch to strategic issues may 
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confuse any such support and influence on these fundamentals 
of public policy.
6.5.2.2 The People’s House
Political scientist Kevin O’Leary (2006) proposes a delibera-
tive improvement of American national government through a 
much larger sample of 435 deliberating groups called local citi-
zen assemblies, each of which has 100 randomly selected citizens 
who choose to accept the role. Members are limited to two-year 
terms and each assembly would represent a congressional ward 
in addition to its current representation by a member of the 
House of Representatives. Local citizen assemblies would con-
duct their business face-to-face, two or three evenings a month 
and they would be linked by internet, so that together they form 
a decentralized national ‘Assembly’ of 43,500 delegates. In the 
first stage of its establishment, as envisaged by O’Leary, this As-
sembly would not have formal power, but its deliberations and 
votes could inform Congress and the president. The agenda for 
the Assembly would be set by a national steering committee of 
50 people randomly selected for a two-year term from 435 can-
didates, each of whom is nominated from each of the 435 citizen 
assemblies. Agenda items would be selected from the Congres-
sional legislative program, with a focus on bills passed either 
by the House of Representatives or by the Senate and awaiting 
ratification by the other. As the whole national Assembly would 
have to deal with each legislative proposal at the same time, it 
would deal with a very restricted number of these each year.
Stage two of O’Leary’s proposal is the People’s House, which 
is the national Assembly after it is empowered by constitutional 
amendment to help set the legislative agenda and to have the 
capacity to veto bills passed by the House of Representatives or 
the Senate. The House of Representatives and the Senate could 
each override a People’s House veto with a 60 per cent vote. The 
People’s House would also have the ‘gate-opening’ power
to force a floor vote on certain bills heretofore stuck in committee 
and destined to die. Other positive powers include the authority to 
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initiate bills in either the House or the Senate, the power to offer 
amendments to bills under consideration on the floor of the House 
or the Senate, the ability to pass formal instructions to individual 
representatives, and the right to draft at-large resolutions addressed 
to the House of Representatives or the Senate as a whole. (O’Leary 
2006, 8)
The members of the citizen assemblies would receive $100 per 
month for their contributions and the 50 members of the steer-
ing committee would each be paid $75,000 per annum as their 
work would be a demanding and crucial job that may require 
full time commitment (O’Leary 2006, 159). The latter salary 
would help ‘to assure the integrity and honesty of these del-
egates when they are the focus of lobbying efforts by various 
interest groups’ (O’Leary 2006, 249n32). These remunerations 
total US$55,950,000 and this must be increased to more than 
US$60 million by the cost of support, including that of 25 techni-
cal and administrative staff.
O’Leary (2006, 113–26) summarizes the mission of the Peo-
ple’s House as giving a voice to the public, curbing the exces-
sive influence of special interests, providing the public with a 
mechanism for breaking legislative deadlock and producing a 
fairer aggregation of electors’ preferences. Although the People’s 
House is designed as an addition to the US system, in some simi-
lar form it may be adaptable to other democracies, including 
parliamentary types and those with proportional representation 
from multimember electorates. 
institutional goods. The People’s House design provides mod-
erate efficiency (3) in that its total financial cost of over US$60 
million per annum is spread among all citizens (O’Leary 2006, 
159). It may lose some efficiency by frustrating legislators, as 
discussed below under governmental goods. However, as noted 
there this loss may produce a governmental good.
Transferability to democratic political systems will be limited 
by the lack of transparency (3) to all citizens that arises from 
the random sample structure, but this may be compensated to 
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some extent by the large number of representatives, making 
them fairly accessible to citizens. Another limitation for trans-
ferability is that the feasibility of introduction (2) of the People’s 
House depends on the development of the political will to cre-
ate the legislation to establish the Assembly and then to amend 
the Constitution to transform it into the House. O’Leary (2006, 
130–32) suggests that this problem could be overcome by intro-
ducing the system in just a few states, to start to develop a na-
tional political will for the Assembly. But even an introduction 
on this scale requires political will that may not be possible to 
generate (Gastil 2007, 646). Another difficulty for feasibility of 
introduction is that each prospective member of the national As-
sembly / People’s House is unlikely to have the incentive to ‘give 
up a good portion of their lives to seriously grapple with public 
policy issues’ (Snider 2007, 4) when they are only paid $100 per 
month and are merely one voice among 43,500, which in turn is 
a body that would only have some influence on legislation.
Transferability in respect of strategic issues (2) may be re-
stricted because the Assembly/People’s House cannot simulta-
neously deal in a comprehensive manner with a multitude of 
issues. This is likely to cause crucial interconnections between 
issues to be neglected, including examinations by citizens of 
their own values and priorities. The national steering commit-
tee can only place on the agenda those issues that all 435 local 
citizen assemblies could consider as a national Assembly or as 
a People’s House in a period of a few months or a year, so a 
very restricted number of issues will be attended to annually. 
The tendency of the People’s House to focus on the current leg-
islative program of Congress reinforces this effect. Furthermore, 
the random sampling of the House will do little to facilitate de-
liberation across the demos. The People’s House may therefore 
be rather blinkered, disjointed and inflexible in its deliberations. 
Symptoms of issues may be attended to while fundamental 
causes are ignored. Any such confusion of priorities in delibera-
tion may limit the development of public opinion and culture, 
blocking the enactment of reforms that could work. This effect 
of random sampling is also noted below as producing a deficit 
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in the governmental good of opportunities for citizens to gain 
enlightened understanding. In contrast to this deficit, however, 
transferability to large-scale (4) national governments in various 
liberal democratic political systems (4) appears quite practicable.
political equality goods. The Assembly/People’s House would 
provide some increased opportunity for all citizens to communi-
cate their views to each other (3) because the very large sample of 
43,500 would attract public attention to their deliberations. This 
large number of representatives would also give citizens more 
access to these political agents, which should motivate citizens 
to communicate their views on policy, to both representatives 
and other citizens. Opportunities for all citizens to vote on policy 
(0) are not provided by this design. Opportunities for all citi-
zens to control the agenda (2) are limited as their input must 
pass through the People’s House and then through the 50-mem-
ber National Steering Committee, which is largely restricted 
to helping Congress set the agenda. Full inclusion (4) of social 
groups should be achieved by the very large sample.
governmental goods. As noted above, because the Assem-
bly / People’s House design does not invite all electors to actively 
participate, it is unlikely to encourage many citizens to think 
more effectively about issues. This deficit of opportunities for 
developing enlightened understanding (2) is likely to mean that 
the quality of the legislation and public policy that elected politi-
cians can produce with the assistance of the Assembly / People’s 
House is somewhat limited by a lack of mass public support. The 
same defect is predicted above for the Popular Branch, but the 
People’s House should not perform as badly in this respect due 
to its much more widespread presence in the community. Even 
so, the 43,500 members of the People’s House may be limited 
enough in numbers to enable special interest operatives to dis-
tort or prevent the development of enlightened understanding 
(Rauch, cited in Snider 2007, 4).
Any disconnect between the deliberated views of the People’s 
House and mass public opinion may cause the veto power of the 
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People’s House to frustrate legislators in their role of represent-
ing mass opinion. This frustration may be wearing for legislators, 
despite their ability to overrule the People’s House with a 60 per 
cent supermajority vote, but these political struggles — arising 
from what might seem to be inefficient design — may cultivate 
two governmental goods. The first is some stimulation of public 
debate and education about the issues involved, which is taken 
into account by the rating of 2 suggested above for enlightened 
understanding. The second governmental good is some dem-
onstration to citizens that their politicians should defer to the 
deliberations of the People’s House because it represents public 
interests more competently than the mass of citizens can man-
age via the political influence of their often disengaged and thus 
often ill-informed public opinion. This limited governmental 
good is a slight tendency for the People’s House to produce po-
litical prevalence of enlightened understanding (2).
6.5.2.3 Pyramidal democracy
In contrast to the addition of mini-publics to current represent-
ative systems by the Popular Branch and the People’s House, a 
quite radical change has been suggested independently by po-
litical scientist Stephen R. Shalom (2005; 2008) and mathemati-
cian Marcus Pivato (2009). Pivato calls this system pyramidal 
democracy and points out that a three-tier approximation to it 
is currently used for participatory budgeting in many cities in 
Brazil. He notes that it is not a new idea, having been discussed 
as early as the seventeenth century.
Pyramidal democracy is intended to completely replace cur-
rent democratic provincial and national governments with sev-
eral tiers of popular assemblies in which each tier is composed 
of representatives from the tier below. All citizens in a nation 
are invited to attend an assembly or ‘node’ (Pivato 2009) in the 
primary tier and each of these nodes would elect one member 
to represent it at similar-sized nodes in the second tier, which 
would likewise elect representatives to nodes in the third tier 
and so on, up to one supreme node that constitutes the top tier. 
This node performs the ultimate legislative and executive func-
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tions and would be much larger than the lower nodes, having 
100 members. Shalom envisages that the total pyramid of ‘nest-
ed councils’ would have 25–50 citizens in each council or node, 
while Pivato’s preference is for a minimum of seven and a maxi-
mum of ten citizens in each. These size restrictions are intended 
to facilitate interpersonal deliberation (whether face-to-face or 
online) but large size would minimize the number of tiers. The 
mathematics of this system is that seven tiers (with the first or 
primary tier comprising the nodes at the base) could serve a 
nation of 100 million citizens, if all nodes comprised 10 citizens 
or representatives (except that at the top, which would have 100 
members) even if there were no age or other restrictions on eli-
gibility to participate. Similarly, nine such tiers could represent 
ten billion people. If only one person in six were interested in 
participating in the primary tier, then eight tiers might govern 
the current population of the planet in this way.
Pyramidal democracy offers face-to-face or online delib-
erative participation to all citizens at the primary level and for 
many citizens at higher levels. Each representative is account-
able to the node she represents, which can replace her at any 
time by electing another. Pivato specifies that node membership 
would be voluntary, with citizens choosing to enter a particular 
node according to the types of issues in which they are interest-
ed, whereas Shalom envisages geographical proximity as the de-
terminant, to enable face-to-face deliberation. Node members 
would be free to choose whether to accept a new member, to ex-
pel a current member and to replace their representative in the 
tier above them. The operation of nodes on the basis of ideologi-
cal affinity or interest in particular types of issues would be facil-
itated by deliberation conducted live online and by email, blogs 
or other types of ‘virtual forum’. Representatives in the upper 
tiers will have to handle many and varied issues so their work 
would be full time, requiring commensurate payment. These 
people will be very competent as their ascent through each tier 
will be based on personal assessments of their dedication and 
ability by fellow members of the nodes they have worked in. 
Pivato points out that this makes pyramidal democracy meri-
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tocratic, as well as being deliberative and accountable to all citi-
zens via the chain of communication in which representatives 
report back to the nodes they represent. He also points out the 
possibility that ‘cascades’ of representative replacements or de-
fections could propagate up the pyramid, causing it to become 
unstable or collapse, but he shows that this could be prevented 
by constitutional provisions of mandatory waiting periods for 
replacing representatives, for allowing new ones to start voting, 
for allowing them to defect, for allowing defectors to start vot-
ing in new nodes and for nodes that have less than the mini-
mum number of members to regain their minimum size.
Shalom’s design, which he calls ParPolity, uses the geographi-
cal basis of the membership of nodes to provide a pyramid that 
covers local and provincial affairs in its lower tiers and nation-
al or wider affairs in its upper levels. He recommends a ‘High 
Council Court’ that would prevent majority decisions unjustifi-
ably harming minorities. This would be formed by randomly 
selecting 41 citizens for staggered two year terms. A system of 
Lesser Council Courts for each tier above the primary level 
would be needed to judge whether an issue should be decided 
at a higher level or not. As Pivato’s concept is for nodes to form 
around types of issue, his version may require separate pyramids 
for local, state (provincial), national and global issues. Attending 
more than one of these pyramids might make the citizen’s task 
too onerous or unfocused so they may choose to specialize in 
just one level of government. Coordination of policies between 
these levels and pyramids may cause problems. With Shalom’s 
version, citizens interested in the broader policy of higher level 
tiers may find it difficult to start deliberating such national or 
global policy in primary level nodes as these could be focused 
on local issues. While Shalom’s system appears confusing for 
citizens, Pivato’s may also overload them with the problems of 
coordinating the policy work of different pyramids.
Pyramidal democracy needs a clearer formulation and the 
following assessment is primarily an attempt to evaluate Pivato’s 
version. The ratings given below for the goods of pyramidal de-
mocracy are therefore especially questionable.
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institutional goods. Pyramidal democracy will lack efficiency 
(3) by demanding much time from citizens, but this problem 
may be alleviated to some extent by this system eliminating 
the expense of the formal institutions of electoral democracy, 
together with the work of party members (such as supporting 
electoral campaigns) and advisors for politicians. Efficiency may 
be assisted by the large numbers of enquiring and deliberating 
citizens increasing the demand for information that is relevant 
and accurate. This may convert professional lobbying from spin 
and trading favours to providing reliable information for node 
members and the general public.
Pivato’s system may have a deficit of transferability to democ-
racies if its long chains of responsibility impair transparency (2) 
for citizens at the bottoms of pyramids. These chains may be 
further complicated by the need to coordinate policy between 
several pyramids that focus on different spatial scales of juris-
diction, from local to national and global, and also on differ-
ent temporal levels of policy, from operational to strategic. Low 
feasibility of introduction (1) is another transferability problem 
because the introduction of pyramidal democracy appears to 
require a very strong demand across the community that would 
generate the political will to introduce it as an official system that 
could replace the current legislature of elected representatives. 
Pivato suggests that this popular demand may be developed by 
implementing the pyramidal system in an incremental, experi-
mental manner that should educate citizens about its potential 
and prevent failure of governance at large scales by uncovering 
flaws before the pyramid is applied to regional or national gov-
ernment. He sees the political will for pyramidal democracy as 
starting in ‘micropolities’ such as student groups, private clubs 
and professional associations. However, such groups show no 
sign of wanting the complexity of the chains of representation 
of multi-tiered pyramids. Perhaps the narrow focus of their in-
terests makes this not only unnecessary, but an encumbrance.
Another transferability problem is that their long chains of 
responsibility may prevent pyramids from considering enough 
policy problems in a given period to enable them to be com-
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petent on strategic issues (1). This could be a major flaw, for 
as pointed out above, many issues are interrelated and should 
therefore be deliberated in a coordinated manner, such as si-
multaneously, or in a specific sequence and also with feedback 
that helps citizens to update their thinking as their opinions 
on related issues are developed. In order to deliberate strate-
gic issues, nodes may have to follow an agenda that applies to 
a whole pyramid and possibly across more than one pyramid. 
This would enable upper-tier nodes to introduce topics to all 
lower tiers when upper-level deliberations reveal needs for the 
grassroots to consider questions they have overlooked, such as 
citizens having to pay more taxes or change other expectations 
in order to enable the implementation of new policy that may be 
identified and favoured by an upper tier or by one pyramid. This 
problem of the transferability of a pyramidal system to strategic 
issues is discussed further in the next section (§6.5.2.4), which 
analyses a proposal by the Nicolas Berggruen Institute on Gov-
ernance. Although the relatively simple three-tiered pyramid 
that was developed for participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, works well, it is a tool for operational rather than strate-
gic policy, being applied to annual budgets.
Pyramidal democracy is potentially transferable to large-
scale (5) national, multinational (and potentially global) liberal 
democratic political systems (4). However, it seems questionable 
whether communication through long chains of delegation and 
between pyramids can produce good accountability, and this is 
registered above in the low transparency rating.
political equality goods. Pyramidal democracy would give 
citizens more opportunity to communicate their views (3) to 
other citizens across the polity than electoral democratic sys-
tems. This is due to the possibility of communication within 
nodes, between tiers and then across tiers (between the nodes 
in a tier) as representatives report views up to the next one and 
then back down to nodes in lower tiers for deliberation. These 
effects would be supported by nodes in upper tiers analysing 
and publicizing policy problems, because these groups would 
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be professionally remunerated and would have the time and fa-
cilities to do this. However, communication between pyramids 
might confuse citizens with too much information.
Citizens have restricted opportunity to vote on policy (3), as 
voting for all citizens is limited to their participation in either 
a primary level node or a higher tier node as a representative. 
Representatives can only vote in the node in which they repre-
sent a lower tier node: they cannot vote in the node they rep-
resent. The long chains of responsibility may create difficulties 
for popular control of the agenda (3). Voluntary membership of 
nodes, together with the obligation to attend meetings, may pre-
vent full inclusion (3) of all socioeconomic and other groups, 
despite the freedom of each node to form around interests that 
its members have in common. Experience with participatory 
budgeting in Porto Alegre indicates that inclusion will not be 
achieved in each pyramid, as nodes that deliberate strategic or 
high level jurisdiction issues will tend to be dominated by politi-
cally active middle-class citizens (G. Smith 2009, 69–70).
governmental goods. Membership of nodes may provide op-
portunities for all citizens to gain enlightened understanding (3) 
that are limited by the small size of these groups. Polarization 
is likely when nodes form around common interests. This may 
happen in the lower tiers and produce standoffs in upper tiers 
so their members vote rather than deliberate. Pivato (2009, 19) 
anticipates that such clashes of views would counter polariza-
tion as representatives report back to their nodes in subordinate 
tiers, but this reciprocating process may be too time-consuming 
and indirect for much educational effect and could discourage 
participation. Nodes at the lower levels may be too short-lived 
or changeable in their membership to be able to make well-
considered judgements and to be consistent in their decisions. 
This could make it difficult for higher-tier members to represent 
lower tiers. The potential for very large numbers of participants 
assists enlightened understanding because it makes the manipu-
lation of public opinion by special interests potentially very ex-
pensive and increases the probability that such corruption will 
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be exposed to public censure by the many citizens that are try-
ing to contribute constructively as members of nodes.
The meritocratic function of pyramidal democracy may pro-
duce political prevalence of enlightened understanding (4). The 
likely problem of lack of transferability to strategic issues may 
limit the utility of this meritocracy by limiting its enlighten-
ment, but this is registered by the low rating given to transfer-
ability to strategic issues.
6.5.2.4 Comparing the four designs and observations 
on five more
The ratings that have been suggested above for anticipated pro-
visions of goods, together with those suggested for the People’s 
Forum in Table 6.1, are compared in Table 6.2. As indicated in 
§6.2.4, these ratings and also the evaluative framework into 
which they are entered are not intended to be the last word, but 
are presented for consideration, which may elicit alteration or 
endorsement of the ratings, or allocation of different weights to 
each one, or alteration of the framework itself. One rating that 
might need closer attention is the institutional good of transfer-
ability to political system. For simplicity, the system considered 
here for this comparison is ‘liberal democracy’, which ignores 
the different political, social, economic and cultural character-
istics of each type of liberal democracy. If the comparison be-
tween institutional designs was to be made for their suitability 
for, let us say, Australia, then the characteristics of that liberal 
democracy should be considered in choosing the rating for 
transferability to political system for each design. Another point 
to note here is that Table 6.2 gives two sets of total scores — a 
complete one and another that has the ratings for feasibility 
of introduction omitted in order to compare the potentials of 
the four designs without the complication of also considering 
whether they could actually be introduced into the political sys-
tem that is being considered.
The People’s Forum ranks here as the most promising of these 
designs, with a total score of 44 that also includes the highest 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































assessment is that the designs based on self-selected participa-
tion (pyramidal democracy and the People’s Forum), which are 
thereby open to participation by all citizens, have the highest 
total scores. The other two designs have restricted participation 
because they employ random samples, which tend to produce 
lower capabilities in political equality and governmental goods. 
We now consider five more designs that might be compa-
rable with the four dealt with above because they also have a 
scale of application that might facilitate the development of 
strategic policy for liberal democratic governments. These sys-
tems are: sortition, Intelligent Governance, the National Public 
Policy Conferences of Brazil, the Council of Citizens and the 
‘Cincinnati’ system. Sortition is the appointment of political 
representatives by random selection from the populace (instead 
of by election, as discussed in, for example, Burnheim 1985 and 
Burnheim 2016). This system could allow constructive face-to-
face deliberation by representatives because the absence of elec-
toral pressures would free them for frank exchanges of views 
and information. However, this potential for deliberation at the 
top may be distorted by special interests being able to manipu-
late representatives because of their limited numbers, a problem 
that would also occur with the random sampling of the Popular 
Branch and the People’s House. Furthermore, as intensive de-
liberation would largely be confined to representatives in these 
random sample systems, they may not generate much enlight-
ened understanding in citizens at large. As sortition systems 
would replace electorally representative systems of government, 
their establishment would be stymied by a lack of political will 
for this in elected representatives. Sortition therefore has a low 
feasibility of introduction that makes it a currently impractical 
prospect and partly for this reason it is omitted from Table 6.2. If 
the ratings total for goods, excluding feasibility of introduction, 
that is assessed for sortition indicates it should be trialled as a 
full-scale political system, then this may require another inno-
vation with higher feasibility of introduction to be implemented 
first, in order to establish a new type of elected government that 
is more capable of considering whether it should replace itself 
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with randomly selected representatives. The selection of this 
preliminary innovation might utilize the comparative frame-
work employed in Table 6.2.
Intelligent Governance (IG) has been proposed by Nicolas 
Berggruen and Nathan Gardels (2013). This ingenious but com-
plex proposal is not added to the comparison of four designs in 
Table 6.2 because it is primarily based on pyramidal democracy 
and thus appears likely to generate goods largely as assessed for 
that system in §6.5.2.3. In the example of IG given by Berggruen 
and Gardels, the peak of the pyramid would be a lower house 
of 100 representatives that is likely to be relatively free of the 
problems that are generated or exacerbated by party allegiance, 
such as antagonism, dogmatism, deception and governmental 
deadlock. An executive, or head of government, is elected by 
the lower house and he or she nominates a four-member col-
lective head of state — the Quadrumvirate — for confirmation 
by the lower house. The executive, the Quadrumvirate and the 
lower house jointly appoint forty distinguished or otherwise 
well-qualified members of an upper house of fifty, the other ten 
being selected from the citizenry by sortition in order to coun-
terbalance the expertise of the appointed forty with the views 
of the general public. These various organs of government in-
teract with several veto and supermajority rules. For example, 
the Quadrumvirate could call mandatory-voting referendums 
in which a 60% supermajority would bind the government to 
implement the result.
IG is intended to produce a strong element of meritocracy as 
it is structured to make citizens more accountable to the com-
mon good, representatives more accountable to citizens and to 
facilitate deliberation by these principals and agents. However, 
the complexity of the system may obstruct their accountability 
and deliberation. For example, public deliberation is expected to 
be encouraged by the proportional representation employed at 
the base of the pyramid, in which local districts of 2,000 constit-
uents each use STV (the single transferable vote) to elect ten del-
egates to form a council that represents them. This should ena-
ble minority interests that are as small as a tenth of the electorate 
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to have a representative explaining their views in most of the ten 
member councils at the first or local level. However, these mi-
nority views are liable to be overlooked as representation pro-
ceeds up the pyramid, so that the proportional representation 
achieved at the base may be lost at the apex. In Berggruen and 
Gardels’ example of a government for a nation of eighty mil-
lion people, local councils elect one of their ten members to rep-
resent them in a twenty-member council at the regional level, 
which in turn elects one of its members to represent it in a twen-
ty-member council at the provincial level, where one hundred 
provinces each elect a member to a hundred-member lower 
house of the parliament/legislature. At each stage of this pyram-
idal representation, minority views will tend to be supplanted 
by mainstream attitudes. At the local level, one or two members 
of a local council may be quite unable to convert the other nine 
or eight members to minority views that pose radical, or subtle, 
or complex challenges to existing assumptions and world views. 
For example they would find it extremely difficult to promul-
gate (within their local council) the anti-growth or steady-state 
economy propositions discussed in Chapter 5, or the sugges-
tions in Chapter 4 of providing employment by sharing it rather 
than by growth (§4.2.1) and of limiting national population to 
an optimal carrying capacity (§4.2.3). To introduce such strate-
gic issues they would need an expert grasp of the arguments for 
and against their view, superb communication skills, an under-
standing of — and empathy for — conservative psychology and 
also (probably) the support of a social environment in which 
such paradigm change was being constructively discussed in 
the media. ‘Expert grasp of the arguments’ is likely to be lack-
ing in advocates, whether they are progressive or conservative, 
as people often do not analyse their case effectively. They are 
usually motivated by emotions and then rationalize their cause 
with ‘evidence’ selected by confirmation bias (e.g. Haidt 2012; 
Kahneman 2011).
Strategic challenges to existing assumptions and habits of 
thinking are therefore unlikely to gain the understanding and 
support of local councils. If a few local councils in a region are 
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won over by such challenges and send a few motivated and ar-
ticulate delegates to explain their unconventional views at their 
regional council they will face similar difficulties there, which 
may be even less surmountable as that council has twice as many 
members as a local council. In the improbable event that one or 
two regional councils send delegates with paradigm-changing 
views to their provincial council, they will strike the same prob-
lem there. The odds therefore seem to be heavily against the 
provinces sending delegates representing such views all the way 
to the lower house. The national parliament may therefore work 
in ignorance of important minority views and thereby help to 
conceal them from the community at large. This could be a cru-
cial problem as important calls for change are usually initiated 
by very small minorities, and if societies are to rapidly adapt and 
progress they need political systems that quickly and effectively 
expose such strategic ideas to public scrutiny. As the anthropol-
ogist Margaret Mead is reputed to have observed: ‘Never doubt 
that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change 
the world. Indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.’ The political 
system should facilitate rather than obstruct that process, which 
means it should proportionally represent the various streams 
of political thought at the most visible and prominent levels, 
which are provincial and national legislatures. Rather than uti-
lizing pyramidal democracy, such representation might be bet-
ter pursued by electing members of parliament or congress from 
multimember electorates via proportional representation such 
as STV. Sortition might also do this if it selects a legislature that 
is large enough to include significant numbers of representatives 
with minority views.
It was noted above in §6.5.2.3 that the election by council 
members of one of their number to represent them at a council 
in the next level of a pyramid should produce the meritocratic 
effect of selecting representatives for high levels that are com-
petent and public-minded. In addition, Berggruen and Gardels 
(2013, 111) explain that the ‘reason for this indirect approach to 
electing a parliament/legislature through a pyramid structure 
is to remove the distance between the representative and rep-
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resented at each level.’ However, as just discussed, pyramidal 
representation may increase this distance — if it is thought of as 
‘policy distance’ — because representation at all levels above the 
base in an IG pyramid is not proportional. Thus, instead of re-
moving policy distance between represented and representative, 
this distance may increase up the pyramid, which will obstruct 
the development of strategic policy by neglecting potentially im-
portant innovations in policy.
Notwithstanding this potential for weakness, IG appears to 
be making some progress. It has raised considerable interest and 
preliminary moves are being made towards erecting some ele-
ments of its structure. Berggruen may be overcoming the low 
rating of 1 suggested in §6.5.2.3 for the feasibility of introduction 
of pyramidal systems with his financial resources, his ability to 
involve influential politicians, entrepreneurs and academics, 
and a judicious selection of three very prominently dysfunc-
tional governance systems for the development and trial of IG. 
These three cases are the State of California, the European Un-
ion and the global group of twenty leading economies, the G20. 
Those cases are being tackled by committees that select institu-
tional reforms from the IG template and then try to implement 
them. Starting with such prominent dysfunctions appears to be 
a good strategy for establishing IG, as it should give it the best 
chance of being operationalized and of demonstrating its capa-
bilities to a global audience. If IG succeeds with these cases it 
may gain a reputation that invites its application to other failing 
forms of governance.
IG has a wider objective than PF as it aims to reform govern-
ment structure at all levels, from base to apex. PF focuses only 
on the base — the opinions of citizens — and should therefore be 
able to help IG to function. At that level, the strategic focus of PF 
should provide a capacity to review policy paradigms. One pos-
sible example of this is that PF might be needed to generate the 
popular support within a polity that is required to establish IG 
in the first place. Another effect of these differing foci is that the 
IG objective of reforming all levels makes it more complex than 
PF. Citizens may therefore find PF easier to understand and em-
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brace. Its more limited focus also positions PF to produce a sim-
pler form of government than that specified by the IG template. 
This simplicity may prove crucial in making democracy work 
well, for it should maximize the transparency of incentives and 
lines of responsibility, which in turn should strengthen the ac-
countability of representatives to citizens and of citizens to their 
common good. A hypothetical example of the potential for PF 
to produce simplicity, clarity and strength of operation is that its 
implementation in bicameral democracies might produce a re-
view or guidance function that makes the upper house or senate 
superfluous and enables it to be abolished because PF is doing 
its job — and more. If that structural change was combined with 
election to the lower house by proportional representation from 
multimember electorates the result would be a unicameral par-
liamentary government with strong public participation, more 
deliberation by citizens and representatives, effective represen-
tation and accountability and a significant element of meritoc-
racy. For this scenario it is notable that political scientist Arend 
Lijphart (2012, 279, 297) has found that parliamentary govern-
ments based on proportional representation produce ‘consensus 
democracy’, which provides significantly higher quality democ-
racy than non-consensual types. To assess ‘quality’ Lijphart used 
the democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. He observed that consensus 
democracy is promoted by coordinated or ‘corporatist’ interest 
group systems that utilize strong peak organisations and aim at 
compromise and concertation. It is arguable that, as PF would 
facilitate such coordination, compromise and concertation by 
sustaining public debate on crucial strategic issues, it should 
make democratic governments more consensual, even if they 
do not have proportional representation. PF may thereby act as 
a ‘peak organisation’ that improves government.
In addition to Brazil’s participatory budgeting (see §6.5.2.3) 
that country also has another pyramidal process working suc-
cessfully on national issues — the National Public Policy Con-
ference (Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014; Pogrebinschi 2012). 
The first of these was held in 1941, on public health, but only 
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in recent years have they become frequent, with 83 being held 
over the period 1992–2010 on a variety of subjects. The pyrami-
dal structure of these conferences enables citizens and public 
officials to deliberate issues together and to deliver their policy 
recommendations to the national government. Although non-
binding, these recommendations have been found to make 
significant contributions to legislation and government policy. 
Each conference begins at the municipal level, with meetings 
in hundreds or thousands of cities simultaneously across the 
country, which are open to any citizen and develop ideas on 
policy for one issue. Representatives of civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs) and government agencies also participate. Each 
municipal conference selects a delegate to its state conference 
and these appoint delegates to the national conference. The 
rules typically require that a majority of voting delegates to both 
the state and national conferences come from CSOs. The largest 
NPPC was the 14th, on health in 2011, which had 600,000 partic-
ipants. Between 2003 and 2011, about 7 million people took part 
in at least one of these events, making them by far the largest 
experiment with such practices in the world. The formal sum-
moning of NPPCs is by presidential or ministerial decree, but the 
initiative usually comes from a collaboration of government of-
ficials and key CSO representatives. The NPPC system appears to 
be a considerable improvement in democratic government, but 
it has a narrow policy focus (on just one issue or type of issue at 
a time) that leaves much space for the People’s Forum to work 
alongside it by dealing with the entire spectrum of strategic is-
sues in a coordinated manner.
The chair of Common Good in New York, Philip K. How-
ard (2014, 168–70, 182–83), has proposed that nine people of 
‘high distinction’ should serve five year renewable terms as a US 
‘Council of Citizens’. This would issue reports on the long-term 
implications of current policy and its members would be chosen 
‘by and from a Nominating Council composed of two nomi-
nees by each governor of a state.’ The Council of Citizens would 
‘have no mandatory duties other than to nominate independent 
commissions to advise Congress on the rewriting of laws. Con-
320
rescuing democracy
gress shall provide funding adequate to support staff and shall 
provide an honorarium to each member of the council in an 
amount equal to the salary of a member of Congress.’ Howard 
anticipates that the ‘absence of any political ambition or obliga-
tion’ by these councillors should give them credibility and that 
this would be heightened when most of them ‘come together 
behind a cogent point of view’. Two problems with this proposal 
are: first, that getting the Council up and running depends on 
the existing political establishment wanting to do this; and sec-
ond, that as it is not designed to foster public deliberation it may 
do little to help politicians adopt more enlightened views. 
The ‘Cincinnati’ system has been proposed by two Austral-
ians, palaeontologist / environmental scientist Tim Flannery 
and entrepreneur/philanthropist Catriona Wallace (2015). They 
suggest that politics would address issues more honestly if po-
litical parties (which are organised around candidates seeking 
votes and funds for campaigning) were replaced by web-based 
chat rooms that help citizens debate issues and recognize those 
amongst them (called ‘Cincinnati’) who are worthy of election 
to parliament. Flannery and Wallace cite Podemos in Spain and 
DemocracyOS in Argentina as examples of such open-source, 
platform-first (rather than party-first) approaches to politics. 
The Cincinnati system does not depend on support from current 
political establishments, but it may require too much work from 
chat room participants and thereby fail to sustain engagement 
by enough citizens. This may mean not only that its feasibility of 
introduction is virtually zero but that its ability to keep operating 
is doubtful. Furthermore, as the agendas of the chat rooms are 
not organised by some publicly accountable entity, their work 
may be largely wasted by addressing superficialities instead of 
systematically tackling strategic aspects of public policy.
6.6 Perspectives on the promise of the People’s 
Forum
The promising result for the People’s Forum in Table 6.2 (p. 312) 
may (or may not) be exaggerated because its functions are more 
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closely inspected than the functions of the other three systems. 
From this or other perspectives, the reader might prefer to al-
locate different ratings with less optimistic views of the Forum 
and/or more optimistic views of the other contenders. However, 
an argument against such preferences is the possibility that the 
Forum performs well in Table 6.2 because of its two strategies 
for improving democratic government (those of helping mass 
public opinion to develop and of inviting the public to give 
political influence to that section of mass opinion that is most 
likely to be well-developed). Pyramidal democracy would also 
tend to execute these two strategies and ranks second here with 
a score of 35, whereas the designs of the lower-ranking Popular 
Branch and People’s House are not strongly focused on those 
objectives, mainly because they employ random samples and 
thereby have less potential for public participation.
The second of the Forum’s two strategies is very significant 
because, as discussed in §2.2.3, §2.2.4, §4.1 (8) and also later 
in Chapter 8, public disengagement and the tenacity of world 
views makes the first strategy (the development of mass public 
opinion) very slow to have much effect. Diana Mutz describes 
some of the disengagement as being caused by people wanting 
to avoid risking their relationships. This means that it
is questionable whether conversation alone is the best route to ex-
posing people to oppositional political views … Deliberative theo-
rists … have not gone so far as to suggest in concrete terms how 
people might interact with one another in mixed company, and yet 
simultaneously pursue active lives as political citizens … Clearly not 
all citizens feel they can speak their minds freely without repercus-
sions for their public or private lives. And yet the goal of reduc-
ing risks, both individual and collective, is an extremely valuable 
one that has yet to be incorporated into political theory or practical 
politics. (Mutz 2006, 144, 149, 151)
The design of both the People’s Forum and pyramidal democ-
racy address this challenge of specifying ‘in concrete terms’ how 
citizens might minimize collective risks by conducting more 
322
rescuing democracy
active political lives that minimize individual risks. Both de-
signs attend to this by providing sites of political influence that 
should build the ‘diverse networks’ advocated by Mutz (2006, 
150): ‘Only when … [we have] the ability to build and maintain 
diverse networks, and to evaluate and promote ideas through 
them — will the metaphor of a marketplace of political ideas 
ring true for American political culture.’ In a similar vein, two 
scholars of nonprofit organization, Mark Moore and Jean Hart-
ley (2008, 19), state that ‘the most important problem facing the 
public is discovering itself and identifying its own true inter-
ests. We argue that this challenge will only be solved by more 
practice with, and innovation in, the processes of democratic 
deliberation itself.’ These views are consistent with those of Ian 
Marsh. In discussing a perceived decline of democratic govern-
ance in Australia, he recommends that renewal requires a 
richer or more elaborated public conversation about policy frame-
works. In turn, this requires an institutional structure capable 
of mediating the strategic or agenda entry phase of the issue cy-
cle … Further, this phase must be located in the mainstream of the 
political drama … [and not be] automatically subordinate to the will 
of the executive. (Marsh 2005, 38)
A serious impact on the quality of political deliberation requires 
institutional change. But this needs to occur in the power structures 
that frame its core dynamics, not in an irrelevant periphery. (Marsh 
2007, 336)
Of the four institutions assessed in Table 6.2, the People’s Fo-
rum and pyramidal democracy are arguably the most strongly 
located ‘in the mainstream of the political drama’ and ‘in the 
power structures that frame its core dynamics’. This is due to the 
openness of their designs, which are structured to work directly 
with mass public opinion.
There is considerable evidence that citizens in liberal democ-
racies may quickly appreciate the Forum’s potential when they 
see it in operation. Their strong distrust of politicians and in-
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creasing disengagement from parties and ideologies, together 
with their keen interest in politics at the level of particular is-
sues, should lead them to welcome the Forum as a way to come 
together to exchange views, to deliberate these and then issue 
directions to their governments. The advent of, and public sup-
port for, online political organizations such as Getup!, MoveOn, 
Change.org, Avaaz and Wikileaks demonstrate desires for such 
capabilities. The People’s Forum would help voters to think 
about issues, to follow the public arguments on these and to 
give specific directions to politicians without the time-consum-
ing and sometimes stressful work of face-to-face discussion and 
deliberation, which includes attending political meetings and 
working for political parties. As citizens are increasingly accus-
tomed to high responsiveness by the market to their individual 
demands, they may also be attracted by the Forum’s potential to 
generate more responsiveness from government. Although the 
Forum cannot produce social choices that are decisive for every 
voter (that is the nature of social choice), it would make those 
choices much more specific than those made by voting for polit-
ical parties and representatives. The Forum would also produce 
social choices that are much better deliberated and coordinated 
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Chapter 6 broadly described the People’s Forum and then com-
pared its likely political value with that of three other proposed 
institutions by assessing potential yields of institutional, politi-
cal equality and governmental goods. As that assessment as-
sumed the Forum would work, another assessment is given here 
to indicate how likely that is. This involves looking more closely 
at: (a) the functions by which the Forum is intended to execute 
its strategies for achieving its mission; and (b) the structure that 
is intended to produce those functions. So this inspection cov-
ers more functions than the five specified in §6.3, and they are 
listed below in §7.1. The elements of structure, together with the 
ways in which they are expected to produce those functions, are 
set out in §7.2. 
This more detailed description of function and structure 
necessarily repeats much of that in Chapter 6, and in discussing 
the structure required to produce each of the functions specified 
below, it repeats information about structure that is relevant to 
more than one function.
7.1 Twelve functions of the People’s Forum
The five major functions of the Forum specified in §6.3 are re-
placed here with twelve functions. These cover the five major 
functions and introduce others. The ways in which the twelve 
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functions would arguably perform the five major ones are indi-
cated in the list below by the notation MF1, MF2 and so on, where 
the numbers give the order of appearance of a major function 
(MF) in the previous chapter; that is, 1 for ‘public deliberation 
of issues’; 2 ‘deliberating what is to be deliberated’; 3 ‘examining 
basics’; 4 ‘an element of meritocracy’; and 5 ‘economizing citizen 
effort’. In addition, those functions that are intended to assist 
the Forum’s first strategy (developing mass public opinion) are 
indicated by ‘So’ (Strategy for opinion) and those that should 
contribute to its meritocratic second strategy (producing politi-
cal influence for citizens’ opinions that are likely to be relatively 
well developed) are indicated by ‘Sm’ (Strategy for meritocracy). 
The twelve functions are as follows.
1. The Forum presents a public opinion poll that is structured 
to provide incentives for citizens to debate and deliberate 
(MF1, MF2) fundamental (strategic), long-running issues 
(MF3) (described as an ‘opinion development poll’ in §6.1) 
(So).
2. The Forum’s poll is open and easily accessible to the whole 
electorate, so that the deliberation it fosters may be wide-
spread (MF1, MF2, MF5) and all electors, including politically 
alienated or marginalized groups, find it easy to vote (So).
3. The poll assists its voters to indicate the specific responses 
they want their government to make to the issues it covers 
(MF1, MF2) (So).
4. The poll indicates when its voters have reached a stable set of 
views on an issue after extensive public discussion and voting 
(MF1) (So).
5. The poll develops political influence for the public opinion it 
registers (MF4) (Sm).
6. This political influence is developed as or after, but not be-
fore, the expressed opinion develops into a stable public 
judgment (MF4) (Sm).
7. The Forum reserves its political influence on the issues it 
deals with for those who have thought about these issues 
(MF4) (Sm).
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8. The Forum invites the public to review its opinion on an is-
sue, as expressed in Forum polls, before any political influ-
ence of these polls causes that opinion to shape policy or law 
(MF1, MF4) (So, Sm).
9. The Forum minimizes the ability of powerful narrow inter-
ests to distort the development of public opinion and voting 
in its polls (MF1, MF2, MF4) (So, Sm).
10. The Forum develops the political will for difficult political 
decisions to be executed (MF4) (Sm).
11. The Forum is structured to enable citizens to initiate and run 
it without government assistance and funding, if these are 
difficult to obtain.
12. The Forum develops the confidence of the people in the Peo-
ple’s Forum, so that they and their representatives will main-
tain and use it. This includes a capacity for the public to set or 
supervise the agenda (MF2, MF4, MF5) (So, Sm).
7.2 Elements of the design of the People’s Forum 
and why they should produce its twelve 
functions
7.2.1 Twenty-two elements of the design
The People’s Forum is intended to produce its twelve functions 
largely through the influence of the following 22 elements (des-
ignated E1 to E22) of its design. These elements are given more 
description later in sections §7.2.2 through to §7.2.13, where their 
contributions to producing the twelve functions are discussed.
E1 A reference document to facilitate deliberation and vot-
ing by the public (the ‘ballot paper’, which also serves as an 
agenda for public discussion of issues).
E2 Agenda contributions from citizens.
E3 Voluntary voting — which provides self-selection, not ran-
dom selection.
E4 Regular repetition of the poll — probably annually — pos-
ing substantially the same questions each time.
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E5 Demonstrating trends in the development of the opinions 
of the citizens who participate.
E6 Feedback: Relaying voters’ opinions back to the public to 
stimulate public debate and deliberation and future partici-
pation in the poll.
E7 Accessibility: All electors eligible; voting by phone and in-
ternet; personal identification available for voting on im-
pulse; a week for voting; media coverage before / during / af-
ter voting.
E8 Focus: The voluntary nature of the poll extends to the voter 
having the freedom to focus on only those issues and only 
those questions that he or she wants to.
E9 Dealing with long-running, fundamental (strategic) issues
E10 Wide-ranging menu of issues. 
E11 Investigating connections between issues.
E12 Issues and questions that search for solutions to causes 
rather than treatments of symptoms.
E13 Questions on voters’ attitudes to questions (i.e. their prefer-
ences for policy), on mechanics of policy, justifications for 
preferences and implementation of policy.
E14 The ‘solidarity exchange’: Eliciting willingness to pay for so-
lutions.
E15 Competition between rival People’s Forum polls, to satisfy 
the public.
E16 Report cards: Ratings for politicians and parties, mainly on 
how closely the actions of each reflect the trends of the Peo-
ple’s Forum poll.
E17 Advisory influence: Poll results are not binding on the leg-
islature.
E18 Executive review: Opportunity for the public to reverse 
voting trends before these trends change the law or govern-
ment policy.
E19 Defence against manipulation (of public opinion and vot-
ing) by special interests.
E20 Incentives for participation by the public in democratic 
government — including motivations for voting in the Peo-
ple’s Forum and for deliberating the questions it poses.
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E21 Ability to privately finance the People’s Forum, especially 
for its introduction to the electorate.
E22 Voting security.
The ways in which these design elements are expected to pro-
duce the twelve functions of the People’s Forum are now ex-
plained, for each function in turn.
7.2.2 Function 1
The Forum presents a public opinion poll that is structured to pro-
vide incentives for citizens to debate and deliberate fundamental 
(strategic), long-running issues.
e1 a reference document to facilitate deliberation and vot-
ing — the ballot paper. The ballot paper would not only en-
able citizens to vote, but it would provide a standing agenda, 
in hardcopy and on website, of key questions on important is-
sues that would help citizens to relate these issues, discuss them 
and think them through. This agenda would be compiled by the 
managers of the poll, with input from the public as discussed 
below in §7.2.13 (E3 and E2). For each issue, a concise description 
would provide information as impartially as possible, including 
the major pros and cons. Questions are then posed, each with 
a range of answers for the voter’s choice. The ballot paper may 
note sources of information on the issues it polls and the inter-
net version may give active links to relevant references. Some of 
this type of issue dissection has been done for many years for 
small groups that deliberate face-to-face, for example, in the US 
by the Kettering Foundation’s National Issues Forums and the 
Paul J. Aicher Foundation’s Everyday Democracy. In Australia, 
Issues in Society (Healey 2005) has produced more than 250 
small books, each dealing with one public issue. These organisa-
tions concentrate on presenting information for discussion, but 
the People’s Forum would usually restrict itself to very little of 
this in order to focus on posing the most significant questions, 
some of which would invite respondents to explicitly state or 
re-examine the value system they use in making their choices.
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The ballot paper would give instructions on how to vote by 
phone and internet and how to have input into the management 
of the poll. New editions of the ballot paper may be published 
annually and, if necessary, a few issues or questions may be 
dropped, replaced or added each time. The intention is to have 
an annual vote on each question for many years, to encourage 
extended public debate and informal deliberation on each one. 
This continuity should help citizens to gather relevant informa-
tion and carefully consider those issues that interest them. The 
ballot paper would try (as explained in §7.2.13 E3 below) to pre-
sent menus of issues, questions and answers that are relevant, 
comprehensive and competent.
As a mechanism to facilitate deliberative participation in 
democratic government, the ballot paper conforms to Dryzek’s 
(2000, 162) stipulation that ‘authenticity of deliberation requires 
that communication must induce reflection upon preferences 
in non-coercive fashion.’ The ballot paper invites and assists 
this form of participation. It might be expected that the Fo-
rum’s process of individuals voting in a secret ballot would al-
low the expression of narrow self-interest, but experience with 
Citizen Assemblies and deliberative opinion polls indicates that 
the secret vote does not prevent public-spirited judgements (G. 
Smith 2009, 97–98). Those two types of panel have participants 
considering public goods with face-to-face meetings that are 
informed by experts and carefully moderated, but the People’s 
Forum should achieve a public goods focus via its ballot paper 
questions and by allowing several years for these to be publicly 
addressed by technical experts, interest groups and concerned 
citizens. Moreover, as noted in §6.3.4, the popular assumption 
that people vote selfishly (SIVH, the self-interested voter hypoth-
esis) has been discredited (Caplan 2008, 198).
Dalton (2004, 146, 151) observes that in the past several dec-
ades, expanding concerns of citizens have raised so many new 
issues that 
in a multidimensional policy space a government can satisfy most 
of the people some of the time, or some people most of the time, 
331
design details of the people’s forum
but not most of the people most of the time … [There is] strong evi-
dence that this factor contributes to the public’s growing frustration 
with their government … It is not so much that governments pro-
duce less, but that citizens expect more.
The People’s Forum ballot paper is intended to assist citizens to 
take up much of the extra work that they now expect from gov-
ernment. It would be a response to the ‘lack of institutions and 
processes that can aggregate and balance divergent interests into 
coherent policy programmes that the participants can accept’ 
(Dalton 2004, 205).
The treatment of issues by the ballot paper will require much 
expert knowledge and would therefore become costly as it is 
extended and made more sophisticated. For the introductory 
phase of a People’s Forum, the number of issues listed may be 
restricted to perhaps fifty or so of the most urgent ones, but as 
the Forum continued to operate, its agenda would be expanded 
(see §7.2.13 E10 below). This would increase not only the appeal 
of the poll to a wider range of citizens, but the ability of the bal-
lot paper to draw the attention of voters to important relation-
ships between issues that they should consider before finalizing 
their vote.
e3 voluntary voting. It may seem superfluous to specify vol-
untary voting as a design element, because the usual assumption 
is that voting is voluntary. This specification is made partly to 
focus on the importance for this poll of self-selective sampling 
rather than random sampling, and also to help distinguish this 
system from other voting events such as in Australia where ref-
erendums may be held together with elections as a compulsory 
vote.
As discussed below (mainly in §7.2.4, §7.2.6 and §7.2.13), ego-
istic and solidary predispositions will drive interest groups, ac-
tivists and others to want their points of view on public goods to 
do well in the poll results. Voluntary voting gives citizens more 
incentive to compete with each other for this goal, because it 
puts them in the position of not only wanting to persuade oth-
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ers to vote their way, but also wanting to persuade them to vote. 
Such tension or competition should help to raise the profile of 
the poll, thus provoking the community into more debate on the 
issues it presents, which should motivate people to educate each 
other and also themselves as they express, revise and develop 
their arguments.
e4 repetition. The People’s Forum poll is to be held at regu-
lar, preset, well-publicised intervals, say, once a year, asking the 
same questions each time. One vote by a respondent may com-
prise answers to any questions on any number of the issues pre-
sented on the ballot paper. The annual repetition of questions on 
each issue run in the poll would allow years for debate, which 
should assist public opinion to develop constructively. Debate 
may be stimulated as people become aware that they have time 
to convince others of their views and thus to influence future 
poll results. The repetition of the poll would invite the propor-
tion of the electorate that is voting on any issue to increase as 
people see the event recur and become tempted to debate and 
vote.
Political scientists Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin 
(2001, 20) argue that repetitive referendums could produce a 
‘public brokerage’ that fosters real deliberation, instead of ar-
gument intended to produce a victory by avoiding full consid-
eration of the issue. In reviewing constitutional referendums, 
Chambers (2001, 250–51) also advocates treating referendums 
as ‘rolling drafts rather than as final accords’, which makes them 
‘part of an ongoing process of consultation rather than a once-
and-for-all ratification’. She anticipates this would not only pro-
duce significant deliberation, but also more legitimacy for the 
ultimate outcome. She cautiously supports this with observa-
tions of the voting behaviour of jurors.
Studies that compare juries that have unanimity as a rule versus 
juries that have majority rules show significant differences in the 
internal dynamic of deliberation. Indeed, some have argued that 
where there is a simple majority rule, jurors do not really deliberate 
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in the sense of formulating arguments that could persuade interloc-
utors … Once a referendum is called or even knowing the conversa-
tion will end in a referendum diminishes the sense that what one 
has to say counts for something. Both majorities and minorities lose 
an important incentive to be reasonable … it creates the incentive 
to find arguments that will sway only the needed number of voters.
Knowing the rules of the end game exercises a huge influence 
on how participants approach the process. This fact has been over-
looked by much of the literature on deliberative democracy. (Cham-
bers 2001, 241)
The fostering of deliberation by repetition should help chronic 
issues to be tackled and ameliorated. One of these is the aliena-
tion of citizens from civic engagement. Although those individ-
uals may not be stimulated by the repetition of polling to join in 
as voters, others who do vote may be able to provoke construc-
tive policy action on alienation and its effects, through their 
engagement with the Forum. Such ‘de facto representation of 
the shy and disinterested by the articulate and engaged’ (Brown 
2006, 211–12) is common in direct-democratic assemblies such 
as New England town hall meetings, and might also be expected 
in the People’s Forum because of its repetition and other fea-
tures designed to foster deliberation. The importance of aliena-
tion is emphasized by sociologist and political scientist Martin 
Gilens (2005, 778), who finds that in American democracy 
actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most 
affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor 
or middle-income Americans. The vast discrepancy … stands in 
stark contrast to the ideal of political equality that Americans hold 
dear … representational biases of this magnitude call into question 
the very democratic character of our society.
But even without repetition, it is noted by political scientists Ar-
thur Lupia and John Matsusaka (2004) that referenda stimulate 
citizens to increase their political knowledge, to donate cam-
paign contributions to interest groups and to vote. These re-
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sponses occur even among the most poorly informed segments 
of the electorate.
e6 feedback. Each annual poll is to be spread over a week, with 
television and other media coverage of the progress of the vot-
ing on the most topical issues each evening. This should pro-
voke reactions from the public to the trends in polling, sharp-
ening interest in the poll and its issues and encouraging more 
to vote before that poll closes. Such promotion of the People’s 
Forum should encourage debate among citizens through cur-
rent channels, such as the electronic and print media, books, 
schools, universities and talk between friends, thereby helping 
public opinion on the Forum’s questions to develop between 
polls. A discussion with the manager of a Tasmanian televi-
sion station on the feasibility of week-long media coverage of 
People’s Forum polling has indicated that this may be readily 
undertaken by the media as a part of their coverage of news and 
current affairs.
e7 accessibility. The extent to which the People’s Forum helps 
to develop mass public opinion will depend to some extent on 
the number of people who are attracted to participate. Voting 
by telephone and internet would therefore be employed to make 
participation as quick and convenient as possible. A central 
computer would receive all voting calls, which would be made 
by keying code numbers for answers on phones or by select-
ing answers offered on the poll website. Other elements aiding 
accessibility are noted in §7.2.3 below. In the recent past, the 
‘digital divide’ would have tended to exclude the poor and the 
elderly, but they will now find that voting via telephone or in-
ternet is hardly more complex than paying their utility bills in 
these ways.
e8 focus. As their time and interests are limited, citizens must 
be able to focus on a restricted number of issues. The voter may 
deal with only those issues and vote only on those questions that 
he or she wishes to. Focus is also assisted by E9, as noted below.
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e9 long-running fundamental (strategic) issues. As the ques-
tions are to be repeated over many years to facilitate deliberation 
and to register trends in opinion, the issues that the poll treats 
must be long-running. This indicates, together with the focus 
described above and the need to make the limited personal in-
put of an annual vote as politically significant as possible, that 
the issues dealt with are of strategic importance, which means 
they should be both long-running and of fundamental impor-
tance. As discussed above in §6.3.5, this focus would facilitate 
effective public participation.
In studying sixteen deliberative organizations, Ryfe (2002, 
369) observes they
have learned that conversations about values ought to be organized 
differently than conversations about actions. For instance, disagree-
ments between pro- and anti-abortion activists are not likely to be 
reduced by the distillation of more policy information or the con-
vening of a debate … [When values are not shared,] conversations 
break down very quickly.
The Forum’s focus on fundamentals may enable this problem to 
be addressed by helping people to recognize where they share 
values (see §6.3.3). This may enable differences in values to be 
seen as less significant or more understandable.
The strategic focus might be objected to as unnecessary be-
cause state and national democratic governments are thought of 
as already dealing with ‘strategic’ issues because they focus on 
the long term by making decisions that are intended to persist 
far into the future. However, this does not mean that these gov-
ernments actually attend to strategy. They may fail to do this in 
two ways: by not addressing issues that are of fundamental im-
portance to society; and when they do address them, they may 
only address their superficial aspects, such as alleviating their 
symptoms. The People’s Forum therefore aims to assist society 
to deal with strategic issues by including them in its ballot paper, 
by describing their fundamental nature and by posing questions 
on those aspects. A current Australian example of the need for 
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this approach is the continuing and unresolved political furore 
over the last decade or so on how to deal with refugees from 
places such as Afghanistan, Iran and Sri Lanka who sail from 
Indonesia for Australia on small boats. As a party to the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Pro-
tocol, Australia accepts genuine refugees and this, in combina-
tion with its reputation as a stable, prosperous and open society, 
makes it an attractive destination for people in troubled (or even 
just crowded) countries. Yet Australians appear to respond to 
the influx of ‘boat people’ with concern about being overrun by 
hordes of refugees and pseudo-refugees from around the world, 
presumably as this might change the Australian culture and life-
style, increase ethnic and religious tensions, lower wages and 
exacerbate pressure on natural resources. While such concerns 
are largely strategic, the public dispute over ‘boat people’ tends 
to be short-term, as it focuses on such aspects as: the horror of 
hundreds drowning as leaky boats sink; the misery of the ‘boat 
people’ detained in camps while their refugee status is assessed; 
trying to deter ‘boat people’ from sailing for Australia by detain-
ing those who arrive; and the unfairness of receiving those who 
can afford to journey to Indonesia and then pay for passage on 
an ‘illegal entry vessel’ while hundreds of thousands of refugees 
are too poor to travel. Meanwhile, important strategic aspects 
are ignored, although these are necessary for constructive pub-
lic policy on immigration. One of these gaps is that Australia 
has essentially no policies for preventing or mitigating global 
warming, or for coping with its consequences — one of which is 
that millions more refugees may be fleeing coastal inundation, 
monsoon failure, resultant warfare and so on. A second yawn-
ing gap in Australian strategic policy is that being a party to the 
UN convention on refugees is incompatible with trying to stop 
‘boat people’ by deterring them with the prospect of prolonged 
incarceration. Both these gaps might begin to be closed by rec-
ognizing the need for two major planks of strategic policy. The 
first is that, after three national population inquiries since 1975 
(see §4.2.1), Australia still lacks a policy on the size of popula-
tion that it prefers. The second plank is that Australia’s respon-
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sibility to the rest of the world in terms of its carrying capacity 
has never been addressed. This requires Australia to consider 
and decide what it wants its carrying capacity to be (the first 
plank above) and then to negotiate with the UN about whether 
this is acceptable to other nations. A UN agreement on this may 
have implications for the UN Convention on Refugees and/or for 
Australia being a party to that Convention. Such negotiation or 
agreement may encourage other countries to be more conscious 
of their responsibilities to control the size of their populations 
in the interests of the sustainable quality of life for their citi-
zens. They may then select their own desirable carrying capaci-
ties and start to work towards achieving them while respecting 
those of other countries. This subject of carrying capacity and 
the focus on its strategic content is illustrated in §7.3 below, with 
a suggestion as to how it might be treated in a PF ballot paper. 
That illustration splits the subject into several fundamental is-
sues that are briefly described and then analysed with several 
questions for the respondent to consider and answer.
e10 wide-ranging menu of issues. The People’s Forum ballot 
paper would present a wide spectrum of issues (see §7.2.13 E10 
below) and embrace controversy, in order to raise all options 
and stimulate voter participation, debate and mutual educa-
tion. Dryzek (2006, 47–48) has called for this type of approach, 
arguing ‘for a discursive democracy that can handle deep dif-
ferences … [to] seek robust and passionate exchanges across 
identities.’ He recommends that these exchanges be moderated 
by ‘partially decoupling the deliberation and decision aspects 
of democracy, locating deliberation … in the public sphere at a 
distance from any contest for sovereign authority’ (2006, 47). 
Such decoupling is to be achieved by the non-binding status of 
Forum results (see E17 in §7.2.7 and §7.2.13). Mutz (2006, 80–84) 
observes that dogmatism / non-dogmatism is a stable personal-
ity trait and exposure to oppositional views creates tolerance in 
non-dogmatists and intolerance in dogmatists. Most learning 
from exposure to crosscutting information will thus be done by 
non-dogmatists. Intolerant responses should be minimized by 
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making information available with minimal confrontation, such 
as by presenting references and web links that citizens may use if 
they wish and by ensuring that this presentation displays differ-
ent conclusions, if these are held by experts in that field. 
e11 investigating interconnections. Many issues are strongly 
related to other issues. For example, the issue of matching sup-
ply and demand in energy in a way that minimizes depletion of 
natural resources is usually seen by democracies as being the 
narrow issue of whether to supply more energy in ways such as 
solar or wind power that are less destructive of these resources 
than using fossil or nuclear fuels or converting rivers, valleys and 
natural lakes into hydro-electric reservoirs. However, matching 
supply and demand in energy has another component, the so-
cial choice of the size of the demand to be supplied, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. Dealing with an issue by ignoring its connections 
with others may allow both it and the others to get worse.
Connections between issues are to be identified in the bal-
lot paper by references in an issue’s description or in its ques-
tions, to other issues or questions on the ballot. These references 
would invite the voter to consider those other issues and ques-
tions before finalizing their vote on the question before them. 
This should reduce the problem noted in 1954 by opinion poll-
ing experts Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley (cited in Bennett 
2006, 115): ‘People often express approval of two ideas which are 
quite incompatible with one another and they frequently up-
hold a general principle while denying its specific application’.
e12 search for solutions. The ballot questions must focus on 
causes and systemic solutions rather than on the amelioration 
of symptoms of problems. To fail to do this will make the poll 
superficial and invite public criticism and boycott, but this task 
will be complicated for some issues as there may currently be no 
universally accepted definition of the problem. This complica-
tion is one of the reasons why the poll managers must be skilled 
in the analysis of issues, as noted previously in §6.1.4.
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e13 questions on attitude, mechanics, justification, imple-
mentation and willingness to pay. Several ‘attitude’ questions 
on an issue would usually be the first posed on that topic in the 
ballot paper. These would ask voters for their attitudes on key 
aspects of the issue, which may then be explored by ‘justifica-
tion’ questions that might search for common ground under-
lying the differing attitudes of voters. Justification questions 
would inquire into the reasons for answers given to attitude 
questions and may prompt the voter to re-examine her world 
view or ideology (see §4.1 (8) and Chapter 8, for comment on 
the stubbornness of world views). To make this inquiry more 
thorough, secondary justification questions might be posed on 
primary justification questions, but this could make the ballot 
paper too complicated. It may be possible to achieve such in-
depth investigation by changing justification questions in sub-
sequent polls. Justification questions should help the debates 
that precede a vote, as they would allow analysed feedback to 
the public on the reasons for attitudes and ideologies that were 
expressed in the previous poll, and this may show why opinions 
diverge in the community, allowing subsequent public debate to 
focus on the reasons for this. Such analysis might also correlate 
voters’ differing attitudes on an issue with whether they gave an-
swers to justification questions. This may help the public to fur-
ther deliberate these issues by indicating which attitudes seem 
dogmatic and which appear to be more firmly based on evi-
dence and reason. Other types of questions that might be posed 
on an issue are: ‘mechanics’ questions, which ask the voter to 
state (and thus think about) how a particular policy (such as one 
they favour) would work; ‘implementation’ questions, which ask 
what specific action the government should take; and ‘willing-
ness to pay’ questions, which ask citizens what they should do 
about the issue, as discussed under E14 in §7.2.4 below.
The importance of mechanics questions is seen from elegant 
studies showing that when people are forced to explain how 
their favoured policies would work, they downgrade their esti-
mates of their understanding of these and moderate their opin-
ions (Greene 2014, 297). Control versions of these experiments 
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show that when people only had to give reasons for their opin-
ions on policy (i.e. only to answer justification questions), those 
opinions remained intact — no doubt because confirmation bias 
and rationalization had not been challenged. Mechanics ques-
tions may therefore cultivate more rational attitudes and reduce 
polarization. As moral psychologist Joshua Greene (2014, 297–
98) observes:
Simply forcing people to justify their opinions with explicit reasons 
does very little to make people more reasonable, and may even do 
the opposite. But forcing people to confront their ignorance of es-
sential facts does make people more moderate. As these research-
ers note, their findings suggest an alternative approach to public 
debate: Instead of simply asking politicians and pundits why they 
favour the policies they favour, first ask them to explain how their 
favoured (and disfavoured) policies are supposed to work [under-
lining added]. 
Greene’s recommendation is supported by Slovic’s observation 
on people’s world views, as given above in §4.1 (under 8 Exter-
nalizability).
The truly disconcerting thing about this work is that it shows how 
difficult it is to change people’s views and behaviours with factual 
information … People spin the information to keep their worldview 
intact. (cited in Bennett 2008, 4, 5)
People do this automatically with the ‘affect heuristic’, in which 
they judge or decide by consulting their emotions instead of by 
inspecting the relevant information and logic. In doing this they 
substitute an easy question for a hard one: The easy one being 
‘what do you like?’ and the hard one ‘what are the relevant facts 
and what do they indicate?’ (Kahneman 2011, 97, 103, 139). As 
the psychologist and Nobel Laureate in economics Daniel Kah-
neman (2011, 217) observes: ‘people can maintain an unshake-
able faith in any proposition, no matter how absurd, when they 
are sustained by a community of like-minded believers.’ In the 
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following example from law and psychology scholar Dan Kahan 
(Economist 2015c), what people like is determined by their pri-
mal social need to belong to a group. He observes that on the 
issue of climate change, their beliefs
have become determined by feelings of identification with cultural 
and political groups. When people are asked for their views on cli-
mate change … they translate this into a broader question: whose 
side are you on? The issue has become associated with left-wing ur-
banites, causing conservatives to dig in against it.
People’s reliance on affect heuristics indicates that the Forum’s 
ballot paper would encourage voters to think more clearly if it 
asked questions that show them when they are using those heu-
ristics and invite them to eliminate that substitution by specify-
ing the information and logic behind their attitude or preference 
on the question. Justification and mechanics questions may be 
able to do this if they have wide-ranging menus of answers with 
sufficient specificity and if, as noted above, the mechanics ques-
tions precede those on justification. From a broader perspective, 
Chambers (2001, 251) has emphasized the importance of a wide 
answer menu for each question by noting that it ‘encourages 
substantive discussion on issues.’
Other ways by which the People’s Forum may minimize po-
larization are discussed in §6.5.1. To sum up, then, the major 
design elements with that purpose are E11 (investigating con-
nections between issues), E12 (searching for solutions to caus-
es — rather than to symptoms), E13 (mechanics and justification 
questions) and, as described below in §7.2.4, E14 (the solidarity 
exchange). In addition to helping ameliorate polarization, the 
Forum’s descriptions of issues and its menus of questions and 
answers should be designed to avoid biased intuitive responses 
such as those discussed by Kahneman (2011), for example, dura-
tion neglect, adaptation neglect, focusing illusions, attending to 
salience (e.g. vividness of description and frequency formats vs. 
probability formats), narrow framing (such as the ‘inside view’ 
vs. the ‘outside view’ and WYSIATI — what you see is all there 
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is) and other framing effects, such as the contexts of questions, 
preference reversals and the specification of consequences as 
losses or as gains (loss aversion trumps desire for gain). 
This discussion of the types of questions (and their contexts) 
that would help People’s Forums to function well may seem to 
make the voter’s task too complex, but this is not necessarily the 
case. Much public deliberation may be achieved merely by the 
Forum’s annual repetition of a few crucial questions on each of 
the strategic issues it treats. The extent to which this is enhanced 
by the range and sophistication of the questions on each issue 
will be a trade-off between the complexity of the ballot paper 
and its convenience for voters. No doubt that trade-off would 
become an art form in which the Forum’s managers develop 
considerable skill as they practice it. 
7.2.3 Function 2
Being open and easily accessible to the whole electorate so that 
the deliberation fostered by the poll is widespread and all electors, 
including politically alienated groups, find it easy to vote.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, 239) have observed: ‘While 
people are not eager to provide input into political decisions, 
they want to know that they could have input into political de-
cisions if they ever wanted to do so. In fact they are passionate 
about this.’ Moreover, they want their participation to ‘be wel-
come and meaningful’. This indicates that the Forum’s poll must 
be very easy to access and give some political influence to the 
views of its voters. Easy access is provided by several elements of 
its design, such as E7, E8, E9 and E22. The last of these concerns, 
voting security, is discussed below in §7.2.13. 
E7 describes accessibility as being provided by several fea-
tures of the poll: all electors being eligible to vote; voting to be 
done by phone or internet; the availability of personal identifi-
cation for voting on impulse (discussed above in §6.1.3); a week 
for voting so that it is hard for electors to overlook the oppor-
tunity; and media coverage before, during and after voting. E8 
is the ability of voters to choose, according to their interests, 
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from a wide variety of issues on the ballot paper, and E9 is the 
strategic power given to voters by the ballot paper’s focus on 
long-running fundamental issues.
7.2.4 Function 3
Assisting citizens to indicate the specific responses they want their 
government to make to the issues covered.
e13 questions on preferences for action (i.e. on implementa-
tion of policy). Each issue should, if appropriate, have a ques-
tion asking respondents what they want their government to do 
about it.
e14 the solidarity exchange: eliciting willingness to pay for 
solutions. Perhaps the most crucial responses by governments 
on many issues, and often the most difficult for elected govern-
ments to make, are those requiring them to ask citizens to make 
costly contributions, perhaps with money or with changes in 
lifestyle or attitudes, if they are to deal effectively with those is-
sues. The People’s Forum could assist here by inviting citizens 
to declare the contribution they would be prepared to make in 
order to have their society achieve specific objectives. Those 
concerning the willingness of citizens to pay financially for 
government action are collectively referred to here as ‘solidar-
ity exchange’ questions, for this function of the poll bears some 
resemblance to that of a stock exchange.
The stock exchange is a market for individual choice in which 
entities choose to purchase and sell rights to profits (which are 
private goods) and thereby invest in the production of other pri-
vate goods. The solidarity exchange (SoX) is similar in that it 
would be a market for financial investment in goods, but in this 
case these are public goods. This market would operate through 
questions in the People’s Forum poll where citizens may pledge 
to pay, or request to cease to pay, for specific public goods — if 
most other citizens make similar contributions. Over a sequence 
of polling events, these pledges and requests may develop into 
strong trends that become seen as instructions to politicians to 
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purchase or liquidate public goods, as discussed in §7.2.6 and 
§7.2.11 below. The solidarity exchange would thereby address 
the crucial problem that many thousands or millions of citizens 
must be able to negotiate easily with each other on how much 
they will pay for important public goods that cannot be provid-
ed unless each makes a financial contribution. Action on global 
warming poses this type of problem, for whether the concern of 
people around the world creates an effective response depends 
on highly developed capacities for collective action, both within 
nations and between nations. Before describing the proposed 
structure of the solidarity exchange, circumstances affecting 
collective action are now outlined as a basis for understanding 
why this ‘exchange’ might work. These same circumstances also 
affect the functioning of the People’s Forum as a whole.
Circumstances affecting the possibility of democratic collective ac-
tion. Evolutionary psychology indicates that the fundamental 
preference of humans for group life has given them a social en-
vironment that over several million years has selected the genet-
ically determined predisposition of ‘wary cooperator’ (Hibbing 
and Alford 2004). This means that we are generally ‘willing to 
pay our fair share only assuming others do the same and evad-
ers face swift and certain consequences’ (Alford and Hibbing 
2004, 711). Kevin Smith (2006, 1015, 1013) observes that ‘what 
drives the behavior of wary co-operators is ‘sucker aversion’ … It 
is not just what they get from decisions, but whether they per-
ceive the process of decision-making as fair that leads people 
to view the decisions as legitimate.’ In democracies, confusion 
from ambiguous delegation about who directs the polity may 
help prevent politicians’ directions being seen by all citizens as 
fair. This would evoke sucker aversion in the form of reluctance 
to pay for public goods.
Confusion about directorship is a crucial confusion in com-
munication that prevents collective action. As public commu-
nication scholars Andrew Flanagin, Cynthia Stohl and Bruce 
Bimber (Flanagin et al. 2006, 32) observe: ‘collective action is 
communicative, insofar as it entails efforts by people to cross 
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boundaries by expressing or acting on individual (i.e. private) 
interest in a way that is observable to others (i.e. public).’ They 
note that ‘formal organization is central to locating and contact-
ing potential participants in collective action, motivating them 
and coordinating their actions’ (Bimber et al. 2005, 365). How-
ever, this organization often fails in democracies and this is at 
least partly due to the ambiguity of their delegation. The Peo-
ple’s Forum is designed to rectify this by clarifying the roles of 
electors and their delegate/trustees. This should facilitate com-
munication between electors and also between them and their 
political representatives, so that reciprocity, openness and trust 
are fostered, to assist negotiation of the norms, rules and sanc-
tions for collective action. The solidarity exchange would per-
form the same role, but with a specific focus within the People’s 
Forum. It would assist citizens to act as directors of the polity by 
helping them to decide and state what public goods they want, 
by inviting them to decide and state whether they are prepared 
to pay for them.
Political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) has described such 
assistance by institutions as producing social learning, a ‘learn-
ing by doing’ that can produce social capital. This type of capital 
comprises attitudes and behaviours such as reciprocity, open-
ness and trust, which help societies to function productively. 
Putnam identifies ‘networks of civic engagement’ as an essential 
form of social capital. ‘The denser such networks in a commu-
nity, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate 
for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1993, 173). His conclusions from 
studying institutional reform in modern Italy are that, although 
preexisting social capital conditions the effectiveness of new 
institutions, these innovations may also change social capital 
and political practice through social learning: ‘Formal change 
induced informal change and became self-sustaining’ (Putnam 
1993, 184). A polity’s networks of engagement may be expanded 
by the establishment of a People’s Forum, and the solidarity ex-
change could be a crucial part of this.
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Before the structure of the solidarity exchange is outlined, 
two specific feelings that it is designed to help develop and com-
municate are described: commitment and solidarity.
Objectives for the solidarity exchange: the development of com-
mitment and solidarity. If a liberal democracy is to take strong 
action on an issue that will require a significant cost to be borne 
by most citizens, then they must have what social psychologists 
call a strong ‘commitment’ to taking that action and consider-
able ‘solidarity’ with fellow citizens in such commitment (Fetch-
enhauer et al. 2006). For the solidarity exchange, these two fac-
tors might be defined as follows.
1. Commitment: A citizen’s commitment to a collective action 
is her feeling that the action is worth her paying her share 
of its cost. The measure of commitment might be the indi-
vidual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the action, in terms of 
the percentage of its per capita cost that she offers (via the 
SoX) to pay. This WTP may be in terms of extra income tax or 
higher cost of living (COL).
2. Solidarity: The solidarity of a community on an action is the 
feeling of each of its citizens that the others will support her 
commitment to it. The SoX measure of solidarity on an action 
could be the ratio of the number of SoX votes to pay some-
thing for that action, to the total number of SoX votes (those 
to pay something plus those to pay nothing). This measure 
ignores those who do not vote in the People’s Forum’s SoX 
(which may be a large majority of citizens), but nevertheless 
it may be considered a fair indication if the government will 
not act on it until it has asked all citizens (as discussed be-
low under ‘How the SoX would operate’) whether they ac-
cept that ratio as being a part of an instruction from them 
to government. The other part of that instruction is citizens’ 
‘average commitment’, the mean of all commitments made 
via the SoX, whether they are positive or zero. This second 
part of the instruction would also be tested by government 
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asking all citizens whether it should regard that average com-
mitment as representative.
Commitment and solidarity may be developed in a community 
if they are demonstrated by citizens to each other in a repetitive 
manner that allows them to respond by joining or leaving the 
demonstration or by revising their commitment up or down. By 
facilitating such repetition, the SoX part of the PF poll may help 
citizens build a common resolution to act on difficult issues.
How the SoX would operate. As noted above, average commit-
ment is intended to eventually be interpreted as the commit-
ment of the whole community even though it expresses the 
views of just those who vote in the SoX part of the PF poll. Only 
a minority of electors, let us say, perhaps five to twenty per cent, 
may bother to regularly vote in a People’s Forum poll — and 
much less on any particular issue that it treats in its SoX. How-
ever, after several well-publicized annual votes beyond the stage 
where the voting trend (see §7.2.5 below) for a particular SoX 
question has levelled, the average commitment being registered 
for that question may be taken by the government as accept-
able to those who do not bother to cast a ballot, for the poll is 
voluntary and open to every elector to take part. An average 
commitment that is sufficient to pay for the implementation of a 
policy if paid by all citizens (subject to capacity to pay according 
to personal income) may be tested to see if it is to be accepted as 
an instruction by the people, by the government declaring an 
intention to implement it unless the next PF poll shows a reduc-
tion of this WTP. This intention would heighten the incentive of 
electors to vote in the PF’s SoX, because it may soon influence 
the taxes or prices they pay and whether effective action is taken 
on that issue by the government. 
An indication of the strength of the resolve of the commu-
nity to pay to fix an issue could be given by multiplying average 
commitment with solidarity, to produce a ‘solidarity index’. As 
solidarity may be anywhere from 1 (every SoX voter wants to 
pay something) to 0 (no SoX voter wants to pay), then when it 
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is multiplied by average commitment (the mean fraction of per 
capita cost offered to be paid by each SoX voter) to produce the 
solidarity index, that index will be a figure somewhere between 
1 and 0. A solidarity index for a proposed action that is close to 
1, say 0.7 or 0.8, would indicate a strong desire by SoX voting 
citizens to pay for their government to execute that action. Soli-
darity indices could be publicised by government to warn the 
general public that it is being pressured by the People’s Forum to 
either act or refrain from acting, so that citizens who have been 
disengaged from this process are encouraged to join in and vote 
to strengthen or overturn such pressures. If the hitherto disen-
gaged do not join in, the government may assume that they are 
happy with the existing pressures and expect government to act 
accordingly.
The operation of the SoX may be considered to comprise 
three stages. Two lie within the People’s Forum process, the first 
of these being the questions in the poll that ask voters to ex-
press their WTP for the implementation of particular policies, 
together with the responses of PF voters. These questions would 
state the approximate costs to each citizen of implementing a 
range of policies on an issue (if all taxpayers paid an income-
proportional contribution) and invite each voter to pledge some 
commitment to the one they prefer. The hard copy ballot paper 
would include a table entitled ‘CHECK YOUR OFFER!’ where vot-
ers should enter each pledge that they make to pay more, either 
in tax or in cost of living. This is to help them add up their SoX 
pledges so they can see their total commitment to pay, before 
they lodge their vote. That addition would be done automatical-
ly by the website ballot paper, which would display it to prompt 
voters to check for over-commitment on SoX questions before 
they submit their vote.
The second stage of the SoX is the post-poll analysis, publica-
tion and public discussion of the answers to the WTP questions. 
The analysis would summarize the answers in terms of average 
commitments, solidarities and solidarity indices. Its publication 
would invite citizens to reconsider what they really want to pay 
for. This analysis, publication and discussion would occur be-
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tween the annual polls leading up to the situation where the po-
litical pressure of SoX voting trends is about to make politicians 
take appropriate action.
The third stage lies outside the People’s Forum and it is the 
response by politicians to solidarity indices. Those indices that 
show citizens sustaining demands that they pay for specific 
policies to be executed will request or command politicians to 
organize this, by increasing taxes and/or cutting back other gov-
ernment programs and/or introducing appropriate policies that 
raise prices (such as a tax on carbon emissions). To help citizens 
ensure that they make pledges they can afford, the SoX would 
present a comprehensive menu of policy costs covering, in very 
broad terms, programs currently implemented by government 
as well as the additional costs of the public goods canvassed by 
the People’s Forum. These costs (including those of existing pro-
grams) would be expressed as percentages of either the citizen’s 
annual income before tax, or COL. If voters want to pay less than 
they currently do, they register this by voting for reductions in 
government expenditure on existing programs and voting zero 
WTP on SoX questions. Negative commitments on WTP ques-
tions would not be recognized by the SoX but may be interpret-
ed as zero WTP. This system should enable electors to vote for 
funding transfers from existing programs to new ones presented 
by SoX questions.
7.2.5 Function 4
Indicating when the people have reached a stable set of views on 
an issue after extensive public discussion and voting.
e4 repetition. Repetition of the vote by the People’s Forum 
would allow the plotting of trends in the opinions it registers, 
as noted above at the end of §6.1.2. The issues on which these 
trends show no change over the last few voting events can be 
considered to be those on which the public has made up its 
mind after the process has given it considerable opportunity to 
evolve and vote for different views. At this point, either a degree 
of consensus has been reached or the people have in some sense 
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agreed to differ, so there may be an acceptance that the majority 
could have its way. This could be tested as described below in 
§7.2.9, and if this leads to political implementation of the views 
expressed in the PF poll on that issue, then it may be taken out 
of the poll.
7.2.6 Function 5
Developing a strong political influence for the public opinion ex-
pressed in People’s Forum polls.
e4 repetition. The repetition of the People’s Forum vote is to be 
a regular event that is very public and gives sustained exposure 
to the opinion it reflects. After a year or two the public profile of 
the poll should start to focus widespread attention on the issues 
it covers, not only in the weeks before the poll, but throughout 
the year. Public awareness that these particular issues are voted 
on year after year should make them and the specific questions 
posed by the poll, ongoing subjects of attention by the media, 
schools, universities, interest groups, legislators, political candi-
dates and the public at large. As people see the event recurring, 
more may be stimulated to argue, discuss, read, think and vote. 
The resultant public profile of the poll and the numbers voting 
in it will do much to give it political influence.
e5 trends. As noted above under §7.2.5, repetition of the vote 
allows the poll to show trends in the development of opinion. 
The managers of the People’s Forum would publicize these 
trends before each poll, during those events and in the publica-
tion of their results. Trends that run against existing policies or 
laws, or urge new ones, should apply a degree of public pres-
sure on politicians to make the changes these trends advocate, 
as discussed below under ‘E3 Voluntary voting’. Such pressure 
may excite more voter participation, which may then gener-
ate more political influence, more discussion of the issues and 
greater public wisdom. Note that a People’s Forum majority vote 
is likely to be a small minority of the electorate. ‘E3 Voluntary 
voting’ below gives reasons to anticipate that the views of ma-
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jorities within this small minority may develop public status and 
political power that far exceeds their weight as a proportion of 
the whole electorate.
The suggestion in §7.2.5 that People’s Forum trends will de-
velop collective agreements to act receives some support from a 
comparison with juries.
Some juries are described as ‘evidence driven’ while others are ‘ver-
dict driven’. In the verdict driven juries many votes tend to be taken 
while in evidence driven juries discussion is less focused on closure, 
and more on the spirit of airing all the facts, while holding off a de-
cision. Evidence driven juries try not to discuss conclusions. In both 
cases, of course, a vote is taken at the end of the deliberative process. 
What is interesting is that in interviews and in polling after jury 
duty, participants in evidence driven juries had a stronger sense of 
satisfaction with the process, the verdict, and the reasonableness of 
their fellow jurors … the process was perceived as more legitimate 
and they had a stronger sense of efficacy, that is, that they as indi-
viduals had made an important contribution to the process and that 
they were actually listened to. (Chambers 2001, 248)
Conventional referendums are similar to verdict driven juries 
in that they produce one vote, the verdict. People’s Forums are 
more like evidence driven juries as they have a regular sequence 
of votes that are not verdicts but merely registrations of the pro-
gress of a public discussion or debate. On this basis, we might 
expect the Forum to develop more legitimacy and efficacy than 
current forms of referenda.
e6 feedback. Stringing the voting period out over a week as 
described under E6 in §7.2.2 should accentuate the public profile 
of the Forum and thus enhance its political influence. The an-
nual repetition of People’s Forum polls would do this as well and 
also enable the people to see what they as a society think, and 
to some extent why they think that way (see E13 in §7.2.2). This 
invites them to argue and discuss again before voting next year 
and so on, continuing such feedback until it becomes obvious to 
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all that a majority view has developed that is stable in the face 
of, and as a result of, all the argument and information that can 
be mustered. As noted in §7.2.5, this should generate agreement 
by the majority and minorities on any issue that they differ and 
that they all accept that the majority can have its way.
e3 voluntary voting.
Power to those who are interested enough to vote. It has been 
argued (see §6.3.4) that the management of public affairs should 
follow the views of those who are interested in the issues. This 
provides a basis for the People’s Forum to acquire public sta-
tus and political influence, as its voluntary, self-selective voting 
should ensure that it registers only the views of those who are 
interested in the issues it treats. Their interests will have stim-
ulated many of these voters to develop their knowledge and 
opinions on the issues they specialize in. But as noted in §6.3.4, 
voter interest in issues also means that People’s Forum voters 
will include dogmatists as well as questioning thinkers. Both 
types should be drawn into exchanges of views by the polling 
process, and the questions it poses would be designed to use this 
interaction to try to develop more reasoning and negotiation, 
as discussed above under §7.2.2 (e.g. E11, E12, E13). These effects 
should lead the public to recognize that People’s Forum poll 
results reflect more considered judgement than conventional 
opinion polls, so that the public learns to grant more status to 
the Forum than to opinion polls despite (and even because of) 
the fact that the Forum represents the views of only a fraction of 
the population. Sustained exposure to Forum polls may there-
fore encourage citizens in general to demand strong responses 
by politicians to Forum results, even if only a low proportion 
of the public votes in these polls. Although the mass public has 
very low levels of political information, with only perhaps ten 
per cent of the population having much political sophistication 
(see §2.2.3), citizens try to compensate for their ignorance by 
using heuristics for political judgments (e.g. Lupia 1994, Zaller 
1992). This suggests that the People’s Forum might perform as 
a heuristic that helps to guide citizens’ votes at elections, espe-
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cially if PF managers and political commentators publicly com-
pare PF trends with candidates’ policies. Some of this should be 
done with ‘report cards’, as discussed in E16 below. Such heuris-
tics may replace those currently provided by political parties, 
especially as citizens have now become political consumers who 
shop around, frustrated by the sameness of parties that try to 
appeal to the mainstream voter (Economist 2015a, 21). 
High status and influence for this poll would also be sup-
ported by a public awareness that its voluntary voting allows 
any elector to participate. After the introduction of a People’s 
Forum poll it should soon become common knowledge that if 
bystanders become alarmed at the way that concerned opinion 
is evolving and expressed through this process, they can decide 
it is time that they became concerned and voted in the next poll, 
or even in the current one if it is still open.
Leading edge . Because the voluntary vote of the People’s Forum 
will reflect the views of those who are interested in the issues, it 
is likely to indicate what the views of the majority of the whole 
population will be on those issues in the future, if and when 
most citizens take an interest in them. Such growth of interest 
in issues may be accelerated by the publicity generated by the 
People’s Forum. Politicians will be sensitive to any such ‘leading 
edge’ indication by this poll because many of them want to be 
seen to be providing ‘leadership’ (leadership is discussed in §2.2, 
§2.2.1, §2.2.2, §2.2.4, §2.2.8 and §2.7).
e16 report cards: people’s forum ratings for politicians. The 
managers of the People’s Forum would publish ‘report cards’ 
similar to those proposed by the Director of Democratic Audit, 
Stuart Weir (2004), to help citizens monitor the performance 
and attitudes of political candidates and members of the execu-
tive and the legislature. A prominent section of each card would 
be the degree to which the subject’s views conform to People’s 
Forum voting trends. As indicated above (under E3), those 
trends are likely to show the most informed and considered 
views of the community on the issues it deals with, and will thus 
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indicate to politicians the views they should espouse in order 
to represent the people in the most responsible way. If electors 
develop an appreciation of this, the report card would become 
a highly regarded guide for their vote at the next election, giv-
ing the poll more political clout. In addition to helping establish 
the Forum as a heuristic, such report cards should also promote 
community-wide deliberation by helping to focus attention on 
the Forum’s questions.
7.2.7 Function 6
Developing political influence as or after, but not before, opinion 
develops into a stable public judgment.
e17 advisory influence. People’s Forum results would not be 
binding on legislatures, merely advisory. They would exert the 
pressure of concerned public opinion for new laws and policies 
reflecting the trends in concerned opinion that have been estab-
lished by successive polls.
e3 voluntary voting. Voluntary voting means that People’s 
Forum results will reflect the views of only a part of the elec-
torate. This may make politicians in the few countries such as 
Australia, where the whole electorate is compelled to elect rep-
resentatives, slow to alter their current laws and policies in order 
to follow People’s Forum results. In countries where voting for 
representatives is voluntary, the Forum may exert political influ-
ence more quickly because those who are concerned enough to 
vote in its polls may also be those who vote in elections.
e5 trends. Politicians would be likely to wait for trends in the 
People’s Forum to establish, or to establish and then level off to 
a flat line, rather than react immediately to a poll result only to 
become known for outdated views after a few more polls. They 
will want to wait to see if there is any reversal of trends, as dis-
cussed in §7.2.9 below.
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7.2.8 Function 7
Reserving political influence on issues dealt with by the Forum 
for those who have thought about these issues (the meritocracy 
principle).
e3 voluntary voting. In §7.2.6 above it is indicated that po-
litical influence is likely to be generated for the opinion regis-
tered by People’s Forum polls. As the voting that expresses this 
opinion is voluntary, it will tend not to register the opinions of 
those who are disengaged and give little thought to the issues 
that the Forum treats. The People’s Forum will therefore tend to 
give political influence to those who have thought about those 
issues. These people are likely to include dogmatic types as well 
as citizens with more carefully considered opinions, but the 
involvement of dogmatists may stimulate them to think more 
constructively as discussed in §7.2.6 (E3 ‘Power to those who are 
interested enough to vote’).
7.2.9 Function 8
Inviting the public to review its opinion on an issue, as expressed 
in People’s Forum polls, before the political influence of these polls 
causes that opinion to be expressed as policy or law.
e18 executive review. As a People’s Forum is run, electors who 
have not voted in its polls may become worried that politicians 
will introduce new policies or laws to reflect the Forum’s polling 
trends. This prospect may also cause previous voters to change 
their minds. Politicians will therefore warn the electorate of 
their intention to act if the trends are not reversed at the next 
poll. With an eye to future votes, they will want electors to ap-
prove their actions.
7.2.10 Function 9
Minimizing the ability of powerful narrow interests to distort the 




Wealthy interests may seek to manipulate public opinion in 
many ways, such as by funding biased media programs and 
movies, by dictating editorial policy via ownership of media, by 
advertising, by supporting selected scholars, activist individuals 
and groups, by deterring activists through strategic litigations 
against public participation (SLAPPs), by funding political elec-
toral campaigns, by lobbying and so on. Such activities com-
promise democratic integrity by corrupting the one person-one 
vote principle, in effect delivering multiple votes to those with 
money who choose to use it in such ways. Graham Smith (2001, 
88) considers this danger to be 
a criticism of the existing practice of initiative and referendum, 
not of their potential … we need to spend more time investigating 
possible ‘imaginative safeguards’ to ensure that information is bal-
anced and that the influence of money and media interests does 
not grow … However, even with … [the existing] imbalance of re-
sources, greens have had success [with initiatives and referenda on 
environmental issues].
Lupia and Matsusaka (2004, 478) support this view by find-
ing that the evidence does not endorse the ‘idea that the initia-
tive allows special interests to subvert the policy process to the 
detriment of the public’. Nevertheless, the more influence that 
the People’s Forum develops, the more attractive a target it will 
become for control by parties with narrow interests. However, 
as explained under E4 below, the transparency of the People’s 
Forum process should mean that as its influence increases, un-
democratic attempts to manipulate it are more likely to be coun-
terproductive for the manipulators.
e4 long-running repetition of issues and questions. The 
long-running nature of the Forum’s process should make ma-
nipulation expensive and also endanger the public image of ma-
nipulators.
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Exhaustion of wealthy manipulators through long-running re-
petitive polling. The People’s Forum process would take several, 
perhaps many years to facilitate and demonstrate the develop-
ment of public opinion on a question. More time may elapse 
before such trends are translated into political action, as indi-
cated by §7.2.7 and §7.2.9. Such time spans would make it very 
expensive to fund a propaganda campaign to sway the views of 
citizens and their responses to the poll.
Exposure of manipulators to public censure through long-running 
repetitive polling. The passage of time as these polls deal with 
each issue would also make any attempt to buy votes on it risky 
for the manipulator, because the public, media and politicians 
will have plenty of opportunity to recognize what is going on. 
When a manipulator’s effort is focused on a question running 
in a People’s Forum poll, the publicity surrounding that effort is 
likely to make it obvious to citizens. The more money the ma-
nipulator spends, the more blatantly undemocratic their activ-
ity will appear to citizens, especially those concerned with the 
issue. As the latter are also those who are likely to vote in the 
poll, big spending by manipulators risks damaging both their 
reputation and their cause. Such situations are also likely to en-
courage citizens to become more discerning about whether the 
information they receive is misleading and also to spur them to 
vote in PF and contribute to the public discourse on the ques-
tions it poses.
Similar risks arise for manipulators whose power to distort 
the poll arises not so much from wealth as from an ability to 
organize and control electors who comprise a significant pro-
portion of the community being polled by PF. Such potential 
organizers may be large corporations with many employees or 
shareholders, unions with many members, or government agen-
cies with many employees. The managers of such groups could 
attempt to influence the vote on People’s Forum questions in 
which they had an interest by encouraging or instructing their 
shareholders or members or employees to vote in the poll with 
the responses the managers want. Such behaviour is likely to be-
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come public knowledge because of (a) anticipation by many cit-
izens that any entity with this organisational ability and vested 
interests in a question on the ballot will be tempted to do it; (b) 
suspicions and protests of citizens with opposing views; (c) poll 
results on that question which appear surprisingly weighted to-
wards these vested interests; and (d) the possibility of evidence 
being found, for example, by whistle-blower disclosure of unfair 
organization of voters by narrow interests. The annual repeti-
tion of the voting event allows time for these factors to provoke 
alarm and for citizens to respond with public criticism and by 
voting in protest against causes promoted by undemocratic ma-
nipulation.
Suspicion or confirmation of this type of activity should 
spark public debate about whether it is excessively self-interest-
ed and thus against the public interest. Such debate could be 
assisted if the People’s Forum added another question to those 
dealing with an issue that evokes an undemocratically manipu-
lated vote. This could ask voters whether they considered that 
responses to the questions on this issue were being unduly in-
fluenced by narrow interests acting against the public interest. 
Any controversy over such a question would focus more public 
attention on the issue in the ballot that is stimulating it, draw-
ing in electors who are not necessarily interested in that issue 
but want to vote on the problem of manipulation of democracy. 
The managers of the People’s Forum should continue to run the 
questions generating this ‘manipulation’ debate until it has been 
cleared up. If the dispute over manipulation drags on without 
showing signs of resolution, all the questions at stake may have 
to be deleted from the ballot. If the controversy is resolved, the 
question on undemocratic manipulation would be dropped, 
leaving the questions on the issue itself to be run through more 
polls until they had developed stable votes indicating that public 
deliberations on them had run their course.
The outcome of extended public debate and voting on wheth-
er votes organized by vested interests are excessively self-inter-
ested may depend on whether the government has procedures 
in place to compensate those who would suffer loss because of 
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new laws and policies. This is crucial for democracy, because 
providing public goods at unjust cost to individuals and minori-
ties is likely to damage the image of the public interest and the 
legitimacy of the relevant government. 
e19 defence against manipulation of opinion and voting. If 
manipulation by powerful self-interested entities is not stopped 
by financial exhaustion, nor by exposure to ethical judgment 
by citizens, the credibility of the People’s Forum may suffer as 
the one-person one-vote fairness of its voting becomes suspect. 
How much damage such suspicion does to the reputation of the 
Forum may depend on whether the questions on its ballot that 
are subject to this manipulation can be identified, so that they 
are protected as suggested above, or abandoned as being likely 
to generate undemocratically distorted results. A backup proce-
dure for preventing such damage to the Forum is that it could 
run questions specifically on the issue of powerful narrow in-
terests manipulating the opinions and voting of the public. This 
would be done by placing that issue on the ballot paper without 
waiting for signs of manipulation and reacting to them as rec-
ommended above under E4. 
One target for such inquisition that is given little attention 
above is the media. The political power of the media differs from 
that of narrow interests that are either wealthy or can directly 
organize and control large numbers of voters in that it comes 
from incessant communication to the public. As free and di-
verse media are essential for informed and well-developed pub-
lic opinion, free-to-air television and radio sponsored by the 
state and thereby independent of commercial imperatives are 
vital parts of the operating environment for the People’s Forum. 
The Forum’s managers should have their ballot paper suggest 
laws or policies designed to prevent manipulation of public 
opinion by all types of powerful narrow interests, not least the 
media. As indicated above, such suggestion must be done at the 
inception of a Forum’s polls, not only for their protection but for 
the protection of democracy itself. One possibility here is for the 
Forum to question whether it should be illegal for commercial 
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interests to make public statements on, or to advertise views on, 
or to pay others to state views on, any issue in which they have 
a pecuniary interest. Such law should help prevent commercial 
interests using their financial muscle to exert unfair and mis-
leading influence on public opinion and legislators — as we have 
seen from the tobacco industry on lung cancer and from the 
fossil fuel industry on climate change. 
If a People’s Forum in the USA ran such questions on restrict-
ing the activities of vested interests it would, to some extent, be 
reviewing the 2010 finding by the US Supreme Court in Citizens 
United v Federal Election Commission, which held that the First 
Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits the government 
not only from restricting political expenditures by nonprofit 
organizations, but also those by for-profit organizations, labour 
unions and other organizations. That determination concerned 
expenditures on campaigning for candidates and parties within 
30 days of a primary election and within 60 days of a general 
election, but the action for the People’s Forum suggested here 
is concerned with public discussion and campaigning on issues 
rather than on candidates and parties, and it would be about 
a continual prohibition of public argument by vested interests 
rather than about such prohibition only in the month or two 
before elections. The idea here is to follow two principles stated 
in §2.1: (1) that the sole purpose of government is to choose and 
implement an optimal provision of public goods; and (2) public 
goods are often in mortal competition with private goods. Citi-
zens with vested interests in private goods are very likely to be 
biased towards these and often have financial muscle they can 
use to persuade others to accept their bias. In the interests of 
productively deliberative democracy, they should be restrained 
from such activity so that all citizens are free to debate, discuss 
and decide the issue without distortion by powerful private in-
terests. 
7.2.11 Function 10
Developing the political will for difficult political decisions to be 
executed.
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e20 incentives for public participation. The People’s Forum 
should increase the political will to both recognize issues and 
act on them, for it would help citizens participate more directly 
in the policy formation process. It would enable them to more 
actively determine what issues are seen as important and what 
they, through their government, will do about them. Wide-
spread distrust of politicians, as discussed above in Chapter 1, in 
§2.2.1, §2.3.2 and in §3.2, should motivate many citizens to take 
the opportunity offered by the Forum, to issue public instruc-
tions to them. Although these directives would be nonbinding 
in a direct sense, citizens will be motivated to issue them (by 
voting in PF) for both expressive satisfaction and to take advan-
tage of the possibility that they may eventually become binding, 
as discussed above in §7.2.6.
e4 repetition of the poll. The ongoing operation of the Peo-
ple’s Forum would allow it to monitor — and apply pressure 
for — the implementation of the policy changes that it effects. 
Lupia and Matsusaka (2004, 476) observe that currently, diffi-
culty with such implementation arises because 
the same governmental actors who once blocked the policies from 
proceeding through traditional legislative channels may be in a po-
sition to influence, or even determine, the extent of their post-elec-
tion implementation and enforcement … Organizations that pass 
initiatives … often disband soon after the election … Compared 
with professional legislatures, such entities are in a relatively bad 
position to oversee those charged with implementing their edicts.
7.2.12 Function 11
Offering a capacity for citizens to initiate and run the poll without 
government assistance and funding, if these are difficult to obtain.
As is discussed later in §9.3, the Forum is not amenable to 
starting up as a small, inexpensive, very local project and then 
expanding it. This is because a large operation that covers a 
province, state or nation is needed to create the strong politi-
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cal impact required to stimulate public interest and deliberation 
on the issues that PF would focus on. Publics of large size usu-
ally have much more power to determine their long-term future 
than small ones, so it would only be People’s Forums run at large 
scales that offer the prospect of strategic influence to those eli-
gible to participate in them. As the People’s Forum is designed 
to develop strategic policy, running it at a small local scale risks 
making it appear irrelevant and impotent. This requirement of 
large scale for the People’s Forum makes it difficult for citizens 
to initiate and test it. However, as noted under E3 / E17 below and 
discussed above in §6.2.3, this is basically a financial problem 
that is probably easier to solve than that of raising the political 
will to have government introduce and run the system.
e3 voluntary voting, e17 advisory influence. As voluntary, 
advisory voting does not compel voting and the implementation 
of results, it allows the People’s Forum to be run by a private 
organisation if government will not run it as a service to the 
public. Voluntary, self-selecting voting also facilitates its opera-
tion on a large scale.
e7 accessibility. Polling by telephone and the internet makes 
voting highly accessible to citizens. It also facilitates fast tallying 
by computer and minimizes cost. As noted under E7 in §7.2.2, 
the virtually extinct ‘digital divide’ should not restrict accessibil-
ity.
e21 funding. Possible sources of finance for this system are 
discussed above in §6.4. The economy of operation noted above 
under E7 support the feasibility of raising funds for a demon-
stration poll covering a substantial region such as a province, 
state or even a nation. This may have to initially use low or negli-
gible voting security as discussed under E22 in §7.2.13 below, and 
be restricted to online ballot presentation and voting, without 
backup with hard-copy ballot papers.
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7.2.13 Function 12
The Forum develops the confidence of the people in the People’s 
Forum as a political institution, so that they and their representa-
tives will maintain it and use it. This includes a capacity for the 
public to set or supervise the agenda.
The People’s Forum should be attractive to many citizens, for 
there is growing interest in new democratic processes. As War-
ren observes, 
people in the developed democracies have become disaffected from 
their political institutions. They are now less likely to trust their 
governments and more likely to judge them incompetent, untrust-
worthy, and even corrupt. While the causes and meanings of these 
trends have been subject to considerable study and debate, it seems 
that disaffection reflects not apathy but increasingly critical evalua-
tions of government … increasing disaffection from formal political 
institutions seems to be paralleled by increasing attention toward 
other ways and means of getting collective things done … The most 
dramatic developments over the past couple of decades include the 
rise in power of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the in-
ternational arena and the dramatic increase in associations devoted 
to problems of collective action that replace, displace, or work in 
concert with state powers. (2002b, 681–82, emphasis in original)
The same concerns of citizens are also noted by Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2001) as being a major cause of Americans’ dis-
like of government. However, instead of referring to it as disaf-
fection with ‘institutions’, they refer to it as a ‘procedural’ prob-
lem.
[W]e do believe that the research contained here, on balance, favors 
procedural rather than policy explanations for Americans’ dissatis-
faction with government … Moreover, public negativity is unlikely 
to be corrected by attempts to facilitate public involvement in the 
political process. Rather, the best strategy for improving public at-
titudes toward government is to enact reforms that would make it 
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difficult or impossible for decision makers to feather their own nests 
by virtue of the decisions they render. (2001, 250)
As the People’s Forum offers transparency and also sensitivity to 
public reaction, its deployment as a part of the policy-making 
apparatus should allow citizens to make it more difficult ‘for 
decision makers to feather their own nests by virtue of the deci-
sions they render.’ If citizens cannot do this, for example by in-
sisting on better laws against such corruption, by voting against 
politicians with excessively narrow policies and by directing 
strategic policy, then who will? Although the Forum appears to 
contravene Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s advice to avoid relying 
on public involvement in politics, that contravention is more 
apparent than real, as much involvement via the Forum is ‘at 
arm’s length’, being merely an annual vote that is made in private 
without face-to-face political discussion or disputation. In addi-
tion, those who actively participate in the Forum by voting on 
or arguing about its questions may be only a very small part of 
the population, while the results of that vote may provide heu-
ristic guidance for the rest, who might promote those results by 
voting for political candidates who support them.
e3 voluntary voting. If the People’s Forum is to succeed, its 
selection of issues, questions and menus of answers must be 
seen by the community to be relevant, comprehensive and com-
petent. If citizens see or suspect shortcomings, they are unlikely 
to participate. Voluntary voting therefore confers an easily ex-
ercised power of boycott on citizens, and this will oblige poll 
managers to invite suggestions from them on the selection of is-
sues, questions and menus of answers, as discussed in E2 below. 
This invitation would be a prominent, permanent feature of the 
ballot paper.
e2 agenda contributions from citizens. In response to re-
quests from citizens for issues and questions on the ballot pa-
per to be altered or deleted, or for new ones to be added, the 
managers would publish a list of the requests they have received 
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since the previous poll. This would note whether each request 
has been acceded to and if not, why not. The reasons given for 
refusing requests, together with any ensuing public controver-
sy, should contribute to the deliberation of issues by the pub-
lic. Such capacity for the public to have a continuing influence 
on the agenda conforms to the recommendation by Chambers 
(2001, 251) that questions should be chosen and framed as an 
iterative, nonbinding process that makes referendums ‘part of 
an ongoing process of consultation rather than a once-and-for-
all ratification.’
As discussed below under E10, the agenda may be of inde-
terminate length, so any agenda suggestions could be accepted 
by the Forum to produce what might be called a ‘wikiagenda’, 
after the manner of compilation of Wikipedia. However, this is 
unlikely to produce a high-quality ballot paper without strong 
control by the managers of the Forum, including their insertion 
of many issues and questions and editing to eliminate any du-
plication and overlap in issues, together with questions that may 
cause confusion. Their judgement would be needed to ensure 
that the issues placed on the ballot are long-running and prefer-
ably of high public significance either on their own or because 
of their relationships to other issues on the ballot. The managers 
must also ensure that the most crucial questions are posed (see 
e.g. §7.2.2 E11, E12, E13), including questions aimed at systemic 
solutions rather than solely at the treatment of symptoms. They 
would also make sure that references are given in issue descrip-
tions and questions, to other issues or questions in the paper 
that are related to them. The description of each issue also re-
quires editorial supervision to minimize bias and to make sure 
that crucial aspects are covered. For such reasons, the published 
agenda must be the responsibility of the managers, but the vol-
untary voting of the Forum ultimately transfers this responsibil-
ity to the public, for they will see what the managers present and 
may pass judgement on this by voting in the poll, or by boycott-
ing it, or by publicly voicing their approval or disapproval of the 
management of the Forum.
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An alternative to relying on the poll managers to write the 
agenda might be a government regulation that requires the Fo-
rum to run issues and questions that are requested by the public 
through a minimum number of signatures on a petition, as is 
done with citizen-initiated referenda. This is not recommended, 
as it should not be necessary, it requires the government to assist 
the Forum, and it would be time-consuming and expensive for 
citizens. The cost of collecting signatures to place one measure 
on a citizen-initiated referendum in California has now risen to 
over US$1 million (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).
As the Forum’s ballot paper would require voters to give their 
personal response to pre-prepared questions, it restricts their 
creativity in devising solutions to policy problems by compari-
son with deliberative processes, such as consensus conferences 
and citizen juries, in which the whole group discusses an issue 
and devises a joint response (G. Smith 2009, 100). However, this 
constraint should be countered by a prominent invitation at the 
head of the ballot paper for citizens to make suggestions for its 
revision. One effect of this might be that new questions are in-
troduced to the ballot, implying solutions different from those 
suggested by its previous questions.
e10 wide-ranging menu. An extensive ballot paper that covers 
the widest range of important long-running issues would maxi-
mize the number of citizens who could find within it issues of 
concern to them and who may therefore engage with the poll. 
The size of this menu should not be intimidating to citizens be-
cause, as with using dictionaries, telephone directories and the 
internet, people will see that size is helpful rather than a prob-
lem, for it means they are more likely to find that the ballot in-
cludes issues on which they want to have a say.
An extensive ballot paper will not make large demands on 
the time of citizens, for they can only vote once a year in a PF 
poll, and when they do, they would only vote on those issues in 
which they are interested. They will be assisted to find these in 
several ways: by grouping related topics under headings (such 
as International Relations, Population, Natural Resources and 
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the Environment, The Economy, and Ethics or Value Systems); 
by showing headings and specific topics in a table of contents; 
by listing issues in an index; and by providing a search engine in 
the web-based ballot paper. The act of voting should only take 
an hour or two at home, and probably less when the voter be-
comes familiar with the ballot paper and more expert with the 
set of issues that he or she wants to vote on.
Another demand on the time of citizens is noted by Beetham 
(1999, 8): ‘It takes time to grasp and discuss the complex issues 
involved in public decision-making, and there is only so much 
time that people will agree to devote to it.’ The People’s Forum 
provides economy of time by not requiring citizens to attend 
deliberation events, either in person or online. However, as PF 
would provide an easy, quick and a potentially slightly influen-
tial way for each citizen to express political views, it may en-
courage them to spend more of their free time reading about, 
observing, discussing and thinking about issues. As part of this 
activity, they may join deliberative groups such as study circles.
The length of the ballot paper will be determined by how 
much editorial and associated work the Forum’s management 
team can handle, and this includes responding to requests from 
citizens and groups for changes to the menus of issues, ques-
tions and answers. As the years of polling pass, the staff of a 
Forum should be able to extend the length of its ballot paper.
e15 competition. Competition between two different People’s 
Forums may assist with creative approaches to the menus of is-
sues, questions and answers that are presented to citizens, and 
this would maximize their choices of issues and questions and 
their interest in this system. However, as indicated above in this 
section under E3, E2 and E10, public scrutiny and good manage-
ment should make this unnecessary.
e20 incentives for public participation. People may be moti-
vated to use the People’s Forum (by voting in its polls and by 
arguing to get others to vote in support of their ideas) through 
both egoistic and solidary interests. Egoism will incline them to 
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try to get their preferences to dominate the results in order to 
take advantage of any political influence that is developed by the 
Forum. The solidary, or cooperative and altruistic motivation 
(e.g. Alford and Hibbing 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Or-
bell et al. 2004), would be to raise the profile of important public 
issues in order to promote public discourse that both develops 
and helps to execute wiser public policy. As the Forum would 
give each citizen the prospect of having slightly more power to 
express and implement their opinions (at a very low personal 
cost in effort and time, as noted in E10 above) it should stimulate 
some citizens to further develop their opinions on public affairs, 
and in turn this may increase the demand for accurate infor-
mation. An additional incentive for these egoistic and solidary 
responses is, as noted in §7.2.11 e20, that widespread distrust of 
politicians and conventional political processes should drive 
some citizens to take the opportunity offered by the Forum to 
attempt to publicly and regularly issue instructions to them. 
In order to enhance the public credibility and thus the force of 
their instructions, some citizens may become motivated to learn 
more about the issues they vote on.
Bennett (2006) emphasizes the importance of cognitive abil-
ity, motivation and opportunity in determining the level of po-
litical information possessed by citizens. This makes good or-
ganization and communication essential, because organization 
produces both motivation (Bimber et al. 2005) and opportunity, 
while communication motivates by developing both trust and 
incentives of purposive, expressive and solidary types. The intro-
duction of PF into a democracy should significantly strengthen 
its organization and communication. Bennett (2006) considers 
nothing can be done about deficits in cognitive ability, but the 
People’s Forum’s meritocratic function (§7.2.6 and §7.2.8) aims 
to circumvent much of this problem by allowing many people 
with these deficits to be bypassed, by facilitating the political 
influence of those who are thinking about public issues. The Fo-
rum’s design assumes that many of those engaged citizens will 
have high cognitive ability.
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e22 voting security. Some degree of voting security is essen-
tial if citizens are to have confidence in the Forum as an institu-
tion that assists governments to function. Security is provided 
by several conditions: That only those people who are eligible to 
vote do so; that they each have only one vote per polling event 
(one vote may comprise answers to any number of questions 
on any number of the issues on the ballot); that their privacy is 
protected; that their votes are tallied without corruption; and 
possibly other facilities, such as a voter being able to revise her 
vote before the final tally and being able to discover if her vote 
was omitted or miscounted and then to be able to correct this 
(Schneier 1996, 125). A security system should permit easy ac-
cess for voting and preferably the freedom for the poll to operate 
without interference by government. Ease of access ideally in-
cludes the opportunity for electors to vote on impulse, without 
prior registration, as discussed in §6.1.3. In Australia, impulse 
voting with some security requires the electoral roll to be used 
as votes are cast, in order to check whether each voter is eligi-
ble and to ensure that they only vote once. High security will 
not cater for voting on impulse as it requires the voter to first 
contact the Forum’s central tabulating facility (CTF) to register 
and be allocated an identification number. The voter may then 
vote, quoting that number and attaching a personally selected 
two-part code. When the CTF publishes her vote with the first 
part of the code she may confirm it by attaching the second part 
and returning it to the CTF (Schneier 1996, 129). This procedure 
allows errors in tabulation to be corrected by the voter and also 
permits her to alter her vote, but its complexity may discourage 
engagement if it were used by the People’s Forum. As this poll is 
not an election but only registers non-decisive opinions, a sim-
pler lower-security approach should be adequate.
To enable impulse voting in countries where citizens do not 
have a personal identification number (PIN) that locates them 
on an electoral roll, the People’s Forum security system must 
personally deliver a PIN to every eligible voter before the poll, 
or the ballot paper must instruct the voter how to devise his or 
her own PIN, so that the tally computer can use it to locate the 
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voter’s name on the roll. The latter type of PIN might be name 
and date of birth, converted by the voter into a number code if 
this is needed for telephone voting. Both types of PIN require 
the cooperation of the government for the use of its electoral 
roll, and this may not be forthcoming. If a government chose to 
assist in this way it could either (a) license the polling company 
to use the electronic form of the roll to identify eligible voters 
in order to check the validity of incoming electronic votes, or 
(b) authorize its (government) electoral department to be con-
tracted by the People’s Forum to validate incoming electronic 
votes and then transmit them to the Forum’s CTF for tallying, 
classified as either fraudulent or valid. In Australia, use of the 
electoral roll by either option (a) or (b) requires the government 
to approve the Forum as one of the few organisations that is per-
mitted to utilize the electoral roll, and this may not be possible 
until a demonstration People’s Forum poll is carried out to raise 
public and political awareness of its potential.
Where a demonstration of the People’s Forum does not have 
the support of the government, it must be cheap enough for the 
necessary funds to be raised by citizens, and it must proceed 
without checking each voter’s eligibility against the electoral 
roll. These conditions present two options for the demonstra-
tion, both of which would use a web-based ballot paper. The 
first is to essentially dispense with voting security and perhaps 
merely require that voters give their name and address before 
being permitted to vote. This insecure way of demonstrating 
the People’s Forum may be sufficient to gain public comprehen-
sion and support. Public confidence in the validity of the results 
of the initial demonstration polls may be much less important 
than citizens using the system or seeing it operate, to get a feel 
for its potential. The second option gives a slight degree of vot-
ing security and has citizens either registering before the poll or 
using a credit card to identify themselves if they choose to vote 
on impulse. To register, a citizen would ask (by phone, website 
or email) PF to allocate them a PIN and send it to their postal or 
email address. In the case of postal delivery, registration may 
have to close a few days before the close of the poll to allow the 
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PIN to arrive in time for a vote to be cast. Citizens who do not 
register before the poll may vote on impulse during the week 
that it is open by prefacing their telephone or internet vote with 
a credit card payment of a nominal fee, say 1c, to the People’s 
Forum. Successful payment by the bank to the Forum would 
inform it that the name used was authentic, or at least linked to 
the credit card number used. Neither that name nor that card 
number could be used to vote again without the managers of 
the Forum seeing it recur, in which case they would block those 
votes and perhaps the initial one as well, to tally them as fraudu-
lent for a subsequent analysis of which views were falsely rep-
resented by multiple votes. With this procedure, impulse voters 
would pay about 21c to vote (20c for the credit card transac-
tion and 1c for the vote), which is hardly a disincentive. A dem-
onstration of the People’s Forum by either the insecure or the 
slightly secure option may produce pressure from the public 
for its government to assist future operation of this system, by 
public funding and also by allowing voting security to be imple-
mented by making the electoral roll available in either of the two 
ways (a) and (b) suggested above.
The Washington-based International Foundation for Elec-
toral Systems (IFES) provides very useful information on voting 
systems, including the internet-based voting that is now used 
in a number of countries, including Norway, Estonia, France, 
Netherlands, Spain–Barcelona, US–West Virginia, Australia–
New South Wales, Canada–Markham and Switzerland–Geneva. 
Each country, province or city selects a system that suits their 
situation and priorities. However, as IFES is focused on state-
run systems, it does not address the independent polling that 
may be needed to establish the People’s Forum, as discussed 
above. An exception to that qualification is the Estonian digital 
identity card, which has been operating successfully for a dec-
ade in many applications including voting, and which is open 
to ‘non-resident ‘satellite Estonians’, thereby creating a global, 
government-standard digital identity’ (Economist 2014b). This 
may not be convenient enough, as applicants pay a fee of around 
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US$40 to 70 and must provide biometric data and suitable docu-
mentation. 
e17 advisory influence. If the People’s Forum is to earn the 
confidence of the public, it must not incite violent conflict be-
tween citizens as they probe controversial and strongly held be-
liefs. In considering such possibilities, Dryzek (2006, 47) argues 
for ‘partially decoupling the deliberation and decision aspects 
of democracy’ (as discussed above in §7.2.2 E10). The People’s 
Forum does this by producing choices that are not binding on 
government but which would invite the mass public to make 
them so.
7.3 Comments on design element E1 — the ballot 
paper
As the transferability of the People’s Forum to liberal democ-
racies will depend on the receptions that their publics give to 
the ballot paper, a few additional comments on its design and 
potential impact are offered.
A Forum covering a limited jurisdiction such as a state or 
province would not restrict itself to issues managed at this level, 
but would also cover issues of a broader scope, from national to 
global. This is partly to encourage residents to develop prefer-
ences for their state in recognition of the wider context in which 
it operates. It also enables state residents to send messages to 
their national government and perhaps on occasion to the rest 
of the world, as well as to their state government. A Forum that 
is run at a high level of jurisdiction, say nationally in a federa-
tion of states, would use ballot papers that may differ from state 
to state in their treatments of state issues but which posed iden-
tical questions in each state for issues of national and wider con-
cern, as noted in §6.1.4. The ballot paper should include subjects 
that are not normally considered to be issues of public policy, 
such as the way citizens think, the values they hold and whether 
they make choices with self-assurance or defensiveness. Such 
inquiry into the culture would be a vital part of the deliberation 
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that the People’s Forum would try to stimulate among citizens, 
for their culture influences the opinions they hold and therefore 
the policies of their democratic government.
An example of the possible treatment of a subject, or a class 
of issues, by the ballot paper is now given, to help the reader im-
agine how it would try to foster public deliberation on strategic 
issues. This illustration uses the subject of population size and 
shows a possible treatment of this by a ballot paper for the state 
of Tasmania in a national People’s Forum for Australia. The stra-
tegic importance of this subject was discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5, and this long-term focus is addressed by the first three issues 
selected below in this subject (coded PO1, PO2 and PO3). This 
contrasts with practice in Australia, where population size tends 
to be treated with a short- to medium-term emphasis, stress-
ing the impact of migration on unemployment, congestion of 
cities, adequacy of infrastructure, aging of the population and 
the desire of the business lobby for labour and greater domestic 
demand.
The menus of issues and questions given here for this sub-
ject are offered merely as examples and it is, of course, possible 
that wide consultation may produce a different selection that 
addresses the public choice of population size more effectively. 
Questions and answer menus are identified here by codes such 
as Q1, which means question 1 for an issue (such as issue PO1 
in the subject of ‘size of population’, which is given the iden-
tification code PO). A1 is the answer menu for question Q1, A2 
the answer menu for Q2 and so on. The bracketed descriptions 
following Q and sometimes A, such as ‘state’, ‘national’, ‘attitude’, 
‘justification’, ‘implementation’ or ‘willingness to pay’ (see §7.2.2 
E13) may not be displayed on operational ballot papers. The 
menus of answers have a code number to the right of each an-
swer that the voter may select as part of their vote.
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a possible treatment of one class of strategic issues by a 
people’s forum ballot paper for the state of tasmania
PO POPULATION SIZE
PO1: HOW MANY OF US DO WE WANT?
What future population size do you think our governments 
should aim at, for the next century or more, in both Australia 
and the state of Tasmania? Before you commit yourself, you may 
like to examine and explain your thinking by considering and 
answering the questions in PO2 and PO3.
Something you may be concerned with here is the question 
of whether Tasmanians and Australians have the right to choose 
the size of their populations. Should these decisions be made 
by these residents or should they be made by the global com-
munity instead (if this were possible, say, through the UN or a 
future world governing body) or should they not be made at all? 
You can vote on GO4 if you want to express your wishes on the 
desirability and structure of a world government [issue GO4 in 
the subject of Government (GO) is not included in this sample 
of a ballot paper].
Q1 (national, attitude)
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We shouldn’t aim for any particular size of population. We 
should be open to the ebb and flow of migration across the 
planet and to whatever birth rate we happen to have.  8
We should adhere to any population targets for Australia  
which may be determined by the world community, for  
example, under the auspices of the United Nations. 9
Q2 (state, attitude)
For this question, just ignore the problems of changing or 
controlling the size of Tasmania’s population — if we wanted 











We shouldn’t aim for any particular size of population  
within Tasmania but be open to ebb and flow of people  
over the whole nation. 19
Q3 (state, attitude)
If your answer to Q2 expresses a preference for restricting the 
size of Tasmania’s population, either currently or after some 
further growth in the future, do you want Tasmania to secede 
from Australia if that is necessary to achieve this restriction? 
This may be needed if federal policy on population size does 
not restrict the size of the nation’s population — so that the state 
can implement its own population policy, including controlling 





No, Tasmania should not secede. 20
Not sure. 21
Yes, Tasmania should secede if this is necessary to  
restrict its population size. 22 
 
PO2: ARE THE BENEFITS OF POPULATION GROWTH WORTH ITS 
COSTS?
Over the last decade, Australia’s population grew at around 1.2% 
per year. This is the fastest of the developed countries, which 
average 0.3% per year and is the same as the current average 
for the world. In 2007, Australia’s population grew at 1.6%, more 
than half of which (56%) was produced by net migration and 
the rest (44%) by natural increase (Weaver and Weaver 2008). 
A larger population gives benefits such as more people enjoying 
the Australian lifestyle, greater ethnic diversity, more cultural 
development and cultural facilities, bigger domestic markets 
and more intellectual and other human resources for our indus-
trial development and our defence forces.
On the other hand, growth of population incurs economic 
costs. It requires expenditure on expansion of infrastructure 
such as housing, hospitals, schools, roads, factories, power sta-
tions, oil wells, mines and farms in order to maintain the na-
tional level of per capita affluence for more and more people. 
The cost (in terms of human effort, which is largely measured 
by financial expenditure) of the population growth-driven part 
of our expansion of infrastructure and skills has been estimated 
in Australia at 9.6% of GDP (for a 1.4% growth in population per 
year) and in the USA at 12.5% of GDP (for a 1% growth in popu-
lation per year) (Cocks 2012; O’Sullivan 2012; Thurow 1986). 
This means that if we decided not to expand our population, 
we could take approximately an extra month holiday each year 
without being financially poorer for it, or if we prefer, spend that 
10% of our GDP on developing a carbon-neutral economy, or 
boosting foreign aid, or giving more help to disadvantaged Aus-
tralians, or protecting more of our environment, or contributing 
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to the development of a global administration as described in 
GO4 [not included in this sample of a ballot paper] and so on.
There is another type of cost incurred by growth of popula-
tion, and this cannot be measured in monetary terms. As the 
population expands it makes natural resources more scarce. The 
nation’s limited stock of these is shared between more and more 
Australians. Those that are non-renewable deplete more quickly 
as more citizens consume them. Renewables may not be dimin-
ished, but more Australians means smaller shares for each to 
enjoy. Depending on the particular renewable resource, smaller 
shares can result in them being less enjoyable (crowding effects) 
or in being overused and destroyed, despite their potential for 
renewable use. So a growing population diminishes the per cap-
ita availability of natural resources. This not only raises the pric-
es of those that are marketed, but also erodes the quality of those 
that are free (such as biodiversity, wilderness and stocks for fish-
ing and hunting) while making it more feasible to have people 
pay to use them. Some of the natural resources affected in such 
ways are overseas, such as oil reserves and native forests of the 
tropics and North America. Australians are among the world’s 
heaviest per capita consumers of natural resources, including a 
per capita contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sion that is around ninth out of 185 countries (a ranking that 
includes emissions from changes in land use).
Q1 (national; attitude and justification)
In view of the possible costs to both financial and natural re-
sources, of increasing the size of Australia’s population, do you 
think this population growth should be slowed or stopped to 
allow these resources to be used for other purposes? 
A1 (attitude )
I think our population growth rate should be increased. 23
I think our population growth rate should be maintained. 24
Population growth in Australia should be slowed. 25
Population growth in Australia should be halted.  26




I think that population growth incurs financial costs. 28
I do not think that population growth incurs financial costs. 29
I think that population growth makes natural resources more 
scarce. 30
I do not think that population growth makes natural resources 
more scarce. 31
PO3: QUALITY OF LIFE, GLOBAL EQUALITY AND OUR CHOICE 
OF POPULATION SIZE 
Since the early years of colonization, Australians have enjoyed a 
lifestyle largely based on a high per capita availability of natural 
resources. This may be regarded as unfair when compared with 
the situation of people in more heavily populated countries. The 
word ‘lifestyle’ is used here to refer to affluence (or per capita 
income), plus quality of life. The latter comprises all those public 
goods that help to make life pleasant, such as a healthy and in-
teresting environment, a supportive and stimulating culture and 
high standards of social justice and social welfare.
Q1 (national; attitude)
Do you want Australia to maintain (or to achieve and then 
maintain) standards of per capita affluence and quality of life 
that are higher than those in many other countries, because of 
an advantage for Australians of a relative per capita abundance 
of natural resources? Or do you think Australians should elimi-
nate any such privilege in order to share our natural resources 
more equitably with other people around the world, perhaps by 
inviting more of them to migrate here?
A1
Select one of the following four options:
We should try to remain more affluent than the world average 
(also see Q3 below). 32
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We should try to remain more affluent than the world  
average — provided that this affluence is not produced  
by exploiting other nations (also see Q3 below). 33
We should only be as affluent as the world average. 34
We should be less affluent than the world average. 35
Select one of the following three options:
We should try to retain a relatively high quality of life  
(also see Q3 below). 36
We should have just an average (in a global sense)  
quality of life. 37
We should have a quality of life below the world average. 38
Q2 (national; attitude, justification)
Do you think that an important ingredient of both affluence 
and/or high quality of life is a low pressure of population on 
natural resources, in other words, a high per capita abundance 
of land, sea, air and the natural resources (including native wild-
life and vegetation) that go with them?
A2
Yes, for affluence. 39
Yes, for quality of life. 40
No, for affluence. 41
No, for quality of life. 42
Q3 (national; attitude)
Do you think that if we are to maintain living conditions that are 
better than those in many other countries, we will have to main-
tain immigration controls to restrict the inflow of immigrants 
wanting to enjoy these favourable conditions?
A3 
We must restrict immigration to maintain relative affluence. 43
We must restrict immigration to maintain relative  
quality of life. 44
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We do not have to restrict immigration to maintain relative 
affluence. 45
We do not have to restrict immigration to maintain relative 
quality of life. 46
PO4: WHO DO WE WANT TO JOIN US?
Q1 (national; attitude)
If Australia is to continue to accept immigrants, on what basis 
should they be selected?
A1
Select one or more of these answers
No selection criteria. First come, first accepted. 47
Acceptable races and cultures only. 48
Their value to Australia’s economy — accept the wealthy,  
those with skills in short supply, young, healthy,  
English language proficiency …  49
People seeking to avoid economic difficulties. 50
Refugees from acute difficulties, such as persecution,  
disaster or war. 51
Family reunion. 52
Minimize the numbers taken now, to maintain a maximum 
capacity for Australia to take refugees in the longer term,  
for example, if global warming inundates places or causes  
famine by disrupting the Asian monsoon. 53
End of issue treatment example
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8 
likely reaCtionS to the forum
If a People’s Forum was to be run at an operational scale, it may 
well be treated with disdain by many conservatives as it could 
seem to them to be biased towards liberals. This is because the 
Forum would be questioning the status quo to see if change 
might improve things. Although many conservatives may be 
uneasy about this, few liberals will react in that way, because the 
two groups have been found to be consistently distinguished by 
the personality trait of ‘openness to change’ (Haidt 2012, 279; 
Jost 2009; Jost et al. 2003a; Mooney 2012, 96). Science journalist 
Jim Giles (2008, 29) summarizes the research as showing that 
people with high scores in openness to change are almost twice 
as likely to be liberals as conservatives. Openness to change in-
cludes willingness to accept new ideas and new experiences, tol-
erance for ambiguity and lack of closure, regarding change as 
an opportunity rather than a problem, and thinking about the 
world as it might be. Liberals are therefore likely to welcome the 
Forum as a tool for developing and implementing progressive 
policies, while conservatives may be offended by its questions 
and results and therefore repudiate the institution itself. Anoth-
er difference between liberals and conservatives is that the latter 
are more sensitive to perceptions of threat (e.g Haidt 2012, 279; 
Jost et al. 2003a) and thus tend to have greater needs for power 
and security. This is related to resistance to change (Jost 2009, 
134), and both dispositions may be aggravated by the Forum’s 
ballot paper because, in order to indicate why an issue could be 
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important and worth public examination, the paper’s descrip-
tion of it is likely to include evidence of need for change, such 
as surveying the risks involved in ignoring the issue. It might be 
thought that discussing risks will arouse the interest of threat-
sensitive conservatives, but some of them could overreact by 
denying any risk at all and rejecting any forum that discusses 
it. This may feel entirely sensible to them as it also expresses 
their aversion to change. Even if some risks or opportunities 
are crucial for the future wellbeing of society, their coverage by 
the Forum’s selection and descriptions of issues and by its ques-
tions may look like bias to someone who is particularly averse 
to change and threat.
Public dispute is therefore expected to arise over perceptions 
of liberal bias in People’s Forums. Although this may inhibit the 
political influence of Forums by tending to discredit them, it 
may also promote this influence, as any such dispute will focus 
attention on the Forum and the specific questions it poses that 
provoke the dispute. This should encourage citizens to think 
more about the Forum and its questions and to participate by 
debating and voting. The people who run People’s Forums must 
therefore manage controversies over bias by trying to minimize 
and resolve them while also channelling them to contribute en-
ergy towards the execution of the Forum’s two strategies.
As some of the perception of bias in the Forum will arise from 
genetically determined predispositions, it is likely to persist. 
Political scientists John Alford, Caroline Funk and John Hib-
bing (2005) have shown from studies of the political attitudes of 
monozygotic (identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) twins that for 
the conservative–liberal spectrum of attitudes, genotype (or ‘na-
ture’) accounts for about 40% of the variance between individu-
als. Political genetics is now a developing field, and at the time 
of writing had identified twelve genes with variants that might 
incline people towards liberalism or conservatism. Perhaps the 
most definite of these prospects is from the gene DRD4, which is 
involved in regulating levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine 
and has a variant (7R) that is associated with novelty-seeking 
behaviour (Hatemi and McDermott 2012). DRD4–7R is there-
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fore considered to facilitate openness to change. In 2010, James 
Fowler and associates (Settle 2010) found that people with this 
variant who also had a large network of friends in adolescence 
tended to be liberal rather than conservative. Although there are 
no genes specifically for liberalism or conservatism, this study 
was the first to show that a specific gene-environment interac-
tion helps people develop an affinity with one or the other side 
of politics.
8.1 A closer look at the differing reactions of liberals 
and conservatives
Paul Slovic was quoted in §4.1(8) as observing that people ‘do 
their best to hold onto their worldviews’ and that they do so 
because it helps them maintain their personal identities and so-
cial networks. However, as observed above, some world views 
such as the conservative resistance to change and the liberal out-
look of openness to change are facilitated by genotype, and this 
further explains why people ‘do their best to hold onto’ them. 
We should therefore not expect rapid political change from at-
tempts to facilitate public deliberation. Any such change will be 
slow, requiring discourse over many years, and most of it may 
take place in young people as they build and modify their po-
litical preferences — partly by observing the discourse and by 
participating in it.
The difference between conservative and liberal world views 
has been summarized by psychologist John Jost (2009) as com-
prising two core preferences: stability versus change and hier-
archy versus equality, both of which are partially motivated by 
differing needs to manage uncertainty and threat. The first of 
these is conservatives’ preference for the status quo and liberals’ 
openness to change, as discussed above. The second is that con-
servatives tolerate and support inequality (possibly as it is seen 
to be the natural order of things, the status quo) whereas liber-
als want change that reduces inequality. As noted in §4.2.3, the 
passive and sometimes active support that conservatives give to 
inequality is a major obstacle to controlling economic growth, 
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as it prevents radical sharing of employment. One of the results 
of this is a crucial block to collective action for halting global 
warming and other damage to our natural capital.
From Jost and others (e.g. Jost et al. 2003a,b; Jost 2009; Giles 
2008; Graham and Estes 2012) we can list the main conserv-
ative-liberal polarities of preferences or tolerances as follows 
(conservative first, liberal last) in which the core tensions noted 
by Jost and his colleagues are printed bold:
1. stability and convention versus openness to change and 
novelty seeking;
2. order, organization and certainty versus tolerance of ambigu-
ity;
3. hierarchy versus equality;
4. cognitive closure versus inclination for integrative complex-
ity (viewing issues from multiple perspectives and merging 
those views into nuanced positions) (Mooney 2012, 69–70);
5. conscientiousness versus rebellion and creativity;
6. lower control of impulses versus higher control of impulses 
(Graham and Estes 2012, 42);
7. fear of threat (including salience of personal mortality and 
threats to the stability of the social system) versus a relative 
tolerance of threat.
In addition to these conservative–liberal polarities, there are 
others in moral values and they will be inspected later, with a 
suggestion as to how they might be explained by these seven 
polarities.
Much of the potential for this list of seven polarities shows 
up in the comprehensive system of human motivational values 
proposed by psychologist Shalom Schwartz (2007). His system 
demonstrates tensions between values within the individual 
(rather than between different individuals) and is depicted in 
Figure 8.1 by opposing segments in a circular arrangement of 
the values experienced by each person. Schwartz developed this 
scheme by hypothesizing from evolutionary psychology that
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values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three universal re-
quirements of human existence to which all individuals and socie-
ties must be responsive: needs of individuals as biological organ-
isms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and 
welfare needs of groups. (Schwartz 1992, 4)
To test this conjecture, Schwartz took 210 samples from 67 coun-
tries on 54 to 57 items of abstract value that should help to satisfy 
those ‘three universal requirements of human existence’, such as 
creativity, wealth and honesty (Schwartz 2007). The people in 
each sample rated each value item for its importance as guiding 
principles in their lives and the relations between items were 
represented by proximity in two dimensions. Those proximities 
placed the value items within segments of a circle as shown in 
Figure 8.1, where each segment is a motivationally distinct type 
of value, as listed and defined in Table 8.1. The circular configu-
ration indicates that each individual, irrespective of nationality 
and culture, experiences the same congruities and tensions be-
tween types of value. Congruities are shown by proximities of 
value types around the circumference and tensions by opposing 
locations of value types across the circle. Schwartz further sum-
marizes these ten types of value into four broad types, which 
are shown outside the circle adjacent to the two or three types 
of value that they encompass. As indicated by their opposing 
locations, these broad types produce two tensions within the 
individual:
1. openness to change (stimulation, self-direction) versus con-
servation (tradition, conformity and security) and
2. self-enhancement (power, achievement and hedonism) ver-
sus self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence). 
Different individuals have different resolutions of the tensions 
between types of value, at both the detailed level (10 types) 
and the broad level (4 types). At the broad level, this means 
that each individual has, in the openness to change–conserva-
tion dimension, some motivation for openness to change and 
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some for conservation. Th ose with more openness to change 
than conservation are likely to be politically liberal and those 
with stronger conservation values, conservative. Likewise, in 




















Fig. 8.1. Th eoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of value 
(from Schwartz 2007).
STIMULATION Excitement, novelty and challenge in life
SELF-DIRECTION Independent thought and action: choosing, creating, 
exploring
UNIVERSALISM Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature.
BENEVOLENCE Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people 
with whom one is in frequent personal contact.
TRADITION Respect for, commitment to and acceptance of the customs 
and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide for 
the self.
CONFORMITY Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to up-
set or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
SECURITY Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and 
of self.
POWER Social status and prestige, control or dominance over 
people and resources.
ACHIEVEMENT Personal success through demonstrating competence ac-
cording to social standards.
HEDONISM Pleasure and sensuous gratifi cation for oneself.
Table 8.1. Defi nitions of motivational types of values in terms of their core goal 
(from Schwartz 2007, 174).
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son strikes their own balance between these two broad values, 
and some will be more self-enhancing and others more self-
transcending. In line with his initial approach, Schwartz sums 
up his analysis with an evolutionary explanation of the two 
broad dimensions of motivational tension. He conjectures that 
the conflict within the individual of self-enhancement versus 
self-transcendence was selected because Homo sapiens evolved 
as a social animal and this demanded that individuals attend 
to the interests of both self and group. The intra-personal ten-
sion of openness to change against conservation is seen as be-
ing selected by the struggle for survival in a sometimes hostile 
environment, as this would require abilities to adapt and to 
maintain stability. Furthermore, natural selection is likely to 
have produced the ability of each person to strike different bal-
ances between self-enhancement and self-transcendence and 
between openness to change and conservation depending on 
their circumstances (see also Jost 2009, 139). Tim Jackson has 
described some of the implications of this with slightly differ-
ent terminology: altruism for self-transcendence, selfishness for 
self-enhancement, novelty seeking for openness to change and 
tradition for conservation.
The important point here is that each society strikes the balance 
between altruism and selfishness (and also between novelty and tra-
dition) in different places. And where this balance is struck depends 
crucially on social structure. When technologies, infrastructures, 
institutions and social norms reward self-enhancement and nov-
elty, then selfish sensation-seeking behaviours prevail over more 
considered, altruistic ones. Where social structures favour altruism 
and tradition, self-transcending behaviours are rewarded and self-
ish behaviour may even be penalized. (Jackson 2009, 163)
Another analysis of motivational values has been developed by 
social psychologists Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph (Haidt 
2012). As with Schwartz’s approach, they base their theory of 
‘moral foundations’ on evolutionary psychology. From the 
major adaptive challenges that confronted our evolving social 
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ancestors, Haidt and Joseph conjectured that natural selection 
should have shaped our minds to value at least six ‘virtues’. 
These ‘moral intuitions’ or ‘moral foundations’ are postulated to 
be generated by cognitive modules that were shaped by our evo-
lution, and the six identified by Haidt and Joseph are concerns 
for: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/
subversion, sanctity/degradation and liberty/oppression. The 
sanctity/degradation foundation covers such concerns as clean-
liness, temperance, chastity and piety, with violations of those 
concerns typically arousing disgust. Together with several col-
leagues, Haidt has surveyed more than 130,000 people, with 
the clear result that self-identified liberals are motivated mainly 
by just three of these intuitive concerns — care/harm, fairness/
cheating and liberty/oppression — whereas self-identified con-
servatives are well motivated by all of them (Haidt 2012, 181–84). 
Haidt’s (2012, 279, 312) explanation of this striking difference is 
that, as noted above, people have different genotypes that give 
them different resolutions of the seven polarities listed in the 
opening part of this section, and these predispose (but do not 
predestine) some people to be less concerned with loyalty/be-
trayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation. As life 
experiences cause people to react to events with these differing 
responses, they settle into those different attitudes, while iden-
tifying with those of similar disposition to form groups such as 
conservatives, authoritarians, libertarians and liberals. The so-
cial identities of the members of these groups then direct their 
confirmation bias, strengthening their divergent world views.
But as Jost (2012, 526) observes:
From a scientific perspective, his theory raises more questions than 
it answers. Why do some individuals feel that it is morally good 
(or necessary) to obey authority, favour the ingroup, and maintain 
purity, whereas others are sceptical? Why do some think it is mor-
ally acceptable to judge or mistreat others (such as gay or lesbian 
couples or, only a generation ago, interracial couples) because they 
dislike or feel disgusted by them, whereas others do not? Why do 
we ‘care about violence towards many more classes of victims to-
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day than our grandparents did in their time’? Haidt dismisses the 
possibility that this aspect of liberalism, which prizes universal over 
parochial considerations (the justice principle of impartiality), is in 
fact a tremendous cultural achievement — a shared victory over the 
limitations of our more primitive ancestral legacy.
Perhaps Jost’s questions are answered by a more thorough appli-
cation of the first mechanism in Haidt’s explanation of conserv-
ative and liberal moral foundations, which is the effect of their 
genetic differences in ‘motivational values’ (Schwartz 2007) or 
‘motivated social cognition’ (Jost et al. 2003a,b). We now de-
vote some space to investigating this possibility because it could 
mean that those motivational values or motivated cognitions 
can construct more thoughtful morals than the intuitions that 
Haidt calls moral foundations. As Jost observes, thoughtful 
morals provide a better basis for public policy than indiscrimi-
nate acceptance of our intuitions.
Conservative–liberal differences in motivational values are 
approximately sketched by the seven polarities listed in the 
opening part of this section. What Haidt missed or perhaps ig-
nored to avoid offending conservatives was that those polari-
ties indicate that liberals tend to be better equipped than con-
servatives to teach themselves new emotional reactions when 
these are more appropriate in the modern world than Haidt’s 
(2012, xiv, xv etc.) six instinctive moral foundations. This con-
jecture may provoke three questions: (1) how are liberals better 
equipped to recognize when new emotional reactions should 
replace instinctive ones; (2) how can people replace instinctive 
reactions with others; and (3) how are liberals better equipped 
to do this than conservatives? The answer to the first question 
is that liberals are more likely than conservatives to recognize 
needs for new emotional responses because liberals are more 
open to change, more inclined to exercise integrative complex-
ity, to rebel against convention, to be creative, and to tolerate 
ambiguity, uncertainty and threat. The answer to the second 
question is that psychologists and psychiatrists have been aware 
for many years that people can largely determine their emo-
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tional responses to stimuli by what they choose to think about 
them (e.g. Haidt 2012, 71; Seligman 1992; Seligman 1994). So, 
within limits, anyone can teach themselves new likes and dis-
likes, approvals and disapprovals, by regarding the stimuli that 
evoke emotional responses in more positive or negative ways. 
Perhaps this is a matter of deliberate association, a self-admin-
istered form of Pavlovian conditioning. The answer to the third 
question is the same as that to the first: liberals are more likely 
to be willing and able to teach themselves new emotional reac-
tions because they tend to be more open to change and more 
thoughtful and tolerant.
From these observations then, we form our first element of 
hypothesis: Liberals are more likely than conservatives to review 
and overrule their intuitions when experience, self-examination 
or criticism from others indicates that they are unhelpful. To be 
blunt, this is a capacity for maturation. But on the other hand, 
conservatives have not only the youthful virtues of drive and 
commitment to their group and its goals, but also rather ma-
ture regards for stability, order, persistence and conscientious-
ness (Mooney 2012, 268). As Haidt (2012, 294–95) emphasizes, 
we need both the conservative and liberal approaches, often 
in alternating balance. He quotes John Stuart Mill: ‘A party of 
order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both 
necessary elements of a healthy state of political life.’ Haidt also 
notes Bertrand Russell claimed that ‘social cohesion is a neces-
sity and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion 
by merely rational arguments.’ The need for cohesion is strongly 
appreciated at an instinctual level by conservatives, but may be 
neglected in the individualistic and reasoning approach of liber-
als that may put instinct on hold in order to consider other per-
spectives. Achieving a productive balance between conservative 
and liberal inputs may not be as difficult as it appears because, 
as the work of Schwartz and others indicates, most individuals 
have some of both dispositions and the balance that each per-
son strikes between the two is in some cases influenced by their 
circumstances. And obviously, those circumstances include the 
ways in which people are treated by those with different points 
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of view. The People’s Forum may be effective in this situation be-
cause its verdicts are nonbinding and thus, while of concern to 
those who differ, initially do not pose an urgent threat to them. 
Those verdicts would remain open to alteration for some years, 
until it becomes clear to all those who are interested in them: 
(a) that a firm majority decision has been reached, (b) why that 
choice was made, and (c) that the time has come to implement 
it.
This hypothesizing of why liberals have much narrower 
‘moral foundations’ than conservatives suggests that liberals 
are more inclined and more able to mentally step outside their 
instinctive moral responses to objectively inspect them for ap-
propriateness in the situation that aroused them. They will also 
be better equipped to conduct the same type of dispassionate 
inspection of other people, including those who are members of 
other groups, such as religions or nations. In all these situations, 
such inspections will often indicate that loyalty to a group, obe-
dience to an authority figure and scrupulous sanctity (avoidance 
of contaminants, dirt, alcohol, other races and so on) can, in real 
life, be unnecessary and sometimes dangerous, whereas care, 
fairness and liberty will appear to be more directly and reliably 
useful. In making those value judgements of what is unneces-
sary, dangerous and useful, the criterion of value that is likely 
to be used is the utilitarian one, of what creates pleasure and 
avoids pain. Just why liberals would select that criterion despite 
their instinctive concern for at least care/harm, fairness/cheat-
ing and liberty/oppression (and to some extent for the other 
three of Haidt’s moral foundations as well) is that, in observing 
the fallibility of moral instincts in others and in themselves, they 
will try to make sense of them by looking for something in them 
that might explain their feeling that all of them seem to have 
some value, even if only vaguely and perhaps not often. Fairly 
obviously, those foundations all have some capacity to produce 
pleasure and minimize pain. For example, obedience to author-
ity generally pays off in terms of the pleasure of a stable life that 
is free of official persecution. If people assess the worth of their 
moral foundations by looking at how likely they are to produce 
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pleasure and minimize pain, for both themselves and others, 
then they are likely to rate care, fairness and liberty as the most 
direct and reliable sources of positive value. Some liberals will 
go further and look at these three values as also being rather 
superficial, in that they are merely instrumental in producing 
pleasure and avoiding pain.
Our hypothesis that many liberals are likely to actively select 
their ‘moral foundations’ by critically reviewing and overruling 
or retraining their ethical intuitions while many conservatives 
continue to view all of them as self-evident truths appears to 
be supported by the observation and theory of moral develop-
ment that was initiated by psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg in 
the 1960s. His work indicates that as children grow up, some of 
them develop the ability to review and control their moral intui-
tions. Kohlberg identified the earliest part of the development 
of moral reasoning as the very superficial ‘pre-conventional’ 
phase of early childhood, such that if an adult punished a young 
child for an act, then the child would feel or ‘know’ that the 
act was wrong. Psychologist Elliot Turiel subsequently modified 
this description with the observation that, in all the cultures that 
he examined, children as young as five recognize, at some level, 
moral rules such as harm is wrong. In elementary school, chil-
dren enter the ‘conventional’ phase of recognizing and respect-
ing authority and social rules, even as they learn to manoeuvre 
within and around these constraints. After puberty, just as chil-
dren develop the capacity for abstract thought,
Kohlberg found that some children begin to think for themselves 
about the nature of authority, the meaning of justice, and the rea-
sons behind rules and laws. In the two ‘post-conventional’ stages, 
adolescents still value honesty and respect rules and laws, but now 
they sometimes justify dishonesty or law-breaking in pursuit of still 
higher goods, particularly justice. (Haidt 2012, 8, emphasis added)
Kohlberg’s finding that only some children achieve the later 
stages of development is crucial (which is also emphasized by 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 198). It echoes the hypothesis 
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advanced here that some people (presumably mostly those who 
become liberals) are better equipped than others (presum-
ably mostly those who become conservatives) to move into the 
post-conventional phase. This developmental progression of 
the individual appears to be mirrored in a similar progression 
of societies. As Haidt (2012, 110) points out, societies that have 
become educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (gener-
ally western societies, hence earning the acronym WEIRD) have 
developed — partly in the Enlightenment — a set of moral foun-
dations that is more liberal than those of most other societies, 
emphasizing concerns about harming, cheating and oppressing 
individuals. Both developmental progressions — in individuals 
and in societies — are suggested here to be processes of learning 
to replace inappropriate intuitions with more appropriate re-
sponses. The relevance of this hypothesis for the People’s Forum 
is that it indicates that this institution might assist such learn-
ing and development. But to do it, the Forum must be managed 
not only to assist learning but also to assist those who are re-
pelled by such change to adjust to it and to find a place within it 
where their motivations are appreciated, which is likely to be in 
leadership and in encouraging group solidarity. Conservatives 
may therefore make their greatest contribution in conventional 
electoral politics and the ‘leadership’ or executive function it 
provides (see §2.2 and §2.2.1 discussions of leadership), while 
liberals mainly use the Forum to develop the citizen director-
ship (see §2.2.2) that guides the so called ‘leaders’.
Before concluding this consideration of differences in the 
dispositions of conservatives and liberals, we should note that 
those differences may produce very different attitudes to gov-
ernment, such as the Republican–Democrat split in the United 
States (see §3.2). As discussed in §2.2.3.1 and §2.2.3.2, and also 
indirectly in §4.1, it is often much easier to recognize and ap-
preciate private goods than public goods. This suggests that 
liberals’ inclination towards integrative complexity, tolerance of 
ambiguity, interest in novelty and so on leads them, as a general 
rule, to perceive the value of a wider range of public goods than 
conservatives will. And so, as it is primarily government that 
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provides and maintains these goods, liberals (generally Demo-
crats in the US) may therefore tend to be more appreciative of 
government than conservatives (mostly Republicans in the US).
This brief and partly conjectural excursion into psychology 
and moral philosophy suggests that although genotype and 
tradition present considerable obstacles to productive public 
deliberation via the People’s Forum, nevertheless this design 
has potential to make a crucial contribution to public policy. 
Although conservatives will suspect liberal bias in the Forum, 
they should not be viscerally alarmed that it threatens the social 
order because its establishment would not require the alteration 
or removal of existing institutions of government. They may 
therefore adapt to its presence by contributing to the debates it 
facilitates and by becoming accustomed to new ideas on public 
policy. But they will need more time than liberals; especially if 
the Forum facilitates deliberation on significant changes to the 
social order such as replacing electoral representation with sor-
tition. Much of the deliberative response to the Forum should 
occur with generational change. As young people become po-
litically aware, they may form their views with more openness 
than their elders. Another part of the potential of the Forum is 
that, if it is well managed, it may become widely used as a politi-
cal heuristic that is recognized and widely accepted as present-
ing well-considered trends in its polling results. All these effects 
may be slow to develop, so the political potential of the People’s 
Forum could take many years to be fully demonstrated.
8.2 The applicability of the People’s Forum to the 
polarized politics of the usa
Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler (2009) have shown 
that in the USA a political sorting has occurred in the last few 
decades by which the Republican Party now much more clearly 
represents conservatives and the Democratic Party unambigu-
ously represents liberals. US citizens are not differing markedly 
more with each other on issues, but politicians are more clearly 
representing one side or the other (Hetherington 2009). In the 
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American system, with its many checks and balances, this sharp 
dichotomy among politicians is producing political gridlock 
and, as a consequence, a zeitgeist of antagonism. Americans 
now feel strongly polarized as their politics undergoes ‘conflict 
extension, in which multiple and seemingly cross-cutting di-
mensions all divide Republicans from Democrats, rather than 
one issue cleavage completely displacing another’ (Hethering-
ton and Weiler 2009, 203). Is this partisanship a problem that 
the People’s Forum could help to transform into constructive 
discourse?
Hetherington and Weiler (2009, 40) note that scholars have 
generally considered conservatives to be distinguished from lib-
erals by one or more of three traits: (1) a desire to protect the 
status quo against change; (2) a preference for free markets and 
small government; and (3) a desire for order, that is, an intoler-
ance of confusion, ambiguity and difference. Hetherington and 
Weiler find that polarization in the US has proceeded mostly ac-
cording to the last trait. Those with a high need for social or-
der have been increasingly voting, campaigning and standing 
for the Republican Party, and those who try to understand or 
tolerate confusion, ambiguity and difference have been turning 
increasingly to the Democrats. Noting that the need for order 
characterizes authoritarianism (2009, 3–4), they describe the 
polarization of American politics as ‘the increasingly central 
role that authoritarianism has come to play in structuring party 
competition, mass preferences and the relevant issue agenda of 
the past forty years’ (2009, 203).
Authoritarianism should not be confused with conservatism 
as it is only one possible part of it (the third part listed above) 
and can, in certain situations and in those who feel it strongly, 
overrule the other components of conservatism to produce a 
zeal for changing the status quo that is the antithesis of con-
servatism. When authoritarians perceive that existing norms, 
institutions and authorities are maintaining the social fabric, 
they will be conservative and
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tend to favour orthodox, venerable understandings of right and 
wrong. But under the right circumstances, they will support radical 
changes in the existing social fabric if they can be persuaded that 
those changes are necessary to maintain order and quell threats to 
the social fabric. (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 39)
Hetherington and Weiler (2009, 203) also observe, beginning
in the late 1960s, our political system began a transformation that, 
in fits and starts but inexorably, produced a picture in increasingly 
sharp resolution — one in which the division between people’s fun-
damental outlooks became refracted onto a landscape of increas-
ingly irreconcilable political differences.
Resolving or accommodating these differences appears to call 
for new processes or institutions. A new system of government 
with many fewer checks and balances (that is, with fewer super-
majoritarian devices, as discussed in §2.2.6) such as a parliamen-
tary system, could help by allowing majorities to rule with less 
opportunity for minorities to undemocratically frustrate them. 
This would produce more order in the political system, which 
should appeal to authoritarians. If this reform is taken further 
with proportional representation, then the ruling group will be 
more likely to consider the interests of other groups, in order to 
avoid provoking them into forming coalitions that can overrule 
the rulers. Another approach, and one that is probably needed 
to enable such reformation of government, is to establish an 
institution — such as the People’s Forum — that is designed to 
facilitate public deliberation on strategic issues, as those include 
constitutional reform. A Forum would also improve the order 
of the system by removing much of its ambiguity of delegation, 
as it explicitly and publicly allocates directorship to the people. 
In addition to helping the people consider how they should 
reform their government, the Forum could also help them in-
quire into ‘the division between people’s fundamental outlooks’, 
which should help them understand why they differ and see 
more clearly where they might come together in order to move 
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ahead. In doing this, the Forum should assist by transferring the 
emphasis of political debate from political personality and party 
rivalries to the substance of issues. Such a shift may be trans-
formative, for people’s beliefs are currently heavily influenced by 
their identification with cultural and political groups (as noted 
in §7.2.2 E13 for the issue of climate change). 
8.3 General prospects for the Forum
As the introduction of a People’s Forum into a community 
would slightly alter its social structure by adding to it an institu-
tion that facilitates debate, discussion and thought about public 
affairs, it may shift the balance, or resolution, of such conflicts 
towards openness to change and self-transcendence. Although 
this means that People’s Forums are likely to encounter opposi-
tion from conservatives (much of which may persist, due to its 
genetic component) these opponents will feel some obligation to 
engage with it, at least to appear willing to publicly explain and 
defend their points of view and to be seen as contributing to the 
democratic process. However, some conservatives may prefer 
to leave the ambiguous business of discussion and negotiation 
to others: to those who are more comfortable with uncertainty, 
who are motivated by seeing opportunities for change and who 
are stimulated by complex problems that demand integrative 
capability. As suggested by Chris Mooney (2012, 267–68), some 
conservatives may therefore prefer to ignore a process such as 
the Forum, viewing it as a frustrating gabfest. But if Forum par-
ticipants actually achieve a strong and stable — perhaps even a 
strengthening — majority view on what should be done about a 
particular issue in the face of counter-argument and the dissem-
ination of new information over many years, then conservatives 
may be drawn in by the prospect of closure. Closure will be even 
more imminent if politicians declare that they will enact the 
next poll result on that issue, unless it is overturned by a reversal 
of the voting trend (as proposed in §7.2.9). Over several years of 
sustained public discussion and polling, conservatives may also 
become accustomed to the prospect of the changes in the status 
quo that majorities in the PF poll are consistently advocating 
as necessary. If closure is broadly recognized by the public and 
their political agents, conservatives may then be among those 
calling for united collective action to enact the change. They 
may be keen to see that everyone contributes according to their 
means and that they all stay the course, because although they 
resist change and accept inequality, they are intolerant of ambi-
guity and have strong desires for hierarchy, conformity, loyalty 
to their group, fairness (as proportionality) and closure.
The slow but potentially deep process of public argument and 
deliberation that the People’s Forum is intended to facilitate may 
help liberals and conservatives to better understand their differ-
ences. It may help liberals show conservatives new possibilities 
and help conservatives show liberals when the time for solidar-
ity and decisive collective action has arrived. In support of this 
optimism it is anticipated that authoritarians would welcome 
the Forum. They are usually a small proportion of the public, 
being just one type of conservative, but in addition to them, 
non-authoritarians tend to react to increasing perceptions of 
threat by becoming authoritarian themselves. As political psy-
chologist Karen Stenner (2005, 269) observes, authoritarianism 
is ‘fuelled by the impulse to enhance unity and conformity and 
manifested under conditions … that threaten that oneness and 
sameness’. She concludes that
authoritarians are never more tolerant than when reassured and 
pacified by an autocratic culture, and never more intolerant than 
when forced to endure a vibrant democracy.
We have long known that the ‘anti-democratic personality’ is 
bad for democracy. The harder lesson to learn is that democracy is 
bad for the anti-democrat. (Stenner 2005, 334)
Stenner observes this in democracies as we know them today. 
But if they are made more systematic while remaining no less 
vibrant, via new, transparent institutions such as the People’s 
Forum, then authoritarians may be reassured by such strength-
ening of the order of the democratic process. One way that the 
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Forum would do this is by minimizing ambiguity in delegation 
by making the people more clearly the directors of their govern-
ment. As discussed in §2.3.4 and §2.3.5, this element of order 
would then create more order by reducing the distractions of 
excessive competition between politicians. Another strengthen-
ing of order by the Forum would come from its reduction of 
excessive compromise in democratic government. As noted in 
§2.4, this might be done by the Forum’s meritocratic effect of 
prioritizing engaged opinion over disengaged opinion, while as-
sisting both categories of opinion to develop. Order would also 
be strengthened by the Forum always giving prior notice of any 
changes to the provision of public goods (see §7.2.9). It would do 
this by publicizing the trends it registers in the development of 
engaged opinion and also by those trends provoking politicians 
to challenge citizens to reverse them before they are expressed 





performanCe inDiCatorS anD 
trialling the people’S forum
The mission of the People’s Forum is described in §6.1 as being 
to improve the performance of liberal democracies by enhanc-
ing the quality of their public policy and also the legitimacy, 
or public acceptance, of that policy. These objectives are to be 
achieved by the Forum using two strategies: accelerating the de-
velopment of mass public opinion and producing political influ-
ence for that part of this opinion which is likely to be the best 
developed. To implement these strategies, the People’s Forum is 
designed to work with existing democratic institutions and ac-
tivities, such as the legislature and the executive, free media, the 
lobbying and campaigning of interest groups and the random 
sample polling of public opinion. In §9.1 below, we consider 
whether, in doing these things, the Forum might be supported 
by democratic innovations that have been either proposed or 
used. The possibility of those devices being supported by the 
Forum is also considered.
In §9.2 a preliminary list is presented of ways for monitor-
ing the effectiveness of the People’s Forum as it operates. Some 
of these performance indicators would use democratic institu-
tions and innovations such as opinion polling, democracy au-
dits and the Deliberative Poll®. If, during the introductory phase 
of the operation of a Forum, performance indicators show that 
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it has some potential to achieve its mission, the public may be 
encouraged to have more confidence in it, which might help it 
work more effectively and increase the probability that it would 
become established as a political institution. Because of the pos-
sibility of such interactions, some devices listed here as having 
a potential to support the People’s Forum also have potential as 
performance indicators.
9.1 Devices that may synergize with the People’s 
Forum
The two strategies of the People’s Forum will tend to reinforce 
each other because some of the development of mass public 
opinion it achieves will be registered in its results, which may 
help these registrations of relatively sophisticated views to de-
velop political influence. That tendency would be strengthened 
by the other mechanisms discussed in §7.2.6, and the resultant 
rising public status of the Forum could help it to further develop 
mass public opinion. Much of this development would occur 
among those voting in the Forum as many of them will be tak-
ing interest in and discussing or debating its questions as part of 
their engagement in it. But the wider public will witness some of 
this activity and may learn from it as well as being encouraged 
by it to vote in PF polls. Such development of opinion would be 
driven by the Forum offering two types of incentive for citizens 
to argue and discuss issues with each other. One type is egoistic: 
the incentive of wanting to shape the Forum’s voting trends in 
order to confer the political influence of those trends — whether 
potential or real — onto one’s own views. The other type is soli-
dary or prosocial: a desire of citizens to assist the development 
of the opinions of their society as registered by the People’s Fo-
rum, because this may influence public policy and could there-
by increase public welfare.
The Forum’s provision of egoistic and solidary incentives for 
public discourse should encourage citizens to form and assist 
groups that campaign on the issues it treats and also groups that 
intensively deliberate these issues. Intensive deliberation groups 
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may be composed of citizens randomly selected from the elec-
torate or the population, or self-selected (by volunteering to 
participate), or randomly selected from volunteers. Examples of 
deliberation groups that are randomly selected from the popu-
lation are citizens’ juries, planning cells, citizens’ assemblies, 
Deliberative Polls® and online deliberative polls. Some of the 
self-selected groups are the 21st Century Town Meetings run by 
AmericaSpeaks, National Issues Forums and the study circles 
run by Everyday Democracy. The third type of structure, ran-
dom selection from volunteers, is employed by consensus con-
ferences. As all these forums are designed for intensive delibera-
tion, their size is usually limited to a tiny fraction of society, in 
order to allow personal intra-group communication. They may 
be considered to execute both of the polity-wide strategies of the 
People’s Forum to some miniscule degree, however slight, and 
thereby to have potential to assist it, and vice versa. For the first 
PF strategy — the facilitation of the development of mass public 
opinion — intensive deliberation forums will have little effect, 
as they are primarily restricted to working on the opinions of 
their members. However, their representativeness, especially 
that of strict random sample forums, gives them a potential to 
persuade non-participating citizens to support their verdicts, 
because some nonparticipants may realize that these verdicts 
are likely to be what they would think, if they had the oppor-
tunity to deliberate effectively (Fishkin 1997, 162; Brown 2006, 
211). Such confidence by citizens in a representative process has 
been well developed for law court juries and, as political scien-
tist John Ferejohn (2008, 202) observes, has also been demon-
strated for the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform: ‘the CA process itself acquired a trustworthy reputation 
and this gave reason for voters to support its recommendation’. 
Whenever such public trust is achieved by a deliberative forum 
it should gain political influence and thus begin to execute the 
second strategy of the People’s Forum — developing political in-




If intensive deliberation forums operate in a society that has a 
People’s Forum and consider some of the issues that the Forum 
treats, they are likely to produce conclusions consistent with the 
Forum’s voting trends on those issues and which forecast, with 
some reliability, what the ultimate conclusions of the People’s 
Forum would be, after it had run those questions for several, 
or perhaps many, years. Because intensive deliberation forums 
are likely to have such predictive capacity, their managers might 
call on all citizens to support their results by voting in alignment 
with these in the Forum’s polls and by calling on politicians to 
implement the policies being advocated by the Forum’s polling 
trends. Many commentators on public affairs might endorse 
such calls. In this manner, the People’s Forum and intensive 
deliberation forums should draw attention to each other, mak-
ing both more effective in facilitating the development of public 
opinion and also in developing political influence for the rela-
tively developed opinion that they express. This symbiosis may 
produce a synergy in which the combined effect is greater than 
that of adding the effects of the People’s Forum operating on its 
own in a society to the effects the intensive deliberation forums 
would deliver if they were run there without the People’s Forum.
In this manner, the People’s Forum might work with other 
deliberative institutions to produce a polity-wide deliberative 
system. As advocated by several political theorists in Delibera-
tive Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Parkin-
son and Mansbridge 2012), these systems would provide a divi-
sion of labour in democratic government that may have parts 
that are weak in deliberation but which contribute strongly 
to the deliberative outcome of the whole. For example protest 
demonstrations, partisan rhetoric and possibly even partisan 
media may create inclusion and energize participation, thereby 
stimulating the development of public opinion and policy.
Some of the most promising types of intensive deliberation 
panels for synergism with the People’s Forum are now briefly 
described.
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citizens’ juries. The citizens’ jury comprises a small number 
of citizens (12–24) who are selected by stratified random sam-
pling and paid a small honorarium by a sponsoring body, such 
as a public authority. It is run by an independent organisation 
that provides a facilitator. The jury hears evidence, questions 
witnesses, deliberates over 3–4 days and produces a report that 
the sponsoring authority is expected to respond to. Citizens’ ju-
ries have been run in the United States by the Jefferson Centre 
and in the UK by several organizations, including the Institute 
for Public Policy Research. Oregon’s Citizen Initiative Review 
Commission operates in a similar way, as it randomly selects 
juries to deliberate citizens’ initiative propositions. These groups 
produce ‘Citizens’ Statements’ that are included with each initia-
tive ballot paper, to summarize the key points of the proposition 
as decided by the voters’ peers. 
Political scientists Vivien Lowndes, Lawrence Pratchett and 
Gerry Stoker (2001, 448) report that ‘not only are people pre-
pared to join ‘juries’, but the public at large is willing to trust 
their decision-making — even over that of elected representa-
tives.’
planning cells. Planning cells are the German equivalent of 
citizens’ juries, being randomly selected groups of around twen-
ty-five citizens who advise government authorities. They are 
rather more formal in the way information is provided and also 
in their organization, as they rotate participants between small 
cells of five to make sure they all interact (Smith 2005).
consensus conferences. These are small deliberating groups 
similar to citizens’ juries, but their members are largely self-
selected, being chosen by socio-demographic criteria from a 
pool of volunteers who have responded to advertisements with 
written applications. They have been run by the Danish Board 
of Technology since the 1980s. Each conference is preceded by 
a series of preconference meetings where the members learn 
about the issue and frame questions. The panel’s recommenda-
tions have no binding authority on government, but have some-
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times had a direct impact on the legislative process (G. Smith 
2005).
the deliberative poll®. This system was devised by James 
Fishkin and uses a random sample of 250–500 citizens, which 
is large enough to make stratification unnecessary. The group 
begins its work with each member completing an opinion poll 
on the issue to be deliberated, and then 2–3 days are spent hear-
ing evidence from specialists and deliberating in small groups. 
The work is concluded with a repetition of the same opinion 
poll of the members, and this is compared with the pre-delib-
eration poll. These comparisons give clear evidence of partici-
pants changing their views during the process, having reflected 
on evidence presented and on the views of other participants 
(G. Smith 2005). However, some scholars (e.g. Shapiro 2005; 
Gleason 2012) question whether these changes are always im-
provements in the quality of the opinions of the participants, 
because the Deliberative Poll® may constrain their thought with 
its ‘heavily rule-bound’ structure (Ryfe 2002, 365). One aspect of 
this is the almost inevitably biased framing of issues and prim-
ing of participants by the few experts who are selected to brief 
them; another is the improbability that any of those few experts 
will think laterally enough to recognize counterintuitive but 
crucial concepts, such as the pervasive democratic dysfunction 
discussed in Chapter 5 as the ‘scarcity multiplier’. 
The Deliberative Poll® has also been conducted online. In 
this format, deliberation is by a random sample of around 500 
citizens and runs for two hours per week for four weeks. The 
change in opinion that is achieved by this version appears to be 
less pronounced than with face-to-face deliberative polling (G. 
Smith 2005).
deliberation day. Deliberation Day was devised in 1999 by 
James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman to try to expand the sample 
of the Deliberative Poll®, potentially to the whole nation. This 
would be a one-day public holiday held ten days before ma-
jor national elections to enable registered voters to deliberate 
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pivotal issues in small groups of 15 that come together during 
that day, in plenary sessions of 500. Attendees would be paid 
US$150 for their day’s work of citizenship. This idea has been 
widely discussed, but many are sceptical, such as political scien-
tist Philippe Schmitter.
The deliberation day — I don’t think that’s a very sensible idea. 
I think what makes more sense is to have much broader kinds of 
mechanisms of deliberation. We talk about smart voting for exam-
ple which allows you to look at the voting record of deputies and 
also the proposed preferences of different candidates, take the test 
yourself and find out which candidate is closest to your preferences 
for example. To me that’s much more feasible and exciting to the 
individual. (cited in POWERInquiry 2004, 6)
Nine years previously, political scientist Adolf Gundersen noted 
that
whereas Fishkin stresses representative, group processes, or delib-
erative forums, I stress universal, undifferentiated ones. (The differ-
ence here is really one of emphasis: the two kinds of process are not 
mutually exclusive. It is just that the latter kind has been too often 
overlooked). (Gundersen 1995, 247, brackets in original)
americaSpeakS 21st century town meetings. These meetings 
are conducted for one day with between 500 to 5,000 citizens 
who are self-selected, as they have volunteered in response to 
advertisements. Some outreach may be used to ensure a reason-
able level of participation from relatively disengaged citizens. 
The meeting employs small group dialogue involving 10–12 de-
mographically diverse citizens and an independent facilitator. 
These groups are connected by computer, voting keypads and 
large closed-circuit television screens. Experts present balanced 
information and give advice as needed. A clear link to decision-
makers such as public authorities is established at the outset and 
their representatives attend the proceedings, but the results are 
not binding on these authorities (G. Smith 2005).
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world wide views. This system has been devised by the Dan-
ish Board of Technology and its partners, in order to extend 
representative deliberation across the planet. It includes de-
sign elements from the Deliberative Poll®, AmericaSpeaks and 
the consensus conference. In each country, citizens are select-
ed as randomly as is feasible and given an invitation to join a 
WWV group. From those who accept, a group of 100 is chosen 
on the basis of representing the demography of their country 
in age, gender, occupation, education and other respects. Some 
countries may have several groups meeting on different sites, 
and all groups from around the world pool their findings via a 
web tool. The initial application was for World Wide Views on 
Global Warming, delivering its findings two and a half months 
before the December 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen (WWV 2009; WWV 2010). On 26 September 2009, 
approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider 
what should happen in Copenhagen. The outcome was signifi-
cantly more progressive than the findings of conventional polls. 
Ninety per cent of the representative participants believed there 
was an urgent need for Copenhagen to produce a new agree-
ment; eighty-eight per cent wanted this to halt global warming 
to within 2 degrees Celsius of preindustrial levels; and seventy-
four per cent favoured increasing the prices of fossil fuels in de-
veloped countries (Herbick and Isham 2010).
national issues forums and study circles. These are locally 
sponsored, various-sized public forums of self-selected partici-
pants. National Issues Forums are coordinated across the US by 
the Kettering Foundation. Every year its NIF Institute focuses on 
several major issues by publishing issue books, each of which 
describes three or four approaches to one issue (never just two 
polar opposites) as a framework for deliberations. Discussions 
are led by trained moderators. The Foundation regularly col-
lates the findings of the forums and its reports are published 
and presented to elected officials to give them an insight into the 
considered views of concerned members of the public. Study 
circles are similar to National Issues Forums and are organized 
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by the Paul J. Aicher Foundation’s Everyday Democracy at East 
Hartford, CT (G. Smith 2005).
televote. This name has been applied to two types of forum 
that culminate in a vote by telephone. One type uses self-select-
ed participants and the other a random sample. Participants 
are presented with questions, information, pro and con argu-
ments and invited to deliberate on these by themselves and with 
friends or acquaintances for a few weeks before voting. The self-
selecting version was invented in California in the early 1970s by 
social psychologist Vincent Campbell, who used newspaper ad-
vertisements to invite people to take part. In 1978, political sci-
entists Ted Becker and Christa Daryl Slaton altered it by using 
random selection to have a representative sample of the public 
deliberate and vote on the Hawaii State Constitutional Conven-
tion. Their system has been subsequently used on eleven other 
occasions in Hawaii, New Zealand and California (Slaton 2001).
e-democracy. E-Democracy started as the Minnesota Poli-
tics and Issues Forum in 1994, running internet-based forums 
for discussing state, national and global political issues. More 
than fifty of these forums have operated across the US, UK and 
New Zealand. Participation is self-selected, and a manager 
lightly moderates the discussion in each forum, ensuring that 
users follow the rules of engagement. On occasions, the press 
has covered the online debates of the Minnesota Politics and Is-
sues Forum, which indicates that it may have an agenda-setting 
influence. Participants have reported that their involvement 
increases their political interest and knowledge as well as their 
understanding and respect for the views of other citizens (G. 
Smith 2005).
civic commons in cyberspace. The Civic Commons in Cyber-
space (CCC) was proposed by the UK Institute for Public Policy 
Research in order to extend the Minnesota E-Democracy model 
from a forum facilitating the development of public opinion to 
one that empowers this opinion and develops it more compre-
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hensively. CCC was designed by Jay Blumler and Stephen Cole-
man (who are quoted in §2.3.3), and they specified that it be run 
by a new publicly funded agency and should promote, facilitate 
and summarize online deliberations, with authorities expected 
to react formally to whatever emerges from these public dis-
cussions. CCC would create a central access point for citizens 
to deliberate on public issues at all levels of government, and 
would provide a one-stop shop for politicians to find out about 
these discussions. It ‘would have a particular interest in explor-
ing new ways of consulting intelligently with the broadest pos-
sible range of citizens’ (Blumler and Coleman 2001, 16). It may 
therefore see needs to coordinate citizens’ deliberations by stag-
ing public events such as polls, so that all who are interested 
know when to engage and can do so in a way that produces a 
collective choice for a polity. An operating CCC could therefore 
have a strong interest in the People’s Forum. Although bearing 
some resemblance to the Forum, CCC has a more complex func-
tion as it would engage in ‘promoting, publicising, regulating, 
moderating, summarizing, and evaluating the broadest and 
most inclusive range of online deliberation’ (Blumler and Cole-
man 2001, 17). In contrast, the Forum would not have its staff 
actively regulating, moderating and evaluating deliberations. It 
would rely on citizens to do the evaluating with their annual 
vote, and its regulating and moderating of deliberations would 
be limited to the guidance it offered via the composition of its 
ballot paper. This guidance would comprise the selection of is-
sues, their descriptions, the selection of questions and the indi-
cations given to voters of relationships between issues. The only 
regulation by the Forum of public argument and deliberation 
would be alterations of the ballot paper (such as in response to 
public criticisms) and this would include updating the range of 
issues it presents.
A CCC could not function without the active support of a 
government willing to (a) provide it with public funding, (b) 
allow an independent body to run it as it saw fit and (c) formally 
respond to the results of citizens’ deliberations. The broad reach 
of CCC means that it might have been added to the comparison 
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of four reforms for democratic government that is presented in 
§6.5.2, but this was not done because its reach appears to be lim-
ited in two ways: It is restricted to online forums and it lacks a 
poll that converts polity-wide opinion into a collective choice at 
a point in time. It therefore seems that PF has more potential to 
directly improve government function, but, as noted above, CCC 
might be very useful in assisting PF. In respect of CCC’s online 
function, Blumler and Coleman (2001, 13) note that the ‘digital 
divide’ should not be a problem as the internet makes 
it easier for individuals to find and follow what concerns them 
personally, and by lowering the costs of obtaining information, 
the influence of social status on political involvement may be re-
duced. Citizens and groups with few resources can undertake acts 
of communication and monitoring that previously were the domain 
mainly of resource-rich organisations and individuals. (Blumler 
and Coleman 2001, 13)
citizens’ assemblies. The Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Re-
form for British Columbia was a representative deliberative fo-
rum that ran from January to December in 2004. It was estab-
lished by the government of BC with a commitment that it would 
hold a referendum on its findings. The Assembly comprised 160 
randomly selected citizens with an independent chairman, and 
it studied the options for electoral reform in BC. It reviewed evi-
dence given at 50 public hearings, received 1603 written submis-
sions and deliberated before determining its recommendations 
by voting. Assembly members were assisted by holding meet-
ings at weekends, with child care and payment for their work.
This process differs from other deliberative forums in that it 
was ongoing for a considerable time and had an official under-
taking that its recommendations would be acted on. As this was 
to put them to a referendum, the wisdom acquired by the mem-
bers of the assembly was partially discarded by having the rela-
tively disengaged and uninformed general public make the final 
choice. Although the final vote within the Assembly was near 
unanimous at 146 to 7, the referendum result was only 57.7% in 
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favour of the Assembly’s verdict. However, this was far higher 
than the same proposal would have secured if it had come from 
the legislature (Goodin 2008, 269). The public exposure of the 
Assembly’s deliberations and its statistical representation of all 
citizens may not only have educated some of them about the 
issue, but also encouraged some of them to trust the Assem-
bly’s work and use its findings as a heuristic for their vote in 
the referendum. However, these effects were not enough for the 
Assembly’s extremely strong choice of an STV electoral system 
to be approved by the statutory 60% majority of public votes.
Ontario followed BC with its own Citizens’ Assembly on 
Electoral Reform, which started in September 2006 and fin-
ished in May 2007 with a recommendation of 94 members for, 
and 8 against, mixed member proportional representation. The 
final result was less impressive than that in BC, for when the On-
tario choice was put to a public referendum in October 2007 it 
was rejected by 63 per cent of voters. A forum patterned on the 
citizens’ assembly called the Citizens’ Parliament (newDemoc-
racy Foundation 2008) was run in Australia from October 2008 
to February 2009 on ‘How can Australia’s political system be 
strengthened to serve us better?’ This event did not have gov-
ernment sponsorship, so its recommendations were not put to a 
referendum. They are therefore unlikely to be pursued and ex-
ecuted, a destiny that is assured by a tendency for those recom-
mendations to fail to be specific about both their ends and the 
means by which they are to be achieved (Dryzek 2009, 3).
brazil’s national public policy conferences. This pyramidal 
system is outlined at the end of §6.5.2.4. As a national scale de-
liberative institution, each of its conferences has both citizens 
and public servants deliberating one issue for many months, a 
process that progresses from municipal meetings to state ones 
and finally to a national conference. Although the results are 
nonbinding, they have a considerable influence on government. 
conclusions on mutual support by the people’s forum and 
intensive deliberation forums. The use of the internet by E-
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Democracy and Civic Commons in Cyberspace gives them a 
potentially unlimited reach across both the number of partic-
ipants and the number of issues being treated that resembles 
the potential of the People’s Forum. However, the undertakings 
of both of those organisations to actively manage discussions 
prevents them from handling many issues simultaneously, a 
problem that the People’s Forum would avoid by facilitating de-
liberation without monitoring or controlling the give and take 
of public debate, as discussed in §7.2.2. The primary problem 
with CCC is that of raising the political will to get it launched 
and run. It was proposed early in 2001 but has not yet been tried 
out, presumably because it relies on a commitment by govern-
ment to establish it, fund it and heed the public deliberations it 
reports. A way of overcoming this problem may be to use pri-
vate funds to initiate the People’s Forum first. If this successfully 
established the Forum as a political institution in a province or 
a nation, then the argument for establishing CCC might be easier 
to promote, for it could be proposed by the Forum as a mother 
department that funds the continuing operation of the Forum, 
as well as other operations. Those would include intensive delib-
eration forums such as deliberative polling, consensus confer-
ences and on-line groups, which would help synergise the work 
of the People’s Forum as discussed above. Intensive deliberation 
forums could also complement the work of the People’s Forum 
by indicating how the general public would respond to issues 
that are too short-term for treatment by the Forum, if all citizens 
were to carefully deliberate them.
If the resolution of an issue being treated by the People’s Fo-
rum ballot paper is especially urgent, then those who are very 
concerned about it may decide to accelerate the Forum process 
by funding a random sample intensive deliberation forum to 
demonstrate what the future development of public opinion is 
likely to be on this issue, if it became better known throughout 
the community. This demonstration might cultivate public con-
fidence most effectively if it was performed by a citizens’ assem-
bly, as that would run for a substantial period (say a year) and 
allow submissions from the public.
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Two other innovations that might be considered for op-
eration in conjunction with the People’s Forum are pyramidal 
democracy (see §6.5.2.3 and §6.5.2.4) and the People’s House 
(§6.5.2.2). Pyramidal democracy would pursue the Forum’s mis-
sion of improving the quality and legitimacy of public policy 
by inviting citizens to have confidence in the deliberations of 
chains of representatives that invite input from all citizens. It 
would do this with strategies that approximate those used by 
the People’s Forum. The first PF strategy, developing mass pub-
lic opinion on strategic policy, would be attempted (without the 
focus on strategic policy) by offering political participation to 
all citizens in the small intensive deliberation groups at the base 
of the pyramid. The second strategy, of giving political influ-
ence to the most developed part of mass public opinion, is to be 
executed by the pyramid giving this power to the small group of 
delegates at its apex. However, the complexity of transmission of 
this influence from all citizens at the base to the few at the top, 
together with the work involved in citizens attending meetings 
at the base, may mean they have less incentive to get involved 
than they have to engage with the People’s Forum. Also, as dis-
cussed in §6.5.2.4, important strategic policy deliberated at the 
base may have little chance of being debated and publicised at 
the top if there are many levels in the pyramid. As the People’s 
Forum and pyramidal democracy are similar in mission and 
strategies, they might be viewed as alternatives to each other 
rather than as complementary. But the ability of the Forum to 
treat an unlimited number of issues simultaneously and to focus 
on strategic policy means that the two institutions should com-
plement each other, as suggested for NPPCs at the conclusion of 
§6.5.2.4. This complementarity may be that as the Forum devel-
ops policy ideas across the strategic spectrum simultaneously, it 
may coordinate those ideas so that pyramids can follow them to 
produce policies in different areas that work with, rather than 
against, each other.
The mission of the People’s House is described in §6.5.2.2 as 
being to give a voice to the public, curb special interests, coun-
ter legislative gridlock and aggregate electors’ preferences more 
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equitably. This bears some similarity to the mission of the Peo-
ple’s Forum of improving the quality and legitimacy of public 
policy, but the strategy of the House is rather different. Instead 
of encouraging the development of the opinion of the general 
public and then assisting citizens to gain confidence in the sec-
tion of their opinion that is most likely to be best developed, the 
People’s House would help a very large random sample (43,500) 
of the public to develop its opinions and ask all citizens to have 
confidence in these. Such confidence would depend mainly on 
public awareness of the following three features: That the sample 
is very representative; that it deliberates carefully; and (perhaps) 
that it is large enough to give most citizens some prospect of 
being able to have meaningful contact with at least one of its 
members.
The strategies of the People’s Forum and the People’s House 
might be compared by viewing the Forum as aiming mostly at 
improving the quantity and quality of participation while the 
House aims mostly at improving the quality of representation. 
These two institutions might therefore complement each other. 
If they were both operating in a polity, the Forum’s strategies 
should assist politicians to endorse the well-developed policies 
of the House by assisting all citizens to understand and accept 
those policies. At the same time, the House would help the Fo-
rum by advocating, within the legislature, specific parts of the 
broad spectrum of policy that the Forum would be slowly devel-
oping over successive polls.
9.2 Performance indicators for the People’s Forum
If the People’s Forum is tried out, it would be useful to have 
objective procedures that monitor how well it works. Direct 
procedures would assess the Forum’s achievement of mission, 
and indirect ones would assess its execution of strategies and 
its provision of the institutional and political equality goods ex-
pected of an institution for assisting government (as discussed 
in §6.2 and applied in §6.3 and §6.5.2). As the two governmental 
goods described in §6.2 are to be provided by the Forum’s two 
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strategies, the provisions of these goods are gauged by judging 
the execution of those strategies. Performance indicators may 
therefore be produced by assessing the first fourteen of the fol-
lowing sixteen types of performance, the last two (the provision 
of governmental goods) not being needed as they are covered 
by iii and iv.
types of performance indicators
Achievement of mission by a People’s Forum:
i. Improving the quality of public policy.
ii. Improving the legitimacy of public policy.
Execution of strategies by a People’s Forum:
iii. Accelerating the development of mass public opinion, es-
pecially on strategic public policy.
iv. Producing political influence for the part of public opinion 
that is relatively well developed.
Provision of goods by a People’s Forum
Institutional:
v. Efficiency.
vi. Transferability to political system.
vii. Transferability to strategic issues.
viii. Transferability to large-scale polities.
ix. Transparency.
x. Feasibility of introduction.
Political equality:
xi. In communication (of citizens’ political views).
xii. In voting by citizens.
xiii. In agenda control by citizens.
xiv. Full inclusion of all classes of citizens.
Governmental:
xv. Enlightened understanding (especially on strategic issues, 
which is covered by vii above). This indicator is equivalent 
to iii above.
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xvi. Political prevalence of enlightened understanding. This in-
dicator is equivalent to iv above.
As the assessment of the achievement of mission directly in-
dicates performance, it is potentially a more reliable indicator 
than assessing the execution of strategies. The descriptions of 
possible indicators that are given below focus only on those con-
cerning mission and strategies and do not address provisions of 
institutional and political equality goods, as these are relative 
details of performance. They could be investigated as additional 
indicators if considered useful, and this might be done in ways 
similar to those suggested below for indicating achievement of 
mission and execution of strategies.
9.2.1 Indicators of achievement of mission (indicator 
types i & ii)
The following four performance indicators (PI1–pi4) might 
show how well an operating People’s Forum improves the qual-
ity and legitimacy of public policy.
pi1. based on democracy indices. A few broad changes might 
be monitored in the quality and legitimacy of the public policy 
of a democracy after it has commenced using a People’s Forum 
by observing trends in its democracy index as assessed by or-
ganisations such as the US-based Freedom House, Democratic 
Audit in the UK, Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann 
et al. 2010) and The Economist Intelligence Unit (Economist 
2008c; Economist 2010). For example, The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit’s Index of Democracy monitors five categories of 
democratic function for each country: electoral process and 
pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; 
democratic political culture; and civil liberties. Each of these 
categories is analysed into several sub-categories (from eight to 
fourteen of these), and for each sub-category the country’s per-
formance is given a rating. Some of these sub-categories con-
cern the legitimacy of public policy, for example, ‘Public confi-
dence in government’ and ‘Public confidence in political parties’ 
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(in the category ‘functioning of government’). It may be possible 
to use some of these democracy index components by compar-
ing the rates of change they show in categories or sub-categories 
before the introduction of the People’s Forum against those at-
tained some years after its introduction.
pi2. based on public opinion polls. Some of the assessments 
of sub-categories for democracy indices are derived from mass 
public opinion polling within the polity being assessed. Polling 
of this type might be done in a more detailed manner than that 
currently employed by democracy index researchers to ascer-
tain citizens’ perceptions of the quality and legitimacy of gov-
ernment policies on specific issues, both before and after a Peo-
ple’s Forum is introduced.
pi3. based on expert opinion. Surveys asking questions simi-
lar to those for PI2 may be posed, not to the general public, but 
to experts in public policy, such as academics and executives 
of interest groups, to give another indicator of the quality, but 
not legitimacy, of policy before and after the introduction of a 
People’s Forum.
pi4. based on intensive deliberation forums. Intensive delib-
eration forums that are either self-selected or random samples 
might assess the effect of the People’s Forum on the quality of 
public policy. The findings of the random sample types may also 
indicate the potential for the legitimacy of the public policies 
being developed by a People’s Forum. That potential might be 
realized only after extensive public debate on those policies, via 
the Forum.
9.2.2 Indicators of execution of the first strategy 
(indicator type iii)
Indications of change in the development of mass public opin-
ion (especially on strategic issues) by an operating People’s Fo-
rum should be given by the following two devices.
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pi5. based on polls of public opinion. Several mass public 
opinion polls before and also after the advent of a People’s Fo-
rum, on questions posed by it, may show whether it appeared to 
accelerate the rate of change of this opinion on these questions.
pi6. based on expert opinion. Surveys of experts in mass pub-
lic opinion (such as political scientists and the executives of 
interest groups) on their perceptions of the effect of a People’s 
Forum on the development of mass public opinion on questions 
that it has run and of which they have good knowledge may 
indicate how well the Forum is executing its first strategy. This 
performance indicator is similar to that of PI3, but it focuses on 
the development of mass public opinion under the People’s Fo-
rum instead of its effect on the quality of public policy.
9.2.3 Indicators of execution of the second strategy 
(indicator type iv)
The following indicators should show the extent to which an 
operating People’s Forum is generating political influence for 
relatively well-developed public opinion, as registered by Peo-
ple’s Forum polls.
pi7. based on forum turnout. A percentage of electors vot-
ing in the Forum that is close to zero would indicate negligible 
influence, but only a small percentage, say 5%, in combination 
with good ratings for PI8 below may indicate considerable influ-
ence for the opinion expressed in People’s Forum poll results. 
The figure of 5% is suggested, as that should be a considerable 
part of the percentage of the community that is knowledgeable 
on political issues (which is suggested in §2.2.3 to be less than 
20% for many issues). Thus, something like a turnout of 5% or 
more at People’s Forum polls might eventually become widely 
accepted by the public as a politically respectable voice. 
pi8. based on polls of public opinion. Mass public opinion 
poll ratings of approval and disapproval of the following two 
aspects of the Forum should indicate its political influence:
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1. The People’s Forum system and management.
2. People’s Forum poll results and their trends.
These polls should be conducted on a regular basis, such as an-
nually, to identify any trends in mass approval or disapproval of 
the system and its results.
9.3 The inadequacy of small-scale trials of the 
People’s Forum
It would be very helpful if the effectiveness of the People’s Forum 
could be assessed by trying it out at a small scale that costs much 
less than the ten million dollars or more anticipated for the op-
erational scale, state or national trials recommended in §6.4. 
Any such experiment must indicate whether the People’s Forum 
is likely to achieve its mission at the large scale of operation for 
which it is designed or — as an indirect indication — whether it 
will execute its two strategies at the large scale. As its mission 
is to improve the quality and legitimacy of public policy in a 
provincial or national or multinational jurisdiction, it would 
seem unlikely that a small scale trial of the Forum could reli-
ably indicate whether it would do this — but could such a trial 
test the likelihood of it being able to execute its strategies? If it 
could, then it would also be testing the likelihood of PF execut-
ing its mission, for any execution of the strategies, especially the 
second one, should produce a corresponding execution of the 
mission.
For the Forum’s first strategy — accelerating the develop-
ment of mass public opinion across a large jurisdiction (espe-
cially with regard to strategic policy) — such a trial might use 
three randomly selected groups of the same size to represent the 
behaviour of the members of such a jurisdiction. Two of these 
groups would be selected at the beginning of a period of perhaps 
five years, during which one of them would be exposed to the 
Forum’s distinctive ‘deliberative’ technique, which is based on 
offering group members an annual vote in a Forum ballot. The 
other group would be offered one vote at the beginning of this 
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period on the same ballot paper and would then have no further 
input into the trial. At the end of the trial period, a third group 
of the same size would be randomly selected from those mem-
bers of the large jurisdiction who have not previously voted on 
that ballot paper and they would be offered one vote on it, with 
no opportunity to deliberate before voting. This vote would be 
compared with the final and contemporaneous vote of the sam-
ple group that had been participating in the annual vote over 
the five year period, to see if there was a significant difference. 
Any such difference should arise from the deliberative influence 
of the Forum’s process on the members of the sample that was 
exposed to the opportunity to vote annually over the five-year 
period. The vote of the sample group that only voted once, at the 
beginning of the period, would be compared with the vote of the 
group that only voted once, at the end of the period, to indicate 
the changes in opinion that occurred over the large jurisdiction 
without any influence from the Forum.
Such comparison cannot, however, test the Forum’s effective-
ness because only part of its deliberative technique can be ap-
plied to small groups. That part of the technique has three main 
components: (1) the way the ballot paper is written (including 
menus of incisive questions, as discussed in §7.2.2) together 
with its very large menu of issues for potential voters to choose 
from; (2) a regular and spaced vote, such as an annual poll, that 
provides publicized periods for deliberation that culminate in 
feedback on attitudes (the poll result) and trends in those atti-
tudes (successive poll results), which may assist the next period 
of deliberation; and (3) voluntary voting, which may promote 
communication about issues as citizens urge each other to vote, 
while it also invites only those who are interested in the issues to 
vote. However, a large part of the Forum’s deliberative technique 
cannot be applied to small groups. This part is the offer to the 
members of a group of the possibility or probability that their 
vote will have political influence. Awareness of this will motivate 
some members to try to use this influence by voting and also by 
arguing with other members about the specific questions that 
are presented by the poll, in the course of which the members 
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of the group may learn more about those questions than they 
otherwise would have done. But awareness of the possibility of 
such political influence cannot arise in the members of a group 
that is too small to have that influence. Such lack of incentive to 
learn is made even more likely for small experimental groups by 
the types of issues that the Forum would deal with. As these are 
persistent, long-term problems, many of which are interrelated 
and of fundamental importance, they can only be influenced by 
large jurisdictions with political systems that can act strategi-
cally. It is therefore only members of such very large, politically 
potent groups that can imagine they might influence this type of 
policy and that could thereby be strongly motivated by the run-
ning of Forum polls to argue, deliberate and vote. As members 
of small groups will therefore not be as motivated by a Forum 
poll to think as much about the issues it presents as the mem-
bers of very large groups could be, a trial of the Forum in a small 
group is likely to underestimate the Forum’s potential to execute 
its first strategy of accelerating the development of public opin-
ion on strategic issues.
To run a small-scale test of the effectiveness of the People’s 
Forum’s execution of its second strategy (producing political 
influence for the part of mass public opinion that is likely to be 
relatively well developed), one randomly selected experimental 
group appears necessary. If this sample accurately represents 
the many members of a large jurisdiction, it might be expected 
to simulate their behaviour. The simulation we need here is to 
run the People’s Forum within this sample group for several 
years, with a sequence of polls at regular intervals of a year, or 
at least of several months. As the vote is voluntary, only those 
in this sample who are interested in any of the many issues on 
the ballot paper would be expected to vote, as envisaged for an 
operational-scale Forum. The results of these trial polls would 
therefore be considered to represent the views of those within 
the sample group that have the better-developed views on the 
issues presented. After several years of polls, all the members 
of the sample group would then be asked whether they think 
that the poll trends should be translated into law or government 
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policy. The response is likely to indicate a very strong execution 
of the Forum’s second strategy by showing that the members of 
the sample readily grant political influence to the voters among 
them, because there is very strong support from all members for 
the voting trends to be enacted in law or policy. That support is 
likely because the voters within the sample may be virtually its 
entire membership, so we have the members supporting their 
own views. Something like this situation may well occur with 
such a sample because its members could feel obliged or stimu-
lated by the attention given to them — in being randomly se-
lected and then personally advised of the availability of a regular 
poll — to take an interest in the issues presented in it and also to 
vote in it, whereas they may be less likely to do that as citizens 
in a polity that offers an operational-scale Forum. This could 
mean that almost all the members of the sample actually vote 
in the polls they are offered, so there is little difference between 
the opinions of the whole sample and that very large majority 
of it that chooses to vote. If this happens, then we do not have 
a test of whether all the members of the sample grant political 
influence to a small subset of it who choose to vote, for the sub-
set is not small, being virtually all the members. This ‘test’ may 
therefore overrate the effectiveness of the Forum in executing 
its second strategy. The test may also have the opposite effect 
because the lack of reality of the situation in which the members 
of a sample group are expected to take some interest in strategic 
policies for their group while that group has no prospect of im-
plementing them may be too uninteresting for any of the group 
members to take seriously. They may therefore fail to debate 
these issues, fail to develop policies on them and be totally care-
less about granting any such policies political influence within 
the group because the group is far too small to be able to imple-
ment those policies.
Small-scale trials therefore seem likely to fail to simulate the 
performance of the People’s Forum in large jurisdictions by un-
derestimating its capacity to execute its first strategy and over, or 
underestimating its capacity to execute its second strategy. Even 
if such trials were not confusing in these ways, they would still 
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be somewhat deficient because they do not specifically assess 
the Forum’s capacity to achieve its mission in large jurisdictions, 
which is to improve the quality of public policy (especially stra-
tegic policy) while developing public legitimacy for that policy.
9.3.1 Simulation instead of small-scale experiment
As small scale trials may be misleading, simulation by thought 
experiment or by computer might be regarded as sufficiently re-
liable for indicating whether the People’s Forum is worth the ex-
pense of trialling at operational scale. To consider mental simu-
lation first, this should focus on the likelihood that the Forum 
will do those things that are crucial for its success. At the broad 
level, there are three such capabilities: that the Forum is ame-
nable to being established at an operational scale and that, as it 
operates, it executes both of its strategies. As discussed previ-
ously in §7.2.12, establishing the Forum (essentially function 11) 
is not fundamentally extremely difficult or impossible, so we fo-
cus on the probability of it being able to execute its strategies. To 
judge this, we assess its probability of performing the functions 
that would execute those strategies. For this purpose we refer 
to the twelve functions listed in §7.1 and discussed under §7.2, 
rather than the five more general functions discussed in §6.3 
(which are covered by the twelve). To identify the functions that 
are crucial, we first rank the strategies in order of importance. 
The first strategy is to develop mass public opinion on strategic 
issues, and the second is to produce political influence for the 
opinions of that section of the public that is more likely to be so-
phisticated in strategic policy. As political studies show that the 
first strategy is extremely difficult to execute to any degree (see 
§2.2.3 and §2.2.4), the second strategy is arguably the most im-
portant for the successful operation of PF. We therefore focus on 
this and assess the likelihood of it being executed by considering 
two aspects of PF’s functions: the significance of a function in 
executing the second strategy and the probability that the func-
tion will be performed by the Forum. This assessment is done 
by selecting the most significant functions first and then judging 
the probability of their execution by the Forum.
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The functions needed to execute PF’s second strategy are, as 
indicated by the notation Sm in the list of 12 in §7.1, functions 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12. Of these, 5, 7 and 9 appear to be especially 
significant for that execution. This makes function 12 (public 
confidence in PF) significant as well, because it is necessary for 
function 5 (political influence for PF voting trends). Functions 6 
and 8 are relative details (less significant for the second strategy) 
and are, in any case, judged as probably achievable with the PF 
design (see their descriptions in §7.2.7 and §7.2.9), so they can be 
dropped from further consideration. Function 10 (PF produc-
ing political will for difficult decisions) depends on function 5, 
which emphasizes the significance of function 5. This focuses 
us on the probability of PF executing 5, 7, 9 and 12. Function 
12 (public confidence in PF) will depend partly on the heuris-
tic produced by executing function 7 (meritocratic influence), 
and it is suggested that the PF design should adequately execute 
both of them, if function 9 (freedom from corruption) is effec-
tively implemented. So, to judge the probability of PF’s success 
we must primarily assess the probabilities that it will perform 
functions 5, 7, 9 and 12. These assessments may be attempted by 
reading §7.2.6 (function 5), §7.2.8 (function 7), §7.2.10 (function 
9) and §7.2.13 (function 12). It is suggested that those accounts 
indicate that a well-managed PF is likely to execute all of those 
four functions reasonably well. All the other functions also ap-
pear feasible, so it appears that PF should work.
As several of the twelve functions are interdependent to some 
degree, a computer simulation might be able to give a better idea 
of the probabilities of their execution by PF and thus the prob-
ability of PF executing its two strategies and achieving its mis-
sion. Such simulation might cover the operation of PF under: 
(a) a range of probabilities that PF will perform each function; 
(b) a range of strengths of those performances; and (c) differ-
ent strengths of interactions between functions. Such modelling 
should indicate the sensitivity of PF’s performance to each vari-
able and thereby give a clearer idea — under subjectively real-
istic ranges of assumptions — of whether it could perform its 
functions and execute its strategies. This approach bears some 
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similarity to the game-theoretic computer simulation used for 
political forecasting by several firms in the US, such as Mesquita 
and Roundell LLC, but that method does not appear suitable for 
our purpose, as it is designed for ‘strategic situations’. Over hun-
dreds of such cases, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s predictions have 
been assessed by the CIA at more than 90% successful (Bueno 
de Mesquita 2009, xix). ‘Strategic situations’ are not events such 
as elections where millions of people each have an extremely 
small influence, but those where relatively small numbers of 
people are haggling over a contentious decision. In such cases, 
influential players and their interactions can be identified and 
modelled in modes such as negotiation, coercion, bullying and 
cooperation (O’Connell 2012, 43). However, it may be possible 
to apply simulation that is not necessarily game-theoretic to 
predict the performances of institutional designs. In game the-
ory, the actors and their situation and influence are identified, 
which allows the computer to generate their likely interactions 
and responses. Simulation of institutional performance may fol-
low a parallel approach by identifying the design elements (such 
as those specified in Chapter 7 for PF), assessing how they would 
interact with human nature to produce design functions (such 
as those specified in Chapter 7 for PF) and then assessing how 
these functions would interact with human nature to produce 
or fail to execute the strategies or mission of the institution. The 
reliability of such predictions might be tested by varying the 
human responses within what are judged to be likely limits to 
see what this does to the simulation. If such sensitivity analy-
sis predicts likely failure of the institution, it may suggest either 
changing specific design elements or abandoning that particular 
basic design.
However, in view of the urgency of the need to improve gov-
ernance, together with the expense of modelling and the in-
herent uncertainty of its theoretical output, it seems advisable 
to give first priority to a trial of the People’s Forum in the real 




We now review our diagnosis of democratic failure and our pre-
scription to cure it by looking at previous diagnoses by others, 
to see how they compare with ours and whether our prescrip-
tion — the People’s Forum — would address them as well.
Four decades before this book was written, political scien-
tist Samuel P. Huntington and sociologists Joji Watanuki and 
Michel Crozier assessed democratic societies as ‘anomic’, or 
lacking in purpose. The assessment by Part 1 of this book is 
similar, with aimlessness predicted from three effects: ambigu-
ity about who directs the polity; distraction of political agents by 
competitive struggles; and a compromising of the wisdom and 
social responsibility of some citizens with the disengagement of 
many others. Huntington, Watanuki and Crozier described this 
anomie in the following terms.
What is in short supply in democratic societies today is thus not 
consensus on the rules of the game but a sense of purpose as to 
what one should achieve by playing the game. In the past, people 
have found their purposes in religion, in nationalism, and in ideol-
ogy … In Europe and Japan, after World War II, economic recon-
struction and development were supported as goals by virtually all 
major groups in society … Now, however, these purposes have lost 
their salience and even come under challenge … In this situation, 
the machinery of democracy continues to operate, but the ability of 
the individuals operating that machinery to make decisions tends 
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to deteriorate. Without common purpose, there is no basis for com-
mon priorities, and without priorities, there are no grounds for dis-
tinguishing among competing private interests and claims … The 
system becomes one of anomic democracy, in which democratic 
politics becomes more an arena for the assertion of conflicting in-
terests than a process for the building of common purposes. (Cro-
zier et al. 1975, 159–61)
In Part 1 we reviewed recent examples of anomic democracy in 
the US and Australia, together with some indications that even 
the Nordic countries may be developing the malaise. Thirty-six 
years after the diagnosis by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 
strategic studies scholar Hugh White (2011) offered an anecdotal 
observation of anomie in Japan.
The way the current government has responded to the tsuna-
mi — especially the nuclear crisis that followed — has intensified 
the sense that Japan’s political system today simply cannot deliver 
effective government able to deal with passing crises, let alone ad-
dress the much deeper and ultimately more demanding long-term 
challenges Japan faces … 
Japan deeply fears that, as China grows stronger, it will squeeze 
Japan economically, politically and strategically, reducing Japan to a 
kind of Chinese dependency … 
… Japan has the basic resources needed to be a great power in 
Asia for many decades. But Japan will need not just a new govern-
ment but a new kind of government. A young Japanese friend said 
to me recently that the only way for Japan to avoid decline was 
by replacing the whole political system. Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi, who resigned five years ago, was as good a leader as the 
present political system could deliver, and he was not good enough 
to halt Japan’s slide. What is needed, my friend told me, is a revolu-
tion — an end to money politics, careerist politicians and the rule of 
party bosses. A new politics formed by competing views of Japan’s 
future, rather than by competing factions and interest groups.
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This might be interpreted as a call for a People’s Forum, as this 
design is intended to produce a ‘new politics formed by compet-
ing views of … [the] future’. 
For another perspective on whether the Forum might im-
prove democratic government, Ralf Dahrendorf ’s (2000) as-
sessment of the task appears useful. Drawing on his experience 
as a social scientist, a founder of the European Community and 
a member of the UK House of Lords, Dahrendorf identified five 
major problems for contemporary democracies. The first is that 
democracy works best when the people are strongly involved, 
which is usually when democracy is being fought for. Once it 
is well-established and citizens’ rights are generalized, conflicts 
become less urgent, more diffuse and the people tend to disen-
gage. The People’s Forum may be able to counter this diffusion 
with its careful identification of issues, its formulation of crucial 
questions and its persistence with these for an extended time, so 
that citizens are encouraged to maintain their focus and thereby 
develop well-considered judgments and insist on their imple-
mentation.
Dahrendorf ’s second democratic problem is that political 
democracy is linked to nation-states and, as their significance 
is eroded by globalization, government seems less relevant. As 
the Forum should be able to work across international domains 
it may be able to counter this decline, partly by developing an 
international form of democratic governance (via questions on 
supranational issues), but also by helping to clarify the respon-
sibilities of each democracy with questions on national issues.
His third concern is a slide towards authoritarianism as na-
tional governments try to bypass parliaments by consolidating 
the power of executive systems, which in the US is led by the 
growing power of the presidency. Dahrendorf (2000, 312) de-
scribes this as 
a curious development that has to do with the complexities of gov-
ernment, the need for expertise, and the as yet undefined role of the 
media … these trends need to be deplored or reversed, but no new 
mechanisms have been found to control ostensibly independent 
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bodies, rein in quangos, and channel vague expressions of public 
opinion.
The People’s Forum design may provide such a mechanism, as it 
should redefine the role of congresses and parliaments by hav-
ing them more explicitly and more wisely directed by the peo-
ple. This should clarify ‘vague expressions of public opinion’ and 
reverse any authoritarian trend.
Dahrendorf ’s (2000, 313) fourth democratic problem is the 
flip side of the slide towards authoritarianism: the apathy of 
many citizens who are ‘tired of what they regard as the demo-
cratic game’. Such disengagement at the bottom strengthens 
authority at the top, but it should be countered by the People’s 
Forum offering citizens easy but meaningful ways to partici-
pate, such as voting once a year on strategic issues and, as they 
choose, engaging in sustained public discourse on the specific 
questions that the Forum poses on these.
Dahrendorf ’s final democratic difficulty is that civil society 
has become less cohesive in ways that erode the social base of 
government. This is partly due to democracy overcoming class-
based party struggles to produce generalized citizenship rights. 
As these are individual rights they tend to atomize collective 
identity, and this challenges us to ensure that tomorrow’s soci-
ety will have the cohesion to function. Here again, the People’s 
Forum appears to offer an answer. It would provide an arena in 
which citizens come together and communicate systematically 
by selecting their agenda and steadily working through it.
The inquiry by Robert Putnam (1993), Robert Leonardi 
and Raffaella Y. Nanetti into the effects of institutional change 
in Italy provides another perspective on the prospects for the 
People’s Forum. In 1970, the Italian government created identi-
cal new regional governments, from the south with its narrow 
family-based morality to the north with its more inclusive out-
look. Putnam and his colleagues assessed the effects of this in-
stitutional change that was applied uniformly across the country 
and came up with three broad lessons. The first was that ‘Social 
context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of 
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institutions’ (1993, 182); the second was that ‘changing formal 
institutions can change political practice’ (1993, 184); and the 
third was that ‘most institutional history moves slowly’ (1993, 
184). The first lesson indicates that the People’s Forum should 
be more effective and least likely to provoke violent conflict in 
open, inclusive societies that are accustomed to managing dif-
ference, while the second means that it may help closed and au-
thoritarian societies to become more open and liberal. The third 
lesson may apply more effectively to new institutions that are 
not personally experienced by citizens than to those that all citi-
zens can actively participate in. With the latter class, into which 
the People’s Forum falls, citizens will ‘learn by doing’ and there-
fore ‘institutional history’ may move quickly.
The somewhat controversial ‘selectorate theory’ developed 
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues provides a use-
ful perspective on triple dysfunction theory and thereby also 
on the potential of the People’s Forum. Selectorate theory is a 
rational choice view of how organisations such as dictatorships, 
democratic governments and corporations work. It underlies 
the game theoretic modelling that Bueno de Mesquita and oth-
ers very successfully use to predict the outcome of ‘strategic 
situations’, as noted above in §9.3.1. In prefacing an introduc-
tion to their theory, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012, 264) 
observe: ‘For the citizens of democracies, life is good. But good 
does not preclude better.’ They note that ‘better’ is an optimal 
provision of public goods, which according to selectorate theory 
is achieved by maximizing the size of the group that keeps the 
leader in power. The most essential such group is the ‘winning 
coalition’, those ‘people whose support is essential if a leader is 
to survive in office’ (2012, 5). Less essential, but influential, is 
the group that effectively selects the leader, which is called the 
‘real selectorate’, or the ‘influentials’. The largest relevant group 
is the ‘nominal selectorate’, which comprises all those (the ‘in-
terchangeables’) who have at least some legal say in selecting 
their leader, such as citizens who are eligible to vote. From the 
perspective of selectorate theory it would seem that, if the Peo-
ple’s Forum receives the public support necessary for it to func-
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tion, then it should improve the democratic provision of public 
goods because it would tend to enlarge both the real selectorate 
(the influentials) and the winning coalition (the essentials). A 
People’s Forum should expand the influentials by encouraging 
more of the interchangeables to join them by voting in its polls 
and by contributing to the development of public opinion on 
its questions via engagement in public discourse on these. Such 
activity should transform these participants in the Forum from 
interchangeables to influentials by giving them more influence 
over who leads their democratic government — because he or 
she will tend to be selected according to their conformity to the 
policy recommendations that Forum participants develop via 
their contributions to Forum polling trends. If the Forum be-
comes very influential, then its voters and those who campaign 
successfully on questions presented on the Forum’s ballot would 
virtually become part of the winning coalition, because they are 
then essential to the political survival of leaders in the sense that 
these voters and activists help to form the public opinion on 
policy that both selects and supports (via elections) only those 
leaders who will execute it. Thus, as the People’s Forum has the 
potential to increase the size of winning coalitions in democrat-
ic governments, selectorate theory indicates that (if it works) it 
would improve the quality of government.
Triple dysfunction theory and selectorate theory thus appear 
to complement each other. While selectorate theory has the wide 
scope of describing how democracies, autocracies and corpora-
tions are managed, triple dysfunction is restricted to democra-
cies, how their structure tends to fail and thus how it might be 
improved. Triple dysfunction might therefore be considered 
to fit within selectorate theory and, from that perspective, the 
nominal selectorate might be regarded in triple dysfunction 
theory as the ‘nominal directorate’, because all those who have 
some legal say in selecting their leader (in selectorate theory) 
also have some possibility of influencing or directing govern-
ment policy (in triple dysfunction theory). Likewise, in democ-
racies the real selectorate (or influentials) can be considered to 
also be a ‘real directorate’. For example, in a democracy that suc-
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ceeds in countering triple dysfunction with an institution like 
the People’s Forum, the real directorate (influentials) includes 
citizens who participate in that institution by voting in its polls, 
and/or by arguing and campaigning on the questions it runs, 
and/or by offering advice to PF managers on the composition of 
their ballot paper. The real directorate or influentials might even 
be considered to include those who distinguish themselves from 
the nominal directorate by utilizing the Forums’ polling trends 
as heuristics when they vote for parties and political candidates.
Considerable potential for the People’s Forum to help devel-
op global governance may be inferred from remarks made by 
Pascal Lamy, director-general of the World Trade Organisation, 
as he observed that current institutions of that scope
only have ‘secondary legitimacy’ as ‘assemblies of nation-states’. 
What they need to be effective is ‘primary legitimacy.’ That can only 
come by building up the ‘community of interests’ [to quote Zheng 
Bijian, former vice-chair of the Chinese Central Party School] by 
bringing global governance ‘closer to citizens,’ particularly by em-
ploying social networking technology so that ‘citizens are inhabited 
by a sense of togetherness’ … 
The great challenge, therefore, is how to move toward ‘a con-
vergence of interests’ when the executive committee of global gov-
ernance — the G20 — is beset by centrifugal tendencies instead of 
drawn toward unity. (Berggruen and Gardels 2013, 156)
The People’s Forum may be essential for governance at this scale 
(as well as at the national scale) because it focuses on building 
the ‘primary legitimacy’ that comes from helping citizens to de-
velop and implement their ideas on policy. It should therefore 
foster the requisite ‘sense of togetherness’ and ‘convergence of 
interests’.
Philanthropist George Soros, who has financed the develop-
ment of democracy in several countries via his Open Society 




What can we do to preserve and reinvigorate open society in Amer-
ica? First, I should like to see efforts to help the public develop an 
immunity to Newspeak [George Orwell’s 1984 term for deceptive 
official jargon]. Those who have been exposed to it from Nazi or 
Communist times have an allergic reaction to it; but the broad pub-
lic is highly susceptible.
Second, I should like to convince the American public of the 
merits of facing harsh reality … 
But improving the quality of political discourse is not enough. 
We must also find the right policies to deal with the very real prob-
lems confronting the country. (Soros 2011, 16)
These three priorities are close to those of the People’s Forum: 
To raise the level of public discourse on public affairs and then 
shape public policy with the resultant enlightened views. 
On the urgency of improving democratic governance, Gus 
Speth provides an environmental perspective. He observes that
we’re trying to do environmental policy and activism within a 
system that is simply too powerful. It’s today’s capitalism, with its 
overwhelming commitment to growth at all costs, its devolution of 
tremendous power into the corporate sector, and its blind faith in a 
market riddled with externalities … The only solution is to … figure 
out what needs to be done to change today’s capitalism … We need 
a new political movement in the US to drive this … The economy we 
have now is an inherently rapacious and ruthless system. It is up to 
citizens to inject values that reflect human aspirations rather than 
just making money … But groups, whether they’re concerned about 
social issues, social justice, the environment, or effective politics, are 
failing because they’re not working together. (cited in Else 2008, 48)
In Chapter 5, the analysis of the ‘scarcity multiplier’ demon-
strates what is needed ‘to change today’s capitalism’. Part 1 initi-
ated that analysis with its diagnosis of ‘triple dysfunction’ and 
Part 2 followed it up by prescribing the People’s Forum as a rem-
edy. This institution could be the crucial tool for Speth’s ‘new 
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political movement … to inject values that reflect human aspira-
tions’.
It is even possible that the Forum may find an important 
heuristic role in some non-democratic regimes. As China 
scholar David Lampton (2014) observes, that country is chang-
ing and now ‘almost all Chinese leaders openly speak about the 
importance of public opinion … China has built a large appara-
tus aimed at measuring people’s views … [and] has even begun 
using survey data to help assess whether CCP officials deserve 
promotion.’ This trend demonstrates the widespread need for 
public opinion to be well developed in both autocratic and lib-
eral democratic systems. People’s Forums should facilitate such 
development, not only directly, but also indirectly by strongly 
implying that free media are crucial in helping public opinion 
to become more sophisticated.
This book observes that political science indicates five of the 
most influential behaviours in democratic politics are: (1) elec-
tors and their representatives tend to be confused about wheth-
er the latter are trustees or delegates (see the concluding part 
of §2.2); (2) a very large majority of citizens is politically disen-
gaged and ignorant of public affairs and policy (§2.2.3, §2.2.4); 
(3) many citizens rely on heuristics to guide their vote (§2.2.3) 
and some of this reliance is expressed by them being quite happy 
to leave the work of becoming knowledgeable on public policy 
and trying to influence government to others, such as politi-
cians and NGOs, provided that they can have a say when they 
want to (§7.2.3); (4) citizens are increasingly disillusioned with 
traditional electoral, party-based politics and are engaging more 
through issues, as noted in Chapter 1 (see its references to An-
dersen and Hoff, Kevill, Brett and the rise of NGOs campaigning 
on issues); (5) small numbers of citizens with intense common 
interests find it much easier to organize politically than large 
numbers of citizens with less direct common interests, which of-
ten corrupts public policy because the intense interests of small 
influential groups are usually focused on narrow concerns, such 
as their private goods (see Olson’s Law, §2.3.2). 
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The People’s Forum’s poll addresses each of these behaviours. 
As triple dysfunction theory sees the confusion of responsibili-
ties noted in (1) above as caused by an organizational flaw, the 
People’s Forum would ameliorate it by reducing the area of re-
sponsibility that elections attempt to delegate from citizens and 
by clarifying the responsibilities that then remain with citizens 
(i.e. strategic policy) and their representatives (tactical and oper-
ational policy). The Forum would minimize the damage to gov-
ernance from citizens’ disengagement and ignorance (2 above) 
by assisting them to delegate responsibility to those among 
them who do engage (3 above). It would facilitate more engage-
ment by citizens with issues (4 above), and in doing so provide 
constructive heuristics for voters (3 above). That combination 
should tend to replace the dubious heuristics currently provided 
by political candidates and parties (e.g. see §7.2.6), which tend to 
be more about personalities and dramas of political power than 
about issues and policies. The People’s Forum should minimize 
the operation of Olson’s Law (5 above) by assisting all citizens 
to organize politically — by helping them, first, to develop their 
opinions on public affairs and then to collectively pressure their 
political agents to implement those developed opinions.
In doing these things, the People’s Forum would be taking 
advantage of what has been argued in this book to be the main 
democratic problem. This is the ambiguous delegation (1 above) 
that seems to make it acceptable for citizens to remain ignorant 
on important issues while trying to compensate by using heu-
ristics as they vote in elections, public opinion polls and refer-
endums. The Forum’s voluntary, self-selective, repetitive voting 
would actually use this widespread democratic disengagement 
to produce sophisticated results — because those who are dis-
engaged will exclude themselves from Forum polls, while those 
who do engage should become progressively better informed on 
public policy via that engagement. As it produces this sophisti-
cation, the Forum would be assisted to inject it into government 
policy and legislation by the reliance of the disengaged mass 
public on heuristics. This may be achieved by the Forum regu-
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larly publicizing both its results and their deliberated quality in 
order to encourage citizens to use them as guides for their vote.
The comparison given in §6.5.2 of several proposed new 
forms of democratic government, together with the assessment 
in §9.3 of the necessary conditions for experimental tests of the 
People’s Forum, indicates that this institutional design warrants 
a trial. To do this it should be run for at least three years across 
either an entire province or nation, which might be sufficient 
exposure for many citizens to start to understand it and to use 
it. The result of the trial may be made more conclusive by con-
currently running one or more intensive deliberation forums to 
try to produce mutually supportive interactions, as discussed 
in §9.1. To consider which forums to run in this context, they 
might be separated into two classes: open (self-selected partici-
pation) intensive forums such as National Issues Forums, Study 
Circles, AmericaSpeaks and Minnesota E-Democracy; and re-
stricted (such as random selection participation) intensive fo-
rums like deliberative opinion polls, online deliberative polling, 
consensus conferences, planning cells and citizens’ assemblies. 
Open intensive forums might make some contribution by assist-
ing in very limited ways to develop mass public opinion on the 
questions posed by the People’s Forum’s ballot paper. Restricted 
(randomly selected participation) intensive forums might con-
tribute by helping to develop political influence for Forum polls. 
They may do this by providing the mass public with heuristics 
for voting in elections, in public opinion polls and in referen-
dums. These heuristics would be the findings of those strongly 
representative intensive forums on Forum questions, as they 
would show (by random sample) how the mass public would 
respond to those questions if it carefully deliberated them. Re-
stricted participation intensive forums are therefore likely, not 
only to largely agree with People’s Forum trends, but also to be 
understood to some extent by citizens as saying what the mass 
public would, if everyone had the resources, time and incentive 
to carefully consider those questions. Publicity for the findings 
of restricted participation intensive forums may therefore en-
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courage citizens at large to support politicians and candidates 
who promise to implement the Forum’s trends.
Although the People’s Forum is recommended here as the 
most feasible and effective way to start to improve democrat-
ic government, its effects may be slow to develop. Its focus on 
long-running issues should help citizens gradually build pres-
sure on their representatives to improve strategic policies, laws 
and basic structures of governance, such as constitutions, un-
written conventions and other institutions. A few examples of 
such structural reforms are: restricting the types and thus the 
number of public servants who are appointed by popular elec-
tion; eliminating gerrymanders by having district boundaries 
redrawn by impartial commissions; and eventually, perhaps, ap-
pointing legislators by sortition instead of by election.
As proposed in the opening Synopsis, the People’s Forum 
might become a new branch of democratic government, and if 
it did, it should fill a yawning gap in their structures. This is that 
the public opinion on which they run is ‘woefully uninformed’ 
(see the first paragraph of §2.2.3). The Forum should amelio-
rate this fundamental fault by helping citizens develop their 
knowledge and opinions on public affairs and by providing con-
structive heuristics for those who don’t. Not until this is done 
will democratic governments have good foundations for their 
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative branches. The 
new branch might be dubbed the ‘opinion development branch’ 
or the ‘public deliberation branch’.
To conclude, we might note that the design of the Forum 
conforms to Marsh’s (2000, 200) judgment that, in Australia at 
least, it is crucial to create a ‘political capacity to seed opinion 
formation and to help mobilize consent’. This includes capaci-
ties ‘to engage interest groups and issue movements in a forum 
that can challenge the executive’ and ‘attract media attention’. 
The People’s Forum should be able to do those things. Its design 
appreciates that any citizen may have the interests, knowledge, 
sensitivities and sense of civic responsibility that can help. This 
open, accessible and careful approach may help us work togeth-
er towards a safer and more fulfilling future.
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afterword 
a methoD for DeSigning 
politiCal inStitutionS
This afterword offers a theory of institutional design. As such, it 
may help those who want to devise a political institution them-
selves; perhaps one that holds more definite promise than the 
People’s Forum and other designs such as those described in 
Chapter 6. 
As Rothstein (2011, 216) points out, institutions may be for-
mal, such as legal and administrative structures, or they may be 
informal, such as generalized trust and other elements of so-
cial capital. It is the formal type that we focus on here, and it 
is suggested that these may be most effectively designed by the 
method that was used to invent the People’s Forum. Acceptance 
of this suggestion may of course be influenced by whether the 
Forum is shown to work in the real world of democratic politics. 
If it cannot be established, or if it is and fails to be effective, then 
more attempts are needed to design an institution of similar 
purpose, and the method set out here may help. In that situa-
tion, however, experience will have indicated that the method 
is deficient, so it will need improving or replacing. Neverthe-
less, it does at least provide a starting point. And if the People’s 
Forum is successful, then the method may be seen as beginning 
to prove itself and might therefore be used to try to devise other 
formal institutions.
In contemplating the Forum’s design and the following de-
scription of how it was produced, one might be prompted to 
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ask: ‘Why wasn’t that particular design suggested long ago?’ This 
question becomes obvious when it is recognized that the diag-
nosis guiding that prescription is basically well-known. Its first 
part, ambiguous delegation, is merely a reinterpretation of the 
old dilemma of whether political agents are delegates or trus-
tees. The second part, excessive political competition, is widely 
recognized, but tends to be seen as necessary for the energy, 
transparency and accountability that it generates. And the third 
dysfunction, excessive compromise, has worried democrats at 
least since Plato emphasized in The Republic that democracy 
could never uphold the kind of knowledge that was needed to 
cure the world’s evils (Shapiro 2012, 193–94). So the diagnosis 
has been broadly apparent for a long time and the prescription 
might therefore be expected to have been concocted decades 
ago. It did not have to await the arrival of technology, such as 
television, the internet and the smart phone, as the People’s 
Forum could conceivably work across large jurisdictions with 
technology no more advanced than print media, radio and snail 
mail post.
The very small number of national-scale innovations de-
scribed in §6.5.2 may provoke a similar question: ‘Why has po-
litical science come up with so few practical designs for improv-
ing democratic function across provinces and nations?’ Part of 
the answer may be that as government failure has always been 
experienced by most people it is seen as normal, rather than 
as a problem that urgently needs solving. Moreover, a particu-
lar policy or action that is seen by some citizens as government 
failure might be seen by others as good government, so what’s 
the problem? And if there is a problem, then it appears to have 
already been tackled, for many attempts have been made to de-
sign better democratic government, as shown by the great varie-
ty of these around the world (e.g. Lijphart 2012). However, these 
different forms may instead be considered fundamentally alike, 
which is the approach tried in this book. Further reason for the 
rarity of fundamental reform in democratic government is that 
it seems impossible to implement because most incumbent poli-
ticians support the current system, as this is where they have 
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been successful. And finally, the crafting of such reform seems 
too difficult as there is no recognized method for designing po-
litical institutions (see Goodin 1996, 31 — and quoted below). It 
is this deficiency that I now attempt to remove, by describing the 
process used to devise the People’s Forum.
This method was only recognized in hindsight, after the de-
sign was produced. But it may derive merit in being deduced 
from the actual experience of devising an institution. The de-
duction began by recognizing that several distinct strategies had 
been used. These are quite unremarkable as they are widely and 
routinely used in everyday life and research, so their specifica-
tion in a method may seem unnecessary. However, it is largely 
the manner in which these strategies were applied that produces 
the method. As this method is, in effect, a theory of how to de-
sign institutions, it may fill the gap described by political theo-
rist Robert Goodin (1996, 31) as a ‘paucity of literature specifi-
cally on design issues’, with ‘little analysis as to what it means 
for institutions (or anything else, for that matter) to be designed 
and still less analysis of what principles might properly guide 
such design attempts’. That gap was clearly demonstrated by the 
book — The Theory of Institutional Design — in which Goodin 
made those comments, as none of its ten articles provided a the-
ory of how to design an institution, despite the apparent prom-
ise of its title. Instead, those articles discussed functions that 
institutions should perform and what might be expected from 
institutions in practice, including what might happen to them. 
That book was an early contribution to the series ‘Theories of 
Institutional Design’, published by Cambridge University Press. 
Many years and volumes later, this series has yet to publish a 
basic ‘theory of institutional design’, in other words, a theory of 
how to design an institution.
Such a theory is now offered by proposing that five strategies 
are useful and perhaps both necessary and sufficient for design-




The five strategies of the method
The first strategy: Utilize existing information
In looking for greater progress in his discipline, political scien-
tist Jon Bond (2007, 904–5) offered the following advice.
The kind of revolution necessary to propel political science to the 
next level of development is a revolution in theory. Sir Isaac New-
ton’s contribution to the science of physics was not the basic re-
search he did, but rather it was his recognition of how to put what 
physicists already knew together into a new overarching theory. I 
believe it is possible that political science has accumulated enough 
information about how and why politics work as they do to support 
such a synthesis.
The first strategy follows this suggestion. Only preexisting in-
formation was used to identify the problem and to try to solve 
it. I did no systematic empirical research and relied largely on 
the interpretations of experts in whatever research appeared 
relevant. The project was therefore multidisciplinary, ranging 
across history, biology, ethology, political science, public choice, 
ecological and neoclassical economics and evolutionary, so-
cial and cognitive branches of psychology. These sources have 
been augmented by nonacademic sources of information and 
my own political and psychological experience, where these ap-
peared reliable and relevant.
There is one exception to this approach, and this is part of 
the fourth strategy, in which potential solutions are tested to 
provide new information that show whether the design process 
needs to be continued and, if so, to guide it. One of the ways 
in which this may be done is by the second strategy of design: 
defining or redefining the problem
The second strategy: Define the problem
The second strategy is that the problem to be solved must be 
carefully defined. With political problems this may produce a 
definition that implies not only whether the solution requires 
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a new institution, but also the function of this institution and 
therefore possible outlines of its design. Definition may there-
by indicate the solution. Perhaps the first people to state this 
strategy in the field of governance were two experts in design 
and city planning, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber. They had 
recognized a widespread confusion about goals in public policy 
and suggested that it was happening because citizens in democ-
racies had started ‘asking for a clarification of purposes’ (Rittel 
and Webber 1973, 157). As public infrastructure planners they 
recognized that
goal-finding is one of the central functions of planning … Goal-
finding is turning out to be an extraordinarily obstinate task … Plan-
ning problems are inherently wicked … The information needed to 
understand the problem depends on one’s idea for solving it … To 
find the problem is thus the same thing as finding the solution. (Rit-
tel and Webber 1973, 160–61, emphasis in original)
Political scientist Michael Harmon and public administration 
expert Richard Mayer (1986, 9) subsequently endorsed this 
view of ‘wicked’ problems: ‘the choice of a definition of such a 
problem, in fact, typically determines its ‘solution’’. Others have 
expressed a similar assessment of how to tackle any problem, 
whether it could be classed as ‘wicked’ or not. For example, Al-
bert Einstein observed that the
mere formulation of a problem is far more essential than its so-
lution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experi-
mental skills. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard 
old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and 
marks real advances in science. (QuoteWorld 2008)
Political scientist Ian Shapiro (cited in Topper 2007, 574) has 
noted that surprisingly little attention is given to problem speci-
fication in the study of politics. Therefore, ‘one central task for 
political theorists should be to identify, criticize, and suggest 
plausible alternatives to … the specifications of problems … and 
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to do it in ways that can spark novel and promising problem-
driven research agendas’ (Shapiro 2005, 180).
Part 1 of this book is devoted to defining the problem, first by 
working from evidence to observe its existence and describe its 
essence, then by using more evidence to check the accuracy of 
that definition.
The third strategy: Utilize only necessary and sufficient 
information
My third strategy was to try to identify and use only the infor-
mation that is necessary and sufficient for the task at hand. This 
is important because the task — to devise a better form of gov-
ernment — is to solve a very broad problem. If the problem was 
narrowly specialized, this strategy may need little emphasis, for 
solutions of narrow problems are likely to present fewer oppor-
tunities for fruitless digression. Researchers of narrow problems 
usually need to look for details within a specialized field, where-
as those who tackle broad problems may need to look for large-
scale patterns or general effects across several fields. Specializa-
tion might be expected to cultivate not only skills in focusing on 
detail, but also a preoccupation with this, so that the capacity 
to take an interest in large problems and to regularly back off 
from the details to assess their relevance to a big picture may be 
neither valued nor developed. This may explain the observation 
of political theorist David Held (1991, 4) that, while
specialization need not always lead to the fragmentation of knowl-
edge, this seems to have happened in the case of politics and related 
disciplines … we seem to know more about the parts and less about 
the whole; and we risk knowing very little even about the parts 
because their context and conditions of existence in the whole are 
eclipsed from view.
Fung (2007, 443) subsequently emphasized this problem, ob-
serving that specialization ‘has become a segregation of thought 
that now poses a fundamental obstacle to progress in democrat-
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ic theory’. Specialization has produced many theoretical models 
of democracy, but as Graham Smith (2009, 10) observes:
No practical design [for a democratic institution] can realistically 
hope to meet all the rigorous demands of any particular theoretical 
model … While theoretical work often proceeds as if it were an ex-
haustive account of democratic politics, theories offer only a partial 
analysis of our democratic condition … we tend not to develop ful-
ly-fledged theories of democracy (whatever they would look like) … 
An article on page C1 of The New York Times on October 20, 
2009 reported several leading political scientists as recognizing 
that their discipline was finding it increasingly difficult to ap-
pear relevant to broader social and political discourse. One of 
these scholars was Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service 
Professor at Harvard, who warned that the motivation to be pre-
cise had overtaken the impulse to be relevant: ‘the danger is that 
political science is moving in the direction of saying more and 
more about less and less’ (quoted in Holmberg and Rothstein 
2012, 1). In 2010, this problem was addressed by panels in the 
annual meetings of both the British and American political sci-
ence associations. Doubt about the relevance of much political 
theory parallels Goodin’s concern at the absence of a fundamen-
tal theory of institutional design — that is, the lack of specifica-
tion of a method of design. The irrelevance of much political 
theory provoked Mark Warren (2002b, 683) to comment that, 
near the turn of the century, innovations in democratic partici-
pation were demonstrating ‘that reality is, once again, ahead of 
democratic theory’.
In executing the third strategy of only using information that 
is necessary and sufficient, the second strategy of carefully de-
fining the problem was used to indicate which information is 
necessary and sufficient. In combining the first strategy of using 
existing information with the third strategy, the presentation of 
details in data from experiment and observation was minimized 
so that patterns are not missed because of a narrow focus. Pat-
tern recognition, in the form of generalizations and conclusions 
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by experts who know the technical details, was used as much as 
possible.
The fourth strategy: Pushing and pulling
Two scholars of public management and policy, Erik-Hans Klijn 
and Joop Koppenjan (2006, 158) have observed that institutions 
for public administration must be designed by careful experi-
mentation.
Institutional design is not a simple activity. The nature of institu-
tional design, its process and its impact are not very well under-
stood. Institutional design is a process of pushing and pulling with 
uncertain results … research into institutional design is still in its 
infancy.
Klijn and Koppenjan (2006, 155–56) explain that ‘pushing and 
pulling’ is partly needed to accommodate the power relations 
between the parties affected by the institution, and this is be-
cause how the ‘formal decisions in institutional arenas aimed 
at changing network rules will work out in the games played 
within networks is highly uncertain.’ This means that institu-
tional ‘designs are by definition imperfect and should be seen 
rather as the start of a trajectory of institutional change than 
as a definitive design’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006, 156). ‘Push-
ing’ is taken here to be the design phase and ‘pulling’ to be the 
testing of a design, so that design-and-test must be followed by 
more design-and-test until a design is produced that performs 
well. The repetition of this design-and-test cycle is minimized 
by making the attempts at design as effective as possible. To this 
end, the second strategy is crucial — the problem must be care-
fully defined.
The fifth strategy: Thought experiment




can’t do serious economics unless you are willing to be playful. 
Economics … is a menagerie of thought experiments — parables, if 
you like — that are intended to capture the logic of economic pro-
cesses in a simplified way. In the end, of course, ideas must be tested 
against the facts. But even to know what facts are relevant, you must 
play with those ideas in hypothetical settings.
My fifth strategy was to follow such advice and use thought 
experiments. This ‘play’ may be described as applied imagina-
tion or attempts to mentally simulate reality, and it may not 
only save much time and expense, but encourage endeavours 
that otherwise would never be undertaken. Some of its use in 
this study was for the ‘pulling’ or testing required by the fourth 
strategy, because testing by experimental trials in the real world 
of politics is not possible at this early stage of the design pro-
cess. As discussed in §6.4 and §7.2.12, such operational trials re-
quire considerable political commitment and/or funding. Part 
1 mainly defines the problem that is being tackled as ambigu-
ous delegation, which leaves public opinion largely in control of 
public policy but too disengaged to do a good job with its tacti-
cal and strategic components. That description of government 
failure shapes both the mission of the design and the two strate-
gies it employs to accomplish its mission, which thereby implies 
a broad outline for the design. In §9.3 it is indicated that this 
design cannot execute its strategies for a small group, because it 
uses motivations to execute those strategies that can only arise 
in very large groups. However, the analysis and synthesis of 
Parts 1 and 2 are the first steps towards a large-scale trial, be-
cause they describe why an institution is needed and the type 
that appears to have the best chance of being able to perform 
the required functions. Thought experiment or imagination is 
crucial for getting to this stage, because if it can, to some extent, 
simulate the ability of a design to solve a problem, or identify 
weaknesses in a design that point to a ‘better’ one, then it should 
expedite the negotiation of Klijn’s and Koppenjan’s ‘trajectory of 
institutional change’. This is because much of the ‘pushing and 
pulling’ is done conceptually before it is necessary to do any of 
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the expensive, time-consuming and risky, real-world ‘pulling’. 
It should be emphasized here that a ‘better’ design is one that 
is not only likely to work better than others, but is also more 
feasible to implement.
‘Pushing and pulling’ as science
The push (design) and pull (test) of designing institutions is es-
sentially theorizing to try to explain data followed by more data 
collection to test the theory, then re-theorizing and re-testing, 
and so on. The cycle begins when existing data indicates a prob-
lem that is serious enough to try to solve. To start doing that, the 
problem is defined. As this is a type of explanation and theories 
are explanations, the definition of a problem may be virtually 
a theory of its cause. If the definition, together with the theory 
it implies, indicates a design solution that is judged impossible 
to implement, this judgment constitutes additional data that in-
structs us to try to redefine / re-theorize the problem in a more 
helpful way. Redefinition may require more data to be gathered. 
If the new definition / theory implies a design solution that 
could possibly be implemented, then testing it becomes the next 
step, which is another act of data collection. Such a test might 
be any or all of three types: first, a thought experiment, which 
may be inconclusive as it has limited capacity to produce new 
data that are reliable; second, an inspection of the performance 
and operating environment of existing institutions that resem-
ble this solution and its anticipated environment; and third, es-
tablishing the institution that appears to be the solution in the 
environment it is designed for and running it to see if it works. 
Such tests may indicate that the design is flawed and, if so, that 
data may be used to guide another redefinition of the problem.
Klijn and Koppenjan’s ‘pushing and pulling’ may thus be 
seen as a cycle of gathering data (pulling), then defining / theo-
rizing / solution design (pushing), then gathering more data by 
testing the design (pulling) and then re-defining / re-theoriz-
ing / re-designing (pushing) and so on until a design is found 
that works well enough. This observing–theorizing–observ-
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ing–theorizing iteration is, of course, the scientific method, the 
process of ‘scientific inquiry’ (Pigliucci 2010, 303–4). Accord-
ing to theoretical physicist Lee Smolin (2006), neglect of this 
method over the last thirty years is causing particle physics to 
stagnate. He suggests that the neglect arises because most physi-
cists are preoccupied with string theory, which minimizes the 
formulation of different theories and thus the competition be-
tween them. This blocks the observation–theorizing–observa-
tion–theorizing iteration in two ways. One is that the paucity of 
competition between theories limits the variety of observational 
tests that might provide information leading to better theories 
(2006, 304–5). The other way is that string theory itself is not a 
real theory as it is not falsifiable — and also is not ‘confirmable’ 
(it is not possible to confirm a prediction that only that theory 
makes) (Smolin 2006, xiii–xv). String ‘theory’ is therefore dis-
paraged by some of its sceptics as ‘not even wrong’ — it does not 
make predictions that could falsify it.
The need for both pushing and pulling was stressed by the 
eminent astrophysicist of the early twentieth century Sir Arthur 
Eddington (n.d.) when he pointed out that observation is not 
enough for effective science: ‘It is also a good rule not to put 
overmuch confidence in the observational results put forward 
until they are confirmed by theory.’ So pushing and pulling is the 
scientific method, in which the meaning of observation is for-
mulated with theory (pushing) and this is then tested with more 
observation (pulling). As such, it was the basis of my method 
of designing an institution. Pushing and pulling organized the 
implementation of the other four strategies. However, as this is 
being written the pulling (testing by observation) remains to be 
completed with the third mode noted above, that of operational 
scale trials in the real world of politics.
The very real difficulty of pulling or testing theories/designs 
in political science means that ever finer details are often inves-
tigated instead, producing theory without it being tested in the 
real world to see not only whether it works, but whether it does 
so for problems that are serious enough to warrant explanation 
and solution. This appears to be the unproductive specialization 
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that raises a ‘fundamental obstacle to progress in democratic 
theory’ (Fung 2007, 443), as discussed above in the description 
of my third strategy of institutional design. To some degree, 
Bond (2007, 905) has also noticed this: ‘it is possible that po-
litical science has accumulated enough information about how 
and why politics work as they do’. Particle physics appears to 
have run into the same problem: theory has specialized to the 
stage where its experimental testing tends to be impossible or 
extremely expensive, for example, the 2010 budget for the Large 
Hadron Collider was US$9 billion. Lack of testing may obscure 
the insignificance of a theory by allowing it to be developed in 
order to employ a problem-solving method favoured by the 
theorist. If that theory is tested, it may show that the favoured 
method of theorizing is inadequate, forcing a search for other 
methods that are more suited to the task. Political scientists 
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994; Shapiro 2005) contend 
that rational choice theorists have made this mistake. Strong 
preferences for particular methods, such as mathematical analy-
sis or the use of assumptions from neoclassical economics, may 
draw the scholar’s attention to problems that appear amenable 
to these methods. However, this may mean that problems are 
studied that are of little significance, or that alternative expla-
nations of significant problems are ignored. Such bias may be 
revealed by testing a proposed solution, for if the test shows it to 
be either a failure or an inconsequential success, then the prob-
lem may be re-evaluated, so that it is more constructively de-
fined or replaced with a problem that is more significant. Green 
and Shapiro’s stipulation that research must be problem-driven 
and Shapiro’s subsequent stipulation that it should also be ‘the-
ory-driven’ (Shapiro 2005; Topper 2007, 574) is followed by my 
second strategy of carefully defining the problem. The fourth 
strategy of ‘pushing and pulling’ assists that strategy by check-
ing and rechecking that the problem is well-defined. In turn, the 
second strategy assists the third strategy because constructive 
definition of the problem points to the information that is nec-
essary and sufficient to solve it.
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The completion of pushing and pulling
To make the ‘pushing’ or designing phase as effective as possible, 
it might seem that collective action theory would be crucial, as it 
should help define the problem and thereby indicate the type of 
institutional design that would solve it. However, as Nobel Lau-
reate in economics Elinor Ostrom (2007, 203) has pointed out, 
experimentation is necessary because collective action theory is 
in need of considerable further development.
[A] key lesson of research on collective action theory is recognizing 
the complex linkages among variables at multiple levels that togeth-
er affect individual reputations, trust, and reciprocity as these, in 
turn, affect levels of cooperation and joint benefits. Conducting em-
pirical research is thus extremely challenging … The reason that ex-
perimental research has become such an important method for test-
ing theory is that it is a method for controlling the setting of many 
variables while changing only one or two variables at a time … In-
stead of looking at all of the potential variables, one needs to focus 
in on a well-defined but narrow chain of relationships … One can 
then conduct analysis of a limited set of variables that are posited to 
have a strong causal relationship … the theory of collective action is 
not only one of the most important subjects for political scientists, 
it is also one of the most challenging.
Ostrom’s view emphasizes the need for the fourth strategy: we 
must experiment, designing and testing (pushing and pulling) 
until we get it right. But as discussed in §9.3, careful definition 
of the problem in Part 1 of this book has produced a design for 
reforming democratic government that is unlikely to work with 
politically uninfluential experimental groups such as random 
samples or small communities. So until the resources can be 
mustered to test it on whole polities, this must be attempted by 
thought experiment (or possibly by computer simulation). At 
the stage of the project achieved here, purely conceptual push-
ing and pulling that relied on thought experiment has yielded a 
design that appears promising enough to warrant the cost of a 
trial (or ‘pull’) in the real world, at the scale of a province or a 
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nation. Such an experiment offers the possibility of completing 
the application of the fourth strategy of pushing and pulling, 
but in order to do this the necessary financial resources must 
be raised.
Applying the five strategies
I applied the five strategies by commencing with the first. Exist-
ing information suggested that democratic government tends to 
malfunction. In the late 1980s this seemed personally apparent 
to me from involvement in two types of work. One was my oc-
cupation as a public servant. For twenty-five years I was a gov-
ernment forester engaged in planning and managing commer-
cial and non-commercial uses of natural resources. My other 
area of work was a private pursuit of environmental concerns, 
which included helping NGOs with conservation campaigns. 
As serious democratic dysfunction became more obvious from 
these two perspectives, I used the second strategy of defining 
and redefining the problem. In doing this I applied the first 
strategy of using existing information that might further illu-
minate the problem, together with the third strategy of trying to 
make sure that the information I looked for was necessary and 
sufficient for this purpose. This took many years as a part-time 
pursuit and in retrospect I expect that I would also have started 
to employ my fourth strategy, by testing (pulling) the definition 
and the type of solution that it implied (the push) with the fifth 
strategy of thought experiment. That is, I would have tried to 
imagine whether my current idea of the solution appeared both 
feasible to implement and likely to work. It was in this mode 
that Bob Brown and I (as noted in Acknowledgments) discussed 
the need for something like Citizen Initiated Referendums. If 
mental simulation had indicated that my current idea of a solu-
tion was either extremely difficult to implement or unlikely to 
work, then I would have made another attempt (following the 
fourth strategy of repeated design-and-test) at a definition (the 
second strategy) that would imply a more effective design. The 
evidence hinting that I had worked in this way was that I simul-
453
afterword
taneously produced a definition of the problem and a design for 
the solution. But this was not apparent for many years, for it was 
only the design that seemed to have been devised. This was writ-
ten down (now elaborated as Part 2) about fifteen years before 
the problem was fully defined on paper (see Part 1). However, as 
that definition was written out, the ease of doing it showed that, 
whether it was right or wrong, it was well-formed in my mind. 
Thus the fourth strategy of repetitive ‘pushing and pulling’ had 
coordinated the use of the other four strategies to produce both 
a definition of the problem and a design for its solution. The def-
inition included a classification of those characteristics of policy 
issues that appeared to be part of the problem, as set out in §4.1. 
As it is merely thought experiment that indicates this design 
may be effective, the next step must be a real-world experiment. 
As indicated in §9.3, this ‘pulling’ requires the design to be op-
erated in a polity such as a province or a nation for the period 
that it was expected to need in order to begin producing results.
My explanation that I had used these five strategies is, of 
course, not thoroughly supported by evidence, and it assumes 
that unconscious thinking played a large part — for example, in 
defining and redefining the problem; in inferring a particular 
design from a particular definition; and in judging what in-
formation is necessary and sufficient for ‘pushing and pulling’. 
However, the idea that unconscious thought is efficacious when 
driven by strong desires to solve problems is well established. 
A century ago, the French polymath Henri Poincaré included 
it as a part of his four-stage description of how he solved tough 
problems. Those stages are: conscious thought, unconscious 
thought (incubation), illumination and then verification. His-
torian of science Arthur Miller (2010) considers that this model 
of creativity is the best we have. He notes that psychologist Ed-
ouard Toulouse, who was an expert on creativity, was satisfied 
with that view after personally psychoanalysing Poincaré. Other 
scientists such as Einstein, Helmholtz and Heisenberg have de-
scribed their problem-solving in the same way. Einstein empha-
sized the importance of both creative imagination and relent-
less persistence, and this has been endorsed by Howard Eves, an 
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eminent historian of mathematics, who observed that an ‘expert 
problem solver must be endowed with two incompatible quali-
ties — a restless imagination and a patient pertinacity’ (quoted 
in Singh 1997, 225).
The method as a theory of institutional design
We have seen that ‘research into institutional design is still in 
its infancy’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006, 158); that there is a 
‘paucity of literature specifically on design issues’(Goodin 1996, 
31); and that the theory of collective action, which should guide 
the design of political institutions, ‘is not only one of the most 
important subjects for political scientists, it is also one of the 
most challenging’ (Ostrom 2007, 203). Graham Smith’s (2009) 
Democratic Innovations is a recent contribution to the Cam-
bridge University Press series ‘Theories of Institutional Design,’ 
and although it does not produce a theory of how to design po-
litical institutions, it moves a little in this direction by offering 
a framework for assessing their capabilities. Such a framework 
is useful, perhaps essential, for the testing (pulling) phase of 
the cycle of define / theorize / design — test, re-define / re-theo-
rize / re-design — retest, and so on. This may be so whether the 
testing is a real-world trial of an institution or just the thought 
experiment of subjectively assessing the capabilities of a design, 
as is done here for four designs in Chapter 6 with a framework 
adapted from Graham Smith’s.
One of several desirable capabilities of institutional designs 
that are recommended by Goodin (1996, 40) is that we should 
‘design our institutions in such a way as to be flexible … to ad-
mit of ‘learning by doing’ and to evolve over time. Thus, we 
might say revisability is one important principle of institutional 
design’. This may be a very useful criterion for preferring one 
design over another, but my fourth strategy of defining / theo-
rizing / designing, then testing followed by re-defining and so 
on may be seen as more fundamental because it could point to-
wards several designs that may then be ranked for suitability 
according to attributes such as their revisability. Another way of 
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understanding the fundamental nature of the fourth strategy is 
that it invites the replacement of a design that performs poorly 
with another that is produced by redefining the problem it is 
intended to correct. This may mean that the new design is so 
different that it could not have been produced by revising the 
design it replaces. Goodin’s ‘revisability’ conflates the desired 
capability of designs with the method of producing them where-
as my fourth strategy (along with the other four) focuses only 
on method.
My method for designing institutions may also help solve 
the problem observed by David Held, Archon Fung, Graham 
Smith and others, that specialization may obstruct theoretical 
progress in some social sciences. The iterative process of the 
method may solve it by each cycle checking the usefulness of 
narrow focus. This is likely because the method is to produce 
a definition / theory / solution that is then tested in some sense 
so that deficiencies may be discovered, which may then elicit a 
new definition / theory / solution that is also tested and so on un-
til sufficient progress is achieved. Theorizing is thus continually 
checked for significance, relevance and effectiveness. The cycle 
starts with the recognition of a problem (indicated by existing 
information, which is my first strategy) and proceeds to a care-
ful definition of the problem (my second strategy), which should 
clarify whether the problem is significant and also indicate a 
theory of cause that may point to a solution — in other words, a 
theory that appears relevant and effective. Definition also helps 
to show what information is necessary and sufficient to solve the 
problem (so definition assists the implementation of my third 
strategy). This phase of defining / theorizing / solution design is 
followed with a testing phase that will initially be restricted to 
thought experiment (my fifth strategy). The two phases are re-
peated (which is my fourth strategy) until testing indicates that 
an adequate solution has been devised. Each repetition should 
improve the relevance and effectiveness of the definition of the 
problem, the theory of its cause, the design of the solution and 
the information gathered to help produce these improvements.
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Thought experiment may seem to be too subject to the im-
aginative idiosyncrasies of the researcher to be useful in this 
procedure, but it should provoke her to look outside her spe-
cialization to see whether her definition, theory, design-solution 
and information gathering appears relevant and effective in the 
‘context and conditions of existence in the whole’ (Held 1991, 
4). And, of course, thought experiment may be made more 
reliable by comparing the thoughts of several people who are 
well-informed on the problem. This may apply more knowledge 
and subject different idiosyncrasies to critical review. However, 
as emphasized in the previous section, this method, or theory 
of institutional design, finally requires the design to be tested 




population growth anD the 
SCarCity multiplier in taSmania
The description of the scarcity multiplier in Chapter 5 argues 
that — without other influences — an abundance (per capita) 
of useful natural capital in a region makes its population grow 
more rapidly than populations of other regions that are less well 
endowed, which then accelerates the decline of that abundance 
in that region. It was further suggested that in modern econo-
mies, the influence of natural capital on the growth of the popu-
lation operates largely by affecting migration. This migration 
response is illustrated below with the history of the growth of 
the Tasmanian population since colonial times. The reaction of 
the state’s democratic government to that growth has been, and 
continues to be, strongly influenced by a private goods bias. The 
result is a persistent scarcity multiplier. If this is to be halted, 
then Tasmania’s political system must be altered to give it the 
capacity to recognize and eliminate its private goods bias.
The British started to colonize Tasmania in 1803 and, as we 
shall see, within a few decades the limitations of its stocks of 
natural capital started to restrict the speed at which the ‘More 
development’ of Figure 5.1 (in §5.3.1) could proceed. The opera-
tion of the scarcity multiplier in Tasmania has therefore been 
somewhat restricted for most of its two centuries of industrial 
development. One limitation of Tasmania’s natural capital that 
causes this restriction is that, compared with the nearby Austral-
ian mainland, Tasmania has a small area of land and therefore 
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relatively limited prospects for agriculture, mining, forestry and 
the other industries that depend on that area. This limitation is 
exacerbated by another natural feature that is not a ‘stock’ in the 
conventional sense and therefore perhaps not strictly ‘natural 
capital’ (as defined in §2.2.3.2, Distraction by advertising). This 
natural feature is Tasmania’s geographic inaccessibility. More 
than two hundred kilometres of sea (Bass Strait) separate the 
main Tasmanian island from the rest of Australia, which means 
that it cannot have land-based road and rail connections that 
would help the main Australian market trade with Tasmania 
and also to trade with foreign countries via Tasmanian ports. 
As the Australian economy developed, this lack of geographic 
accessibility became an overarching limitation that further re-
stricted the economic value of Tasmania’s relatively limited 
natural capital. These two types of limits to natural capital have 
resulted in Tasmania’s population growing to less than a tenth, 
the size of that of neighbouring Victoria, which by mid-2010 
had more than 5.5 million residents, whereas Tasmania had only 
half a million. This difference is not due to earlier colonization 
in Victoria, as both states had their first European settlement 
at the same time, in 1803. However, in the early 1850s a very 
large difference was created by the Victorian gold rush, which 
brought hundreds of thousands of people to that state. As this is 
written, the evidence that Tasmania’s geographic isolation con-
tinues to be an economic penalty is that although Victoria has 
3.3 times Tasmania’s land area, its rate of growth in population is 
presently about 30 times that of Tasmania. Expressing this dis-
parity in terms of percentage rates for the year ended 30/9/2011, 
Tasmania’s population grew by 0.5%, Victoria’s by 1.5% and Aus-
tralia’s by 1.4%.
Tasmania’s lack of geographic accessibility thus appears to 
have been a major driving force of its historical trend in migra-
tion, in which migration out of the state tends to exceed migra-
tion into it. Because of this, Tasmania’s population has basically 
grown only through its natural increase (the ratio of births to 
deaths), whereas Australia as a whole has had strong net im-
migration in addition to natural increase. Figure A1 shows these 
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Fig. A1. An historical overview of Tasmania’s natural increase and net migration 
(http://www.taspop.tasbis.com/webapps/i/588/1396/195797).




Fig. A3. Tasmania’s journey to 500,000 (http://www.taspop.tasbis.com/
webapps/i/588/1396/195796)
components in Tasmania’s population change since 1901 with 
out-migration (below the horizontal line) generally exceeding 
immigration (above that line). Other data for Tasmania from 
the same source extends from 1901 back to 1860, showing a 
similar preponderance of out-migration over immigration for 
that period. Figure A2 shows that, at least since 1971, Tasma-
nia’s out-migration has been to the mainland states, with no net 
out-migration to foreign countries. Figure A3 shows the result: 
a slow increase in the state’s population.
Two centuries of this modest growth means that Tasmani-
ans now retain more natural capital per person than they would 
have if their population had grown more quickly. This is because 
a larger population would have two major effects: It would di-
vide the total quantity of natural capital into a lower per capita 
quantity; and it would consume and destroy more natural capi-
tal, thereby diminishing its total quantity, leaving even less per 
capita. In addition to Tasmania’s slow growth of population re-
sulting in a per capita abundance of natural capital in the state 
that is higher than it would have been with faster growth of 
population, its slow growth may also mean that Tasmania’s per 
capita abundance of natural capital is now greater in some im-
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portant respects than that of mainland Australia. Although the 
land area of the mainland is 112 times that of Tasmania, most of 
it is inhospitably dry or hot, or both, so its much higher rate of 
growth of population may have, over more than two centuries, 
now reduced its per capita abundance of much of the natural 
capital that is useful to people to levels below those that remain 
in Tasmania. An obvious exception is the geological natural 
capital of the mainland that recently produced a mining boom 
in iron ore and natural gas in Western Australia, in uranium, 
copper and gold in South Australia and coal and coal seam gas 
in Queensland. This natural capital is, of course, nonrenewable, 
and the boom now appears to be producing a bust before it is 
exhausted due to market contraction in China (Cleary 2011). 
Arguably, that boom has produced a nation-wide scarcity mul-
tiplier that will exacerbate the bust by boosting the numbers of 
Australians that the country must support after this part of its 
natural capital is exhausted. A further cost of this boom is the 
large contribution to global warming by the fossil fuels it pro-
duces.
Research is needed to see whether Tasmania really does have 
a higher per capita abundance of useful natural capital than 
mainland Australia and, if this is so, to get a good understand-
ing of specifically what it is that is more abundant on a per capita 
basis. Such investigation would compare mainland and Tasma-
nian availabilities or prices of land, flows of fresh water, natural 
recreational assets and other sustainable inputs from natural 
capital to quality of life. Preliminary research into the per capita 
availability of natural capital for Australia as a whole has been 
done by economist Doug Cocks (1996, 90–103). A few others, 
such as economist Hans-Jürgen Engelbrecht (2009), have in-
vestigated the effect on subjective well-being of the per capita 
abundance of natural capital in a number of developed and de-
veloping countries.
Even without the knowledge that such research might pro-
duce, it seems obvious to many Tasmanians and visitors to the 
state that it does have a per capita abundance of some useful 
types of natural capital that is greater than in the rest of the na-
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tion. Tasmania’s geographic inaccessibility has developed this 
favourable situation by helping to keep its per capita income 
lower and rate of unemployment higher than in the rest of the 
nation. Those conditions make Tasmania’s population grow 
much more slowly than that of the mainland and therefore its 
per capita abundance of natural capital diminishes more slowly. 
Rates of unemployment for Australia and Tasmania are shown 
in Figure A4 from late 1978 to late 2008. At the end of this period 
national unemployment is shown here as starting to exceed that 
of Tasmania, but later data show that, true to form, this rever-
sal only lasted for eighteen months, and by late 2012 Australia’s 
rate of unemployment was around 5% while Tasmania’s was over 
7%. This indicates that residing in Tasmania is often a lifestyle 
choice, one that is made to enjoy an abundance of natural capi-
tal, rather than the industrial, medical and cultural advantages 
afforded by high concentrations of population. Tasmanians may 
continue to enjoy that abundance only as long as their num-
bers do not grow significantly. That would erode the abundance 
by physically destroying more natural capital to produce more 
income to support the larger population and by intensifying 
crowding effects in the use of the natural capital that remains.
This picture of residency in Tasmania, as a lifestyle choice 
and/or a lack of ability to relocate interstate, appears to be sup-
Fig. A4. Unemployment rates in Tasmania and Australia. Source: Labour Force, 
Australia, Spreadsheets, October 2008 (Cat. No. 6202.0.55.001), cited in ABS 
1307.6 — Tasmanian State and Regional Indicators, Dec 2008.
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ported by economist Saul Eslake (2012, 15–16) as he observes 
that
in the 2010–11 financial year, Tasmania’s per capita gross state in-
come was more than 23% below the mainland average — the widest 
margin in the 20 years for which figures are available. In 2006–07 
(the year before the [global] financial crisis began) the gap was 
‘only’ 17.5%, having narrowed by more than 3.5 percentage points 
since the beginning of the decade … 
Tasmanian households are to a significant extent shielded from 
the consequence of the state’s poor economic performance by 
the operation of the national fiscal system. They pay 21% less per 
head in income tax to the national government than mainland 
Australia. And they receive 27% more per head by way of so-
cial security benefits than those living on the other side of Bass 
Strait. As a result, Tasmanian household disposable income is 
less than 7% below the corresponding figure for mainland Aus-
tralia — less than one-third of the difference in per capita gross 
state income between Tasmania and the rest of Australia.
But this 7% difference in per capita income is significant, and 
it adds to the incentive for emigration from Tasmania that is 
produced by its usual relative scarcity of employment opportu-
nities. So we can conclude that if the national government did 
not compensate Tasmanians for their economic handicaps, the 
incentive for emigration would be much larger and this would 
slow the state’s scarcity multiplier. With its fiscal assistance, the 
federal government is boosting this multiplier.
The population feedback of the multiplier analysis of Figure 
5.1 (§5.3.1) indicates that further increases in per capita income 
might be achieved in Tasmania while minimizing erosion of the 
availability of natural capital if economic development is cou-
pled with measures that prevent it from encouraging the popu-
lation to grow, such as restrictions on migration into Tasmania. 
This is not permitted by the Australian Constitution, but, as we 
have seen, such restriction has been partially effected during 
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Tasmania’s two centuries of development by its relatively inac-
cessible location making it less affluent than the rest of Australia.
Apparently most (perhaps all) Tasmanians do not recognize 
that restriction of their economic growth has preserved relative-
ly high per capita availabilities of natural capital, for they gen-
erally do not see their state’s lack of accessibility as a benefit. 
Instead, they focus on their isolation as limiting their incomes 
and their opportunities for employment, and strongly support 
any measure that would make Tasmania more accessible. Three 
that have been implemented are the Tasmanian Freight Equali-
zation Scheme, the Bass Strait Passenger Vehicle Equalization 
Scheme and Basslink. The first two of these subsidize transport 
costs to and from Tasmania (at the expense of mainland Aus-
tralians) to make them more comparable to transport costs be-
tween the mainland states. In 2014 these subsidies were worth 
approximately $95 million and $38 million respectively to Tas-
mania (Clark 2014). Basslink is a high-voltage direct current ca-
ble across Bass Strait that shunts extra peak load capacity to the 
mainland from the flexible supply of Tasmania’s hydro-electric 
system and takes — into Tasmania — some of the excess base 
load capacity of mainland coal-fired generators. This creates 
economic savings and arguably reduces pollution, as it lessens 
Tasmania’s need to invest in base load generation, supplies Tas-
mania with power in times of drought and enables it to sell peak 
load power that makes mainland coal-fired power generation 
more efficient. Another measure that might be implemented to 
increase Tasmania’s accessibility is a faster, larger and cheaper 
vehicular ferry system for Bass Strait. A cross-Strait highway of 
bridges, tunnels and links via several Bass Strait islands is the ul-
timate dream of this type, but would be quite uneconomic with 
current technology and the limited market. For comparison, the 
50 kilometre English Channel tunnel is half the length of any 
Bass Strait tunnel system and serves a far larger market.
As the scarcity multiplier indicates, economic assistance 
such as increasing Tasmania’s accessibility and payoffs from the 
national fiscal system encourage its population to grow, thereby 
reducing its per capita abundance of natural capital while fuel-
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ling its desire for yet more development, which then leads to 
further reduction of that abundance and repetition of the pro-
cess. Such erosion of abundance does not arouse concern in 
most politicians and the business lobby. They do not want to 
recognize it because it argues against the lobby’s mission of in-
creasing their profits by expanding the supply of labour and en-
larging the domestic market, both of which depend on expand-
ing the population. Moreover, business people are in nirvana 
when the population is enlarged because that helps the scarcity 
multiplier to drive more development, which then drives more 
of it. Citizens are unconcerned by the resultant multiplication of 
scarcity as their thinking is usually too short-term to see it. Most 
of this multiplication is further off in the future than the direct 
effects of currently proposed developments, which are usually 
more employment, more income and the immediate environ-
mental impacts. While such ‘stage one’ thinking (as discussed in 
§5.4) gives many citizens some awareness of the initial benefits 
and costs of currently proposed developments, their usual fail-
ure to think ‘beyond stage one’ prevents them from seeing the 
consequences of those initial benefits, of which a major one is 
the exacerbation of their own wants as described by the popula-
tion and affluenza feedbacks of the scarcity multiplier. This con-
sequence tends to be too far off in the future to be of personal 
concern and to exercise one’s social conscience.
Although the scarcity multiplier limps along in Tasmania, 
hobbled by geographic isolation, it still depletes natural capital 
to an extent that alarms many residents and others who know 
the state. So Tasmanian society has been racked by fierce en-
vironmental disputes for half a century, and these continue 
to erupt. But the relatively slow progression of the multiplier 
means that the state still retains much of its natural capital 
in a relatively intact condition. One facet of this is that 45% 
of Tasmania has its natural condition protected to some de-
gree — from nominally highly protected World Heritage Area 
and National Parks to less well-protected reserves on both pub-
lic and private land. The qualifier of ‘nominally’ is used here be-
cause the scarcity multiplier is actually chewing away at these 
‘protected’ areas in the guise of tourism developments that dam-
age the wild character (the combination of naturalness and re-
moteness) that these reserves were intended to protect, at least 
in the minds of those who campaigned for their protection (see 
for example, www.keepthecapeswild.org.au). Another manifes-
tation of the per capita abundance of natural capital in Tasmania 
is its very strong ‘shack culture’ (Newton 2003; Vowles 2012), 
in which — until a few decades ago — many Tasmanians built 
shacks on public land by beaches, lakes, rivers and mountains 
with no formal permission from (or payment to) government. 
These buildings were often constructed by amateurs to rough 
standards with second-hand materials. Their freedom to do that 
has now been curbed by laws requiring that all shack owners 
and prospective shack builders must obtain government per-
mission to use public land and pay for lease or freehold and for 
any associated services such as roads and waste disposal. This 
recent transition largely reflects a rising scarcity of land and 
other types of natural capital, brought on by growth in both the 
size of the population and the spending power of each person.
Tasmania’s ratio of natural capital to population appears high 
by comparison with most other advanced economies, and this 
seems to make any further reduction of the ratio acutely dis-
tressing to many who are familiar with it. Tasmanians still have 
much to lose, so environmental protests are frequent. However, 
despite a widespread appreciation of this potential for loss, most 
residents and their political representatives (left-wing, right-
wing and green) regard Tasmania as retarded unless it can be 
freed from impediments to economic growth, such as its relative 
inaccessibility. But, as we have seen, any boost to its economy 
energizes its scarcity multiplier, escalating both the wants of 
Tasmanians and the depletion of their natural capital. Obvi-
ously, that combination is a vicious one, but Tasmanians do not 
appear to see it. Either one or both parts are invisible to them. 
As noted in the scarcity multiplier analysis, this is because their 
short-sighted focus on immediate results prevents them from 
seeing the effects of those results, which are a little further off 
into the future. No doubt there are a few Tasmanians far-sighted 
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enough to see and be worried by these long-term implications, 
but they are thoroughly outnumbered and feel vulnerable to 
political ridicule. Unless Tasmanians can reform their political 
system with institutional changes that improve their collective 
capacity to look ahead, the scarcity multiplier will increasingly 
impoverish them, from one generation to the next.
For those Tasmanians who are concerned about the decline 
of their ratio of natural capital to population, a rough rule of 
thumb for assessing the activity of the scarcity multiplier is to 
look at the rate at which their population is growing. If this is 
trending positive (say decade by decade), then the scarcity mul-
tiplier is likely to be working and degrading their quality of life. 
This would suggest to concerned Tasmanians that their govern-
ment should halt the multiplier, which could be done in one or 
more of several ways, as implied above in this Appendix and 
discussed in §5.3.4, the end of §5.3.5 and early in §5.4. Four of 
these ways may be the major options. The first is that the Tas-
manian government restores the state’s economic isolation by 
closing freight equalization schemes and Basslink. The second 
is that it prohibits new development projects — especially large 
ones — even if they appear to be environmentally benign in 
their immediate impacts. The third option is for the Tasmanian 
government to ask the federal government to adopt a policy of 
zero population growth for the nation and to implement this 
primarily by restricting migration into Australia. The fourth op-
tion may be a last resort for Tasmania: To secede from the Com-
monwealth, so that the state acquires a direct power to control 
its intake of migrants. 
However, if Tasmanians are to engage effectively enough 
with public policy to be able to recognize the operation of a 
scarcity multiplier and then deliberate their collective response 
to it, they must have more assistance than that afforded by their 
current institutions, such as the mass media, social media, elec-
tions and parliament. The People’s Forum is designed to fill this 
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